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Knowing Victims: 
feminism, ressentiment and the 
category 'victim' 
Abstract 
Throughout the 1990s feminism was criticised for being centred on a 
representation of women as 'victims', a representation which purportedly is 
substantially untrue, inimical to female agency, and politically regressive. 
This criticism has gained increasingly broad purchase both outside and within 
feminist circles, and has become something of a mass media truism. The 
main task of this dissertation is to examine salient articulations of this 
criticism, firstly within the sphere of popular feminism, and secondly within 
the sphere of feminist political theory. The concern motivating the 
dissertation is that this criticism, while illuminating in some important 
respects, predominantly has operated as a vehicle through which attempts 
are made to curtail feminism's potential to foster radical social change. 
The first part of the dissertation addresses popular feminist critiques of 
'victim feminism'. The popular accounts are found to construe the 'victim 
problem in feminism' as a venue for reasserting traditional liberal feminist 
edicts and for cultivating a neoliberal feminism. With a view to elucidate the 
generic turns of 'victim talk' in liberal democratic settings, and with particular 
attention to the issue of sexual violence, my analysis reveals (inter alia) that 
the association these accounts set up between 'the victim problem' and 
radical feminist politics relies on an elision of the latter's guiding construction 
of 'victims' as agentic subjects. 
The second part of the dissertation exammes accounts by feminist 
political theorists in which the question of feminism's relationship with the 
category 'victim' is taken up under the aegis of Nietzsche's concept of 
ressentiment. These accounts argue that feminism has become a politics of 
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ressentiment-a resubordinative disposition which reifies women's victim-
status and encourages apolitical moralism-and ought to construe its 
political horizon as a move beyond ressentiment. However, my analysis 
reveals fundamentally conflicting judgements in these accounts regarding 
which feminist political strategy-liberal/neoliberal or radical-counts as 
ressentimental and, therefore, which could lead the move beyond ressentiment. 
With this problem in mind, but agreeing that Nietzsche's concept of 
ressentiment has explanatory power for interpreting feminism's relation with 
the category 'victim,' I set out to examine this concept in the third part of the 
dissertation. 
The dissertation's third and final part offers a critical re-reading of the 
concept of ressentiment, most notably as it is articulated in Nietzsche's On the 
Genealogy of Morals. Rather than uphold Nietzsche's condemnatory attitude 
toward ressentiment, I present a positive reading of ressentiment as the 
affective venue in which the relatively disempowered craft the agentic 
capacity to articulate, problematise and ameliorate their experience of, and 
vulnerability to, victimisation. On this reading, liberal feminist strategy 
appears as a containment of ressentiment, while radical feminist strategy 
appears to mine its energy for far-reaching socio-political change. On the 
basis of this reading I also articulate my view that feminism's relationship 
with ressentiment is twofold in character: feminism is both 'within' and 
'against' ressentiment. This view posits that feminism will move beyond 
ressentiment when it has successfully redressed the configurations of power 
which serve to incite ressentiment in the first instance. My reading of 
ressentiment also suggests that this concept can perform a greater variety of 
labours for feminist political theory than that of intra-feminist diagnosis. 
Most notably, I suggest that this concept can be used to interpret aspects of 
the relationship between men, masculinity and violence. 
The analyses presented in the dissertation draw on literatures within 
feminist theory, political theory, criminology and Nietzsche scholarship. 
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Introduction 
The new orthodoxy of feminism is abandoning the image of 
the independent, existentially responsible woman in favour 
of woman as helpless victim of male oppression-treat her 
as equal before the law, and you are compounding her 
victimisation. 
-Robert Hughes.I 
In this statement of critical observation, Robert Hughes provides a succinct 
articulation of an argument about feminism that was to gain increasingly 
broad purchase throughout the 1990s. Feminism, Hughes argues, has 
undergone a shift from representing women as responsible and capable 
agents, to representing women as absolutely unfree 'victims'. Providing a clue 
as to what has precipitated this shift, Hughes suggests that it stems from 
certain feminist reservations about the goal of seeking equality within 
current conditions-reservations which generally are associated with radical 
feminist perspectives. By the time Hughes traced this shift in his 1993 book 
The Culture of Complaint, his view was not entirely novel. Criticism of 
feminism's relationship with the category 'victim' was already underway both 
outside and within feminist circles. However the period after Hughes' book 
saw critical engagement with this relationship reach something of a fever-
pitch. 
A number of mainstream feminist writers generated highly publicised 
books addressed to feminism's "victim problem".2 Among them was Naomi 
Wolf, whose book Fire With Fire argues centrally that feminists have shifted 
from 'identifying victimisation' to 'identifying as victims'.3 In academic 
1 Robert Hughes, The Culture of Complaint: the fraying of America (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), 12. 
2 Naomi Wolf, Fire With Fire: the new female power and how it will change the 21st century 
(London: Chatto & Windus, 1993), 148. 
3 Ibid., 148. 
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feminist circles meanwhile, a number of political theorists took up the 
question of feminism's relationship with the category 'victim' under the aegis 
of Nietzsche's concept of ressentiment. Among them was Marion Tapper, who 
argued that, having become a regressive "politics of ressentiment," feminism 
has instituted a "need to see women as helpless victims".4 In an intriguing 
moment of simultaneity, popular feminist writers sought to move feminism 
beyond the 'victim problem,' while feminist political theorists beckoned an 
apparently similar move: the development of "a feminist politics without 
ressentiment". 5 
Questions for Research 
As well as generating what one commentator has referred to as "victim 
panic", the critical readings of feminism's relationship with the category 
'victim' produced during the 1990s served also to generate a great deal of 
questions, many of which have remained unaddressed as the image of 
feminism as a regressive ethos of victimhood has gone on to become firmly 
entrenched in the popular imagination.6 Is it the case that feminists have, by 
and large, regarded women as helpless victims? What kinds of meanings does 
the word 'victim' carry within feminist thought? Does it simply denote 'non-
agent'? Given that the 1980s and 1990s also witnessed a broad diversification 
within feminist theory and activism, is the 'victim problem' as pervasive 
within feminism as some of its critics claim? If the 'victim problem' has to do 
with certain feminist reservations about the goal of seeking equality within 
current conditions, would a political strategy which unreservedly embraced 
4 Tapper, 'Res sentiment and Power: some reflections on feminist practices,' in Nietzsche, 
Feminism and Political Theory, ed. Paul Patton (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1993), 135. 
5 Wendy Brown, States of Injury: power and freedom in late modernity (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1995), 47. 
6 Mark Davis, 'Crying in Public Places: neoconservatism and victim-panic,' in 
Bodyjamming: feminism, sexual harassment and public life, ed. Jemma Mead (Sydney: 
Vintage Books, 1997), 223-242. 
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this goal ameliorate this problem? What is the relationship between the 
category 'victim' and feminist political strategy? What is the relationship 
between the category 'victim' and the political disposition Nietzsche named 
'ressentiment'? Should feminists aim to overcome the form of victim-centred 
politics ressentiment is said to inspire? 
To address these questions, this dissertation sets out to critically examine 
a selection of popular and academic accounts which delineate the 'victim 
problem' and the 'ressentiment problem' respectively. These accounts raise a 
number of important issues for feminism, but they also warrant careful 
critical attention. My aim in examining these accounts is, firstly, to critically 
assess the ways in which they represent existing feminist relationships with 
the category 'victim' and, secondly, to discern and assess their intended 
ramifications for the future direction of feminist politics. As Hughes' 
comment hints, the question as to what kind of political agency feminism 
should assume within current configurations of power is posed centrally by 
critics of feminist victim-centred politics. In the accounts examined in this 
dissertation, questions of female agency and questions of feminism's political 
agency are intimately interwoven. For this reason, of the several questions 
noted above, two assume central importance for the purposes of this 
dissertation: What is the relationship between the category 'victim' and 
feminist political strategy? Should feminists aim to overcome the form of 
victim-centred politics ressentiment is said to inspire? 
These questions also assume centrality on account of the main concern 
motivating the dissertation. With some significant exceptions, critics for the 
most part have construed the 'victim problem' as a venue for reasserting 
liberal feminist edicts and for cultivating a neoliberal feminism. This move 
relies upon an equation of radical politics with victim-centred politics, and it 
aims to impose a particular set of limits upon the political agency feminism 
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might assume within current configurations of power. In short, the moral of 
the story for most of the critics is that, if a feminist conception of female 
agency is to be had, feminism's political agency needs to be reigned to a 
relatively conciliatory posture. The analysis presented in this dissertation 
questions rather than accepts the status of this moral as a positive step 
toward conceptualising female agency. 
Previous Research and Research Remit 
This dissertation offers an examination of how the question of feminism's 
relationship with ressentiment and the category 'victim' was taken up in 
critical discourses of the 1990s. As yet there is no single-authored treatment 
of this matter. However, there is a range of previously conducted research on 
some of the issues of key importance to the dissertation. Outlining this range 
of research will aid in locating the dissertation within the particular debates 
to which it is addressed, and indicating the dissertation's distinctive 
contribution to these debates. This range of previous research may be divided 
into two categories, both of which are domains of literature to which the 
dissertation seeks to contribute: feminist theory and Nietzsche scholarship. 
Within feminist theory, popular accounts of feminism's 'victim problem' 
have attracted a fairly sizeable secondary literature. 7 A number of scholars 
have been concerned to delineate and examine the politically conservative 
character of these popular accounts, and to critically rebuff the ways in 
which they represent existing feminist relationships with the category 
7 See, for example, Shane Rowlands and Margaret Henderson, 'Damned Bores and Slick 
Sisters: the selling of blockbuster feminism in Australia,' Australian Feminist Studies, 
Vol. 11, No. 23 (1996): 9-16; bell hooks, Outlaw Culture: resisting representations (New 
York: Routledge, 1994), Chapters 8 and 9, 91-99; 101-108; the essays collected in 
Jemma Mead, ed., Bodyjamming: feminism, sexual harassment and public life (Sydney: 
Vintage Books, 1997); and Pamela Haag, "'Putting Your Body on the Line": the question 
of violence, victims, and the legacies of second-wave feminism,' differences, Vol. 8, No. 2 
(1996): 23-67. 
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'victim'. I share ground with much of this existing literature, which in the 
course of the dissertation is treated as a rich fund of insight. 
However the dissertation also contributes new insights to this literature. 
Using the scope provided by the dissertation form, it offers a much closer 
examination of the main themes and claims of the popular accounts of 
feminism's 'victim problem' than is evident in the existing literature. It also 
uses this examination as occasion to explore the meaning of the term 'victim' 
within feminist thought (specifically in relation to sexual violence), while in 
the existing literature the significantly polysemic character of this term, and 
the complexity of feminism's relationship with it, remain largely unexplored. 
Another distinctive feature of the dissertation is that it considers the popular 
feminist accounts in combination with theoretical accounts of feminist 
ressentiment. Considering these in combination positions me to illuminate the 
role that Nietzsche and the concept of ressentiment plays in the popular 
accounts, specifically those of Naomi Wolf and Christina Hoff Sommers. 
Discerning this role underlines the relevance of the concept of ressentiment to 
the question of feminism's relationship with the category 'victim'. 
The existing literature on the popular accounts also aids in carving out the 
dissertation's particular remit. Although the dissertation has much to say 
about questions of sexual politics, one particular task the dissertation does 
not undertake is an examination of how the feminism of Catharine 
MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin, particularly their anti-pornography politics, 
is represented in the popular accounts of feminism's 'victim problem'. This 
task has been directly and very capably undertaken by Chris Atmore in her 
piece 'Victims, Backlash, and Radical Feminist Theory', and also forms a 
main feature of Kathryn Abrams' article 'Sex Wars Redux.'8 
8 Chris Atmore, 'Victims, Backlash and Radical Feminist Theory,' in New Versions of 
Victims: feminists struggle with the concept, ed. Sharon Lamb (New York: New York 
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While the popular feminist accounts of the 'victim problem' have 
attracted considerable critical attention within feminist theory, the academic 
feminist accounts of the 'ressentiment problem' have met a comparatively 
quieter reception. Of the four accounts of feminist ressentiment I examine in 
the dissertation-by Joan Cocks, Anna Yeatman, Marion Tapper and Wendy 
Brown-those of the latter two authors have garnered the most attention.9 
For the most part, Brown and Tapper's respective calls for feminism to move 
beyond the politics of ressentiment are affirmed.IO Their diagnostic use of 
Nietzsche's concept of ressentiment, and their association of ressentiment with 
particular forms of feminist politics, have not been subject to critical 
examination. Most importantly for the purposes of this dissertation, their 
University Press, 1999), 183-212; Kathryn Abrams, 'Sex Wars Redux: agency and 
coercion in feminist legal theory,' Columbia Law Review, Vol. 95, No. 305 (1995): 304-
376. For the complete dossier on MacKinnon and Dworkin's anti-pornography politics 
see Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin, eds., In Harm's Way: the pornography 
civil rights hearings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997). For a range of 
critical perspectives on MacKinnon and Dworkin's anti-pornography politics see: Gayle 
Rubin, 'Misguided, Dangerous and Wrong: an analysis of anti-pornography politics,' in 
Bad Girls and Dirty Pictures: the challenge to reclaim feminism, eds. Alison Assiter and 
Carol Avendon (London: Pluto Press, 1993), 18-44; Nadine Strossen, Defending 
Pornography: free speech, sex, and the fight for women's rights (New York: Scribner, 1995); 
Gillian Rodgerson and Elizabeth Wilson, eds., Pornography and Feminism: the case 
against censorship (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1991); Carole Vance, 'The Pleasures of 
Looking: the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography versus visual images,' in 
The Critical Image, ed. Carol Squiers (Seattle: Bay Press, 1990), 38-58 and, also by 
Vance, 'Feminist Fundamentalism: women against images,' in The Traffic in Culture, 
eds. George Marcus and Fred Myers (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 
359-368. 
9 The accounts of feminist ressentiment I examine are as follows: Joan Cocks, 'Nietzsche, 
Augustine, and Contemporary Body Politics,' differences Vol. 3, No. 1 (1991): 144-158; 
Anna Yeatman, 'Feminism and Power,' in Reconstructing Political Theory: feminist 
perspectives, eds. Mary Lyndon Shanley and Uma Narayan (London: Polity Press, 1997), 
144-157 and 'Voice and Representation in the Politics of Difference,' in Feminism and 
the Politics of Difference, eds. Sneja Gunew and Anna Yeatman (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 
1993), 228-245; Marion Tapper, 'Ressentiment and Power'; Wendy Brown, States of 
Injury, Chapters 2 and 3, 30-51; 52-76. 
IOsee, for example, Moira Gatens, Imaginary Bodies: ethics, power and corporeality 
(Routledge: London & New York, 1996), Chapter 6, 76-93; Elsbeth Probyn, 'Re: 
Generation: women's studies and the disciplining of ressentiment.' Australian Feminist 
Studies, Vol. 13, No. 27 (1998): 129-136; Maudmarie Clark, 'Nietzsche's Misogyny,' 
International Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 26, No. 3 (1994): 3-12; Caroline Joan S. Picart, 
Resentment and the "Feminine" in Nietzsche's Politico-Aesthetics (Pennsylvania: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), Chapter 5, 147-180; Rosemary Hennessey, 
Profit and Pleasure: sexual identities in late capitalism (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2000), Chapter 7, 203-232. 
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understanding of ressentiment as a regressive and purely resubordinative 
posture which serves to reify victim-status and to encourage apolitical 
moralism, has gone unchallenged. 
However, the literature does host exceptions to this trend. Shortly after it 
was first published, Marion Tapper's account of feminist ressentiment was 
critically assessed by Zoe Sophia and, more recently, Brown's account was 
the subject of critical reflection in Vikki Bell's book Feminist Imagination. 11 
Sophia sought to defend the particular kind of feminist politics Tapper 
impugns against the charge that it may be regarded as an example of 
ressentiment, while Bell challenges the exhaustiveness of Brown's account by 
moving to locate moments in feminist thought when its parameters exceed 
those of ressentiment. 
My own engagement with the question of feminist ressentiment pursues a 
different kind of trajectory. Firstly, by examining a wider range of accounts, 
my analysis is positioned to reveal that theorists of feminist ressentiment 
offer conflicting judgements regarding how ressentiment plays out within 
feminism and, therefore, conflicting visions of the relationship between 
feminism, ressentiment, and the category 'victim'. So, rather than take up one 
vision of feminist ressentiment, I ask after the conflicts which emerge when 
different accounts of feminist ressentiment are compared. Secondly and 
perhaps most importantly, the trajectory I pursue includes a critical re-
reading of Nietzsche's concept of ressentiment. This re-reading challenges 
I !Tapper's account originally appeared in Arena Magazine (October 1992): 41-45. Zoe 
Sophia's reply article was published soon afterwards, 'Position Envy and the 
Subsumption of Feminism,' Arena Magazine (April-May 1993): 34-36. Sophia's argument 
is discussed at greater length in Chapter 3. Vikki Bell's discussion of Brown features in 
Chapter 3 of her book Feminist Imagination: genealogies in feminist theory (London: Sage, 
1999), 40-61 (Bell refers also to Tapper, Ibid., 40, 53). Bell's argument is discussed at 
greater length in Chapter 5. More cursory critical commentaries on Brown's account 
feature in the following book reviews: Mary Heath, 'Review: Wendy Brown's States of 
Injury,' Australian Feminist Studies, Vol. 11, No. 23, 1996: 167-168; Nancy S. Love, 
'Review: Wendy Brown's States of Injury,' American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 
2, June 1997: 431. 
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Nietzsche's condemnation of ressentiment and the subsequent adoption of this 
condemnation by critics of feminist ressentiment. It also questions the idea 
that ressentiment is a purely resubordinative posture. In short, where Sophia 
and Bell present critical reflections which nonetheless still accept that 
ressentiment is bad for feminism, my reading of Nietzsche suggests a more 
positive and complex relation between the two. 
The dissertation's critical re-reading of Nietzsche's concept of ressentiment 
brings us to the second category of previous research. The domain of 
Nietzsche scholarship contains a great many reflections on the concept of 
ressentiment given that it forms a key element of Nietzsche's philosophy. 
Less common in this area, however, are readings which call Nietzsche's 
condemnation of ressentiment into question. As Daniel Conway notes, two 
particular pieces of Anglophone Nietzsche scholarship offer this kind of 
reading: Richard Solomon's article 'One Hundred Years of Ressentiment' and 
Henry Staten's book Nietzsche's Voice.12 Solomon crafts a defence of 
ressentiment based on the idea that it inspires a range of democratic values 
and political ruses that we would do well to preserve. Staten takes a different 
approach in concentrating on the textual instabilities within Nietzsche's 
articulation of the concept of ressentiment so as to demonstrate the difficulty 
of Nietzsche's effort to maintain what Staten refers to as his "official attitude 
of condemnation" toward ressentiment.13 
I draw on both of these scholars, although my approach is closer to that of 
Staten as it is based on exegetical analysis of Nietzsche's articulation of the 
concept of ressentiment. However my critical re-reading of ressentiment also 
12Daniel Conway, Nietzsche and the Political (New York: Routledge, 1997), 153, n. 22. 
Richard Solomon, 'One Hundred Years of Ressentiment: Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals,' 
in Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: essays on Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals, ed. Richard 
Schacht (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 95-126. Henry Staten, 
Nietzsche's Voice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990). 
13Staten, Nietzsche's Voice, 59. 
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departs from those of Solomon and Staten in being especially concerned with 
the ethics of using this concept to 'diagnose' particular forms of politicisation, 
and concerned also to reflect upon the labours that the concept of 
ressentiment can perform for feminist political theory. In foregrounding these 
concerns my analysis seeks to add a new ground of insight to the re-reading of 
ressentiment initiated by Solomon and Staten. 
In relation to Nietzsche, I do not attempt to provide an interpretation of 
his philosophy as a whole, nor to provide an account of a specifically 
Nietzschean political theory. Rather, my particular remit restricts me to 
specific concern with his articulation of the concept of ressentiment, his thesis 
on the moralities of master and slave, and the roles these can play for 
feminist political reflection and auto-critique. On account of these concerns, 
my analysis of Nietzsche primarily is focussed on two texts: On the Genealogy 
of Morals and Beyond Good and Evil. While maintaining primary focus on 
these texts, I do also refer to other works by Nietzsche, and other accounts of 
ressentiment, including those of Eugen Diihring and Max Scheler.14 My 
strategy for reading Nietzsche's articulation of the concept of ressentiment is 
best described as one of critical exegesis. The approach is exegetical in the 
sense that I seek to unpack key elements of Nietzsche's account of 
ressentiment, especially those elements which are obscured when the concept 
of ressentiment is employed diagnostically. The approach is critical in the 
sense that, with Solomon and Staten, it seeks to call Nietzsche's 
condemnation of ressentiment into question. 
14Eugen Diihring, Der Werth des Lebens: eine philosophische betrachtung (Breslau, 1865); 
Max Scheler, Ressentiment, trans. William H. Holdheim (New York: Free Press, 1961 
[originally published 1914]). 
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Overall Argument 
The overall argument of the dissertation is, essentially, that feminist 
identification of women as 'victims' does not in any necessary sense perform 
an elision of female agency, nor deliver a regressive and resubordinative 
politics-although this identification does not by itself deliver a conception of 
agency nor deliver a political strategy. 
This argument is drawn on the basis of two main findings of the 
dissertation. Firstly, the dissertation's analysis of the popular accounts of 
feminism's 'victim problem' reveals that these accounts rely on an 
understanding ofvictimhood as a simple deprivation of agency, and that they 
superimpose this understanding of the category 'victim' upon existing 
feminist treatments of this category. However, upon turning to existing 
feminist treatments of this category, specifically in relation to sexual 
violence, we find not elisions or denials of agency, but interventions upon the 
victim/agent dichotomy, a concern to ontologise 'victims' as particular kinds 
of 'agents,' and interrogation of the existing forms of (sexual) agency ascribed 
to women, most notably in juridical settings. We find, in short, that forms of 
agency are visible, affirmed and examined in existing feminist accounts of the 
category 'victim,' and existing feminist politicisations of victimisation. 
The second finding which informs the dissertation's overall argument is 
drawn from its analysis of the academic accounts of feminist ressentiment, 
and the critical re-reading of Nietzsche's concept of ressentiment conducted in 
view of these accounts. The academic accounts construe ressentiment as a 
resubordinative disposition which reifies victim-identity and, as such, inspires 
a regressive politics. My reading of ressentiment, however, seeks to elucidate 
the extent to which ressentiment fosters a conception of 'victimhood' which is 
in fact a potential avenue to 'agency'. While acknowledging the 
resubordinative potentialities of ressentiment, I find that, at its best, the 
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conceptual technology ressentiment elaborates delivers the idea that 
victimisation and subordination are not inevitable. I find further that the 
potential threat this technology therefore poses to the social order it now 
perceives as potentially contingent forms part of the reason why Nietzsche 
condemns ressentiment. In importing these insights back into the question of 
feminist ressentiment as it is taken up by the theorists I examine, I find that 
the forms of politics they associate with ressentiment do exhibit ressentiment's 
potentially emancipatory element, and can not therefore be rendered as 
inevitably inimical to agency nor necessarily resubordinative. 
Chapter Outlines 
The dissertation is divided into three parts, each of which contain two 
chapters. The first part of the dissertation, 'Feminism and Victim Politics,' 
offers a comparative exposition and critical assessment of a selection of 
popular feminist accounts of feminism's 'victim problem'. The selection of 
accounts addressed in this part of the dissertation, those of Christina Hoff 
Sommers, Katie Roiphe, Rene Denfeld, and Naomi Wolf, are the most salient 
examples of the critical discourse with which I am concerned, and are kindred 
in having been highly publicised books on international release-hence my 
reference to these accounts as 'popular,' and my concern about the role these 
accounts have played in shaping popular perceptions of feminism.15 
Chapter 1 provides an exposition of each account, compares their 
respective claims, and illuminates the particular manner in which they go 
about framing feminism's 'victim problem'. The main finding of the chapter is 
15Christina Hoff Sommers, Who Stole Feminism? How women have betrayed women (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1994); Katie Roiphe, The Morning After: sex, fear and 
feminism (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1993); Rene Denfeld, The New Victorians: a young 
woman's challenge to the old feminist order (New York: Warner Books and Sydney: Allen 
& Unwin, 1995); Naomi Wolf, Fire With Fire: the new female power and how it will 
change the twenty-first century (London: Chatto and Windus, 1993). 
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that each account constructs a stark dichotomy between a 'good' reformist 
feminism which is cognisant of women's present agency, and a 'bad' radical 
feminism which persists with a substantially untrue and presently obsolete 
understanding of women as victims. In Hoff Sommer's case, the 'bad' 
feminism is referred to as "resenter feminism", and in Wolfs account this 
association of radical feminism with resentment is affirmed. It is through 
these dichotomies that the popular accounts construe the 'victim problem' as 
a venue for reasserting liberal feminist edicts and, in Wolfs case especially, 
for cultivating a neoliberal feminism. However the chapter's analysis also 
suggests that these accounts pursue their own kind of victim-politics. In 
elucidating the 'harm' caused by the feminisms they impugn, they each point 
to a more deserving population of Real Victims. Discerning this aspect of the 
accounts then forms part of the critical assessment of their claims presented 
in the following chapter. 
Chapter 2 runs two lines of argument in relation to the popular feminist 
accounts. Firstly, the chapter challenges their equation of radicalism with 
victim-centred politics by placing these accounts within a wider field of 
discourses of victimhood and victimisation-a field which encompasses 
existing feminist interventions upon the language of victimhood, most notably 
in the sphere of sexual violence. This enables me to demonstrate the extent to 
which 'radical' feminists actually have tended to perceive the 'victim' as a 
particular kind of 'agent'. The second line of argument I pursue takes up the 
question as to why the popular critics elide existing feminist discourses of 
agency and interventions upon the victim/agent dichotomy. I argue that this 
is because their own brand of victim-politics, which presents what I refer to 
as 'reverse victimologies,' requires that the victim/agent dichotomy remain 
stable. In showing how the category 'victim' also operates as a centre of 
gravity in the popular feminist accounts, my analysis interrupts the other 
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side of the core equation they deliver-their association of liberal feminism 
with a move beyond victim-centred politics. 
In pursuit of a more productive approach to understanding feminism's 
relationship with the category 'victim' I turn, in the dissertation's second part, 
to the academic accounts of feminist res sentiment. All of these accounts 
employ the concept of ressentiment as a vehicle through which 
resubordinative dynamics within feminist politics, most notably an 
attachment to victim identity, can be discerned and diagnosed. All are, 
therefore, concerned to direct feminism beyond the politics of ressentiment, a 
move which is thought to promise the development of a positive relationship 
with agency and capacity. As my analyses confirm, these accounts are 
illuminating a several important respects. What is most interesting, however, 
is that they offer conflicting diagnoses of feminist ressentiment and, as a 
result, conflicting judgements as to what kind of political strategy could lead 
feminism beyond ressentiment. So as to reveal these conflicts, this part of the 
dissertation, entitled 'Feminism and Ressentiment,' assumes the form of two 
comparative analyses. 
In chapter 3, Joan Cocks' and Marion Tapper's accounts of feminism and 
ressentiment are analysed comparatively. It is found that Cocks and Tapper 
share a concern with feminist willingness to abet state and institutional 
power so as to forward its political goals, and that both theorists identify 
feminist appeals to such powers as symptomatic of a ressentimental victim-
politics. However the chapter also finds that these theorists deliver very 
different formulations of the relationship between radicalism, reformism and 
ressentiment. Cocks understands ressentiment as a psycho-political disposition 
which curtails radicalism and encourages reformism, suggesting that a return 
to a properly radical politics will release feminism from the mire of 
ressentiment. Tapper, on the other hand, understands ressentiment as a 
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psycho-political disposition which encourages radicalism, arguing that such 
radicalism is especially problematic given that feminist reforms have been 
successful enough for it to be bereft of purpose. A similar conflict regarding 
the relationship between radicalism, reformism and ressentiment is traced in 
the following chapter. 
Chapter 4 sets out to provide a comparative analysis of two further 
accounts of feminist ressentiment, those of Anna Yeatman and Wendy Brown. 
The chapter's analysis finds that Yeatman and Brown offer similar portraits 
of the politics of ressentiment within feminism. Both theorists conceive of 
ressentiment as a resubordinative form of politics which hypostatises victim 
identity and entrenches the distance between emancipatory subjects and 
positive political capacity. However the chapter also finds that these 
theorists offer conflicting accounts of how the politics of ressentiment play out 
in feminism and, most significantly, how the problem of ressentiment may be 
remedied. Yeatman proposes that feminism's move beyond ressentiment 
should involve desisting in political radicalism and working co-operatively 
within the existing politico-economic order, including this order's institution of 
neoliberal rationalities of government such as individual contractualism and 
self-regulation. Brown's account, however, beckons a more radical challenge 
to this order and, most significantly, reads its signature powers-liberalism, 
capitalism, and disciplinarity-as an assemblage which works to incite 
ressentiment. Hence Yeatman's formulation of feminist politics beyond 
ressentiment would, according to Brown's account, serve only to intensify 
ressentiment. 
The conflicting judgements evident in this literature deliver the proposition 
which guides the dissertation's third and final part. The proposition is that the 
relationship between ressentiment, feminist politics, and the category 'victim' 
is more complex, dynamic, and multivalent than the accounts in this 
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literature acknowledge. This proposition sets two tasks. First, a close and 
critical examination of the concept of ressentiment itself. Second, application 
of the insights this examination yields to the question of feminist ressentiment. 
These tasks comprise the labour of the dissertation's third part, 'Reading 
Ressentiment'. 
Chapter 5 undertakes a critical exegesis of Nietzsche's concept of 
ressentiment. This approach works to broaden our perspective on ressentiment 
by bringing into view the features of this concept which tend to be elided when 
it is employed diagnostically, most notably Nietzsche's account of the 
dynamic struggle between master and slave. Illuminating the sense in which 
the concept of ressentiment describes a complex and dynamic process of 
revolt provides grounds on which to challenge a range of key assumptions 
about ressentiment made in the literature examined in Part 2. Most notably, 
these include the assumption that ressentiment is unambiguously 'bad' and 
that it ordains a purely resubordinative, non-transformative politics. 
According to the interpretation of Nietzsche I offer, ressentiment can instead 
be understood as a vehicle through which the relatively powerless craft a 
capacity to create an emancipatory conceptual technology through which 
social being can be opened to contingency. Within this technology, the 
category 'victim' is not construed as an end in itself, but rather as a potential 
source of agency. 
In short, Chapter 5 delivers a reading of ressentiment as an effect of 
domination which has the potential to become an effective weapon against 
domination. This reading of ressentiment also serves to distil three stages of 
ressentimental revolt: brute, creative, and explosive/contained. I argue that, 
insofar as feminism has sought to show that women's subordination is 
neither natural nor inevitable, there is a very basic affirmative relationship 
between feminism and the emancipatory conceptual technology ressentiment 
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elaborates in its creative stage. But I also suggest that ressentiment's third 
stage is of greatest interest and import for purposes of feminist political 
reflection. According to my reading of Nietzsche, ressentiment in its third 
stage begins to pose a threat to the configurations of power which have 
conditioned its production and, as such, becomes a 'problem' to which the 
powerful will require a 'solution'. 
The task of Chapter 6 is to examine the strategies Nietzsche describes as 
providing 'solutions' to the threat of ressentiment. These strategies are 
legalism and priestly asceticism and, according to my reading of Nietzsche, 
they work to contain the threat of ressentiment by redirecting its ire. In 
reviewing these strategies, I make my concluding arguments regarding the 
relationship between feminism, ressentiment and the category 'victim,' and 
articulate my view that feminism works both 'within' and 'against' 
res sentiment. 
Examining the role of priestly asceticism in redirecting ressentiment 
enables me to present a final set of reflections on the discourses of victim 
identity, blame and responsibility within the popular and academic feminist 
accounts the dissertation examines. One of the threads running through the 
popular and academic accounts is that a gesture referred to as 'taking 
responsibility' will aid in ameliorating feminism's 'victim problem'. For the 
most part, reference to this gesture is underpinned by the idea that victim 
identity involves a self-thwarting evasion of self-responsibility which serves 
to perpetuate unfreedom. I argue that injunctions to 'take responsibility' 
require scrutiny in view of the labour of the ascetic priest, which is to disarm 
ressentiment by compelling it to self-blame. In making this argument, I 
suggest that the popular accounts in particular may be interpreted as a form 
of asceticism. In relation to the academic accounts I register that, when it is 
operationalised diagnostically, Nietzsche's concept of ressentiment can itself 
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assume an ascetic guise. This delivers the suggestion that future feminist 
engagements with discourses of responsibility need to interrogate the 
relationship between 'self-blame' and 'taking responsibility'. 
On a different tack, elucidating the role of law in containing ressentiment 
provides fresh ground on which to reconsider the conflicting judgements about 
ressentiment, radicalism and reformism evident in the literature examined in 
Part 2. Nietzsche's account of the role of law furnishes me with a distinction 
between two interrelated modalities in the direction of ressentimental desire: a 
radical modality which hosts a desire for a substantially different socio-
political order, and a reformist modality which imposes reform upon the 
character of rule at the expense of containment. This distinction, then, places 
both radicalism and reformism 'within' ressentiment. Another feature of this 
distinction is that it suggests the success of reformism in reshaping the 
character of rule relies on the possibility that a more radical threat could 
instead be posed. 
On the basis of this distinction I argue that the problematic of feminist 
ressentiment does not turn on the question as to what kind of political strategy 
will deliver feminism beyond ressentiment. Rather this issue turns, firstly, on 
the question as to how feminism ought to inhabit and direct ressentiment and, 
secondly, on the question as to what kind of political strategy will serve best 
to redress the configurations of power which incite ressentiment most 
potently. I also use this distinction to identify the sense in which ressentiment 
is a political force which always works against itself in the sense that its 'aim' 
is to transform the configurations of power which have conditioned its 
production. In combination, these lines of argument forward my view that 
feminism is both 'within' and 'against' ressentiment, and that, at its best, the 
articulation of victimisation ressentiment enables does not thwart but rather 
delivers the possibility of agency. 
PART ONE 
Feniinism and Victim Politics 
1 
The Category 'Victim' and Popular Feminism 
From rape redefinitions to feminist theory on the 
"patriarchy," victimisation has become the subtext of the 
movement, the moral to be found in every feminist story. 
Together, these stories form a feminist mythology in which 
a singular female subject is created: woman as helpless, 
violated and oppressed victim. 
-Rene Denfeld.1 
The presumption that men are collectively engaged in 
keeping women down invites feminist bonding in a 
resentful community. 
-Christina Hoff Sommers.2 
Introduction 
The medium of heavily marketed books on international release has been of 
immeasurable value to feminism in providing an interface between feminist 
ideas and large populations of women. From consciousness-raising novels 
such as Marilyn French's The Women's Room through to polemics like 
Germaine Greer's The Female Eunuch, Ann Summers' Damned Whores and 
God's Police, and Betty Friedan's The Feminine Mystique, feminist books 
published on broad release are widely recognised for challenging the status quo 
and making profound and lasting contributions to social change.3 But during 
the 1990s, popular feminist books shifted in character. A spate of books 
appeared which were attuned not so much to providing a critical account of 
Rene Denfeld, The New Victorians: a young woman's challenge to the old feminist order 
(Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1995 [originally published: New York, Warner Books, 1994]), 
61-62. 
2 Christina Hoff Sommers, Who Stole Feminism? how women have betrayed women (New 
York: Simon and Shuster, 1994): 21. 
3 Marilyn French, The Women's Room (London: Warner, 1992 [originally published 1978]); 
Germaine Greer, The Female Eunuch (London: Paladin, 1971); Ann Summers, Damned 
Whores and God's Police (Victoria: Penguin Books, 1994 [originally published 1975]); 
Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (London: Penguin, 1963). 
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the world, but a critical account of feminism's critical account of the world. 
The medium of heavily marketed books on international release became a 
significant venue for intra-feminist critique, perhaps for the first time. At the 
centre of the spectacle stood feminism's relationship with the category 
'victim'. As the plaint rang out that feminism had come to be centred on a 
representation of women as victims, a particular set of arguments about this 
relationship emerged. The task of this chapter is to identify this particular set 
of arguments by providing expositions of the four books in which they are 
articulated most powerfully: Christina Hoff Sommers' Who Stole Feminism?, 
Katie Roiphe's The Morning After, Rene Denfeld's The New Victorians, and 
Naomi Wolfs Fire With Fire. 
In many respects these books are prompted by and focussed on questions 
of sexual politics. For example, they tend to be centrally concerned to offer a 
critique of the ways in which feminists have politicised sexual violence, 
contending as they do that such politicisation works to elide and discourage 
female sexual agency in attempting to recode the erotic sphere as an 
inevitable site of female victimisation. However as this chapter's expositions 
will seek to highlight, in these books questions of sexual and cultural politics 
are always intimately tied to questions of feminism's overall political strategy 
and world view. These books are not solely concerned with the question as to 
how feminism should envisage its subject-hapless victim or capable agent-
but with what kind of political agency feminism should assume within existing 
politico-economic arrangements. Where earlier popular feminist books were 
more often than not centrally concerned to agitate against the politico-
economic status quo, these books are centrally concerned to reassert the 
politico-economic status quo. They deliver a formula in which feminism will be 
returned to genuine political efficacy and faithful representation of women 
and their interests so long as it desists in political radicalism. More 
specifically, they construe what Wolf refers to as "the victim problem in 
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current feminism" as a venue for a reassertion of liberal feminist edicts.4 As 
this chapter aims to demonstrate, this manoeuvre is dependent upon 
constructing an exclusive relation between feminist political radicalism and 
victim-centred politics, and providing grounds for a dissociation of liberal 
feminism from such politics. My view, expressed partially in this chapter and 
more concertedly in the next, is that neither construction is tenable. 
While the task of this chapter is to show how the accounts go about 
making these manoeuvres, the task of the next is to provide a critical 
examination of them. That said, cursory critical points in relation to each 
account will be offered in this chapter as they arise. The chapter does not 
seek to provide a history of the debate about feminism's relationship with the 
category 'victim'. Rather it seeks to distil the major themes of the debate as 
they arise in the contributions to this debate considered here. In tune with 
this, the order in which we will consider each account is determined according 
to theme. Hoff Sommers' account is considered first because it is broad in 
scope and it introduces an idea that will be of concern throughout the 
dissertation: that feminism represents women as victims when it comes to be 
motivated by resentment, an 'undemocratic' and 'illiberal' passion. The 
accounts of Roiphe and Denfeld follow, as they introduce the question of a 
generational divide within feminism as well as the notion of feminist 
'Victorianism'. Wolf marks her book out as an alternative account of "the 
victim problem": so as to best determine her book's difference from those of 
the other authors, it is addressed in the final section of the chapter. 
4 Wolf, Fire With Fire, 148. Chris Atmore also registers this move in observing that 
"liberal feminism is generally the only feminism allocated an honourable history, worthy 
of scholarly appreciation, in this writing." Chris Atmore, 'Victims, Backlash and Radical 
Feminist Theory,' in New Versions of Victims: feminists struggle with the concept, ed. 
Sharon Lamb (New York: New York University Press, 1999), 189. 
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1.1 Hoff Sommers: engendering resentment 
The central contention of Christina Hoff Sommers' book Who Stole 
Feminism? is that throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s feminism was 
"stolen" by a relatively small and unrepresentative class of women whose 
brand of feminism departs significantly from feminism's original, equality-
oriented project. Hoff Sommers' book is governed by a dichotomy between 
"equity feminism" and "gender feminism" (she also refers to the latter as 
"resenter feminism" and "the New Feminism").5 As she explains, equity 
feminism is the "traditional, classically liberal, humanistic feminism" that 
demanded not special treatment for women but rather that they be accorded 
"the same rights before the law that men enjoyed."6 This "old mainstream" 
feminism, originally instituted through the "pure and wholesome article first 
displayed at Seneca Falls in 1848", emphasised women and men's shared 
humanity and concentrated on a process of legal reform-suffrage, divorce, 
property rights-which, Hoff Sommers notes, was complemented in more 
recent times with moves to protect abortion rights.7 This feminism's agenda 
for equality, on Hoff Sommers' view, is "not yet fully achieved" but 
5 Hoff Sommers, Who Stole Feminism?, 22; 45. Hoff Sommers explains that "gender 
feminism" is shorthand for "sex/gender feminism". With this latter name Hoff Sommers 
is referring to the sex/gender distinction of second wave feminist theory, although she 
does not provide references pertaining to the sex/gender distinction. This distinction was 
introduced into feminist theory by Ann Oakley in her book Sex, Gender and Society 
(London: Temple Smith, 1972) but it is widely recognised than an early articulation of 
this distinction is made in Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex, trans. H. M. Parshley 
(London: Picador, 1988 [originally published 1949]). For Hoff Sommers' critique of 
Beauvoir see Who Stole Feminism?, 256-257. For an account of the history of the concept 
of gender in feminist thought see Ann Oakley, 'A Brief History of Gender,' in Who's Afraid 
of Feminism? seeing through the backlash, eds. Ann Oakley and Juliet Mitchell (London: 
Penguin, 1998), 29-55. 
6 Hoff Sommers, Who Stole Feminism?, 22. 
7 Ibid., 22; 275. The "wholesome article" Hoff Sommers refers to is the 'Declaration of 
Senitments and Resolutions' presented and adopted at the Seneca Falls Convention at 
the Wesleyan Chapel, Seneca Falls, New York on July 19, 1848. The Declaration, 
drafted by Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott among others, was modelled on 
the American Declaration of Independence and is widely regarded as the founding 
document of organised American feminism. See 'Declaration of Sentiments and 
Resolutions' in ed. Miriam Schneir The Vintage Book of Historical Feminism (London: 
Vintage, 1996), 77-82. 
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nonetheless has enjoyed success enough so that it no longer can be said that 
women occupy a subordinate position in relation to men in contemporary 
liberal democratic settings, most notably the United States. 8 Hoff Sommers 
locates equity feminism as the kind of feminism with which most women, 
including herself, identify.9 
According to Hoff Sommers, equity feminism has been replaced by gender 
feminism as the public face and guiding ideology of feminism. Gender 
feminism, she argues, is neither properly representative of women's interests 
nor properly democratic.lo The task of her book is to provide a total critique of 
gender feminism so that its power might be countered and equity feminism 
restored to its rightful place as feminism's mainstream. Thereby, Hoff 
Sommers argues, feminism will be returned to its "true purposes".11 At a 
later stage in this section I will point out some problems with Hoff Sommers' 
account of gender feminism, but let us now summarise what kind of feminism 
she means to describe with this term. Hoff Sommers places the origins of 
gender feminism with the advent of the sex/gender distinction and the 
development of feminist consciousness-raising in second wave feminist 
theory and practice. She writes: 
8 Hoff Sommers, Who Stole Feminism?, 22. In this vein Hoff Sommers also states that 
"women today can no longer be regarded as the victims of an undemocratic 
indoctrination", Ibid., 260. 
9Ibid., 18. 
lOin relation to gender feminism's failure to be representative, Hoff Sommers argues that 
while gender feminists have "achieved visibility and influence", they nonetheless "have 
not succeeded in winning the hearts of American women. Most American feminists, 
unwilling to be identified as part of a cause they find alien, have renounced the label 
and have left the field to the resenters" (Ibid., 49). As proof of her claim that gender 
feminism is unrepresentative Hoff Sommers cites two media-sponsored polls. Both polls 
found that a majority of women supported the goal of sexual equality, but only 37% of 
women in the first poll and 16% in the second described themselves as feminists (Ibid., 
18). For Hoff Sommers, these results indicate that a majority of women are equity 
feminists, but that they fail to identify themselves as feminists owing to their alienation 
from gender feminism. 
11 Ibid., 21. 
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The idea that women are in a gender war originated in the midsixties, 
when the antiwar movement and antigovernment mood revivified and 
redirected the women's movement away from its Enlightenment 
liberal philosophy to a more radical, antiestablishment philosophy ... 
by the midseventies, faith in liberal solutions to social problems had 
waned, and the old style of consciousness raising that encouraged 
women to seek avenues of self-fulfilment rapidly gave way to one that 
initiated women into an appreciation of their subordinate situation in 
the patriarchy and the joys and comforts of group solidarity.12 
24 
Where equity feminism apprehends a limited set of sexual inequalities which 
can be remedied through reform of existing socio-economic arrangements, 
gender feminism apprehends a system of male domination and female 
subordination which is deeply ingrained within existing arrangements and can 
only be overcome through a radical transformation of those arrangements, 
initiated when women individually then collectively perceive the need for such 
transformation. Hence Hoff Sommers describes gender feminism as 
"transforma tionist" .13 Having situated the initial formation of gender 
feminism with the rise of the New Left, Hoff Sommers argues throughout her 
book that the institutional support, financial backing and hegemonic status 
this form of feminism has managed to achieve was consolidated during the 
1980s and continued into the 1990s.14 
Hoff Sommers does not provide an account of the sex/gender distinction, 
nor of the extensive feminist debates regarding this concept.15 Rather she 
12Ibid., 23. 
13Ibid., 65. See especially the chapter 'Transforming the Academy,' Ibid., 50-73. 
14Throughout her book Hoff Sommers regularly refers to the financial backing and 
institutional support gender feminism has attracted (see for example Ibid., 33; 82-3; 
124-127). Her comments regarding public funding of feminist anti-rape activities based 
in universities are typical of the critical line she takes on this support. She argues that 
feminisms' expanded definition of sexual violence ''justifies the salaries being paid to all 
the new personnel in the burgeoning college date rape industry", commenting further 
that "college women are getting a lion's share of public resources for combatting rape", 
Ibid., 220. As the argument of her book makes clear, Hoff Sommers regards this as a 
misappropriation of public monies and resources. 
15Salient contributions to the debate regarding the sex/gender distinction and the concept 
of gender include: Moira Gatens, 'A Critique of the Sex/Gender Distinction,' Imaginary 
Bodies: ethics, power and corporeality (New York: Routledge, 1996 [originally published 
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notes that it encouraged women to "view society through the sex/gender 
prism" and "identify their personal selves with their gender."16 Although the 
sex/gender distinction actually encouraged women to disidentify with their 
gender-that is, to disidentify with existing constructions of cultural 
femininity so as to entertain self-definition-Hoff Sommers means to argue 
that this concept formed a platform for establishing political solidarity among 
women. This is where her characterisation of gender feminism as 
"gynocentric" and "misandrist" comes into play.17 This form of solidarity 
among women, she argues, depends upon an "ontology of a society divided 
against itself along the fault line of gender" and, as such, institutes a 
"divisive," "unwholesome," "doctrinaire," "illiberal" and "resentful" political 
imagination. 18 Of course Hoff Sommers' characterisation of this social 
division as "illiberal" is curious given that liberalism is founded upon just such 
a gendered division, in the form of a public/private dichotomy.19 This point 
aside, let us note that one of the main arguments Hoff Sommers makes 
against gender feminism is that when this form of feminism attempts to 
"raise" female consciousness it actually works to impute a false 
consciousness. Hoff Sommers wholeheartedly disagrees with what she takes 
to be gender feminist belief that women are "under siege" by a malevolent 
in 1983]), 3-20; Catriona Mackenzie, 'Simone de Beauvoir: philosophy and/or the female 
body,' in Feminist Challenges, eds. Carole Pateman and Elizabeth Gross (Sydney: Allen 
& Unwin, 1986), 144-156; Linda Nicholson, 'Interpreting Gender,' in Social 
Postmodernism: beyond identity politics, eds. Linda Nicholson and Steven Seidman 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 39-67; Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: 
feminism and the subversion of identity (New York: Routledge, 1990) and Bodies That 
Matter: on the discursive limits of "sex" (New York: Routledge, 1993). For summaries of 
the debate see Stevi Jackson, 'Theorising Gender and Sexuality,' in Contemporary 
Feminist Theories, eds. Stevi Jackson and Jackie Jones, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1998), 131-146; and Fiona Webster, 'The Politics of Sex and Gender: 
Benhabib and Butler debate subjectivity,' Hypatia, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Winter 2000): 1-22. 
16Hoff Sommers, Who Stole Feminism?, 23. 
17Ibid., 22; 256. 
18Ibid., 224; 21; 18; 257; 42. 
19See Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988); and Ellen 
Meiksens Wood, Democracy Against Capitalism (Cambridge: Canbridge University 
Press, 1995), 204-238. 
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"sex/gender system" which perpetuates male domination and female 
subordination in a vast array of obvious and insidious ways.20 Referring to 
Virginia Held's comment that once the "sex/gender system" is discerned, 
traces of its operation can be perceived "everywhere", Hoff Sommers argues 
that "how these feminists regard ... society is more a matter of temperament 
than a matter of insight into social reality."21 
That the world view of gender feminism is untrue, and that its deceptive 
account of gender relations is sustained through emotions since it can not be 
substantiated with fact, is the leading idea of Hoff Sommers' critique of 
gender feminism.22 She writes that the "'gender war' requires a constant flow 
of horror stories showing women that male perfidy and female humiliation are 
everywhere", and argues that these horror stories are supplied in two ways. 
Firstly, such horror stories are contrived through falsification of evidence 
regarding, for example, the rates of violence against women. Secondly, they 
are produced when gender feminists sustain an emotional state which 
combines "anger," "outrage," "resentment" and "hypersensitivity".23 This 
emotional state enables the gender feminist to perceive "revelations of 
monstrosity in the most familiar and seemingly innocuous phenomena", such 
as the prevalence of female nudity in modern art or catcalls on the street.24 
Before looking more closely at the connection Hoff Sommers draws between 
20Ibid., 26. See especially the chapter 'Women Under Siege,' Ibid., 19-40. 
21Ibid., 26. Hoff Sommers is drawing on the following article by Virginia Held, 'Feminism 
and Epistemology: recent work on the connection between gender and knowledge,' 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Summer 1985). 
22Hoff Sommers makes the point that gender feminism's world view is not factual very 
clearly in the following statement: "The New Feminists are a powerful source ofmischeif 
because their leaders are not good at seeing things as they are. Resenter feminists like 
Faludi, French, Heilbrun and MacKinnon speak of backlash, siege, and an undeclared 
war against women. But the condition they describe is mythic-with no foundation in 
the facts of contemporary American life ... To the extent that one can speak at all of a 
gender war, it is the New Feminists themselves who are waging it." Ibid., 45. 
23Ibid., 19-21, 29-33. 
24Ibid., 27. 
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emotion and this fem.inism.'s political world view as well as what she has to 
say regarding gender feminism's falsification of evidence, let us note that Hoff 
Som.m.ers is especially concerned with the extent to which this world view 
constructs a firm. division not just between worn.en and m.en, but between 
feminist worn.en and "uninitiated" wom.en.25 
Hoff Som.m.ers argues that the gender feminist world view gives rise to a 
"corrosive paradox": "no group of worn.en can wage war on m.en without at the 
same time denigrating the worn.en who respect those m.en."26 This world view 
leads the gender feminist to adopt a "patronising," "condescending" and 
"pitying" attitude toward worn.en who do not regard them.selves as "hapless 
victims of patriarchy".27 Such worn.en, she notes, are regarded with disdain 
when gender feminism. necessarily casts them. as "benighted" victims of false 
consciousness.28 Arguing that an "illiberal authoritarianism." lies at the heart 
of the gender feminist argument that "worn.en are socialised to want the 
things the gender feminist believes they should not want"-her examples are 
heterosexual marriage, hom.em.aking, childrearing, reading romance novels 
and using cosmetics-Hoff Som.m.ers contends that gender feminism. actually 
hosts not just "m.isandry" but "m.isogyny".29 According to Hoff Som.m.ers, the 
25Jbid., 257. 
26Ibid., 256. 
27Ibid., 257. 
28Jbid .. It should be noted here that Hoff Sommers here repeats a very well-worn and 
widely held criticism of radical feminism's conception of consciousness-raising. Although 
Hoff Sommers, like the other critics we address in this chapter, offers this criticism as 
though for the first time, its status is broad and longstanding. Consider, for example, 
Jean Grimshaw's critique of radical feminist Mary Daly, made in the late 1980s: "Daly 
sees women as not merely brutalised by patriarchy, but reduced to a state of near-
robotitude. . . . views such as these . . . are divisive because they implicitly divide 
women into two camps: those who are liberated and have shaken the dust of service to 
others from the soles of their feet, and those who are still trapped in the old ways and 
not sufficiently enlightened even to perceive the depths of their own degradation and 
dehumanisation." Jean Grimshaw, Feminist Philosophers: women's perspectives on 
philosophical traditions (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1986): 157-159. 
29Jbid., 257, 256. Emphasis in original. For Hoff Sommers' examples see the chapter 'The 
Gender Wardens,' 255-275. 
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gender feminist desire to counter the forces they think circumscribe women's 
freedom actually represents an authoritarian attempt to reprogram and 
control women. In foisting an "ideologically correct censorious revisionism" 
upon the public, this feminism does not acknowledge or enhance women's 
tastes and choices, but rather prescribes them in accord with its rigid 
ideology.30 
Let us note, however, that Hoff Sommers herself is led to adopt the 
posture she maligns here. When discussing those women who find themselves 
"indoctrinated" into "gender feminist ideology"-women who are "'converted' 
to a view of the society they inhabit as a patriarchal system of oppression"-
gender feminism's purported distinction between the right-minded and the 
benighted necessarily is redrawn.31 According to Hoff Sommers, gender 
feminism's program of "indoctrination" and "reeducation" is no where more 
evident than in the academy.32 Across four chapters of her book she provides 
a critique of the academic "gender feminist establishment".33 Academic 
gender feminists, she argues, have been taking advantage of "well-meaning 
government officials" so as to attract vast funds to their "rapid 
colonis[ation]" of all aspects of university life, from the curricula of all 
disciplines through to the behaviour of male academics, who now live in fear 
of being falsely accused of gender-bias or sexual harassment.34 Hoff 
Sommers' objection to gender feminism's seizure of the academy is grounded 
in her critique of gender feminism's "women-centred" epistemology.35 
30Ibid., 269. 
31Ibid., 47. See also Hoff Sommers' comments on Naomi Wolfs "indoctrination" into gender 
feminism, Ibid., 245. 
32Ibid., 97; 95. 
33Ibid., 136. 
34Ibid., 82; 134; 113-116. Hoff Sommers explains that gender feminists are able to win 
the confidence of "well-meaning officials" because these officials mistake them for equity 
feminists, Ibid., 82. 
35Ibid., 55. 
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Referring to salient contributions to the feminist critique of androcentrism, 
including the feminist standpoint theory developed by Nancy Hartsock and 
Sandra Harding's figuration of "the science question in feminism", Hoff 
Sommers argues against the idea that subjugated groups bear different ways 
of knowing and have an epistemic advantage in being positioned to offer a 
view on the world which is less distorted by interest in power than is the world 
view of superordinate groups.36 On the contrary, Hoff Sommers argues, "the 
oppressed and socially marginalised often have little access to the 
information and education needed to excel in science, which on the whole puts 
them at a serious 'epistemic disadvantage."'37 
We must note that this criticism skirts the main point of Hartsock's and 
Harding's arguments-for them the epistemic promise of subjugated 
knowledges stems precisely from the marginal position they occupy in 
relation to institutionalised knowledges-and it is also the case that Hoff 
Sommers' discussion elides the existing and quite lively feminist debates 
already underway about these matters. But Hoff Sommers holds that gender 
feminism's promotion of "a gynocentric critique of knowledge" is not only 
"unworthy of a dignified feminism" but also is "educationally harmful" since it 
creates a "climate of gender mistrust of received knowledge" which lowers 
36Nancy Hartsock, 'The Feminist Standpoint: developing the ground for a specifically 
feminist historical materialism,' in Discovering Reality: feminist perspectives on 
epistemology, metaphysics, methodology and philosophy of science, eds. Sandra Harding 
and Merrill B. Hintakka (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1983), 283-310; Sandra Harding, 'From the 
Woman Question in Science to the Science Question in Feminism,' The Science Question 
in Feminism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 15-29. For a critical engagement 
with Hartsock and Harding, see Donna Haraway, 'Situated Knowledges: the science 
question in feminism and the privilege of partial perspective,' Simians, Cyborgs and 
Women: the reinvention of nature (New York: Routledge, 1991), 183-202. 
37Ibid., 75. 
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educational standards and fuels "anti-intellectualism".38 As though writing 
from the MacCarthyist era's House Un-American Activities Committee, Hoff 
Sommers contends that the purpose of the discipline of women's studies, and 
of gender feminist academics more generally, is not to educate but rather to 
"train" "crops" of "young feminist ideologues" who will be "even angrier, more 
resentful, and more indifferent to the truth than their mentors."39 In this 
way, Hoff Sommers effectively redraws the distinction between the right-
minded and the duped that she has identified in the form of feminism she 
Let us now return to Hoff Sommers' claims regarding the role of emotion 
in gender feminism's political world view. She provides a very specific account 
of gender feminism's relation to resentment. As we will see in the dissertation's 
second part, Nietzsche's concept of ressentiment (resentment) forms a central 
theme in the feminist theoretical writings on feminism and the category 
'victim.' On my reading, Hoff Sommers' account is kindred with a certain 
strain ofNietzscheanism although, unlike Wolf, who as we will see provides a 
similar account, Hoff Sommers does not refer to Nietzsche directly.40 
38Jbid., 78. In relation to gender feminism's lowering of educational standards, Hoff 
Sommers notes that women's studies and other "women-centred" courses "are 
unscholarly, intolerant of dissent, and full of gimmicks." Ibid., 90. In a sense, Hoff 
Sommers here provides a feminist version of the arguments made by Allan Bloom in his 
book The Closing of the American Mind: how higher education has failed democracy and 
impoverished the souls of today's students (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987). 
39Jbid., 18. My reference to the House Un-American Activities Committee is not intended 
to be facetious. In the months after Hoff Sommers' book was published in 1994 it was 
listed on the website of the National Association of Scholars (NAS), a North American 
professional association for conservative academics, as one of the publications they 
"supported." In context, "supported" denoted "commissioned". Hoff Sommers is a 
member of NAS. For her glowing account of their opposition to "the "politically correct" 
forces" see Ibid., 128-131. 
40Hoff Sommers is a professor of philosophy who specialises in moral theory. Hence it is 
not difficult to imagine that her perspective draws on Nietzsche. 
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Hoff Sommers situates resentment as a motivating and galvanising force 
.in gender feminism. In the following passage she spells out her view of the role 
of resentment in shoring up gender feminism's bifurcated world view: 
[Gender feminism] is a feminism of resentment that rationalises and 
fosters a wholesale rancor in women that has little to do with moral 
indignation. Resentment may begin in and include moral indignation, 
but it is by far the more abiding passion. Resentment is ''harboured" or 
"nurtured"; it "takes root" in a subject (the victim) and remains directed 
at another (the culprit). It can be vicarious-you need not have 
harmed me personally, but if I identify with someone you have 
harmed, I may resent you. Such resentment is very common and may 
easily be as strong and intense as resentment occasioned by direct 
injury. In a way it is stronger, for by enlarging the class of victims to 
include others, it magnifies the villainy as well. Having demarcated a 
victimised "us" with whom I now feel solidarity ... the next step is to 
regard the individual who wronged "us" as himself representative of a 
group ... [m]y social reality has now been dichotomised into two 
groups politically at odds, one of whom dominates and exploits the 
other.41 
Hoff Sommers' account of gender feminism as a feminism of resentment has 
three distinct features. Firstly, Hoff Sommers is at pains to distinguish 
resentment from indignation. She goes on to note that resentment, unlike 
indignation, is neither a "wholesome" nor "ethical" passion, but that in the 
case of gender feminism, like other forms of political movement bent on 
'political correctness,' resentment parades as indignation and is "made to 
sound like a commendable passion for social justice."42 The second feature of 
Hoff Sommer's view is that of false identification. Gender feminism, she 
suggests, hosts a process through which the real suffering of some women 
becomes the fictional suffering of all women, and the reasonable object of 
some women's resentment (particular male 'culprits') is enlarged to become 
the unreasonable object of all women's resentment (men as a group). Hence 
41Ibid., 41-42. Emphasis in original. 
42Ihid., 43. 
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one need not have suffered "direct injury'' to enjoin the victim's resentment. 
Importantly, empathy is not mentioned in Hoff Sommer's account of this 
process. While feminists such as Andrea Dworkin, a gender feminist par 
excellence according to Hoff Sommers, do insist that women "empathise with 
hurt women", Hoff Sommers is arguing that false identification as, as distinct 
from empathy with, hurt women is the gesture which galvanises gender 
feminism. 43 
The third feature of Hoff Sommer's view on gender feminism as a politics 
of resentment continues the theme of the first two features: falsity. Hoff 
Sommers reasons that resentment institutes "the habit of regarding women 
as a subjugated gender".44 This habit primes the gender feminist "to be 
alarmed, angry and resentful of men as oppressors of women."45 However, 
given that women no longer are oppressed, evidence of this oppression must 
be contrived somehow. Hence the gender feminist prepares herself"to believe 
the worst about [men] and the harm they cause to women" and is "ready", if 
need be, "to fabricate atrocities."46 Hoff Sommers goes on to devote five 
chapters of her book to 'exposing' the gender feminist predilection for the 
fabrication of atrocities through the falsification of evidence. Gender 
feminism, she contends, is a machine purpose-built for the production of 
"noble lies" or "myths" regarding the situation of women and the practices of 
men.47 
Hoff Sommers disputes an array of gender feminist "myths" on two 
counts. Firstly, in tune with her argument that they represent not "insight 
43Andrea Dworkin, 'Suffering and Speech,' in In Harm's Way: the pornography civil rights 
hearings, eds. Catharine MacK.innon and Andrea Dworkin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1997), 25. 
44Ibid., 42. 
45Ibid .. 
46Ibid .. 
47See especially the chapter 'Noble Lies,' 188-208. 
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into social reality" but a symptom of gender feminist resentment, she argues 
that these myths spring from the gender feminist "need" for "sensational" 
rather than "accurate" accounts of gender relations.48 That is, she argues 
that gender feminism has "so great a stake in exaggerating" the injuries 
women endure that such exaggeration has become an accepted norm among 
gender feminists and indeed the men they manage to intimidate (the 
researchers, editors, journalists and academics who publish or otherwise 
facilitate gender feminist access to the public sphere).49 The second count on 
which Hoff Sommers disputes gender feminist "myths" is that they impose 
gendered analysis upon issues which do not warrant such analysis. She 
argues, for example, that gender feminism treats the "cause of battered 
women" as "a handy bandwagon for [their] creed", and works to impose its 
bifurcated world view upon the analysis of spousal violence when it actually is 
the case that such violence has "very little to do patriarchy or gender bias."50 
The array of gender feminist "myths" Hoff Sommers seeks to debunk, 
aside from its central "myth" that women's subordination remains a social 
reality, includes the following: that girls and young women typically have 
lower levels of self-esteem than do their male counterparts; that women are 
overrepresented as victims of spousal violence and sexual violence, that a 
majority of women are a risk of such violence, and that such violence should 
be regarded as a gendered phenomenon; and finally that there has been a 
backlash against feminism. Hoff Sommers' battle against this array of 
"myths" is waged primarily on the ground of statistical data. She challenges 
48Ibid., 198. 
49Ibid., 203. Hoff Sommers argues, for example, that "respected medical periodicals" give 
"research on 'women's topics' an abnormal latitude" and "uncritically indulge the 
feminists in their inflationary tendencies." Ibid., 202-203. Assuming that these 
periodicals are edited and refereed by men, Hoff Sommers writes that their indulgence of 
gender feminism "is patronisingly sexist." Ibid., 203. 
50Ibid., 188; 200. 
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the categories feminist researchers employ (for example, definitions of 
violence against women which encompass psychological abuse51), the 
"pronounced ideological slant"52 operative within feminist research (which she 
refers to as "advocacy research"53), and feminist use of "overblown" 
statistics to focus public attention upon the situation of women.54 Most 
notably, however, Hoff Sommers garners statistical findings which may be 
interpreted as contradicting the claims of gender feminists. For example, to 
argue for the irrelevance of gender to the case of spousal violence, Hoff 
Sommers lofts studies which show that women, too, practice violence toward 
their spouses,55 that violence also occurs in lesbian partnerships,56 and that 
spousal violence is more likely to be perpetrated not by "normal men" but by 
"criminals" and "sociopaths" (ie. men with criminal convictions other than 
spousal violence).57 Although the first two points remain unconvincing when 
one considers that most forms of violence, whether enacted by a woman or a 
man, are masculinised in Western culture, on Hoff Sommer's view this point 
is likely to be read as a reimposition of gender feminist mythology.58 
51Ibid., 216. 
52Ibid., 253. 
53Ibid., 222. 
54Ibid., 189-196; 209-219. 
55Ibid., 195. Hoff Sommers draws on the following source in making this argument: 
Richard Gelles and Murray Strauss, Physical Violence in American Families (New Jersey: 
Transaction Publishers, 1990). Let us note, however, that Hoff Sommers' reporting on 
this source is problematic. Hoff Sommers states that Gelles and Strauss found that 
"women assault their partners at about the same rate as men assault their partners. 
This applies to both minor and severe assaults." Who Stole Feminism?, 194. However, 
Gelles and Strauss also found that "women are far more likely to be injured and to need 
medical care" and that in violent families "nearly half the violence (though not half the 
injuries) is perpetrated by women." Who Stole Feminism?, 195. How it is that women 
and men are assaulting one another at the same rate, yet women are suffering more 
injuries and causing less injuries, is neither considered nor explained. 
56Ibid., 199-200. 
57Ibid., 198-199. 
58For accounts of the masculinisation of violence, and of men's relationships to violence, 
see: R. W. Connell, Masculinities (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1995); Martin Mills, 'Football, 
Desire and the Social Organisation of Masculinity,' in Social Alternatives 16/1 (1997): 
10-13; and Lynne Segal, Slow Motion: changing masculinities, changing men (London: 
Virago, 1990). 
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Hoff Sommers extends the view that violence has nothing to do with 
gender into her account of sexual violence. The line of argumentation Hoff 
Sommers pursues here is significant for our purposes given, firstly, the 
centrality of the issue of sexual violence to the debate about feminism's 
relationship with the category 'victim' and, secondly, the critical engagement 
with this aspect of the debate conducted in the next chapter. So as to counter 
gender feminism's production of a mythic "rape epidemic", Hoff Sommer's 
chapter on rape seeks to demonstrate that feminist statistics on the 
prevalence of sexual violence against women are exaggerated. Hoff Sommers 
argues that this "epidemic" and its attendant "date rape industry" actually is 
a junket designed to secure upward mobility for certain feminist researchers 
and to attract public funding to the institutional rape-awareness activities of 
"self-preoccupied" "campus feminists."59 Her aim is to show that the "device" 
which enables these statistics to be exaggerated is an "expanded definition of 
rape", a broadened category which bestows upon women who have not 
(according to Hoff Sommers) experienced rape the same "moral parity" 
ordinarily accorded to "the real victims [of rape] in the community at large."60 
Hence, in relation to Dean Kilpatrick's study in which 'rape' is expanded to 
include unconsensual penetration of the vagina by an object other than a 
penis, Hoff Sommers finds herself arguing that "there [is] a big difference 
between being violated by a broomstick and being violated by a finger".61 Hoff 
Sommers raises a more compelling objection to an element of Mary Koss' 
study, which classified women whose experiences aligned with the study's 
59Ibid., 220; 217; 221; 221. 
60Ibid., 220. 
61Ibid., 216. Let us note that the objection Hoff Sommers raises here is inconsistent with 
her earlier argument that violence among lesbians is discounted by feminists. The 
inclusion of such events in the definition of rape is in part designed to make sexual 
violence among women visible. Hoff Sommers is drawing on the following research report: 
Dean Kilpatrick, Rape in America: a report to the nation (Charleston S. C.: Crime 
Victims Research and Treatment Centre, 1992). 
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(legal) definition of rape as victims of rape, even if the women themselves "did 
not believe they had been raped."62 To rebuff Koss's defence that these 
women were unaware of the legal definition of rape, Hoff Sommers asks 
"Since when do feminists consider 'law' to override women's experience?"63 
However we must note that Hoff Sommers' position necessarily leads her to 
wield very the power she identifies with Koss. In the same way as Koss's 
expanded (though legal) definition of rape leads her to register some women as 
rape victims even as they do not regard themselves as such, Hoff Sommers' 
narrow definition of rape leads her to register some women as unworthy of the 
title 'rape victim' even as they themselves identify as such.64 
Hoff Sommers argues that "high rape numbers", facilitated by an 
unreasonably expanded definition of what constitutes sexual violence, "serve 
the gender feminists by promoting the belief that American culture is sexist 
and misogynist."65 Hoff Sommers bemoans the extent to which the public 
have been amenable to this belief, and takes particular issue with the level of 
government support for the (North American) Violence Against Women Act 
proposed in 1993. This Act, she suggests, has neither "constitutional or 
moral" grounds for "singling out female crime victims for special treatment 
under civil rights laws".66 Such "special treatment", she reasons, will cause 
62Jbid., 213. Hoff Sommers is drawing on the following research: Mary Koss, 'Hidden Rape: 
sexual aggression and victimisation in a national sample of students in higher 
education,' in Rape and Sexual Assault, Volume 2, ed. Ann Wolbert Burgess (New York: 
Garland Publishing, 1988). 
63Jbid., 214. 
64For a thoughtful account of the issues called up when a woman who judges that she was 
not raped has nonetheless had an experience which conforms to feminist and/or legal 
definitions of rape, see Nicola Gavey, "'I Wasn't Raped, but ... ": revisiting definitional 
problems in sexual victimisation,' in New Versions of Victims: feminists struggle with the 
concept, ed. Sharon Lamb (New York: New York University Press, 1999), 57-81. For an 
account of the tremendous variety in popular perceptions of what constitutes sexual 
violence in the North American context see the research of Linda Brookover Bourke in 
her book Defining Rape (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1989). 
65Jbid.' 222. 
66Jbid., 224. 
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"social harm" since it accepts "a divisive, gender-specific approach to a 
problem [sexual violence] that is not caused by gender bias, misogyny, or 
'patriarchy"'.67 Concerned that the Act not only will sanction the gender 
feminist world view but will obscure "lesbian battering" and "male-on-male 
sexual violence", Hoff Sommers argues that rape be recast as "just one 
variety of crime against the person", and "rape of women" as "just one 
subvariety" of this kind of crime.68 Hoff Sommers' concern that these forms 
of violence may be obscured is reasonable, and her proposed understanding of 
rape may be so too-many feminists have argued that gender-specific 
legislation can have the effect of fixing rather than transforming the 
particular script of female experience it writes into law.69 Let us note, 
however, that aside from the fact that rape of men by other men-which, as 
Hoff Sommers notes, occurs primarily in prisons-is by no means 'outside' of 
gender given the emasculating effect rape has on its male victims, the 
grounds on which Hoff Sommers would have sexual violence dissociated from 
gender are curious. She offers the unconvincing explanation that rape is 
"caused" by "criminal violence, not patriarchal misogyny", and is 
"perpetrated by people who are wont to gratify themselves in criminal 
ways."70 We are left, then, with a bifurcated world view dividing not women 
from men but 'normal people' from 'criminals,' the latter of whom are, for 
reasons unknown, predominantly male (Hoff Sommers: "most violence is 
male"71). 
67Jbid., 225. 
68Jbid., 225; 226. 
69See, for example, Carol Lee Bacchi's chapter "Equal' Versus 'Special' Treatment,' in her 
book Same Difference: feminism and sexual difference (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1990): 
108-133. 
70Jbid., 223; 225. 
71Jbid., 225. 
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As we have seen, Hoff Sornrners argues that gender feminism. draws on, or 
rather engineers, provocative yet false statistics so as to "underscore the 
plight of worn.en in the oppressive gender system. and to help recruit 
adherents to the gender feminist cause."72 These statistics pertain to issues 
including "eating disorders, rape, battery, and wage differentials".7 3 
Interestingly, Hoff Sornrners devotes m.uch tirne to 'debunking' feminist 
statistics on the first three issues, and considerably less tirne on the issue of 
wage differentials. Here, Hoff Sornrners' task is to refute the following facts: 
worn.en not just in America but the world over have not achieved pay parity 
with their m.ale counterparts,74 spend significantly rnore tim.e engaged in 
unpaid labour than do their rnale counterparts,75 experience greater difficulty 
managing family and work cornm.itrnents than do their m.ale counterparts,76 
and remain overrepresented in low paid and unprotected wage labour within a 
72Ibid., 188. 
73Ibid., 188. My emphasis. 
74The most recent United Nations report on the status of women internationally found 
that "Although the principle of equal pay for work of equal value has been incorporated 
in the labour legislation of many countries, in no country for which data are available do 
women earn as much as men." United Nations, The World's Women 2000: trends and 
statistics (New York: United Nations, 2000), 131-132. Among the many measurements 
of pay inequity the report presents is a set of statistics gathered on pay differentials in 
manufacturing. Its findings are typical: in Australia in 1990 women's average weekly 
earnings came to 82% of male earnings, and climbed to only 85% by 1997; in the United 
Kingdom in 1990 women's earnings, on par with the earnings of women in the United 
States, stood at 68% of mens earnings, and climbed to 72% by 1997. The situation is 
most severe in Bangladesh: in 1990 women's earnings came to 49% of men's earnings, 
and rose. only one per cent by 1997. Ibid., 132. 
75The time-use survey data gathered by United Nations researchers indicate that 
"[w]omen spend 50 to 70 per cent as much time as men on paid work, but almost twice 
as much more time as men on unpaid work." Ibid., 126. In Australia, women on average 
spend 35 hours per week engaged in unpaid labour (the average for men is 18 hours) 
and 15 hours per week engaged in paid labour (the average for men is 30 hours). Ibid., 
125. 
76The United Nations research finds that it still is the case that "responsibility for 
childcare lies mainly with women, who spend more than twice as much time as men do 
on childcare." Ibid., 127. In Australia (in the period 1995-1999), women's unpaid work 
rises by an average of 9 hours per week (from 40 to 49 hours) when they have children, 
while men's average number of hours of unpaid work when they have children holds 
steady at 22 hours. Contrawise, women's paid work rises by an average of 2 hours per 
week (from 14 to 16 hours) when they have children, while men's paid work rises by 13 
hours per week (from 30 to 43 hours) when they have children. Ibid., 126. 
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labour market still marked by gender segregation.77 A 'gender feminist' 
analysis of these statistics is likely to point out that discriminatory gender 
norms which accord more value to men's time and capacities, and which 
figure participation in production with little consideration of participation in 
reproduction, play a fundamental role in these trends. Hoff Sommers, 
however, persists with equity feminism's faith in the present insignificance of 
sexual difference. Hoff Sommers argues that gender gaps in the labour 
market are brought on by two factors. Firstly, on the whole, women bring less 
"experience" to the workplace and, therefore, have lesser remunerative 
merit.78 Secondly, Hoff Sommers notes that "many women choose to move 
into and out of the workforce during childbearing and child-rearing years."79 
Her use of the term "choice" is key here. Hoff Sommers is siding with that 
position within the gender and work debate which holds that pregnancy is a 
"private choice" that, as such, does not warrant compensation from 
employers and/or the state for loss of earnings or job security. Hoff Sommers 
argues that women's loss of earnings and job security "naturally results" 
from their childbearing role, and can not therefore be regarded as 
"discriminatory". 80 According to Hoff Sommers, then, one would have to be 
indoctrinated into gender feminist ideology to observe that, as Barbara 
77The United Nations research finds that although women now have a much greater share 
of the labour market (at least one third excepting Northern Africa and Western Asia) 
they are vastly overrepresented in part-time work and in the informal sector (both of 
which are characterised by "lack of security, lack of benefits and low income"), and on 
the whole women "remain at the lower end of a segregated labour market", "continue to 
be concentrated in a few occupations" and tend to "hold positions of little or no 
authority." Ibid., 109. 
78Hoff Sommers, Who Stole Feminism?, 241. 
79Ibid., 241. 
80Jbid., 241. 
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Sullivan puts it, "[t]he organisation of work in our society appears unable to 
accommodate one of the most common life experiences of adult females".81 
Before summarising Hoff Sommers' account let me raise a final point in 
relation to the analysis it forwards. One of the most important features of 
Hoff Sommers' argument is that gender feminism is unrepresentative. Hoff 
Sommers needs to represent gender feminism as the predilection of a small 
but powerful minority, since this conforms with her argument that it fails to 
achieve what she thinks any feminism must achieve, which is to faithfully 
represent the "hearts" of a majority of women. This presents a conundrum, 
however, since Hoff Sommers also wishes to portray gender feminism as an 
alarming epidemic, the exigency of which her book is acting upon. Ultimately, 
Hoff Sommers portrays gender feminism as the ideology of a minority and as 
a pervasive, fashionable and popular epidemic. This gives rise to 
contradictory statements regarding the representativeness of gender 
feminism: 
All indications are that the new crop of young feminist ideologues 
coming out of our nation's colleges are even angrier, more resentful, 
and more indifferent to the truth than their mentors .... [t]he large 
majority of women, including the majority of college women, are 
distancing themselves from this anger and resentfulness ... [i]t is 
difficult to estimate the proportions of students who become 
committed gender feminists. It is surely a minority.82 
To some extent Hoff Sommers solves this contradiction by representing 
gender feminism's "impressionable" young adherents as reeducated dupes, 
but as we noted earlier this redraws what she regards as one of gender 
feminism's more problematic tactics.83 As we will see, the problem identified 
81 Barbara Sullivan, 'Sex Equality and the Australian Body Politic,' in Playing the State: 
Australian feminist interventions, ed. Sophie Watson (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1990), 
186. 
82Ibid., 18; 111. 
83Ibid., 106. 
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here regarding how the possible popularity and representativeness of gender 
feminism is handled by Hoff Sommers also surfaces when the accounts of 
Roiphe and Denfeld are compared. 
To summarise, Hoff Sommers' account has introduced a range of themes 
which, as we will see, run throughout all four accounts of 'victim feminism' 
considered in this chapter. Most notably, these include the idea that feminism 
has been taken over by an ideology which betrays the sensible equality-
orientation of feminism's first wave, which persists with a substantially 
untrue representation of women as the "hapless victims of patriarchy'', and 
which can only sustain this representation by producing "noble lies" regarding 
the present status of women. Hoff Sommers' contention that the production 
of such lies obscures the plight of "real victims"-"the victims of true abuse 
and discrimination"- is echoed throughout the accounts considered here, and 
forms a major preoccupation in the critical examination forwarded in the 
following chapter.84 Finally, let us note that two further aspects of Hoff 
Sommers' representation of gender feminism will remerge as we analyse the 
accounts of Roiphe, Denfeld and Wolf. The first is Hoff Sommers' central 
tactic of organising a diverse field of different feminisms into a dichotomy of 
'good' and 'bad' feminisms such that forms of feminism which ordinarily would 
be acknowledged as distinct or opposing-for example, Foucauldian feminism 
and gynocentric feminism-are merged, and the 'bad' feminism is represented 
as a unified, seamless whole which hosts neither debate, conflict nor 
dissent.SS The second aspect is her representation of gender feminism as 
"ideological" and her corollary dissociation of equity feminism, and its 
attendant commitment to liberalism and capitalism, from ideology. 
84Ibid., 220; 17. 
85For Hoff Sommers scathing critique of Foucault (who is "like Marx" in having "little love 
for the modern democratic state'', Ibid., 229) and of gender feminists who purportedly 
have uncritically adopted his "infantile leftism" (Ibid., 230) see Ibid., 202, 229-232, 253. 
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1.2 Roiphe: the ends of feminism 
While Hoff Sommers' book is quite wide-ranging in scope, Katie Roiphe's The 
Morning After: sex, fear and feminism focuses more narrowly on university-
based feminist activism in relation to sexual violence and sexual harassment. 
Indeed, Roiphe's book may be regarded as an amplification of Hoff Sommers' 
single chapter on feminist politicisations of sexual violence (a chapter in 
which Roiphe's book is cited appreciatively86). Like Hoff Sommers, Roiphe 
argues that the 1980s and early 1990s saw a significant shift in the 
character of feminism's mainstream and public face. Stating that her book is 
motivated by a "deep belief that some feminisms are better than others", 
Roiphe forges a dichotomy between 'good' and 'bad' feminisms similar to that 
found in Hoff Sommers' book. 87 However Roiphe's characterisation of the 
shift from one to the other feminism is made in less clearly defined terms 
than in Hoff Sommers' account. In Roiphe's book we do not, for example, find 
a clear separation between an 'equity' and a 'gender' feminism, although she 
does, like Hoff Sommers, associate the form of feminism she impugns-'rape-
crisis' feminism and 'politically correct' academic feminism-with myth-
making and illiberal authoritarianism. In Roiphe's less clearly defined version, 
it is argued that recent feminism is marked by a shift from an early second-
wave focus on female strength, autonomy and sexual liberation, to a focus on 
female powerlessness, vulnerability and sexual regulation. 
The central argument of Roiphe's book is based on her interpretation of 
the effect of feminism's newfound focus on "sexual regulation."88 Her 
argument is that feminist politicisations of sexual violence and sexual 
harassment actually have the effect of producing the forms of female 
86For Hoff Sommers' references to Roiphe's book see Who Stole Feminism?, 219, 222. 
87Roiphe, The Morning After, 7. 
88Jbid., 171. 
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victimisation and vulnerability which they seek to eradicate. By instituting a 
wide range of regulatory measures which are intended to protect women from 
forms of sexual violence and harassment (from campus blue-light systems to 
educational pamphlets, films and workshops about sexual violence and 
harassment), by broadening the definitions of sexual violence and 
harassment, and by directing an inordinate amount of public attention to an 
exaggerated "epidemic" of sexual violence, feminists build a climate of fear 
which "transforms perfectly stable women into hysterical, sobbing 
victims."89 In this climate "female sexual agency'' is denied and discouraged 
while "the image of women as powerless" is reinforced.90 "Again and again," 
Roiphe writes, "the rape-crisis movement peddles images of gender relations 
that deny female desire and infantilise women."91 
Given what she regards as feminism's representation of women as 
powerless victims, Roiphe notes that "feminists are closer to their backlash 
than they'd like to think."92 By this Roiphe means to argue that the political 
culture and techniques of rape-crisis feminism itself, as opposed to the anti-
feminist forces arrayed against feminist-led social change, are working to 
revive the very feminine stereotype early second-wave feminism sought to 
overturn: 
The image that emerges from feminist preoccupation with rape and 
sexual harassment is that of women as victims, offended by a 
professor's dirty joke, verbally pressured into sex by peers. This image 
of a delicate woman bears a striking resemblance to that fifties ideal 
my mother and the other women of her generation fought so hard to 
get away from. They didn't like her passivity, her wide-eyed innocence. 
They didn't like the fact that she was perpetually offended by sexual 
innuendo. They didn't like her excessive need for protection. She 
89Jbid., 112. 
90Jbid., 84; 90. 
91 Ibid., 65. 
92Ihid., 6. 
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represented personal, social, and psychological possibilities collapsed, 
and they worked and marched, shouted and wrote, to make her 
irrelevant for their daughters. But here she is again, with her pure 
intentions and her wide eyes. Only this time it is the feminists 
themselves who are breathing new life into her.93 
44 
According to Roiphe, reinforcing images of women as powerless produces in 
the women whom feminism would protect a feeling of powerlessness, fear and 
vulnerability where ordinarily there would be no such feeling and where, 
according to Roiphe, there should not be such feeling. Like Hoff Sommers, 
Roiphe argues that the forms of male power this feminism regulates against 
are to be regarded not as social realities but as products of a priggish, neo-
Victorian feminist mythology which is not adequately cognisant of feminism's 
successful achievement of female liberation.94 For Roiphe, the mythological 
status of these forms of male power is especially evident in the context of 
campus feminism given the relative safety of university campuses and the 
relative degree of privilege and protection already accorded their 
predominantly middle-class inhabitants. Of the university's female 
inhabitants Roiphe argues, like Hoff Sommers, that feminist mythology leads 
them to falsely identify as "innocent," "fragile," "passive,'' "gullible,'' and 
"sensitive" victims who are incapable of assuming the responsibilities which 
attend freedom.95 As we will see, Roiphe argues further that the university, 
swayed by forces of political correctness, has built a system of rewards which 
encourages such false identification. This creates a paradoxical situation in 
which young women, many of whom already are empowered by their socio-
economic location, disingenuously "embrace the mantle of victim status" as a 
further source of power. 96 
93Jbid., 6. 
94For Roiphe's comments on feminism's neo-Victorianism see Ibid., 67, 69. 
95Jbid., 60, 66, 172, 69, 172, 68-69. 
96Jbid., 44. 
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Roiphe's argument is conveyed through a sequence of analyses, based on 
personal experience and observation, of various elements of rape-crisis 
feminism's political culture, agenda and techniques. Her first chapter, for 
example, is concerned with the installation of a "blue light system" across the 
campus of Princeton university where Roiphe was a student, and which 
served as her window onto rape-crisis feminism. In the following passage 
Roiphe links the blue light system to the climate of fear she thinks rape-crisis 
feminism creates: 
A friend shows his younger sister around Princeton ... the blue lights 
catch her eye. She asks if the lights are for catching bugs. After some 
hesitation ... her brother tells her what they're really for. In case 
someone attacks you. In case someone tries to rape you. In case. In the 
long process of learning what those lights are really for, she'll learn 
vulnerability and lurking dangers in the bushes. She'll learn to be 
afraid walking around at night ... the campus is dramatically dotted 
with glowing blue lights ... They signal reassurance and warning at 
the same time. Red means stop, green means go, and blue means be 
afraid.97 
Roiphe's anecdote about the blue light system's lesson in fear works in with 
her argument that rape-crisis feminism is "training [women] in victimhood".98 
For Roiphe, the effectiveness of this training is perhaps no where more 
evident than in the subject of her second chapter, rape-crisis feminism's 
annual Take Back the Night march.99 In general, Roiphe characterises the 
march as self-defeating since it creates the very atmosphere that it seeks to 
overcome-the night no longer feels safe but rather is "suddenly charged with 
a nameless threat"lOO_and, although it is "intended to celebrate and bolster 
97Ibid., 28. 
98Ibid., 163. 
99Known in Australasia as the 'Reclaim the Night' march. 
100Ibid., 12. 
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women's strength, [the march] seems instead to celebrate their 
vulnerability ."101 
With this general characterisation in place, Roiphe moves on to table an 
array of criticisms of the march. The first of these is her argument that the 
march represents not a moment of collective political action but rather "a 
substitute for religion" and "march as therapy".102 Roiphe casts the march's 
main feature, an open-microphone speak-out in which survivors of sexual 
violence tells their stories, as an "obscene ... spectacle of mass confession" in 
which "students throw stories of suffering to the waiting crowds" who in turn 
derive an unavowed voyeuristic pleasure from these stories.103 The speak-
outs, she contends, set up a competitive scenario which will award those 
whose stories are "more Sadean, more incest-ridden, more violent, more like a 
paperback you can buy at a train station."104 The second criticism Roiphe 
tables is that this competitive scenario and climate of religious fervour 
inspires duplicity. Suggesting that truth may be the only real victim present 
in rape-crisis culture, she contends that "students are willing to lie" so as to 
enjoin this culture's "blanket warmth":l05 
The line between fact and fiction is a delicate one when it comes to 
survivor stories. In the heat of the moment, the confessional rush of 
relating graphic details to a supportive crowd, the truth may be 
stretched, battered, or utterly abandoned. It's impossible to tell how 
101 Ibid., 44. 
102Ibid., 38; 37. 
103Ibid., 42-43. 
104Ibid., 42. It is worth noting here that from an Australasian perspective Roiphe's 
account of the march is difficult to recognise. The Reclaim the Night marches I have 
attended in Sydney, Melbourne and Dunedin have tended to be characterised not just by 
seriousness and emotionality but great humour, diversity of expression, and lively 
debate about the politics of sexual violence (mostly notably regarding the intersections of 
race, ethnicity, class and gender in such politics). Perhaps Australasia's lack of 
proximity to the idiom of the confessional talk show is significant in making this 
difference. 
105Ibid., 39. 
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many of these stories are authentic, faithful accounts of what actually 
happened. They sound tinny, staged.106 
47 
As we will see in the following chapter, the testimonies of sexual violence 
survivors have always been associated with duplicity and thought to require 
the ratification of an impartial authority who will discern whether or not a 
form of violation truly has occurred. But let us note that Roiphe's mention of 
the "tinny" and "staged" character of survivor testimonies links with her third 
criticism of rape-crisis feminism's annual march, which is that the 
testimonies it hosts have a "formulaic" character.107 
According to Roiphe, the complexity and nuance of the incidents survivors 
retell are dropped out as speakers press their stories into rape-crisis 
feminism's generic vernacular. Referring to phrases which recur within 
survivor testimonies such as "I am a survivor," "I am finally breaking the 
silence," and "Thank you for listening", Roiphe writes: 
As the vocabulary shared across campuses reveals, there is an 
archetype, a model, for the victim's tale. Take Back the Night speak-
outs follow conventions as strict as any sonnet sequence or villanelle. 
As intimate details are squeezed into formulaic standards, they seem to 
be wrought with an emotion more generic than heartfelt.108 
One of the main themes of Roiphe's account emerges in this discussion of the 
formulaic character of survivor testimonies. Developing her argument that 
rape-crisis feminism encourages privileged, empowered women to falsely 
identify as powerless victims, Roiphe contends that this politics in turn 
construes the subject position 'powerless victim' as a powerful source of 
authority. Roiphe reads this theme of 'the power of the powerless' into rape-
106Ibid., 42. 
107Ibid., 36. 
108Ibid., 36. 
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cr1s1s feminism's "obsession with silence."109 She suggests that self-
identification as one who has been silenced by "a shadowy force [which] takes 
on many names-patriarchy, men, society" is the signature gesture of her 
peers, and is a gesture which has come to yield great authority in the 
university setting: 110 
These Princeton women, future lawyers, newspaper reporters, 
investment bankers, are hardly the voiceless, by most people's 
definition. But silence is poetic. Being silenced is even more poetic. 
These days people vye for the position of being silenced ... It is the 
presumption of silence that gives these women the right to speak ... 
Silence is the passkey to the empowering universe of the 
disempowered. Having been silenced on today's campus is the ultimate 
source of authority.111 
Hence Roiphe's explanation for the continuing popularity of Take Back the 
Night marches is that "there is power to be drawn from declaring one's 
victimhood and oppression."112 Before reviewing Roiphe's critical 
commentary on the role played by broadened definitions of sexual 
harassment and sexual violence in rape-crisis feminism, let us look to where 
this theme of the 'power of the powerless' travels in Roiphe's account. 
A chapter of Roiphe's book provides a series of portraits of her peers 
which are crafted to demonstrate the kinds of people produced by rape-crisis 
feminism and 'politically correct' academic feminism more broadly.113 The 
portraits are punctuated with anecdotes telling of Roiphe's adversarial 
encounters with these inauthentic, politically correct types, encounters in 
which Roiphe's arguments were shut down and in which she was personally 
109Ibid., 35. 
llOibid., 34-35. 
111 Ibid., 34-35. 
112Ibid., 44. 
113'The Mad Hatters' Tea Party,' Ibid., 113-137. 
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insulted.114 Hence, more than in any chapter of the book, this chapter 
conveys what appears to be Roiphe's quite profound sense of alienation from 
her generation, and conveys as well her understanding that feminism's 
newfound political correctness is essentially authoritarian and censorious. 
The portraits include a young woman whose second-hand clothing and 
commitment to leftist feminism carefully disguise her upper-class 
background, 115 a graduate student of literature who reads not literature but 
feminist literary theory so as to arm herself with enough jargon to "calculate 
her way into the [academic] profession",116 and a young man whose 
commitment to sexual diversity and immersion in "profeminist reading and 
activity" situate him as a foolish "new Adam being created out of Eve's 
rib".117 
In providing these portraits Roiphe aims to describe the emergence of 
what she refers to as a "Nietzschean breed", a generation of women who are 
positioned to take hypocritical advantage of sexual liberation (they wear "less 
clothing than most people"118) as well as feminist-inspired sexual regulation 
("It's great that men stare at you at a party, but they shouldn't stare if you 
don't want them to"119). Situating feminism as a store of useful fictions to 
which opportunistic women feign commitment, she writes: 
With their will to power, Lauren and her friends are a Nietzschean 
breed. They take status where they can get it. Socially and 
intellectually, the university rewards women for being sexy and 
rewards them for being oppressed. Declaring oneself oppressed 
translates into definite social currency, and so does sexual 
attractiveness . . . these women . . . are not about to surrender the 
114Ibid., 114, 115, 117, 118, 121, 127-8, 131. 
115Ibid., 115-120. 
116Ibid., 126-130. 
117Ibid., 135-137. 
118Ibid., 124. 
1l9Ibid., 125. 
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opportunities and benefits offered to the flirt or the militant 
feminist.120 
50 
For our purposes, what is most interesting here is Roiphe's assumption of 
'victim' as an authorial location. Situating herself as prey to the plethoric yet, 
as only she can see, hypocritical display of strength and status-gaining in her 
milieu, her book actually assumes the narrative structure of a confessional 
which finally breaks the silence about the systematic workings of a shadowy 
power, feminist political correctness. Setting this narrative structure in 
place, her Preface declares: "This book comes out of frustration, out of anger, 
out of the names I've been called, out of all the times I didn't say something 
because it might offend current feminist sensibility."121 
This suggests that the category 'victim' plays a complicated role in 
Roiphe's account. On one hand, Roiphe argues that feminism trains women in 
victimhood when its relentless focus on sexual violence, harassment and 
systemic oppression generates more and more reason for women to feel 
powerless, vulnerable and voiceless. In this sense, feminism produces the 
victims it purports to represent and creates the phenomena of victimisation 
it aims to remedy.122 On the other hand, however, Roiphe also argues that 
this politics of victimisation empowers those whom it falsely casts as victims, 
and victimises those who dissent from its world view. The latter, presumably, 
emerge as the 'real victims' in this political scenario, meaning that we glimpse 
something of Hoff Sommers' search for the 'real victim' in Roiphe's account 
as well. We will examine this search, along with the idea that the accounts of 
'victim feminism' find their centre of gravity when they are able to point to 
the 'victims' of'victim feminism,' in the following chapter. 
120Ibid., 125. 
121Jbid., 7. 
122For a direct statement that feminism "creates the problem" it aims to remedy see Ibid., 
110. 
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Let us return to Roiphe's critical commentary on feminism's expanded 
definitions of sexual harassment and sexual violence. In relation to sexual 
harassment, Roiphe is especially concerned with feminist redefinitions of 
sexual harassment which allow that such harassment "is not confined to 
relationships involving power inequity."123 Where the original definition of 
sexual harassment was concerned strictly with the abuse of direct authority, 
the redefinition with which Roiphe is concerned allows that sexual 
harassment can occur between people occupying an ostensibly equal relation 
(among co-workers, among students) and can be perpetrated by the 
ostensibly less powerful party to an inequitable relation (such as a student 
sexually harassing a teacher). Roiphe argues that by broadening the 
definition in this way, feminists work to institute an "assumption that female 
students or faculty must be protected from the sexual harassment of male 
peers or inferiors", where this in turn "promotes the regrettable idea that men 
are natively more powerful than women."124 For Roiphe, in serving only to 
"reinforce the image of women as powerless", this redefinition of sexual 
harassment demeans women, works to "undermine" their hard-won 
authority, and creates a "hypersensitive environment" which injects 
"suspicion and distrust" into the many relations which constitute any given 
workplace or public domain.125 Moreover, given that "unwanted sexual 
attention is part of nature", this redefinition's intervention upon the natural 
presumably is doomed to failure.126 Working her book's central argument into 
her account of sexual harassment, Roiphe contends that it is not sexual 
123Ibid., 87. 
124Jbid., 89. 
125Jbid., 90, 90, 93, 92. 
126Jbid., 87. 
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harassment itself, but rather feminist efforts to counter it, which 
"transforms perfectly stable women into hysterical, sobbing victims."127 
Roiphe's further objection to the feminist redefinition of sexual 
harassment lies with what she regards as this redefinition's loss of objective 
criteria for determining whether or not harassment has occurred. In releasing 
the definition of sexual harassment from its original mooring in relations of 
inequity, adjudication of this form of harm becomes increasingly dependent 
upon "the individual psyche", upon the perceptions of those who think they 
have experienced sexual harassment.128 When Roiphe notes that university 
counsellors "reportedly tell students, If you feel sexually harassed then 
chances are you were", her account comes to be animated by an anxiety 
about the kind of power feminism's redefinition bestows upon self-identified 
victims of sexual harassment. Roiphe argues that this redefinition's 
amenability to subjective criteria invites false accusation in offering "an 
ideology that explains "uncomfortable" in political terms".129 By distributing 
"alarmist propaganda" which charges "everyday experience" with the 
prospect of traumatic victimisation, feminists are inviting a litigious wave of 
false and trivial accusations. BO The theme of the 'power of the powerless' 
remerges here, as Roiphe illustrates her argument through reference to a 
play in which a female student, "puffed large with her sense of her own 
victimisation", claims power over her professor by falsely accusing him of 
sexual harassment.BI Angered by his inability to prove his innocence, the 
professor finally does insult and assault the student, who thereby becomes 
127Ibid., 112. 
128Jbid., 90. 
129Jbid., 92. 
130Jbid., 104, 112. 
131The play Roiphe refers to is Oleanna, written by David Mamet, Ibid., 106. 
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"the victim she never was".132 With this, Roiphe writes, "the student's 
charges are seen for what they are: a self-fulfilling prophecy."133 Here, the 
innocent professor emerges as the real victim, while the student is cast as a 
false victim who desires victimisation on account of her thirst for power. 
Roiphe makes a similar set of objections to rape-crisis feminism's 
redefinition of sexual violence. In unpacking this last aspect of her account I 
will raise some critical points in relation to Roiphe's argument which will be 
further developed in the following chapter. In relation to sexual violence, 
Roiphe argues that feminists are using the issue of rape as a "trump card" to 
forward their "overtly ideological" interpretation of gender relations.134 The 
moral gravity of "declarations of rape", she argues, is used to "block analysis" 
of feminism's engineered "rape epidemic", and to prohibit questioning of the 
vast amounts of university money and resources feminists have attracted to 
the movement against rape.135 Like Hoff Sommers, Roiphe disputes Mary 
Koss' statistics on the prevalence of sexual violence, contending that these 
statistics are only possible when one includes events which ought not to be 
characterised as rape. "Everyone agrees that rape is a terrible thing," she 
writes, "but we don't agree on what rape is. There is a gray area in which 
someone's rape might be another person's bad night."136 In relation to this 
gray area, Roiphe is concerned to reject feminist and legal definitions of rape 
which remove traditional rape law's grounds for distinguishing consensual sex 
from forcible rape: the use or threat of physical force.137 According to Roiphe, 
definitions of rape which allow that rape has occurred when only "verbal 
l32Jbid., 107. 
133Jbid.' 106. 
l34Jbid., 56. 
135Jbid., 56-57. 
136Jbid., 54. 
137Jbid., 61. 
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coercion"l38 was used and which promote the idea that parties to a sexual 
relation ought to have displayed "active consent", 139 work to recuperate 
Victorian views about "the fragility of the female body and will".140 Moreover, 
Roiphe argues, such definitions of rape extend the purview of the law beyond 
its rightful place and work to recode concupiscent ambiguity as danger and 
risk.141 Roiphe also expresses concern that feminism's expanded definition of 
rape has worked to conjure a genre of "retrospective trauma" which 
empowers women to "decide afterward" that "a night that was a blur, a night 
you wish hadn't happened" was rape.142 This, she argues, trivialises the 
experiences of real victims of real rape.143 So as to counter such 
trivialisation, Roiphe reasons that the word "rape" needs to be "reserved" to 
describe "instances of physical violence or the threat of physical violence" .144 
This way, the experiences of women "raped by a stranger at knife point" 
would not be falsely equated with the experiences of women "raped by their 
former boyfriend."145 It is clear from this characterisation of aggravated 
stranger rape as 'real rape' that Roiphe is concerned to reassert traditional 
rape law's hierarchy oflaw-worthy sexual violence. 
To demonstrate the neo-Victorian character of feminist redefinitions of 
rape, Roiphe punctuates her account with excerpts from Victorian guides to 
feminine manners in which men's prerogative positioning, and women's 
requirement of protection, is assumed.146 These excerpts play a key role in 
138Ibid., 66-67. 
139Ibid., 62. 
140Ibid., 66. 
141Ibid., 62. 
142Ibid., 80. This point explains the title of Roiphe's book The Morning After. 
143Jbid., 81. 
144Jbid., 81-82. 
145Jbid., 82. 
146Jbid., 66, 69. 
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Roiphe's argument against the inclusion of verbal coercion as a criteria for 
determining rape. Roiphe contends that century-old assumptions about 
"female passivity and gullibility" are rekindled when feminists express 
concern that some women's lower levels of self-esteem negatively affect their 
ability to assert their desires: 147 
[Feminists present] a portrait of the cowering woman, knocked on her 
back by the barest feather of peer pressure. Solidifying this image of 
women into policy implies an acceptance of the passive role. By 
protecting women against verbal coercion, these feminists are 
promoting the view of women as weak-willed, alabaster bodies, whose 
virtue must be protected from the cunning encroachments of the 
outside world. The idea that women can't withstand verbal or 
emotional pressure infantilises them. The suggestion lurking beneath 
this definition of rape is that men are not just physically but 
intellectually and emotionally more powerful than women ... We 
should not nurture this woman on her back ... we should not support 
her in her passivity ... The brand of "low self-esteem" these 
psychologists describe should not be tolerated, it should be changed. 
Whether or not we feel pressured, regardless of our level of self-
esteem, the responsibility for our actions is still our own.148 
In sum, Roiphe finds rape-crisis feminism's campaign against sexual violence 
lacking in two respects. Firstly, this campaign forges political leverage by 
exploiting the moral gravity of the issue of sexual violence and by 
exaggerating the prevalence of sexual violence. Secondly, the expanded 
definition of sexual violence which enables this campaign's exaggerated 
account of sexual violence fosters a neo-Victorian policy of protectionism 
which elides and is inimical to female sexual agency. 
Having tabled Roiphe's perspective on sexual violence let us note that 
Roiphe does raise compelling concerns regarding an increased imposition of 
juridical reason upon the realm of sexuality, and the extent to which this 
l47Ibid., 69. 
148Jbid., 67-68. 
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imposition may preempt female sexual agency. However, let us also register 
that Roiphe does not provide an adequate account of the motivations which 
lay behind feminist politicisations and redefinitions of rape. Indeed, Roiphe 
seems studiously to avoid such an account. Apart from her suggestion that 
rape-crisis feminism's efforts are motivated by the promise of financial gain, 
Roiphe makes one vague reference to its attempt to "break down myths like 
'She asked for it"'.149 By this Roiphe refers to the feminist project to counter 
the logic of victim precipitation in popular and juridical conceptions of sexual 
violence. As we will see in the following chapter, the concept of victim 
precipitation has played a prominent role in casting women who experience 
sexual violence as responsible for their violation. One of the ramifications of 
Roiphe's having dropped consideration of the question of victim precipitation 
out of her account of feminism and sexual violence is that she elides as well 
the flipside of her Victorian Madonna: the Victorian whore whose assumed 
sexual agency is thought to overpower men such that they no longer may be 
regarded as responsible for their actions.ISO As one of the Ormond College 
complainants recalled of her media representation when her indecent assault 
case against the Ormond College Master went to court: "[I was] portrayed as 
endowed with a type of terrifying sexual power that once unleashed was 
capable of annihilating a man."151 
149Ibid., 71. 
150For an account of the role of this notion of female sexual agency in psychoanalytic 
seduction theory see Jeffrey Masson A Dark Science: women, sexuality and psychiatry in 
the nineteenth century (New York: Noonday Press, 1986). 
lSI:x:x: [Anonymous], 'Sticks and Stones,' in Bodyjamming: sexual harassment, feminism 
and public life ed. Jenna Mead (Sydney: Vintage, Random House, 1997), 53. The 
Ormond College case involved two complaints of sexual harassment lodged by female 
students against the Master of Ormond College at the University of Melbourne. The 
alleged harassment took place at the College's 1991 valedictory dinner. The College 
Master occupied a position of direct authority over the students. After several failed 
attempts to pursue their complaint through university channels, the students went to 
the police and filed criminal charges of indecent assault. The Melbourne magistrate's 
court upheld the charges. The case stimulated intense public debate about the issue of 
sexual harassment. The better part of public sympathy swayed against the 
complainants. Helen Garner's controversial book The First Stone: some questions about 
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In positing sexual agency as a given and non-complex element of women's 
present liberation, Roiphe fails to reckon with the extent to which assumed 
sexual agency has been the ground on which many women's sexual 
victimisation has been rendered invisible. She figures female sexual agency, 
finally achieved when white women overcome their Victorian heritage, as the 
worldly referent of feminist success. However for many women, most notably 
women of colour and sex workers, assumed sexual agency has fostered 
victim-blame and ensured greatly limited access to the category 'law-worthy 
rape victim'. It would seem that one would require pause before affirming the 
sexual agency ascribed to the Hottentot Venus or Manet's Olympia.152 My 
point, then, is that Roiphe is right to take issue with what she regards as 
feminism's regulatory rekindling of "myths surrounding female innocence 
[which] have been used to keep women inside and behind veils", but wrong in 
her assumption that counter-images of female sexual agency are new to 
history and necessarily coterminous with liberation-for many women, the 
opposite is the case.153 
A further and related matter to be raised in relation to Roiphe's critique of 
rape-crisis feminism pertains to the alternative her account poses to what 
she sees as this feminism's reification of female vulnerability. In the 
quotation cited above, Roiphe argues that certain forms of low self-esteem 
"should not be tolerated" but rather "should be changed." This suggests that 
Roiphe links high self-esteem to invulnerability and the capacity to assert 
sex and power (Sydney: Picador, 1995) was written in response to the case. The book, 
which portrays the Ormond College women as false victims and the Master as their 
prey, became the epicentre of the Australian chapter of the victim feminist debate. 
152Ngozi Onwurah presents a thoughtful reflection on the 'Hottentot Venus' in her film 
And Still I Rise (New York: Women Make Movies, 1993). Contributions to the debate 
among feminist art historians regarding the agency of Manet's Olympia include Eunice 
Lipton, Alias Olympia: a woman's search for Manet's notorious model and her own desire 
(London: Thames and Hudson, 1993) and Griselda Pollock, 'Modernity and the Spaces 
of Femininity,' Vision and Difference: femininity, feminism and the histories of art 
(London: Routledge, 1991), 50-90. 
153Ibid., 72. 
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oneself, however she does not indicate what kind of intervention or process 
might stand between low self-esteem and the 'change' toward developing the 
capacity for self-assertion. As we will see in the following chapter, the very 
ethos of survivorship Roiphe so maligns in her book is attuned precisely to 
articulating this process. That is, rape-crisis feminism is marked by an effort 
to chart and encourage a subjective transition from victim identity (marked 
by low self-regard) to survivor identity (characterised by high self-regard and 
the capacity for self-assertion). As Roiphe herself describes, the sexual 
assault "survivors" hosted at Take Back the Night marches speak of the 
"ascent toward self-esteem" that rape-crisis feminism has facilitated for 
them.154 
On this point, then, Roiphe and rape-crisis feminists are in accord. Both 
suggest that low self-esteem is inimical to women's assumption of agency, 
and both perceive the need for 'change'. The main difference is that Roiphe 
sees self-assertion exclusively through the prism of women's individual 
exercise of self-responsibility, while rape-crisis feminism, apart from its 
discourse of survivorship, takes recourse to the agency of the law owing to its 
philosophy that the burden of preventing sexual violence should not rest with 
women alone. A further difference is that Roiphe's account hosts an 
assumption that contemporary women simply have fully-fledged agentic 
capacities, while the work of rape-crisis feminists suggests they assume 
women have partial agency and at this stage require support-here Roiphe 
uses the word 'protection'-if they are to assume full agency. The conflict 
between Roiphe and rape-crisis feminism, then, does not just turn on the 
question of whether feminism's regulatory measures 'support' women to 
assume agency, or 'protect' women from having to assume agency. The 
conflict comes down to what kind of generalisation one is prepared to make 
154Ibid., 37. 
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regarding the contemporary relation of women to agency. Roiphe, in accord 
with traditional rape law, theorises on the basis of an a priori blanket 
attribution of agency to women, while rape-crisis feminism's perception of the 
relation of women to agency as dynamic and complex leads them to develop 
and advance a more cautious understanding of women as partial and 
potential agents, and indeed potential victims, whose exercise of agency is 
better facilitated by a reformed public sphere. I would not argue that this 
logic of facilitation be protected from critique. However Roiphe's alternative 
logic-women are agents and where they fail to exercise agency they are to 
blame themselves-although convenient for her purposes, is insufficient for 
having skirted the very process through which women come to be constituted 
as agents, and disturbing in its likeness to traditional rape law's regime of 
victim-blame. 
In sum, Roiphe's account seeks to challenge the legitimacy of 
contemporary feminism in two primary ways, both of which pertain to this 
feminism's interpretation of social reality. Firstly, Roiphe argues consistently 
that this feminism's representation of women as powerless victims is 
substantially untrue given the positive relation to agency that second wave 
feminism has enabled women to assume. Secondly, Roiphe argues that this 
feminism is the engineer of, rather than the remedy for, the forms of injury it 
ostensibly is arrayed against. As such this feminism is harmful to the women 
it purports to protect, harmful to those who will suffer false accusation on 
account of its alarmism, harmful to the real victims of sexual violence whose 
plight is trivialised by this feminism's expanded definition of sexual violence, 
and harmful to the university in its assault on truth and promotion of "the 
timid, inarticulate, even dull student who has risen to power on the crest of 
the multiculturalist wave."155 Roiphe's remedy for the harmful effects of this 
155Ibid., 107. 
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feminism echoes Hoff Sommers' account in calling for a halt to feminism's 
politically correct reforms, a return to traditional modes of adjudicating sexual 
violence, and a rekindling of the earlier feminist definition of sexual 
harassment. 
Before turning to Rene Denfeld's account, let us note that Roiphe's 
portrait of the feminism she impugns prompts one last point regarding the 
matter of this feminism's popularity and representativeness. Roiphe's 
representation of her generation as steeped in the form of feminism she 
impugns would seem to contradict Hoff Sommers estimation that "it is surely 
a minority'' of young women who are committed to this form of feminism. As 
we will see, Denfeld's account further complicates this matter in being crafted 
along generational lines: according to Denfeld, this form of feminism is the 
predilection of an "old feminist order" and is summarily rejected by "young 
women". Denfeld identifies Roiphe as part of this young generation, but 
Roiphe identifies herself as a minority of one.156 Hence between these 
accounts-and in Hoff Sommers' case within her account-we are not given 
a stable portrait of this feminism as either 'representative' or 
'unrepresentative' of a majority of women, even though stability on this point 
forms a necessary element of the counter-discourse these accounts pose. 
1.3 Denfeld: Victorianism versus liberalism 
If one were to go about synthesising Hoff Sommers' and Roiphe's books into 
one single account, the result would look very much like Rene Denfeld's book 
The New Victorians: a young woman's challenge to the old feminist order. 
Echoing Hoff Sommers' critique of 'gender feminism,' Denfeld argues that 
contemporary feminism's radical world view has initiated a departure from 
156For Denfeld's identification of Roiphe as representative of young women's resistance to 
the 'old feminist order' see The New Victorians, 81, 202. 
THE CATEGORY 'VICTIM' AND POPULAR FEMINISM 61 
and betrayal of feminism's proper path, the pursuit of equality. Echoing 
Roiphe, Denfeld argues that feminism's radical world view is animated by a 
priggish neo-Victorian morality which threatens women's successful 
achievement of sexual liberation when it recasts women as the passive 
asexual victims of predatory rakish men. Synthesising the complaints of Hoff 
Sommers and Roiphe, Denfeld refers to the form of feminism she impugns as 
"New Victorianism", a cast of feminism which has "changed the feminist 
agenda from fighting for equality and choice to promoting socially, sexually, 
and politically repressive ideals."157 For Denfeld, this repressive feminism's 
neglect of sexual equality is symptomatic of its departure from "good old-
fashioned liberalism, the kind that supports freedom of expression and 
upholds and respects the rights of the individual as fundamental to a free 
society."158 Hence her account is centred on a dichotomy between a 
'Victorian' feminism and a 'liberal' feminism. 
Denfeld's book also features all of the key arguments made by Hoff 
Sommers and Roiphe. Like these critics, Denfeld impugns Mary Koss' 
statistics on the prevalence of sexual violence, arguing that broadened 
definitions of sexual violence trivialise the plight of real victims of real rape.159 
As with Roiphe, Denfeld contends that feminism's neo-Victorian "sexual 
purity crusade" endorses "state regulation of sexual behaviour" and aims to 
"revive notions of female sexual purity and helplessness".160 And Denfeld 
enjoins Hoff Sommers in criticising women's studies curricula as attuned to 
indoctrination rather than education, and in objecting to this feminism's 
representation of women as "helpless puppets" suffering a patriarchally 
151The New Victorians, 239. 
158Jbid., 244. 
159Jbid., 89. 
160Jbid., 237, 235, 237. 
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induced "false consciousness."161 Given our acquaintance with these lines of 
argument, our exposition of Denfeld will concentrate on distilling the three 
aspects of her account which distinguish it from those of Hoff Sommers and 
Roiphe. 
The first of these is the way in which Denfeld figures the problem with 
feminism as one of generational divide. Where Roiphe's account is set up as 
an apostatic departure from her generation's disingenuous investment in 
feminism's empowering brand of powerlessness, Denfeld's account is set up to 
voice her generation's alienation from and rejection of feminism's focus upon 
"a singular female subject ... woman as helpless, violated and oppressed 
victim."162 Interestingly, in the Australian chapter of the 'victim feminist' 
debate, this generational divide was figured the opposite way around: second 
wave feminists angrily opposed what they regarded as the younger feminist 
generation's righteous insistence upon female powerlessness.163 But the 
primary concern motivating Denfeld's North American account is that young 
women, even as they are committed to sexual equality, "refuse to call 
themselves feminists" and "want nothing to do with women's organisations" 
because they are unable to identify with the brand of feminism which now 
stands as feminism's mainstream and public face.164 Like Hoff Sommers, 
Denfeld contends that feminism has been 'stolen' by a small and 
unrepresentative group of women. But in Denfeld's case these women are 
161Ibid., 164. 
162Ibid., 62. 
163This view was put forward most saliently in the following books: Helen Garner, The 
First Stone and Beatrice Faust, Backlash? Balderdash! Where Feminism is Going Right 
(Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 1993). Garner's argument, that the 
litigiousness of young feminists betrays the eros-affirming politics of their sexually 
liberated antecedents, is similar to that of Roiphe. Significantly, Beatrice Faust wrote 
the forward for the Australian edition of Denfeld's book (The New Victorians, ix-xii). Two 
particular books were devoted to rebuffing the plaint voiced by Garner and Faust: 
Virginia Trioli, Generation F: sex, power and the young feminist (Melbourne: Minerva, 
1996) and Jenna Mead, ed., Bodyjamming: sexual harassment, feminism and public life 
(Sydney: Vintage, Random House, 1997). 
164The New Victorians, 203. 
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represented as old, embittered radicals, and the project to reclaim feminism is 
conceived as an inter-generational battle in which youthful proponents of 
sexual equality will rally against their misguided antecedents. This project is 
conceived of as a battle rather than an interlocutory negotiation because, 
according to Denfeld, New Victorianism is marked by an authoritarian 
intolerance of dissent. Denfeld observes that women who "dare to step 
forward" and criticise the political culture and agenda of this form of feminism 
are "dismissed" as "backlashers" or as having been "manipulat[ed] by 
negative male ideas."165 "[C]urrent feminists", she writes, "ensure that fresh 
ideas, differences of opinion, true diversity, and honest debate aren't welcome 
in their movement."166 
So Denfeld's account is designed to operate in two ways. Firstly, given that 
her generation's alienation from feminism has been "shrouded in silence", her 
account seeks to break this silence and operate as a mouthpiece for her 
generation.167 Secondly, her account is designed to operate as a rallying cry to 
her generation to "reclaim feminism".168 To forward her account's role as a 
mouthpiece, Denfeld punctuates her chapters with lengthy excerpts from 
interviews she conducted with women in their twenties, excerpts which are 
designed to act as testimony to young women's shared alienation from New 
Victorianism.169 Aside from the manner in which New Victorians handle the 
issue of sexual violence, Denfeld singles out a range of New Victorian traits 
165Jbid., 202, 164. 
l66Jbid., 203. 
167Jbid., 19. 
168Jbid., 266-279. 
169Jn her Introduction, Denfeld describes the intended function of these testimonies as 
well as how she gathered them: "Throughout this book, you will hear voices from other 
women of my generation. These women come from a variety of backgrounds-from 
struggling young mothers, to students, to women in the workforce-but despite a 
tremendous diversity in their lives, all believe in women's rights. Yet almost all refuse to 
call themselves feminists. I sought these women out in a variety of places, and I make 
no claim that I conducted anything even remotely resembling a scientific survey. But I do 
think that these women speak for many." Ibid., 21. 
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which serve to alienate young women. These include misandry (or "male-
bashing" as Denfeld puts it170), "exclusive focus on lesbian rights",171 and 
opposition to pornography.172 Given its importance to the issue of feminism's 
representativeness in Denfeld's account, let us consider her criticism of the 
New Victorian focus on lesbian rights (without, however, dwelling on the point 
that supporting lesbian visibility would seem to be at odds with 
Victorianism) .173 
According to Denfeld, emphasis upon lesbian rights, and idealisation of 
lesbian relationships as truly liberatory, is a primary feature of this 
feminism's misandrist "anti-phallic campaign".174 This campaign alienates 
not just young women in general but young heterosexual women in particular, 
for their interests are sidelined in favour of the interests of lesbian women, 
and they "are made to feel they have to justify their sexual choices" in the 
face of the campaign's "antiheterosexual" focus.175 Fusing identity politics 
with a concept of proportional representation, Denfeld reasons that because 
lesbian women's issues pertain to "gay" as opposed to "gender" 
discrimination, and because heterosexual women outnumber homosexual 
women, the interests of heterosexual women should in fact take priority 
within feminism: 
... for many women, feminism should be concerned with representing 
all women-regardless of race, class, or sexual orientation-and the 
idea that any one group of women should be overrepresented is 
offensive. White women have always been overly represented in 
feminism, but no one would herald that as positive ... many lesbian 
rights centre on issues of gay discrimination, not gender 
170Ibid., 25-57. 
171 Ibid., 202. 
172Ibid., 90-123. 
173Ibid., 42. 
174Ibid., 25-57. 
l 75Ibid., 26. 
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discrimination-and the women's movement should be fighting gender 
discrimination first and foremost ... If feminism is the struggle for all 
women's rights, then lesbian issues would have to come after efforts 
for such things as political parity, child care, and an end to job 
discrimination.176 
65 
By referring to the historical centrality of white women's interests in western 
feminism, Denfeld appears to enjoin the ongoing feminist debate about the 
practices of exclusion and exnomination which have attended feminist 
circumscriptions of the category 'women'. 
Let us note, however, that even as Denfeld aligns herself with this project 
to critique feminism's exclusionary tactics, she employs the very tactic this 
project presses against: the representation of women who do not conform to 
the heterosexual norm as somehow unable to be registered as 
straightforward examples of 'women.' Assuming that political gains for 
lesbian women will not benefit "all women", and assuming further that 
lesbian women are discriminated against not as "women" but as "gays", 
Denfeld puts lesbian women 'in their place': a sidelined minority whose issues 
must "come after" the primary business of feminism lest heterosexual 
women-the proper referent for feminist politics-be alienated from their 
movement. As we will register at greater length in the following chapter, the 
manoeuvre Denfeld performs here is a crucial element of the critique of 
feminism offered in the accounts we address in this chapter. The manoeuvre 
involves taking on the style of radical politics so as to recode mainstream 
values and practices (in this case heterosexuality) as transgressive 
departures from feminism's oppressive 'norm'. But for the moment let us note 
simply that the population of women Denfeld's account is designed to speak 
for are marked out by her not just as 'young' but as 'heterosexual'. These are 
176Jbid., 42-43. My emphasis. 
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the particular traits she attaches to that "majority of women" whose 
alienation from feminism she seeks to counter.177 
The second operation of Denfeld's account, to issue a rallying cry to her 
generation to reclaim feminism, is articulated very clearly in Denfeld's final 
chapter: 
New Victorian causes hurt the pursuit of equality and often directly 
infringe upon our rights as individuals ... We should not feel we have 
to tolerate this because New Victorians claim that criticising their 
causes makes one an agent of the "backlash." This is a lie, used to 
squash dissent and keep the movement closed off to the majority of 
women ... I believe that standing adamantly against New Victorianism 
is crucial to creating a new, truly inclusive movement concerned with 
equality. We need to make it clear we do not believe they speak for 
women. We have got to make the movement more open to women, 
and the only way to do that is get [sic] rid of those who are driving 
women away ... as long as New Victorians are allowed to own the 
feminist label, more and more women will be alienated from any 
organised movement for equality ... and progress will continue to be 
stalled.178 
This statement has much in common with Hoff Sommers' formulation: when 
feminism returns to the project of equality, the "ideologically narrow" New 
Victorians will give way to true inclusivity and representativeness.179 
However this statement, particularly its final comments regarding 
feminism's stalled progress, may also be used to identify the second respect in 
which Denfeld's account may be distinguished from those of Hoff Sommers 
and Roiphe. The difference has to do with how Denfeld represents the political 
character and effectivity of the feminism she impugns. 
Two points are to be made in relation to this difference. Firstly, in tune 
with Hoff Sommers' argument that feminism's agenda for equality "is not yet 
177Ibid., 277. 
178Ibid., 277. Emphasis in original. 
179Ibid., 278. 
THE CATEGORY 'VICTIM' AND POPULAR FEMINISM 67 
fully achieved", Denfeld holds that feminism's progress toward. equality has 
been "stalled" at the point of near-equality. However, unlike Hoff Sommers, 
Denfeld does go on to indicate what remains to be achieved. Denfeld tables an 
agenda for a "final wave" of feminism, a final round of reforms which will see 
feminism achieve equality.180 The second point to be made is that, while the 
accounts of Hoff Sommers and Roiphe act as testimony to the vast political 
efficacy of the form of feminism they impugn, Denfeld argues that this form 
of feminism is politically ineffectual on account of its adoption of an "outsider 
stance".181 This gives rise to confusions about how we are to understand this 
feminism's political strategy. Let us expand on this second point before 
looking at Denfeld's agenda for feminism's final wave. 
According to Denfeld, New Victorianism incarnates feminism as apolitical 
moralism rather than publicly engaged politics. The New Victorian turn, she 
argues, has involved a retreat from "political and economic activism".182 New 
Victorian "ideological" indulgence in issues of sexuality, popular culture, 
spiritualism and self-development, as well as its stubborn anti-capitalism and 
distrust of the strategy of reformism, has resulted in its being ever more 
ineffectual when it comes to concrete political issues. Hence progress toward 
equality has stalled and political "inertia" and "passivity" have set in.183 
Denfeld explains that this feminism's "women-centred" ideology has spawned 
an "absurdly unattainable" utopian political vision which aims to substitute 
"patriarchal systems" with "an ill-defined, feminist-inspired matriarchy."184 
For Denfeld this vision is absurd since its attainment would involve 
jettisoning a number of social necessities: "free markets, capitalism, 
180Ibid., 267. 
181Ibid., 186. 
182Ibid., 132. 
183Ibid., 185. 
184Ibid., 14, 186. 
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democracy, education, all forms of hierarchy, meat-eating, and objective 
thinking."185 This vision, in which "[social] transformation is passivity 
masquerading as activism", has enabled feminism's "retreat from the 
daylight world of public involvement" in carving out three roles for its 
proponents: "outsider", "moral leader" and "martyr".186 
There are a number of confusions at play in Denfeld's portrayal of this 
feminism. Firstly, even as Denfeld defines this feminism as a moralism rather 
than a politics, her account, like those of Hoff Sommers and Roiphe, 
illustrates very clearly the political efficacy of this feminism and, as with 
these other critics, her account draws its reason for being precisely from this 
efficacy. If the New Victorians were not apolitical force to be reckoned with, 
Denfeld's account surely would be bereft of purpose. Denfeld and the other 
critics seek to demonstrate that this feminism, quite apart from its 
regulatory and extra-legal influence upon behavioural mores, has managed to 
yield a considerable degree of institutional power, public visibility, and political 
clout. This feminism, they argue, is so publicly visible that 'ordinary women' 
know to identify it as feminism's new 'mainstream'. According to Denfeld, one 
of the main proponents of this feminism is Catharine MacKinnon. However, 
during the late 1980s and into the 1990s, MacKinnon arguably enjoyed more 
public attention than any other Western feminist the world over. And her 
anti-pornography politics pursued the strategy of legal reform, as distinct 
from the revolutionary utopianism Denfeld attributes to New Victorianism. 
MacKinnon's anti-pornography politics may resemble what Denfeld describes 
as New Victorianism's "sexual purity crusade", but it certainly does not read 
as an "outsider stance". 
185Ibid., 14. 
186Ibid., 186, 185. 
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Secondly, at Denfeld's time of writing, the "feminist leaders" she identifies 
as proponents of an apolitical outsider New Victorianism-Gloria Steinem, 
Susan Faludi, Naomi Wolf, Eleanor Smeal, and representatives of the (North 
American) National Organisation for Women-were explicit in their support 
of the Clinton administration, partly on account of Clinton's masterful 
construction of his centre-right politics as left-leaning and feminist-
friendly.187 Indeed, these feminist leaders exhibited such faith in Clinton's 
ability to effect concrete political change through congress that many 
publicly withdrew support for the allegations of sexual misconduct made 
against him in connection with Paula Jones, Gennifer Flowers, Kathleen 
Willey and "that woman, Miss Lewinski."188 So it would seem that Denfeld's 
portrayal of this feminism as wholly "paralysed" by anti-reformism is 
vulnerable to substantive rebuff. Anne-Marie Smith's observation of feminist 
politics actually is far more accurate: "serious feminist activists no longer 
187For a balanced and exacting analysis of Clinton's public image (specifically in relation 
to feminist and minority concerns such as abortion, affirmative action, childcare, 
parental leave, same-sex marriage and gays and lesbians in the military) versus his 
actual policies see Anne-Marie Smith, 'Feminist Activism and Presidential Politics: 
theorising the costs of the 'insider strategy,' Radical Philosophy 83 (May/June 1997): 25-
35. Smith argues that "Feminist rhetoric was used by the Clinton camp to sell his 
centre-right agenda, in spite of the fact that it includes several major anti-feminist 
elements. Clinton himself was skilfully constructed as pro-feminist while his campaign 
deliberately preempted and censored feminist critics.", Ibid., 25. See also Zillah 
Eistenstein's analysis of Clinton's 'feminism' in her chapter 'Feminism of the North and 
West for Export: transnational capital and the racialising of gender,' in Feminism and 
the New Democracy: resiting the political, ed. Jodi Dean (London: Sage, 1997), 29-49; 
and Nancy Fraser's analysis of Clinton's neoliberalism, 'Clintonism, Welfare, and the 
Antisocial Wage: the emergence of a neoliberal political imaginary,' Rethinking Marxism, 
Vol. 6, No. 2 (1993): 9-23. For Denfeld's critique of feminists who doubted Clinton's 
feminist credentials and the efficacy of his reforms for yielding sexual equality see The 
New Victorians, 189. 
188The following quotations are drawn from Marjorie Williams, 'Clinton and Women,' 
Vanity Fair (May 1998): 105-107, 163-166. In an interview with Marjorie Williams, 
Susan Faludi noted that the point of most significance in the Lewinsky case was that 
"she put the moves on him" (Ibid., 106, emphasis in original) and that Lewinsky has 
been "sleeping her way to the bottom of the Revlon empire." (Ibid., 164). More 
generously, Eleanor Smeal (then president of the Feminist Majority Foundation) argued 
that focussing on the complaints made against Clinton obscured "the bigger picture [of] 
what's best for women." (Ibid., 106). Gloria Steinem, also interviewed by Williams, 
noted that seeing Clinton's behaviour as an abuse of power denied the complainant's 
"sexual wills" and goes "against the whole struggle for self-determination and taking 
responsibility for our own lives" (Ibid., 165). 
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think politics in terms of a simple choice between pure insider and pure 
outsider positions."189 
This brings us to Denfeld's agenda for feminism's final wave. Let us note 
first that as part of her agenda Denfeld offers a particular vision of how 
feminist politics should be conducted. Denfeld argues that single issue-based 
campaigning should replace the formation of umbrella organisations since the 
latter mode of organising leads to "overextended agendas and demands of 
ideological purity."190 Hence Denfeld would like to see an end to that form of 
feminist political activism which agitates on the basis of a 'big picture' 
understanding of the array of social, political and economic forces which 
circumscribe women's fields of possibility. Although Denfeld's vision exhibits a 
measure of naivete about the demands of activism-the resources and 
political acumen of longstanding organisations and experienced activists are 
invaluable to effective domestic campaigning and for the making of 
international networks-she is concerned to point out that women need not 
"devote [their] lives to the cause" in order to "do something about [their] 
concerns".191 
In tune with this vision, Denfeld's final wave agenda is organised into a set 
of discrete issues. The first item on the agenda is state-sponsored child care: 
she recommends that women "make child care a public issue" and agitate for 
"a presidential task force on child care."192 The "outsider" feminists Denfeld 
identifies were among those who agitated for this reform, with albeit limited 
success, in Clinton's second term. In regard to the issue of abortion, Denfeld 
argues that feminism's original "women-centred" tactic of setting up discrete 
189Smith, 'Feminist Activism and Presidential Politics,' 27. 
190Ibid., 266. 
191Ibid., 266. 
192Ibid., 269. 
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abortion clinics was wrongheaded since such clinics have proven themselves 
vulnerable to "arson, bombings, and violence".193 Hence Denfeld proposes 
that feminists cease "politicising and marginalising" abortion, and begin 
treating abortion as a "medical right" to be exercised alongside all other 
medical procedures in the hospital system.194 Hospitals, she argues, are more 
difficult to bomb than small clinics.195 Interestingly, Denfeld notes 
approvingly that the 'pro-feminist' Clinton administration had initiated this 
mainstreaming of abortion within the health sector. She does not mention, 
however, that this administration did nothing to ammeliorate the fact that 
only 24% of American counties hosted abortion providers at this time, and 
that although Clinton removed the ban on late-term abortions, his health 
care plan (proposed by Denfeld's time of writing) left public health cover for 
abortions to the discretion of individual states, a move which served to 
perpetuate the limits on poor women's access to abortion.196 
Political parity is another issue which appears on Denfeld's agenda. She 
argues that an equal number of men and women in parliament "is 
fundamental to equality."197 However Denfeld does note that women's 
organisations such as Emily's List already are working toward this goal.198 
Denfeld also offers a program of action on the issue of sexual violence. Like 
Hoff Sommers and Roiphe, Denfeld's critique of feminism's expanded 
definitions of sexual violence lead to her champion a return to traditional rape 
law's definition of 'real rape,' hence her agenda only addresses evidently 
"brutal" rape.199 Here Denfeld recommends that women argue for longer jail 
193Ibid., 272, 273. 
194Ibid., 274. 
195Ibid., 273. 
196Smith, 'Feminist Activism and Presidential Politics,' 27. 
197Ibid., 27 4. 
l98Ibid., 18. 
199Ibid., 275. 
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terms and rehabilitation programs for convicted rapists.200 We will return to 
examine this recommendation in the following chapter. Finally, Denfeld's 
agenda for reform includes a recommendation that universities "dump 
women's studies programs" because they have "proven themselves 
extremely counterproductive."201 
Given Denfeld's complaint that New Victorians neglect economic issues, 
we must register that her proposal does not comment upon the economic 
status of women beyond calling for affordable child care for employed parents. 
Pay equity, gender segregation in the labour force, women's 
overrepresentation in low-paid wage labour, minimum wage-setting, the 
increasingly broad gap between rich and poor, the situation of migrant women 
workers, welfare and health benefit cuts: none of these are mentioned. In 
relation to this point let us register another confusing element of Denfeld's 
analysis. Denfeld also impugns New Victorians for their stubborn anti-
capitalism. Let me suggest that an anti-capitalist feminism which pays no 
attention to economic issues is difficult to imagine, and suggest further that 
Denfeld's own pro-capitalist stance may be one reason why her book invokes 
but does not actually deliver consideration of the role of capitalist economic 
arrangements in general, and neoliberal economic policy in particular, in the 
lives of contemporary women. This, combined with her agenda's vision of 
feminism's political future as a finite case-by-case sequence of single issue-
based campaigns conducted within the parameters of a single nation state, 
would seem to suggest that Denfeld's agenda would serve to depoliticise 
rather than repoliticise feminist politics. 
The third feature which distinguishes Denfeld's account from those of Hoff 
Sommers and Roiphe is her emphasis upon New Victorianism's doctrine of 
200Jbid., 275-276. 
201Ibid., 278. 
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women's moral superiority. This theme also appears in Hoff Sommers' 
critique of gynocentrism, but the theme is far more pronounced in Denfeld's 
account and, as we will see, forms a major preoccupation in Wolfs account as 
well. According to Denfeld, the notion that women are "morally, ethically, and 
spiritually different from men-and, by extension, superior to them" forms 
the lynchpin of New Victorianism's gynocentric political vision.202 New 
Victorianism, she argues, hosts a purist, separatist and misandrist desire to 
"overthrow the patriarchy", counter androcentrism and eliminate the 
influence of masculine values-aggressiveness, autonomy, rationality, binary 
logic, hierarchy, competitiveness, objectivity, linear thinking-so as to create 
a matriarchal society in which women's better nature will prevail.203 
Women's better nature consists of traits including peacefulness, pacifism, 
intersubjective connection, emotionality, intuition, non-linear thinking, non-
hierarchical organising, and a nurturing regard for life based in women's 
maternal capacities.204 
Denfeld runs three main lines of argument against this political vision 
which, she contends, is ascendant among "current feminists".205 Firstly, 
Denfeld objects that this vision recuperates Victorian representation of 
women as the moral guardians of home and hearth, a representation which 
historically has been influential in arguments against women's voting rights 
202Ibid., 14-15. 
203Ibid., 157. 
204Denfeld registers the following as exemplars of this construction of femaleness: Carole 
Gilligan's work on sexual difference and moral reasoning, and her concept of a feminine 
"ethic of care", as articulated in her book In A Different Voice (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1982); Deborah Tannen's exploration of sexual difference in relation to 
speech practices, as articulated in her book You Just Don't Understand: women and men 
in conversation (London: Virago, 1990) and Sara Ruddick's exploration ofnurturance and 
pacifism in her book Maternal Thinking: toward a politics of peace (London: The 
Women's Press, 1990). Denfeld associates Susan Faludi with New Victorianism, but 
Faludi's book Backlash features a critique of 'difference feminism' and its proponents, 
most notably Carole Gilligan, Backlash: the undeclared war against women (London: 
Chatto & Windus, 1992), 361-366. 
205Ibid., 183. 
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and participation in public life.206 Secondly, Denfeld notes that this vision 
romanticises female powerlessness, offers a blanket association of women 
with powerlessness, and succeeds in casting power as a masculine property. 
In so doing, some women's participation in "racism, sexism, and violence" is 
rendered either invisible or excusable, and women who occupy positive 
relationship with power-women politicians, teachers, scientists and so 
forth-are registered as "tainted" by male values.207 Thirdly, Denfeld argues 
that this vision's recuperation and universalisation of Victorian gender 
dimorphism is easily disproven by anthropology: "Any anthropologist will note 
that there are cultures in which men are the primary nurturers, which ... 
immediately disproves feminist theory."208 
To my mind, Denfeld's argument is for the most part correct. Although her 
treatment of the relationship between oppressed groups and the traits 
bestowed upon them as part of their oppression is lighthanded, her argument 
invites general agreement. But what of her claim that this gynocentric vision 
is ascendant among "current feminists", that it represents the latest in 
"feminist theory", a realm in which this vision is "entrenched"?209 Denfeld's 
chapter on feminist preoccupation with women's moral superiority cites only 
three feminists who offer "dissenting" views, where this aids in creating the 
impression that this preoccupation is pervasive among feminists, and that 
Denfeld is among the few who are challenging this preoccupation for the first 
206Jbid., 167. It should be noted here that Denfeld's objection is factually incorrect. One of 
the most powerful arguments for suffrage was that women's greater 'moral sense' would 
serve the domain of politics well in countering its 'corrupt' character. For an account of 
how this argument played out in New Zealand, the first nation to grant women suffrage 
(in 1893), see Kay Saville-Smith, Gender, Culture and Power (Auckland: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), 32-48. 
207Jbid., 161, 167. 
208Ibid., 169. 
209Ibid., 183; 
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time.210 It actually is the case that the particular feminism of difference211 
Denfeld describes has attracted broad criticism among feminists of a variety 
of political persuasions. For example, the central task of socialist feminist 
Lynne Segal's 1987 book Is The Future Female? was to call this form of 
feminism's "Manichean struggle between female virtue and male vice" into 
question.212 To take another example, Denfeld's argument that this 
feminism's understanding of women as innocent of power replicates the 
criticism bell hooks made in 1984: 
Bonding as "victims," white women liberationists were not required to 
assume responsibility for confronting the complexity of their own 
experience. They were not challenging one another to examine their 
sexist attitudes towards women unlike themselves or exploring the 
impact of race and class privilege on their relationships to women 
outside their race/class groups.213 
The book in which hooks voices this criticism, Feminist Theory from Margin to 
Centre, is cited in Denfeld's chapter, but not as the source of Denfeld's 
argument. Rather, hooks is registered as a New Victorian feminist of 
difference on account of her critique of capitalism.214 It also is the case that 
210Denfeld (Ibid., 181) cites the following dissenting texts, only one of which is referenced: 
Catharine Stimpson, Women's Studies in the United States (New York: Ford Foundation, 
1989); Carol Travis, The Mismeasure of Woman: why women are not the better sex, the 
inferior sex, or the opposite sex; and a magazine article by media critic Kath Pollit. 
211 Let us register here that the form of difference feminism Denf eld impugns is to be 
distinguished from another line of feminist theorising on sexual difference which has 
emerged from poststructuralist and psychoanalytic feminism. Simply put, this latter 
feminism is marked by an effort to resist, on the one hand, the erasure of sexual 
difference symptomatic of what Moira Gatens termed the 'degendering proposal' and, on 
the other hand, the reification of sexual difference which occurs when fixed 
characteristics are attached to the categories female and male. See Moira Gatens, 'A 
Critique of the Sex/Gender Distinction,' Imaginary Bodies: ethics, power and corporeality 
(Routledge: London & New York, 1996 [originally published 1983]), 3-20 and, for a 
summary, Linda Nicholson, 'Interpreting Gender,' in Social Postmodernism: beyond 
identity politics, eds. Linda Nicholson and Steven Seidman (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 39-67. 
212Lynne Segal, Is The Future Female? Troubled Thoughts on Contemporary Feminism 
(London: Virago, 1987), xxi. 
213bell hooks, Feminist Theory: from margin to centre (Boston: South End Press, 1984), 46. 
214Denfeld, The New Victorians, 158, n.4. 
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Denfeld's argument against the universalising tendency of the feminism of 
difference with which she is concerned may be read as a scaled down and 
simplified version of a longstanding critique of radical feminism's tactic of 
homogenising female experience so as to carve out a seamless impression of 
female oppression which might invoke unified political resistance. There is a 
plethora of feminist literature Denfeld might have drawn upon or referred to 
here.215 I want to suggest, then, that in Denfeld's dealings with this feminism 
of difference, her concern with "honest debate" is nowhere evident.216 This is 
reminiscent of Roiphe's careful omission of the motivations which lay behind 
feminist politicisations of sexual violence. Indeed, I will be arguing in the 
following chapter that strategic omission of existing relevant feminist debates, 
and of the motivations which lay behind the feminist tendencies with which 
they are concerned, is a central element of the accounts we address in this 
chapter. 
In sum, Denfeld's account portrays feminism as steeped in a 
Victorianesque reification of sexual difference rather than a liberal pursuit of 
sexual equality, a portrayal which synthesises the complaints of Hoff 
Sommers and Roiphe and yet has three features which distinguish it from 
their accounts. As we have seen, the first of these is Denfeld's use of 
generational divide as an organising principle for her account, the second is 
her albeit confusing portrayal of the feminism she impugns as politically 
ineffectual on account of its outsider stance, and the third is her emphasis 
215For example, at Denfeld's time of writing, the following texts were offering arguments 
kindred to hers and helping to frame the debate: Chandra Talpade Mohanty, 'Feminist 
Encounters: locating the politics of experience,' in Destabilizing Theory: contemporary 
feminist debates, eds. Michele Barrett and Anne Phillips (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1992), 74-92; Trinh T. Minh-Ha, Woman, Native, Other: writing post-coloniality and 
feminism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989); Elizabeth V. Spelman, 
Inessential Woman: problems of exclusion in feminist thought (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1988); and Denise Riley, ''Am I That Name?" Feminism and the Category of "Women" in 
History (Hampshire: Macmillan Press, 1988). 
216Denfeld, The New Victorians, 203. 
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upon this feminism's valorisation of distinctive 'female' traits and utopian 
belief that women's morally superior nature would forge a more peace-loving 
world. Before moving on to Wolfs account, let us make the point that Hoff 
Sommers' casting of the feminism she impugns as "ideological", and 
concomitant situation of equality feminism outside of ideology, runs through 
each of the accounts so far. Each critic uses "ideology" to denote a system of 
beliefs which distorts social reality in such a manner that this feminism's 
politico-moral posture is legitimated. In these accounts, adopting a critical 
posture in relation to liberalism and capitalism is registered as ideological, 
while an unargued fealty to these politico-economic forms is aligned with 
possession of objective truth. As we will see, this theme is intensified in Wolfs 
account as she presents a more explicit defence of liberalism and capitalism 
against feminism's radical ambitions. 
1.4 Wolf: victim feminism versus power feminism 
Naomi Wolfs role in the debate about feminism's relationship with the 
category 'victim' is an interesting one given that Hoff Sommers, Roiphe and 
Denfeld all argue that Wolfs feminism, as articulated in her first book The 
Beauty Myth, is a classic example of the form of feminism they impugn.217 Let 
us briefly outline this first book before addressing Wolfs contribution to the 
victim feminist debate. The Beauty Myth (1990) was figured as an update of 
Betty Friedan's landmark book The Feminine Mystique (1963).218 Friedan had 
argued that women's assignment to housewifery-justified by a naturalised 
conflation of femininity with the arts of homemaking which she dubbed the 
'feminine mystique'-served a crucial economic function in providing 
217Naomi Wolf, The Beauty Myth: how images of beauty are used against women (London: 
Vintage, 1990). Hoff Sommers, Who Stole Feminism?, 227-229; Roiphe, The Morning 
After, 125; Denfeld, The New Victorians, 8-9. 
218Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (London: Penguin, 1963). 
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commodity capitalism with a pliable "army of consumers".219 Wolf updated 
this argument in 1990 with her observation that women's entrance into the 
workforce in unprecedented numbers, attended as it was by an opening for 
redefinitions of femininity, raised fears of obsolescence within those industries 
reliant upon women's role as the primary consumers (advertisers, women's 
magazines, the fashion, clothing and textile industries, the dieting and beauty 
cosmetics industries).220 Wolf argues that a "violent backlash against 
feminism which uses images of female beauty as a political weapon against 
women's advancement" ensued.221 The "beauty myth"-"a briefcase-sized 
neurosis that the working woman could take with her to the office"-took 
over the function of the "feminine mystique" as ever-more aggressive 
advertising compelled women to internalise and pursue new prescriptions of 
ideal female appearance, thus locking them back into patterns of "insecure 
consumerism".222 Arguing that advertisers were seeking to induce then 
exploit female self-surveillance and indeed "self-hatred", Wolf linked this 
backlash to the steady incline in reported cases of anorexia nervosa 
throughout the 1980s, as well as a general increase in cosmetic surgery and 
women's oft-noted "terror of aging".223 Wolfs argument in The 8eauty Myth 
was not so much anti-capitalist as caveat emptor, and the point of the book 
was to encourage a greatly expanded understanding of beauty which would be 
generated by women rather than imposed upon them.224 
2191bid., 184. 
220Wolf, The Beauty Myth, 66. 
2211bid., 10. 
2221bid., 66. 
2231bid., 10, 66. For Wolfs commentary on anorexia nervosa see Ibid., 179-217; for Wolfs 
commentary on costemic surgery see Ibid., 232-241. 
224See the chapter 'Beyond the Beauty Myth,' Ibid., 270-291. 
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According to Denfeld, The Beauty Myth promoted the idea that "women are 
the hapless victims of men."225 Similarly, Hoff Sommers argues that Wolf, 
inspired by the "infantile leftism" of Michel Foucault, contributed to gender 
feminism's "siege mentality" by portraying women as "Stepford wives-
helpless, possessed, and robotic."226 Both critics note that in her second book, 
Fire With Fire: the new female power and how it will change the 21st century, 
Wolf made a "radical departure" from her initial woman-as-victim theme.227 
For Hoff Sommers, Wolfs departure is evidence of her recovery from "the 
effective indoctrination she got in women's studies at Yale."228 For Denfeld, 
Wolfs departure is not radical enough since, in Fire With Fire, "she refers to 
society as patriarchal".229 
For our purposes, these comments raise an expectation that Wolfs book 
might deal with feminism's relationship with the category 'victim' in a less 
inflammatory and more fair-minded manner that do the other critics. This 
certainly is what Wolf promises. She notes that Fire With Fire will not enjoin 
"the chorus that calls women's objections to injustice 'whining"', that it will 
instead "confront the growing voices of critics who are charging that all 
feminism is puritanical, man-hating, and obsessed with defining women as 
'victims"'.230 Importantly, Wolf does not aim to depart from these critics 
entirely. Part of the task of Fire With Fire, she writes, is to "separate the 
nugget of truth in those charges from the destructive, categorical hype."231 
Wolfs account of feminism's relationship with the category 'victim' does 
indeed depart from those of Hoff Sommers, Roiphe and Denfeld in some 
225Denfeld, The New Victorians, 9. 
226Hoff Sommers, Who Stole Feminism?, 230, 245, 232. 
227Denfeld, The New Victorians, 161. 
228HoffSommers, Who Stole Feminism?, 245. 
229Denfeld, The New Victorians, 162. 
230Wolf, Fire With Fire, 153, xvii. Emphasis in original. 
231 Ibid., xvii. 
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significant respects, and on the whole her account is far more generous. We 
will see, however, that the difference between them often is only skin deep, 
and I will be suggesting that one of the ways to read the contrast between 
Wolf and the other critics is that Wolfs account contains a much more 
sophisticated impugnation of feminist political radicalism, one that may be 
identified as kindred with the 'centre-radicalism' associated with the political 
discourse of the Clinton and Blair governments.232 In their grave association 
of feminism with brain-washing and authoritarianism the other critics exhibit 
a strain of pseudo-McCarthyism. Wolfs account, however, delivers the more 
carefully packaged claim that feminist anti-capitalism and wariness of 
reformism is simply irrelevant given that advanced capitalism and liberal 
democracy are the only politico-economic forms left standing in this, the post-
socialist age. 
The central argument of Wolfs book is that the early 1990s saw the 
wealthiest of the first world nations enter "the final throes of a civil war for 
gender fairness, in which conditions have shifted to put much of the 
attainment of equality in women's own grasp".233 The "masculine empire", 
she argues, has reached its "twilight", and the 20th century is the last 
century in which men, particularly white men, will predominate.234 But 
whether women grasp equality, or "cling to an outdated image of ourselves as 
powerless", will depend upon how women negotiate the three, related 
"obstacles" standing in their way: "many women have become estranged 
from their own movement; one strand of feminism has developed maladaptive 
232Wolfs understanding of the Clinton administration as pro-feminist and post-sexist, 
and her understanding of Clinton himself as passionately dedicated to empowering 
women and ending male domination, forms a key element of her argument for 
reformism, Ibid., xiv, 9, 21, 196. It is worth noting that many of the arguments 
presented in Wolfs account, as well as the general flavour of its 'centre-radical' political 
position, were replicated for the English context in Natasha Walter's book The New 
Feminism (London: Little, Brown and Company, 1998). 
233Ibid., xv. 
234Ibid., 20-28. 
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attitudes; and women lack a psychology of female power to match their new 
opportunities."235 
These obstacles are related since the "maladaptive" strand of feminism 
Wolf refers to-"victim feminism"-is, she argues, one of the main reasons 
why women have become estranged from their movement, and its "obsolete" 
conflation of femininity with victimisation acts as a counter-force to women's 
assumption of an appropriate psychology of power.236 Like the other critics, 
Wolf carves the field of feminisms up into a dichotomy between a bad and a 
good feminism-"victim feminism" and "power feminism", respectively-
arguing that power feminism is the brand now required to usher in a third and 
final wave of feminist reform. Also like the other critics, Wolf constructs this 
dichotomy around the difference between outsider-style radicalism and 
insider-style reformism, and between attachment to sexual difference and the 
goal of sexual equality. And in the same way as Hoff Sommers locates the 
feminism she valourises, equity feminism, with feminism's original and proper 
political orientation as per the Seneca Falls Convention, so too Wolf identifies 
power feminism with this historical tradition, situating Emmeline Pankhurst 
and Lucretia Mott as "early champions of power feminism."237 
Redrawing Hoff Sommers association of 'gender feminism' with the rise of 
the New Left, Wolf argues that victim feminism's customary reflexes-"anti-
capitalism, an insider-outsider mentality, and an aversion to the 'system"'-
stem from its association with what she terms the "hard left" of the 1960s.238 
However Wolf offers a slightly different perspective on the political character 
of 'victim feminism' to those of the other critics. Where the other critics 
235Ibid., xvi. 
236Ibid., xvi, xviii. 
237Ibid., 157. 
238Ibid., xvi, 73. 
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represent leftist political radicalism as a dangerous diversion from the goal of 
equality, Wolf argues that the political reflexes noted above were once 
"necessary and even effective [but] are now getting in our way."239 Wolfs 
particular argument is that the status of women can and has outgrown left 
feminist politics: 
The focus of some feminists, like Andrea Dworkin, Catharine 
MacKinnon, and Adrienne Rich, on female victimisation at the expense 
of female agency, derives from conditions that once applied more than 
they do now. During the early 1970s women. were indeed 
overwhelmingly silenced and negated but the genderquake means 
that the rationale for this kind of feminism is becoming obsolete.240 
Since the decline of the backlash against feminism during the 1980s, the 
"decline of the masculine empire", and the emergence of what she calls the 
"genderquake", the status of women in the first world has improved to the 
extent that victim feminism has lost its reason for being, which means of 
course that it had reason for being: something the other critics do not 
contend.241 As we will see, Wolf expands on this account of victim feminism's 
reason for being when defending the pro-capitalist orientation of power 
feminism: the loss of the socialist alternative since the fall of Stalinism in 
Eastern Europe is a determining factor in Wolfs representation of feminist 
239Jbid., xvi. 
240Ibid., 154. See also Wolfs argument that women are beginning to behave in ways that 
"victim feminism consigns to men alone" such as using guns and sexually objectifying the 
opposite sex, Ibid., 230-246. 
241Wolf is the only one among the critics of victim feminism who accepts that feminism 
underwent a 'backlash' during the 1980s. In Wolfs book the term 'genderquake' refers 
to an "emerging female power structure" that began to appear as the Clarence Thomas-
Anita Hill scandal came to dominate the North American media in October 1991, 
harnessing and sparking productive anger among American women of all walks of life 
(Ibid., 29). In Wolfs telling, the Thomas-Hill trial acted as a catalyst for positive 
feminist agitation (detailed in Ibid., 30-32) and created a political mood in which 
"something critical to the sustenance of patriarchy died", Ibid., 5. Wolfs account of the 
Thomas-Hill events and subsequent public debate does not address their racial aspects 
nor the theme of meritocracy versus 'political correctness'. For a set of essays which do 
acknowledge and examine these elements centrally see Toni Morrison, ed., Race-ing 
Justice, En-gendering Power: essays on Anita Hill, Clarence Thomas, and the construction 
of social reality (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992). 
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anti-capitalism as obsolete. Her argument at this stage, though, is that 
victim feminism, a potentially effective political ruse in certain climates, is 
symptomatic of dark times for the status of women, and that power 
feminism must come into play now that women's socio-economic situation 
has substantially improved. Let us now examine the meanings Wolf attaches 
to these terms 'victim' and 'power' feminism. 
Wolfs portrait of victim feminism associates this form of feminism with 
many of the traits we have encountered across this chapter. These include: 
neo-Victorianism, misandrism, a tendency to be doctrinaire, a belief in 
women's moral superiority, categorical antiheterosexism, preference for 
collectivism over individualism, intolerance of dissent, understanding of power 
as a male property, registration of empowered women as 'tainted,' 
registration of violent or prejudiced women as not responsible, and 
identification of women in general as powerless, innocent victims.242 Like the 
other critics, Wolf also singles out academic feminism for severe impugnation. 
To demonstrate the irrelevance of feminist theory to genuine feminist 
imperatives Wolf quotes a passage "taken at random" from Luce Irigaray's 
Speculum of the Other Woman, arguing that academic feminism has 
"glamourised the margins", alienated non-academic women from feminism, 
and sealed itself off from "the real world of politics and action".243 
Aside from these points of commonality, Wolfs handling of the theme of 
victimisation is more nuanced and carefully argued than are those of the 
other critics, and it aims to depart from their lines of argument in important 
respects. Most significantly, Wolf does not dispute feminist statistics which 
242See respectively Wolf, Fire With Fire, 181-182; 162, 119-122, 182, 200, 127-129, 221, 
190, 262, 211-215, xvii. 
243Wolf, Fire With Fire, 136. Denfeld makes a similar point, The New Victorians, 278. 
Luce Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, trans. Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1985 [originally published 1974]). 
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indicate the scope of male violence. Indeed, she argues that feminist political 
activism centred on issues of sexual violence, domestic violence and child 
sexual abuse have made a powerful contribution to casting the masculine 
empire into its twilight.244 Directly challenging the argument shared among 
the critics we have examined that feminism exaggerates women's 
victimisation and, in so doing, portrays women as inevitable victims, Wolf 
writes: 
Roiphe ... paints an impressionistic picture of hysterical "date-rape 
victims" who have made it all up, but she never looks squarely at the 
epidemic of sex crimes that has been all too indelibly documented by 
police forces the world over ... The 'victim culture' critics assail even 
the mere act of analysing real harm done to women ... but these critics 
seem to believe themselves that women have no will or critical 
intelligence. The act of documenting the way others are trying to 
victimize women is the very opposite of treating women as natural 
victims. The premise of such documentation is that women are not 
natural victims ... There is no way around it: women are not natural 
victims, but they certainly are victimised.245 
We must note that even as Wolf registers this criticism of Roiphe, at another 
point in Fire With Fire she does enjoin Roiphe's argument that the 
testimonies at sexual violence survivor speak-outs can strike "a false 
note".246 Wolf also enjoins these critics in arguing that victim feminism 
glamourises victimisation and encourages women to falsely identify as 
victims.247 In arguing that victim feminism is marked by a "misuse of the 
reality of women's victimisation", she also suggests that this feminism's 
244Wolf, Fire With Fire, 21. 
245Ibid., 147-148, 153. Emphasis in original. 
246Ibid., 207. 
247For example, Wolf notes: "The fashionable lapse in logic among the left right now is 
that you can't identify with victims of oppression unless you identify as a victim" and 
"middle-class college students scramble to identify downward, thinking they have to 
pretend to be oppressed in order to champion the oppressed." Ibid., 217, 125. Emphasis 
in original. 
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identification of women as victims trivialises the plight of real victims.248 And 
she uses rape-crisis feminism as the basis of her "case study" of victim 
feminist politics in action, a feature of her analysis that we will examine in 
the following chapter.249 These factors aside, let us ask: given Wolfs 
statement of support for feminist documentation of women's victimisation, 
where does her primary objection to feminism's relationship with the category 
'victim' lie? 
Wolfs objection has two main components. Firstly, she objects to the way 
in which 'victim feminism' lofts victimhood as an identity category with which 
women are encouraged to identify personally. She writes: "There is nothing 
wrong with identifying one's victimisation. The act is critical. There is a lot 
wrong with moulding it into an identity."250 Part of Wolfs point is that women 
who either experience or feel vulnerable to victimisation will benefit if they 
refuse to allow victimhood and a sense of vulnerability to become dominant 
and abiding aspects of their identities as women. We will return to this point 
in the following chapter: as with Roiphe's comments on self-esteem, Wolf here 
elides existing and extensive feminist efforts to counter 'victim identity,' 
especially among survivors of sexual violence. The other aspect of Wolfs 
point is that victim feminism encourages women to seek power through an 
identity of victimisation, rather than an identity as the equals of men. 
Clinging to old scripts of female passivity, dependency and innocence, victim 
feminism induces guilt in its political opponents so as to claim power 
indirectly, rather than "honestly" and "straightforwardly".251 Insofar as 
victim feminism casts women as good on account of their suffering, and 
petitions for their rights on that basis, women are once again fettered by a 
248Jbid., 147. 
249Jbid., 164-169. 
250Jbid., 148. 
251Jbid., 148, 190-191. 
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Victorianesque code of female virtue and effectively tied to a strategy in 
which they will only be regarded as 'good' so long as they 'suffer.'252 We will 
return to this argument in the dissertation's second part as it forms a major 
theme in the feminist theoretical literature on feminism and ressentiment. 
The second component of Wolfs objection is that victim feminism 
portrays women as innocent victims-innocent of power, aggression and 
responsibility.253 This is where the argument Wolf shares with Denfeld-that 
victim feminism is a feminism of difference which idealises women as 
naturally virtuous and men as naturally villainous-comes into play. Wolf 
argues that this portrayal of women and men, the "core mythology" of victim 
feminism, delivers a "belief system in which all evil-from environmental 
desecration to meat eating to child abuse-is seen to derive from the will to 
power, which is confined to men and institutionalised in patriarchy."254 This 
belief system works not only to rekindle Victorian gender dimorphism, but 
also to revive "the old female stereotype that discourages women from 
appropriating the power of the political and financial world to make that 
power at last their own."255 Rather than encourage women to claim "their 
own will to power" and "take responsibility for the power they do possess", 
victim feminism "stigmatizes the female use of power" and sets up "taboos 
on ego, money, aggression and power".256 For Wolf, victim feminism's 
aversion to worldly power has effectively "stymied a generation of young 
activists who inherited a critique of power in which power itself was not 
morally neutral, useable for good or for evil, but evil in itself."257 
252Ibid., xvii. 
253See especially Ibid., 221-215. 
254 Ibid., 15 7. 
255Ibid., 160. 
256Ibid., 161, 191. 
257Ibid., 158. 
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Let us note at this point that, as with Hoff Sommers, a Nietzschean 
theme runs through Wolfs account. Although encrypted, this theme has a 
strong and decisive presence. Nietzsche's On The Genealogy of Morals 
appears in Wolfs bibliography,258 and apart from her use of Nietzschean 
themes and phrases such as will to power, agonism and twilight of the 
idols,259 Wolf seems especially cognisant of Nietzsche's concept of 
ressentiment when she claims that victim feminism's negative ethos of self-
sacrifice "fosters resentment of other's recognition and pleasures" while 
power feminism's future-oriented, life-enhancing positivity is "without 
resentment".260 Victim feminism's resentment of male power, its subsequent 
casting of power itself as "evil", its emphasis on "collective identity" rather 
than "strong individuals", and its translation of "suffering into virtue"-all 
appear to align with the psycho-political force Nietzsche named 
ressentiment. 261 As we will see in the second part of this dissertation, 
Nietzsche's concept of ressentiment plays a more overt role in the writings of 
feminist political theorists concerned with feminism's relationship with the 
category 'victim'-these accounts also beckon a feminism that can be 
'without resentment'. Let us register, then, that Nietzsche's concept of 
258Jbid.' 366. 
259The phrase 'will to power' recurrs throughout Fire With Fire, and is key to Wolfs 
argument that girlhood is marked by an untrammelled will to power which gradually is 
curtailed as girls mature and "learn to conceal and deny" this will (Ibid., 277). Hence 
Wolfs power feminism is conceived of as a project to recapture women's wills to power. 
In relation to agonism, Wolf argues that victim feminism's emphasis upon collectivity 
and consensus, and its understanding of conflict and competition as masculine, inhibits 
the development of agonistic feminist discourse in which "evenly matched" and mutally 
respecting opponents vye for ascendency (Ibid., 222). This recalls Nietzsche's distinction, 
in On the Genealogy of Morals, between the noble and base approaches to having an 
enemy (GOM: I, 10, 11). Finally, Wolf refers to the "decline of the masculine empire" as 
a "twilight of the gods" (Fire With Fire, 20). This is the title of one of Wagner's operas 
(Gotterddmmerung) which Nietzsche plays on in naming one of his books Twilight of the 
Idols (Gotzenddmmerung). 
260Jbid., 149, 150. 
261 Ibid., 149, xvii. 
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ressentiment will require our further investigation given the role it is playing 
within this debate. 
Another important difference between Wolfs account and those of the 
other critics is that they conceive of feminism's return to the goal of equality 
and the strategy of reform as a break with feminist radicalism. Wolf, by 
contrast, conceives of this return as radicalism's true beginning. Wolf 
performs an interesting manoeuvre here: feminist dissatisfaction with 
existing politico-economic arrangements is cast as an apolitical, conservative 
attitude leftover from a dead age, while power feminism's "use of realpolitik 
and capitalism" is cast as a timely course change toward the true sources of 
female empowerment: parliamentary representation and private sector 
entrepreneurship.262 "Nothing is more radical", she writes, "than going to the 
root of power". 263 
To argue for her position, Wolf characterises the politics of those who 
entertain "cynicism about the social contract" as pseudo-radical. Such 
cynicism, she argues, combines with protestation about the exclusion of 
"differently situated" groups to create a dead-end tactic of "reverse 
injustice".264 This in turn delivers a pseudo-radical strategy of "opting out, 
staying pure, and changing nothing."265 Arguing that American liberal 
democracy-not attempts to critique and counter its exclusionary, normative 
and pro-business dimensions-is the true seat of radicalism, she writes: 
Sure, dead white men formulated the principles of representative 
democracy and the free press. But the flaws lie not in the ideals 
themselves, but in the fact that the founders' blindness, in structuring 
citizenship as white, male and propertied, and the self-interest of 
262Ibid., 336. 
263Ibid., 336. 
264Ibid., 125, 126. 
265Ibid., 127. 
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those who hold power now, prevents the ideals from unfolding 
according to their own logic. If 'radicals' take these ideals lightly or 
turn their backs on them, they defeat themselves. But if we compel 
these values to open up and work fairly-the goal that is, rightly 
understood, that all multicultural and feminist movements seek-then 
there is no more 'radical' system imaginable than the one we have 
inherited ... [a] real radical does not stand in the margins, admiring her 
own purity. She is a warrior to bring outsider's views into the centre, 
asking, 'How can my actions spark change for the good in the real lives 
of as many people as possible?' A true radical is not content to tear 
down and turn away; these are the skills of the weak.266 
89 
Wolf is arguing that exclusion and marginalisation of "differently situated" 
groups from political participation and recognition is an abherent rather than 
endemic element of liberal democracy's universalist political culture. Hence 
she locates true radicalism as a project to separate and preserve liberalism's 
principle of universal inclusion from its heretofore erroneous manifestation. 
Her 'skills of the strong' consist in bringing the margins to the centre so as to 
compel liberalism's ideals-such as equality, meritocracy, and participation-
to manifest in true, all-inclusive form and so to reach their "logical 
conclusion". 
A great many critical points may be made in relation to this argument 
and the manner in which Wolf represents her adversaries. At minimum we 
may note that Wolf elides the fact that it is the logic of inclusion itself that 
gives rise to exclusivity as imperative since it necessarily creates a 
constitutive outside, and that her account skirts questions arising from the 
nexus of inclusion, pluralism and homogenisation, preferring to assume that 
the "differently situated" wish to cast off their impoverished particulars so as 
to enjoin liberalism's preestablished norms. But let us reserve engagement 
with these matters until Chapter 4, where they arise in relation to Anna 
Yeatman's account of ressentiment and modern emancipatory politics. For our 
266Jbid., 126-127. 
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current purposes it suffices to note that Wolfs recasting of true radicalism as 
a social democratic insider strategy guided by basic fealty to the politico-
economic status quo prepares the way for her later argument about feminism 
and capitalism. 
Aside from rescinding the link between femininity and 'victim identity,' the 
main task of Wolfs proposed "third wave of power feminism" is to foster a 
new "psychology of power" among women as a group.267 For Wolf, such a 
psychology would return women to their native state of girlhood will to power: 
"We are at first unsocialised little power feminists, almost every squalling one 
of us".268 Guided by the equation of money with power and a conception of 
economic self-reliance and individual self-interest as key elements of 
complete personhood and democratic citizenship, Wolf proposes to ameliorate 
the feminisation of poverty in the first and third worlds by calling an end to 
women's longstanding aversion to money and replacing this aversion with 
entrepreneurial acumen and a willingness to exercise consumer power. Wolf 
argues that feminism's anti-capitalist orientation reflects and has entrenched 
women's aversion to money: 
Feminism often seems more comfortable with the important tasks of 
pointing out economic discrimination against women, or with 
legislating for more money for women, than it is with the 'masculine', 
potent act of putting the means to generate profits in women's own 
hands.269 
In Wolfs vision, increased female entrepreneurship will perform an immanent 
revolution: the means of production will at long last be in the hands of a few 
women, as well as a few men. 
267Ibid., 323. 
268Ibid., 275. 
269Ibid., 263. 
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Let me suggest at this point that, in retrospect, Wolfs argument may be 
understood as a feminist version of a Third Way or 'radical centre' political 
position since it echoes this position in a number of key respects-not the 
least of these being its recoding of social democratic postures as truly radical. 
As with proponents of the Third Way, Wolfs point of departure in assailing 
anti-capitalism is "the fall of communism in Eastern Europe".270 Given the 
collapse of Stalinism and, therefore, the triumph of capitalism, Wolf argues 
that left-leaning social democrats need to pursue a new path.271 For 
proponents of the Third Way, this new path cuts between the state-centric 
social democracy of the old left, and the free market-centric neoliberalism of 
the new right (however as critics of the Third Way point out, in practice this 
approach tends to fully maintain rather than amend the neoliberal policy 
agenda).272 
Wolfs pursuit of this path is evident in a number of respects, the first of 
these being her argument that while capitalism cannot be countered, it can 
be tamed: 
Capitalism is innately exploitative. It does oppress the many for the 
benefit of the few; its excesses must be tempered by compassionate 
policies ... the progressive community serves its values better by 
engaging with capitalism to fund social change than it does by 
professing an aversion to it ... 273 
270Ibid., 263. 
271 Ibid., 263. 
272For an incisive account of the Third Way as it played out in the North American context 
under Clinton see Robert Pollin, 'Anatomy of Clintonomics,' New Left Review, No. 3 
(May/June, 2000): 17-46. For a general critical appraisal of the Third Way, including its 
maintenance of neoliberal macroeconomic policy see Alex Callinicos, Against the Third 
Way: an anti-capitalist critique (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001). Key texts by 
proponents of the Third Way include: Anthony Giddens, The Third Way and its Critics 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001) and 'Introduction,' in Anthony Giddens, ed., The Global 
Third Way Debate (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001); and Tony Blair, New Britain: my 
vision of a young country (London: Fourth Estate, 1996). 
273Ibid., 263. Emphasis in original. 
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Wolf does not explain how capitalism's "innately exploitative" character fits 
with her goal of equality. She writes that the impact of misogyny would be 
reduced "if women were no poorer than men" without mentioning, however, 
that women's "equal" wealth would of course be distributed unequally among 
women, as is already the case given the vast and growing gap between rich 
and poor within the advanced capitalist countries.274 Nor does Wolf indicate 
what policies are required to temper capitalism's "excesses". The obvious 
disparity between capitalism's system of exploitation and the liberal goal of 
equality is dealt with among proponents of the Third Way by shifting the 
focus from equality of outcome to equality of opportunity.275 This same kind of 
shift is evident in Wolfs account when she provides a range of tactics women 
might employ so as to increase their individual wealth, presenting this as 
more caring and progressive than the "condescending" attitude of anti-
capitalist feminists.276 
In tune with her individualism-versus-collectivism theme, Wolf advises 
that women become confident enough to bargain for more money from their 
employers within the confines of individual employment contracts, dropping 
the role of unions and the effects of anti-union industrial relations policy-
including increased employer prerogative-completely from her account. 
Following the logic of 'a hand up rather than a hand out,' Wolf advises that 
women's organisation host "economic empowerment zones" in which women 
learn the arts of personal finance and consumer activism, dropping from view 
the role publicly funded welfare can play in these times of high 
unemployment, declining security of employment, declining real wages, 
declining small-business viability, and declining private sector 
274Ibid., 265. 
275See Giddens, The Third Way, 85-89. 
276Ibid., 265. 
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accountability.277 Wolf argues that victim feminist anti-capitalism is guided 
by a credo of "self-sacrifice", and as such "fosters resentment of other's 
recognition and pleasures."278 But Wolf does not reckon with the extent to 
which this very credo of self-sacrifice would seem to underpin the culture of 
exploitation she regards as endemic to capitalism: a few shifts in a free trade 
zone, meat-packing factory or deep cleaning job might just be enough to 
foster the form of resentment to which she refers.279 
In making these points, I do not mean to contend that Wolfs concept of 
power feminism is bereft of value. Wolfs argument that women fear money 
and tend to undervalue their capacities, and that this represents a key "pillar 
of women's oppression" that women should be encouraged to counter, is not 
only sound but tends to replicate the main themes of three decades worth of 
feminist debate about gender, work and political economy.280 My concern lies 
with the schema within which these arguments and remedies are articulated, 
this schema's dependence upon a denigration and indeed caricature of 
feminist anti-capitalism, and the unconvincing claim that these arguments 
connect to the real world and to real lives in a way that anti-capitalism does 
not. 
A further concern is the extent to which Wolf aligns anti-capitalism with a 
desire that women remain poor. Wolf claims that victim feminism has 
277Ibid., 264. 
278Ibid., 149. 
279N aomi Klein provides an account of working conditions in free trade zones, drawing 
particular attention to deskilling, deunionisation, long working hours and low minimum 
wage setting, in No Logo: taking aim at the brand bullies (New York: Picador, 2000). For 
an account of the working conditions prevailing within the 'de-skilled' meat-packing 
industry see Eric Schlosser's chapter 'The Most Dangerous Job' in his book Fast Food 
Nation: what the all-American meal is doing to the world (London: Penguin Books, 2002), 
169-192. Deep cleaning refers to the job of dismantling public toilet facilities so as to 
clean their components thoroughly. 
280Ibid., 259. Valerie Bryson offers a summary of this literature in Chapter 6 of her book 
Feminist Debates (London: Macmillan, 1999). See also Rosemary Crompton, ed., 
Restructuring Gender Relations and Employment: the decline of the male breadwinner 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
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impeded women's progress because it "sees money as contaminating", and 
moves to lend power feminism a monopoly on women's well-being: "Power 
feminism ... knows that poverty is not glamorous".281 This is the first of two 
transferences of blame for the feminisation of poverty in Wolfs account. The 
second inheres in her combination of a doctrine of individual responsibility on 
the one hand, and omission of the economic policies which have contributed 
powerfully to the feminisation of poverty on the other. If one goes to Fire With 
Fire asking 'Why are women poorer than men?', a partial and deceptive 
answer is delivered: because victim feminism has discouraged women from 
generating wealth and, relatedly, because women have not equipped 
themselves with an appropriate psychology of wealth. Wolfs use of 
psychology to address economic issues, while insightful at times, enjoins an 
all-too-familiar refrain that the source of an individual's unfreedom is to be 
traced within that individual rather than in the patterns of economic 
distribution and opportunity framing their particular situation, over which 
they are likely to have profoundly limited control. Wolfs emphasis upon a 
future of female empowerment and plenty most certainly is laudable. 
However her equation of empowerment with, as Anne-Marie Smith puts it, 
"any socio-economic gain that is achieved by any individual woman by any 
means necessary" would seem not so much to recognise, as though at long 
last, women's potentials to partake of worldly power, but rather to 
underestimate women's potentials to participate in changing the world's 
future power structures.282 
To summarise, Wolfs contribution to the debate about feminism's 
relationship with the category 'victim' differs from those of the other critics in 
important respects, while at the same time echoing many of their salient 
281Ibid., 149. 
282Anne-Marie Smith, 'Feminist Activism and Presidential Politics,' 33. 
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features. Like the other critics, Wolf uses a dichotomy between a 'bad' victim 
feminism and a 'good' power feminism to argue that feminism return to the 
goal of equality and to an insider strategy, but Wolf adds the caveat that this 
would not represent a departure from radicalism, rather its true beginning. 
Where the other critics employ an unargued distinction between ideology and 
objective truth to discount feminist critiques of existing politico-economic 
arrangements and rhetorically establish their fealty to these arrangements, 
Wolf offers an explicit defence of her account's political orientation-an 
orientation that, I have argued, may be regarded as a centre-radical or Third 
Way style of politics. Hence Wolfs account, more than those of the other 
critics, may be read as a feminist version of an 'end of history' argument: the 
future, as Wolf envisions it, is one in which liberalism and capitalism will 
prevail indefinitely, extending their logic into the third world so as to expand 
the free world, and consumating the ideals of feminism by ensuring that 
women as a group and men as a group are suitably class-stratified so that 
they may share equally in the burdens of exploitation and, for the best 
psychologically equipped among them, the pleasures of wealth. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have seen that the accounts of Hoff Sommers, Roiphe, 
Denfeld and Wolf share three particular commonalities. The first of these is a 
central objection to what they regard as feminism's representation of women 
as victims. This representation, they contend, is alienating, substantially 
untrue, and indeed harmful in the sense that it discourages women from 
assuming agency and responsibility, encouraging them instead to falsely 
identify as victims, where this in turn trivialises the plight of 'real victims.' 
The second commonality the accounts share is their joint alignment of 
feminist political radicalism (or as Wolf would have it, pseudo-radicalism) with 
victim-centred politics, and their joint association of liberal feminism and the 
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goal of equality with a move beyond victim-centred politics. The third 
commonality may be deduced from the second. It is their joint contention that 
feminism's relationship with the category 'victim' is a key determinant of the 
character and direction of feminist politics, meaning that for these accounts 
"the victim problem" is intimately tied to questions of political strategy. The 
way in which feminism envisages its subject-hapless victim or capable 
agent-is key to the mode of politicisation feminism will adopt and the 
interpretation of the world feminism will generate. 
The main task of this chapter has been to reveal how the accounts go 
about establishing the second point of commonality, their joint construction 
of "the victim problem in current feminism" as a venue for a reassertion of 
liberal feminist edicts.283 We have seen that a number of lines of argument 
are employed across the accounts in the making of this construction. They 
include: situating the goal of equality as more worthy in being clean of 
misandrist equations of women's victimisation with their moral superiority; 
casting feminism's 'original' orientation toward equality as feminism's proper 
political orientation; portraying feminist political radicalism as 
unrepresentative of women's interests and general orientation toward 
equality; construing feminist political radicalism as undemocratic on account 
of its 'ideological', 'authoritarian' and intellectually dishonest character; 
portraying feminist political radicalism as either politically ineffectual or 
politically dangerous; and treating agency as a given, non-complex element of 
women's present liberation, an unshakeable fact that victim feminism's 
obsolete political imagination cannot digest. Many of these lines of argument 
depend upon providing highly schematic or simply incomplete renditions of 
283Wolf, Fire With Fire, 148. 
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existing feminist debate, which is where the most salient tactic that these 
accounts employ comes in. 
Above and beyond these lines of argument stand the accounts' joint 
assumption that feminist politics is reducible to an either/or decision between 
valourising sexual difference or pursuing sexual equality, between adopting a 
radical or a reformist strategy. This assumption is forwarded through their 
shared tactic of representing the diverse and dynamic field of feminisms as 
reducible to a dichotomy between a 'good' reformist feminism which is 
cognisant of women's present agency, and a 'bad' radical feminism which 
persists with a now obsolete understanding of women as victims. This tactic's 
symptomatic tendency toward homogenisation works to elide important 
differences between the feminisms under consideration, and works also to 
redraw the very melodrama of good versus evil that these accounts cast as 
inimical to democratic politics. The tactic also gives rise to confusions when 
the accounts are read together as a single discourse. Taken together, these 
accounts present an unstable and indeed unconvincing portrait of feminist 
victim-centred politics as obscurantist yet simplistic, transformationist yet 
reformist, the predilection of a minority yet the fashion statement of a 
majority, unrepresentative and alienating yet broadly persuasive, anti-
democratic yet politically successful within democracies, politically 
successful yet politically ineffectual, the fault of the old and the idiom of the 
young.284 It would seem that if feminism does have a 'victim problem,' these 
accounts either partially enlighten its parameters, or actually obscure them. 
So it is reasonable to conclude that these accounts deliver more questions 
than they do answers. What is the relationship between feminist politics and 
the category 'victim'? Have feminists explicitly or implicity conceived of 
women as non-agentic victims, as these accounts claim? And what of the 
284'Transformationist' is Hoff Sommers' term. Who Stole Feminism?, 65. 
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discourse of 'real victimisation' running through these accounts-is this not 
an alternative victim-centred politics rather than an alternative to it? 
2 
Victimhood and its {Dis)contents 
The word "revenge" is said so quickly, it almost seems as if it 
could not contain more than one root concept and feeling ... 
as if all words were not pockets into which now this and 
now that has been put, and now so many things at once! 
Thus "revenge," too, is now this and now that, and now 
something very composite. 
-Friedrich Nietzsche.I 
Ironically, while the media and psychology books have 
increasingly pointed out that everyone wants to be a victim, 
victims have vehemently argued that they are not victims. 
-Sharon Lamb.2 
Introduction 
The task of this chapter is to offer a critique of the popular feminist accounts 
of the 'victim problem in feminism' surveyed in Chapter 1. In general, the 
chapter's discussion is designed to situate these accounts within a broader 
field of discourses on victimhood and victimisation so as to better examine the 
particular manner in which they treat the category 'victim' and represent, or 
perhaps misrepresent, feminism's relationship with this category, most 
notably with regard to feminist politicisations of sexual violence. 
In this chapter I am especially concerned to disrupt the alignment of 
'radicalism' with victim-centred politics, and 'liberalism' with a movement 
beyond such politics, which we discerned in these accounts in Chapter 1. In 
this regard I present two lines of argument. Firstly, in taking on the first 
element of this alignment, I dispute the idea that feminists-most notably 
I WS: 33; GOM: Appendix, WS, 33. 
2 Sharon Lamb, 'Constructing the Victim: popular images and lasting labels,' in New 
Versions of Victims: feminists struggle with the concept, ed. Sharon Lamb (New York: New 
York University Press, 1999), 118. 
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those identified as taking 'radical' approaches to the issue of sexual violence-
have in fact uncritically adopted the word 'victim' as an appropriate signifier 
for 'women' in the first instance. Taking my cue from the popular feminist 
critics' use of the term 'victim' to denote 'non-agent,' I explore the 
victim/agent dichotomy so as to reveal the variety of ways in which victims 
are construed, by feminists and others, as agents. In relation to the concept of 
victim precipitation, I show how a blurring of the victim/agent dichotomy can 
have the problematic ramification of victim-blame. But in turning to the 
criminological discourse of victimology, and then to feminist victim activist 
accounts of survivorship, I show how the agentic capacities of victims can be 
acknowledged and positively affirmed in a manner which avoids victim-blame. 
This survey of discourses of victimhood and victimisation reveals the 
polysemic character of the word 'victim.' As such it enables my argument 
that while the popular feminist critics may be correct in observing that 
'radical' feminists have described women as 'victims,' they are incorrect in 
their assumption that, for such feminists, the word 'victim' simply denotes 
'non-agent.' 
This first line of argument enables us in turn to make a significant 
observation regarding the way in which agency and empowerment are 
treated in the popular feminist accounts, particularly that of Naomi Wolf. 
Through our exploration of feminist victim activist discourses of survivorship, 
in which 'victims' are termed 'survivors' and are understood as active and 
agentic subjects, it becomes clear that Wolfs vision of 'power feminism' is 
indebted to these discourses. Wolfs (mis)representation of feminist victim 
activism erases its ethos of survivorship completely. But, in a finely crafted 
legerdemain, it reemerges in Wolfs account as the apparently novel ethos of 
'power feminism.' 
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The second line of argument I pursue has to do with the second element of 
the above noted alignment: the idea that a return to liberal feminism's 
political posture will enable a move beyond victim-centred politics. In relation 
to this idea, I am especially concerned to reveal the extent to which the 
popular feminist accounts are themselves steeped in the form of victim-
centred politics they associate with 'victim feminism.' Recalling the mass 
media analysis of Herman and Chomsky in their book Manufacturing 
Consent, in particular their emphasis upon the dichotomy between 'worthy' 
and 'unworthy' victims which still is widely evident in the popular media, I 
suggest that the popular feminist accounts have appropriated the tactics of 
victim-centred politics which they impugn, primarily through their 
construction of what I term 'reverse victimologies.'3 This term refers to the 
counter-sets of 'victims' of 'victim feminism,' arrays of 'worthy' victims set in 
contrast with the 'unworthy' victims feminism constructs and purports to 
represent, presented in the popular feminist accounts. This enables my 
argument that there is a very strong sense in which the category 'victim' also 
is operating as a centre of gravity for the popular feminist accounts, meaning 
that radicalism and victim-centred politics are not mutually dependent, and 
liberal feminism's fealty to the politico-economic status quo does not in any 
necessary sense mark the move beyond victim-centred politics, and its 
attendant 'politics of resentment,' that these accounts beckon and purport to 
have made. 
The chapter's discussion also works to bring poststructuralist feminist 
perspectives on sexual violence into view. These perspectives, like the 
popular feminist accounts of 'victim feminism,' also express concerns 
regarding the inability of a simple victim/oppressor dichotomy to capture the 
3 Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: the political economy of 
mass media (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988). 
i 
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relation of gender to power. I argue, however, that these perspectives offer 
ways of grappling with this issue without entertaining the reversals and 
legerdemains evident in the popular feminist accounts. 
2.1 Victimhood and Polysemy 
In a recent edition of one of New Zealand's weekly national newspapers, The 
Sunday Star Times, an article entitled 'The Rape Survivor Who Faced Fear to 
Fight Back' appeared.4 It told the story of a courageous South African 
woman, a journalist called Charlene Smith, who experienced rape and has 
since written a book about her experience, including the "battle against fear" 
which troubled her path to recovery.5 The book, Proud of Me, urges rape 
survivors to "stop their quivering" and offers the counsel that "the word 
victim. is a term of abuse".6 In her book Smith documents her nightmarish 
confrontations, in the period after the rape, with a paralysing fear, an 
overwhelming sense of vulnerability and an incapacitating depression. But 
she also speaks of finding her strength, making the "choice to live", and 
realising that "he cannot imprison my mind. I have the power."7 Smith, who 
"has no time for excuses or self-pity", construes her recovery as a necessarily 
self-generated movement from being a "victim." to becoming a "survivor."8 
She explains to the columnist that "she hates the word victim" and that 
those who have experienced sexual violence ought to be referred to as 
"survivors".9 The columnist in turn describes Smith as an "active survivor" 
as opposed to a "passive" one as Smith is working to increase public 
4 Julie Hosking, 'The Rape Survivor Who Faced Fear to Fight Back,' Sunday Star Times 
(March 31, 2002), C5, ClO. 
5 Ibid., C5. 
6 These quotes are from Smith's book, Proud of Me (London: Penguin, 2002), and are 
reprinted in the article, C5. 
7 Ibid .. 
8 Ibid .. 
9 Ibid .. 
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awareness of sexual violence and also has worked hard to pursue her rapist 
through the criminal justice system to the point of his conviction and 
imprisonment.IO 
In this article, Smith's experience of sexual violence is narrativised in 
what is, in some significant respects, a conventionally feminist manner. 
Many of the staple themes of feminist victim activist discourse are present. 
For example, Smith's book, along with her other activities tuned toward 
increasing public awareness of sexual violence, are spoken of in terms of 
"breaking the silence".11 Her determination to see her attacker convicted and 
imprisoned is rendered as the assertion of an inalienable and appropriately 
state-adjudicated right to bodily integrity. Most saliently, Smith rejects the 
term "victim" and embraces the term "survivor" so as to signal that her 
attacker may have impinged upon, but did not quash, the self-determined 
character of her being. 
However, in the article these themes-breaking the silence, bodily 
integrity construed as right, and survivorship-are represented, firstly, as 
initiated by Smith herself and, secondly, as distinctly "postfeminist".12 To 
buttress these representations, the columnist writes: "Smith's outspoken, 
often unconventional views have riled many, including feminists who she says 
would 'have us all blame men.'"13 On the whole, the effect of this is that 
'feminism' is associated with the term 'victim' while the term 'survivor' is 
lOibid .. 
l l Ibid., ClO. As Linda Alcoff and Laura Gray describe, the "strategic metaphor of 
·"breaking the silence"" is "virtually ubiquitous" within feminist victim activism: "survivor 
demonstrations are called "speak outs," the name of the largest national network of 
survivors of childhood sexual abuse is VOICES, and the metaphor figures prominently in 
book titles such as I Never Told Anyone, Voices in the Night, Speaking Out, Fighting 
Back, and No More Secrets." Linda Alcoff and Laura Gray, 'Survivor Discourse: 
transgression or recuperation?,' Signs Vol. 18, No. 2 (Winter 1993): 262, n.7. 
12Ibid .. It should be noted that I am not seeking to dispute Smith's 'ownership' of the 
notion of survivorship, but rather to point out that this notion has a longstanding 
history within feminist work on sexual violence. 
13Ibid .. No evidence offeminist criticism of Smith's ideas is provided in the article. 
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employed to mark a move beyond feminist negativity. Moreover, when this is 
coupled with Smiths' registration of 'victim' as "a term of abuse", the 
association crafted here between 'feminism' and 'victim' suggests that the 
former can only compound the fruitless suffering characteristic of the latter. 
One of the things I will be arguing in this chapter is that a similar 
manoeuvre to the one evident in this article-a manoeuvre which involves 
dissociating 'feminism' from a range of staple feminist edicts and, in turn, 
appropriating these edicts for a move beyond feminism or toward an 
alternative feminism-is at play in the popular feminist accounts examined 
in Chapter 1, and is especially evident in Wolfs account with her construction 
of a dichotomy between 'victim' and 'power' feminism. That is, I will be 
arguing that the figurations of empowerment offered up as novel elements of 
a new 'power feminism' actually may be regarded as recycled and repackaged 
elements drawn from the very forms of feminism that Wolf and the other 
critics impugn. To cut a path into this argument, however, a set of questions 
about the word which is pivotal in all these matters-'victim'-needs to be 
addressed. 
One of the most surprising aspects of the accounts of 'victim feminism' is 
that they offer little or no reflection on the meaning of the word 'victim.' As 
against this, we must ask: What is a 'victim'? What kind of subject does this 
word purport to describe? What kinds of concepts have informed attributions 
of meaning-feminist and otherwise-to this word? Does the meaning of this 
word in accounts of 'victim feminism' square with how this word has been 
understood by those identified as 'victim feminists'? What is the power of this 
word such that it may be referred to as "a term of abuse"? 
In the accounts of 'victim feminism' the word 'victim' is loaded with a 
particular meaning and set of connotations which do accurately reflect how 
this word often is employed in common usage, but which are nonetheless 
VICTIMHOOD AND ITS (DIS)CONTENTS 105 
made strange when the history of the word, including feminist intervention 
upon its meaning, is considered. In forming their arguments regarding 
feminism's having foisted victim identity upon women as a group, the critics 
invariably marry the word 'victim' with a range of adjectives which paint this 
figure as one who does not act. Victims are 'passive,' 'guileless,' 'paralysed,' 
'innocent,' 'helpless,' 'violated,' 'pathetic,' 'fragile,' 'self-pitying,' 'pitiable,' 
'fearful,' 'oppressed,' 'needy,' 'hapless,' 'hopeless' and so forth. Victimhood is 
rendered as a kind of stasis to which only one action, albeit one which merely 
ensures continued passivity, may be attributed: the deflection of 
responsibility, the outward direction of blame. But as we address the 
questions noted above and survey the kinds of meanings that the word 
'victim' carries, we will find major constructions of victimhood which run 
contrary to these two central aspects of the 'victim' in popular feminist 
parlance-non-action and deflection of responsibility. 
We will find, for example, that in traditional legal contexts, specifically 
those involving the adjudication of sexual violence, to qualify as a 'victim' one 
must have been anything but passive. One must, rather, have engaged in 
'actively resistant' and 'properly agentic' behaviours. We also will find that in 
some quarters, namely those of feminist victim activism, qualifying as a 
'victim' is thought to involve precisely the inability to deflect responsibility-
that is, a persistent tendency toward self-blame. And we will encounter that 
complex set of circumstances in which those who have been victimised seek 
to overcome victim identity through recourse to the law-a gesture which 
entails moving beyond victim identity and toward a reclamation of agency 
only upon having victim status confirmed by a higher power. In short, and as 
against the image of an army of feminists encouraging the female population 
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to swap their existing garb for the easy14 suits of victimhood, we will 
encounter victim identity as a difficult, contradictory, vexed, relational and 
above all complicated phenomenon. 
In his discussion of the word "revenge" in The Wanderer and His Shadow, 
Nietzsche makes an argument which is fruitful for our purposes here-not 
only because the word 'victim' often is associated with the desire for revenge. 
Pointing out that the concept "value" is a unity in name only, Nietzsche 
impugns the efforts of economists to locate "the original root concept of 
value" as though this would deliver the singularly true meaning of that word 
as against the distortions it has suffered since its inception.15 Reminiscent of 
his claim in On the Genealogy of Morals that "only that which has no history is 
definable", Nietzsche suggests that we embrace the polysemic or "composite" 
character of words, conceiving of them as "pockets into which now this and 
now that has been put, and now so many things at once".16 Making this 
embrace for an analysis of "revenge", Nietzsche goes on to distil two 
profoundly different meanings of this word, two profoundly different "types" of 
revenge: immediate, self-defensive counter-blow, and calculated revenge 
designed to exact compensation from a specific opponent, a revenge for which 
"time is needed". 17 
Nietzsche's approach to the word 'revenge' is, for two particular reasons, 
instructive for our dealings with the word 'victim' in this chapter. Firstly, 
following Nietzsche, we may think of this word as a pocket which carries 
many meanings and connotations. We will survey an array meanings and 
connotations this word carries in common usage, in the discourse of the 
14Denfeld notes that assuming victim identity is "far easier than taking responsibility for 
those aspects of our lives we can control." The New Victorians, 87. 
1sws: 33; GOM: Appendix, WS, 33. 
16Ibid.; GOM: II, 13. 
17WS: 33; GOM: Appendix, WS, 33. Emphasis in original. 
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victimiser-as-victim and the concept of victim precipitation, and in the 
arenas of criminological victimology and feminist victim activism. These 
meanings and connotations will then be compared with those attributed to 
this word in the accounts of 'victim feminism' specifically so that disjunctions 
between how feminists have conceived their relationship with the category 
'victim,' and how this relationship is represented in accounts of 'victim 
feminism,' may be exposed. 
Secondly, Nietzsche's approach is useful for this survey of meanings 
insofar as his distillation of two distinct sets of actions which travel under the 
same name-'revenge'-involves a dichotomy which, as we will see, also 
cleaves the distinction between two major kinds of 'victim' that we will 
encounter below. For Nietzsche, the first kind of revenge has an aura of 
innocence: it is an immediate and "almost ... involuntary reflex" propelled by 
an instinct for self-preservation. The second kind of revenge, however, bears 
no such aura as it is marked by calculation, deliberation and premeditation. 
The process of distinguishing between a 'victim' and a 'victimiser' tends in 
general to be informed by a dichotomy between passive innocence and 
calculated activity such that 'victim' is associated with innocent passivity 
while 'victimiser' has a monopoly on calculated action. However, as we will 
see, it is also the case that the word 'victim' itself houses this very dichotomy. 
It will become clear that what Martha Minow refers to as "victim talk"-by 
which she means public and counter-public discourses invested in offering and 
contending popular and officio-juridical designations of victimhood-is riven 
through with dichotomies between innocent victims and calculated victims, 
between 'real' and 'false' victims, 'blameless' and 'blameworthy' victims, 
'deserving' and 'undeserving' victims, 'worthy' and 'unworthy' victims.IS 
18Martha Minow, 'Surviving Victim Talk,' UCLA Law Review Vol. 40, No. 1411 (1993): 
1413-1428. 
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Victim talk tends to begin and end with the question 'Will the Real Victim 
please stand up?', and we will come to discern the prevalence of this 
attachment to Real Victimisation in the accounts of victim feminism. We 
also will discern that the main problem with this attachment is that it 
forecloses rather than opens investigation as to how victimhood itself is 
constructed and may be understood. 
2.2 Victims and/as Agents 
'Victim' is an unruly word. Its meanings and connotations, its capacity to 
invite scorn or sympathy, seems to depend on what category of victim is 
being addressed, on whether 'victim' is supposed to denote a kind of agency or 
an utter lack of agency, and on what reading of power relations the denotation 
is servicing. The etymology of the word 'victim'-which, in the OED, is nestled 
aptly between the etymologies of 'vicissitude' and 'victor'-gives a sense of 
how the meaning of this word has shifted since it initially appeared in the late 
fifteenth-century to name any living creature offered in sacrifice to a deity or 
supernatural force.19 This initial definition, which is still in circulation, was 
quite 'amoral' in the sense that this victim-more commonly beast or bird 
than human-does not connote deserving innocence, their experience of 
suffering is not foregrounded and, contestation of pagan ritual 
notwithstanding, this cast of victimisation stands at a great remove from 
conceptions of preventable or individually culpable criminal action. We must 
note too that this usage of 'victim' names a particular kind of death. To be a 
victim on this definition is to have had one's life sacrificed: one becomes this 
victim only in death. 
19The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 2355. The Latin 
'victima' denotes 'beast for sacrifice.' 
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A layer of moral adjudication, along with attentiveness to the experience 
of suffering and an undoing of this necessary association of victimhood with 
physical death, had come into play by the mid seventeenth-century as the 
word is made to refer to any subject "reduced or destined to suffer under some 
oppressive or destructive agency'' or who "perishes or suffers ill health from 
some enterprise or pursuit voluntarily undertaken."20 Here, the word finds 
broader reference and comes to contain a quite nuanced calculus of human 
action, relations and experience21 as it is made to encompass incidental and 
systemic victimisation22 attributable to the actions of an exterior agent, as 
well as unforseen misfortunes suffered as a result of one's 'voluntary' 
activities. 
This later definition sees the word 'victim' lent a classificatory character, 
and at least three classes of 'victim' may be discerned under its auspice. The 
first two-victims of incidental or systemic victimisation-are set in a 
dichotomous relation with an exterior agent or 'cause' of victimisation, where 
this relation facilitates a direction of blame toward that agent. The victim 
status of the third class of victim is not quite so straightforward. This victim 
is, albeit not deliberately, self-made: they are the inadvertent author of their 
own victimisation. The slings and arrows of fortune as well as the limits of the 
concept of blame find reference here, but given the emphasis in this definition 
20Jbid .. 
21 My particular interest here lies with this definition's reflection and construction of 
human relations, but it must be noted that the "oppressive or destructive agency" 
referred to is not necessarily human: it may be a natural phenomenon such as a storm 
or a drought. It is worth noting further that this is consistent with a Nietzschean 
analysis to the extent that such an analysis would emphasise the imposition of a 
grammar of causation and intentionality upon the action of such phenomena, as in 
Nietzsche's complaint that the "popular mind"-structured by a language of cause and 
effect which separates doer from deed to yield a conception of subjective intentionality-
will "separate the lightening from its flash and [take] the latter as an action, for the 
operation of a subject called lightening." GOM: I, 13. Emphasis in original. 
22Although it should be noted that the term "victimisation," along with "victimiser" and 
"victimise," is first recorded much later, in 1830. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 
2355. 
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on imposing a grammar of causation and, hence, a structure of blame upon 
the relations and events to which it refers, the possibility of self-blame and 
victim-blame do quietly attend this third class of victim. 
This general definition and the dichotomous relation it sets up between 
'victim' and 'agent'-or, by the mid-nineteenth century, victim and 
"victimiser"-still formally hold sway in the contemporary vernacular, but 
have not of course been lent safe passage. In the following passages we will 
examine two salient interventions in the legal and criminological arenas 
designed to rework this dichotomy such that its distinction between a 
victimised subject who is 'acted-upon' and a victimising subject who 'acts' is 
lent lability and ambiguity. These two interventions-the discourse of the 
victimiser-as-victim and the concept of victim precipitation-lend complexity 
to this general definition of victimhood in calling its customary applications 
and apportionment of blame into question. However they are best thought of 
as surface interventions since they rework the victim/agent dichotomy by 
reversing its terms. They do not call into question the gesture of apportioning 
blame-rather than intervene upon this dichotomy's logic of blame they 
maintain its categories and work to redistribute blame-nor do they 
interrogate the normative function of this dichotomy, which is to posit the 
self-determining individual as generic and ideal. 
According to Martha Minow, the discourse of the victimiser-as-victim has 
been a penchant of criminal justice reformers for over two hundred years.23 
Arguing that a staple feature of victim talk is "the classic example of the 
rejoinder to victimhood, which takes the form, 'Don't blame me; I'm a victim 
too"', Minow notes that this discourse and the rejoinder it installs have been 
fuelled by the argument that "individual defendants-or defendants as a 
23Minow, 'Surviving Victim Talk,' 1415. 
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group-violate legal rules because of their own histories of deprivation."24 
Minow links this with the emergence of the insanity defence and, relatedly, we 
can add that in its contemporary form this argument finds its most common 
expression in the idea that practices of unlawful violence and abuse have a 
cyclical character such that child victims of violence and abuse are marked 
by a tendency to become adult perpetrators of them. Reminiscent of 
Nietzsche's argument that state-sponsored dispensation of punishment 
inhibits "the development of the feeling of guilt" since a criminal will perceive 
the likeness between their deed and the punitive measures "practised in the 
service of justice", Minow notes further that situating the victimiser as a 
victim also has extended to the idea that "criminal defendants suffer 
victimisation at the hand of the state".25 Hence this discourse reworks the 
victim/victimiser dichotomy by recasting the victimiser as a victim in two 
ways: the victimiser's own experience of victimisation in turn prompts their 
practice of victimisation, and secondly this practice in turn prompts their 
own victimisation, at the initiation of their accuser, by a punitive state. Here, 
the victimiser-agent emerges as a victimised non-agent, and the legitimacy of 
the justice system's customary distribution of blame is challenged. But this 
challenge remains at the level of a surface intervention insofar as it consists 
of a redistribution of blame. In appropriating the system's logic of blame the 
challenger protects this logic, as distinct from its customary application, from 
critique. 
24Ibid .. 
25GOM II, 14; Minow, 'Surviving Victim Talk,' 1415. For a classic and oft-cited 
articulation of this argument see Robert Cover, 'Violence and the Word,' Yale Law 
Journal No. 95 (1986), 1601-1626. My reference to Nietzsche is not meant to align him 
with the discourse Minow refers to. While his comment in GOM is reminiscent of this 
discourse he nonetheless impugns those "in the habit of taking the side of criminals" for 
assuming "a sort of socialist pity [as] their most attractive guise." BGE: On the 
Prejudices of Philosophers, 21. 
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The concept of victim precipitation is the mirror opposite of the discourse 
of the victimiser-as-victim in the sense that they perform the same kind of 
surface intervention but with opposite results with regard to the 
redistribution of blame. We saw with the third class of victim discerned 
above-the victim who unwittingly authors their own victimisation-that 
there is a sense in which this dichotomy might be made to construe one as 
both 'victim' and 'agent' such that the possibilities of self-blame or victim-
blame arise. This figuration of the victim as the author of their own 
victimisation is accelerated somewhat with the criminological concept of 
victim precipitation which arose to some salience in the late 1950s.26 This 
concept interrupts the sense in which 'victim' may denote a pure instance of 
being 'acted upon' as it is centred on the possibility of contributory, 
precipitant, provocative, negligent, consenting, or indeed lack of non-
consenting behaviour on the part of the victim, who may not therefore be 
understood as blameless. 
Minow renders such attentiveness to the behaviour of the victim as 
another staple element of victim talk which, she argues, hosts a volatile 
struggle "over whether noting the fact that a victim could behave differently 
implies that the victim is to blame."27 The concept of victim precipitation is 
by now a well-worn instrument of criminal defence, and in the legal arena it 
has operated rather like a filter for juridical vision as it provides further 
grounds on which classificatory distinctions between 'law-worthy' and 'law-
trivial' victims may be produced. Apart from raising the ire of conservative 
law-and-order-driven factions in the victim's rights movement-whose will is 
to have the law bend to the victim's desire for justice through, for example, 
26This concept was first developed by Marvin Wolfgang in his work on homicide, Patterns 
of Criminal Homicide (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1958). 
27Minow, 'Surviving Victim Talk,' 1417. 
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longer jail terms and the reintroduction of capital punishment28_the concept 
of victim precipitation has been of longstanding concern to feminists in its 
application for adjudicating cases involving sexual violence and abuse.29 The 
concerns feminists have raised about this concept are worthy of review for it 
is in cases of sexual violence and abuse that the concept of victim 
precipitation's reinscription of the victim as a blameworthy pseudo-victim 
finds its most complex and indeed contentious manifestation. Reviewing these 
concerns also suits our purposes since, as we saw in Chapter 1, they come as 
part of the very kind of feminist politicisation of sexual violence centrally at 
issue in the popular feminist accounts of 'victim feminism.' 
2.3 Sexual Violence and Victim Blame 
Feminist engagement with the concept of victim precipitation has come as 
part of a broader project to reform the law so as to reconstruct its hitherto 
narrow figuration of the 'law-worthy rape victim.' In the case of sexual 
violence, the concept of victim precipitation has a dual operation: it can work 
to indict the victim for behaviours and actions that they did perform, or for 
behaviours and actions that they failed to perform. Before elucidating this 
operation let us note that such spotlighting of the behaviour and actions of 
the victim has been a longstanding element of rape trials owing, firstly, to the 
role that 'non-consent' has played in the legal distinction between consensual 
sex and forcible rape and, secondly, to the longstanding legal equation of non-
28For a critical account of the evolution of victims' rights legislation in the United States, 
specifically in relation to race, capital punishment, and the introduction of the 'victim 
impact statement' to the prosecution process, see Angela P. Harris, 'The Jurisprudence 
ofVictimhood', Supreme Court Review No. 77 (1991): 77-102. 
29Marvin Wolfgang's concept of victim precipitation (see Note 26) was adapted for analysis 
of sexual violence by Menachem Amir, Patterns in Forcible Rape (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1971). As Susan Estrich outlines, Amir argues that a victim may be 
regarded as precipitant where she "acted in a way that 'could be taken as an invitation 
to sexual relations'-agreed to drinks, rides, or dates or failed to react strongly enough 
to sexual suggestions and overtures." Susan Estrich, Real Rape: how the legal system 
victimises women who say no (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 25; 
Amir, Patterns in Forcible Rape, 259. 
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consent with active resistance.30 Prior to feminist intervention the tradition 
has been that for an event to be legally described as 'rape,' for the event to be 
distinguished from 'consensual sex,' and for a complainant to sit comfortably 
within the law's figuration of the 'rape victim,' a victim must prove that they 
met the assailant's use of physical force with utmost resistance, and that 
their self-protective effort nonetheless was thwarted.31 That is, to qualify as 
a 'victim' in these circumstances one must have been able to render oneself 
as an agent whose agentic capacity was expressed as physical (and in some 
cases verbal) resistance and whose momentary deprivation of agency was 
physically enforced by the assailant. Hence, as Kristen Bumiller puts it, rape 
cases have tended to rely heavily for their adjudication on "the image of the 
rape victim as a reactive agent."32 
Bumiller, writing in the late 1980s, enJoins many other feminists in 
highlighting the main problem with this 'resistance requirement' and the 
manner in which it conducts adjudicatory attention. Arguing that traditional 
legal parameters work to blindspot the perspective of victims whose non-
consent was not, for compelling reasons, actively demonstrated, she contends 
that "[w]omen who are sexually attacked are concerned with their survival, 
not with the demonstration of nonconsent."33 Bumiller's point is that the 
30Kristen Bumiller, 'Rape as a Legal Symbol: an essay on sexual violence and racism,' 
University of Miami Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 75 (1987): 76; Estrich, Real Rape, 31. 
31As Estrich notes, this is formally termed the 'resistance requirement', Real Rape, 31. 
The formal factors influencing the adjudication of rape cases do vary tremendously 
according to location, but it is the case that the resistance requirement has formed a 
common denominator between the American, English, Canadian, Australian and New 
Zealand legal systems. 
32Bumiller, 'Rape as a Legal Symbol,' 84. 
33Ibid., 77. The feminist literature on the concept of consent in the case of sexual violence 
is extensive. Salient contributions include Catharine A. MacKinnon's chapter 'Rape: on 
coercion and consent' in her book Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 171-183 and Carole Pateman's article 'Women 
and Consent,' in Political Theory 8 (May 1980): 149-168. Other notable texts in the 
feminist literature on sexual violence include: Carol Smart and Barry Smart, eds., 
Women, Sexuality, and Social Control (London, Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1978); Susan Griffin, Rape: the politics of consciousness (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 
1986); Judith Rowland, The Ultimate Violation (London: Pluto Press, 1986); Sylvana 
. I 
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law's equation of agentic self-protection with physical and/or verbal 
resistance failed to recognise the sense in which, in some circumstances, 
acquiescence constituted not consent but a self-protective measure against 
greater harm. This equation also failed to take into account what Susan 
Brownmiller refers to as women's "training" in acquiescent victimhood: that 
element of the broader culture which maintains a dissociation of femininity 
from aggressive self-assertion.34 Such self-assertion can represent an 
effective strategy for preventing rape, but the law's elevation of it to a 
requirement set up what feminists regarded as an unfair distribution of 
responsibility for preventing rape. 
Bumiller's concerns about the resistance requirement reflect those of 
Susan Estrich's book Real Rape where it is it argued that this requirement, 
coupled with the legal conception of force as coterminous with physical 
coercion, has worked to situate the phenomenon of "aggravated rape" as the 
benchmark for legal reckoning of serious, law-worthy rape.35 Such 
benchmarking in turn has situated cases of 'simple' or 'technical' rape as 
contrastingly ambiguous, suspect, less serious, and therefore less amenable 
to the processes oflegal redress.36 Laura Hengehold elucidates this point: 
Tomaselli and Roy Porter, eds., Rape (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986); Anna Clark, 
Women's Silence, Men's Violence: sexual assault in England, 1770-1845 (London: 
Pandora, 1987); Merril D. Smith, ed., Sex Without Consent: rape and sexual coercion in 
America (New York: New York University Press, 2001); Toshiyuki Tanaka, Japan's 
Comfort Women: sexual slavery and prostitution during World War II and the US 
occupation (London: Routledge, 2002). 
34Brownmiller writes "Women are trained to be rape victims. To simply learn the word 
"rape" is to take instruction in the power relationship between males and females ... 
[e]ven before we learn to read we have become indoctrinated into a victim mentality", 
Against Our Will: men, women and rape (London: Pelican Books, 1986 [originally 
published 1975]), 309. 
35 As Estrich elucidates, 'aggravated rape' is defined as rape involving "extrinsic violence 
(guns, knives or beatings) or multiple assailants or no prior relationship between the 
victim and the defendant", Real Rape, 4. 
36As Estrich elucidates, 'simple' or 'technical' rape is defined as being characterised by "a 
single defendant who knew his victim and neither beat her nor threatened her with a 
weapon", Real Rape, 4. 
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The easiest rapes to prosecute are those in which the event of sexual 
violence stands out as a clear anomaly from the victim's everyday life 
... Cases in which the victim was previously acquainted or socially 
involved with her attacker present the most difficult problems for 
prosecution, since rapes occurring in the context of a prior 
relationship are often treated as "private" (not amenable to public 
adjudication), less serious or frightening, or the result of contributory 
negligence on the victim's part.37 
1 1 6 
Bumiller observes that with the parameters oflegal definition set in this way, 
"indictment of the victim" emerged as the best avenue for a defence team in a 
rape trial.38 This is where the concept of victim precipitation has found its 
primary point of purchase. 
There is a cluster of classic examples of actions and behaviours which 
have been cast as 'precipitant' in cases of sexual violence. They include 
hitchhiking, allowing the assailant into one's home, wearing 'revealing' 
clothing, going out with or accepting drinks, food or gifts from the assailant, 
and having a prior relationship with the assailant. Drawing on Judith Butler's 
commentary on a rape trial in which the defence took a victim precipitation 
line, let us note that each entry on this list bears a trace of what she 
identifies as that "line of reasoning [wherein] the "sex" of a woman is claimed 
as that which establishes the responsibility for her own violation."39 
Hitchhiking, answering the door to a stranger and wearing a short skirt would 
be robbed of significance in the absence of a conception of female sexuality as 
inevitably violable property where a certain code of public propriety has not 
37Laura Hengehold, 'Remapping the Event: institutional discourses and the trauma of 
rape,' Signs Vol. 26, No. 1 (2000): 198. 
38Kristen Bumiller, 'Fallen Angels: the representation of violence against women in legal 
culture,' International Journal of the Sociology of Law No. 18 (1990): 132. 
3 9 Judith Butler, 'Contingent Foundations: feminism and the question of 
"postmodernism,"' in Feminists Theorise the Political, eds. Judith Butler and Joan W. 
Scott (New York: Routledge, 1992), 18. The case Butler refers to is the New Bedford, MA 
gang rape case which received a great deal of media attention and later formed the 
basis for the film The Accused. The case is officially known as Commonwealth Vs. 
Rapozo, Cordeiro, Silva and Viera (Massachusetts Supreme Court, March 17, 1984). 
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been pursued by the 'owner' of that property. We will encounter a new entry 
on this list of 'precipitative' behaviours shortly, but for now let us note that 
counterpoised to this cluster of classic examples is what is by now an equally 
classic line of feminist criticism, a succinct articulation of which can be found 
in Susan Brownmiller's book Against Our Will. 
Brownmiller's primary objection to the concept of victim precipitation is 
that "it rests in the final analysis on a set of arbitrary standards".40 
Brownmiller's point is that the principles which underpin the nomination of 
certain behaviours as precipitative inevitably will reflect particular kinds of 
values regarding female sexual availability and the nature of 'normal' 
heterosexual sex. Offering her own interpretation of 'precipitative' behaviours 
as "insufficiently wary" rather than as precipitative, Brownmiller points out 
that these same behaviours may indeed be interpreted by a "rape-minded 
man" as "tantamount to an open invitation."41 Hence, where the law is 
amenable to the nomination of such behaviours as precipitative, it actually is 
ceding neutrality so as to ratify the latter perspective and sanction the 
values regarding female sexuality which underpin it. 
At first glance the concept of victim precipitation does promise to lend 
visibility to the kinds of complexities that the victim/victimiser dichotomy 
stubbornly elides. However this concept does not disturb the role of this 
dichotomy in legal settings: the apportionment of blame. As Brownmiller 
suggests, in the context of the rape trial-where interest in the credibility of 
the victim's perspective tends to be especially acute and her authority hard-
won-this concept has tended to simply reaffirm an existing social reflex of 
victim-blame and an existing tendency to greet rape victims with mean-
spirited suspicion of duplicity, as well as to preempt open interpretation of a 
40Brownmiller, Against Our Will, 353. 
41 Ibid., 354. 
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victim's behaviour in a pre-rape situation and to preserve precisely the 
narrow figuration of the law-worthy rape victim that feminist interventions 
have sought to broaden and revise.42 
As Laura Hengehold has commented, given the level of scrutiny imposed 
upon the behaviour and actions of rape victims-not only at the time of the 
rape but also in court-it is little wonder that rape trials often are referred to 
as 'second rapes,' as sites of a second-order victimisation.43 The defining 
gesture of the rape trial is that which oversees the complainant seek to align 
herself with the legally prescribed ideal victim while distancing herself from 
its counter-image: the pseudo-victim who perpetrates a victimisation of her 
own in having brought unconvincing accusations to court.44 Bumiller gives 
some sense of how this alignment can play out in the courtroom in her study 
of the rape case to which Butler refers above, and which was made famous 
after it formed the basis of the film The Accused: 
As she testified in a calm monotone, she tried to present herself in 
society's image of an innocent victim rather than revealing weakness 
and anger. Adopting the pose of the innocent victim required her to 
show that her actions conformed to what is expected of a person of 
good character: consistency, sobriety, and responsibility.45 
42Aithough feminist intervention in this area has been met with much success, victim-
blame still stands as a significant problem and certain applications of the concept of 
victim precipitation remain largely undisturbed, most notably its application for the case 
of sex workers who encounter sexually violent clients. For a contemporary account see 
Maggie O'Neill's chapter 'The City, Masculinity, and the Social Organisation of Desire: 
pimps and punters,' in her book Prostitution and Feminism: towards a politics of feeling 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), 154-182. See also Barbara Sullivan's work on 
prostitution, 'Rethinking Prostitution,' in Transitions: new Australian feminisms, eds., 
Barbara Caine and Rosemary Pringle (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1995), 184-197, and The 
Politics of Sex: prostitution and pornography in Australia since 1945 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
43Hengehold, 'Remapping the Event,' 198. 
44Jt is worth noting that one of the reasons why 'simple' or 'technical' rapes are less likely 
to go to trial is that they may be received as an attempt by the accuser to exact 'private 
revenge' from the accused, where this would contravene the role of the law to provide an 
orderly alternative to 'wild justice.' 
45Bumiller, 'Fallen Angels,' 133. 
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Here, victim identity is lent a convoluted character as the second order 
victimisation often mentioned in feminist work on sexual violence consists of 
the very process through which the rape victim seeks to be recognised as 
such. For our purposes, and as against the popular conception of the victim 
as a passive non-agent, what is striking about this gesture of alignment is 
that it involves not a disavowal of agency but rather identification with a 
particular prescription of agency. Both the resistance requirement and the 
concept of victim precipitation construct the victim as an agent with a 
capacity for a certain form of self-protection, self-determination, self-control 
and personal responsibility. Where these particular agentic capacities 
evidently have been exercised-yet ultimately thwarted-the victim qualifies 
as a victim; where they have not, the victim appears as a blameworthy 
pseudo-victim, one who in some way 'asked for it' and so may be regarded as 
having actively visited the passivity of victimisation upon themselves. Hence 
we have here not just a distinction between an ideal victim and a pseudo-
victim, but a good agent and a bad agent. 
A recent development in the deployment of the concept of victim 
precipitation adds a further twist to these calculations ofvictimhood, agency, 
passivity and blame. When lent a pathological dimension this concept can 
function to reinscribe the victim as a type of agent who precisely can not act 
agentically, as in the psychologistic portrait of the accuser who suffers a 
'victim personality' and of the 'battered woman' whose 'learned helplessness' 
'allows' sustained battery.46 Here, the victim is registered as a victim of a 
46For an account of how the concept of "learned helplessness," as articulated in 
theorisations of Battered Women's Syndrome, can function as an argument for victim 
precipitation in spousal violence defence cases see Neville Robertson and Ruth Busch, 
'The Dynamics of Spousal Violence: paradigms and priorities,' in Psychology and Family 
Law: a New Zealand perspective, eds. M. E. Pipe and Fred Seymour (Dunedin: 
University of Otago Press, 1998), 51-54. See also Linda Alcoff and Laura Gray's 
discussion of the notion of the "victim personality" as steeped in the language of victim-
blame, 'Survivor Discourse,' 262, n. 7. 
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pathology-in this case the pathology appears as the 'agent'-but this 
pathology is one which in some way 'solicits' victimisation by another. That 
other may thereby be relieved of some blame for having acted upon an 
'invitation' to victimise, while the victim is set up for a therapeutic encounter 
with their 'true assailant'-themselves. This example exhibits the labour of 
the concept of victim precipitation with particular clarity. To reverse the 
victim/agent dichotomy's customary distribution of blame, the concept of 
victim precipitation reproduces this dichotomy as a sub-individual economy 
such that we may speak of a self-assailing subject, a subject whose measure 
of blame is more readily calculable and whose inter- and intra-subjective 
relations are, therefore, law-ready.47 
Let us register at this point that our encounter with the concept of victim 
precipitation links directly back to the popular press accounts of victim 
feminism. Arguably, where these accounts advocate a return to traditional 
conceptions of 'real rape' so that the law-trivial complaints of pseudo-victims 
may be jettisoned-as is the case with the accounts of Denfeld, Hoff 
Sommers and Roiphe rather than Wolf-they behave rather like the concept 
of victim precipitation and, like that concept, channel the force of victim-
blame to great effect.48 This is perhaps most evident in Roiphe's account 
given her argument that blame for women's sexual victimisation be 
transferred from a system of male dominance to feminist agitation against 
such a system. Recall Roiphe's claim that women assume victim identity as 
a ruse so that they might benefit from the kudos it provides. With this claim, 
47It should be noted that this logic is non-partisan to the extent that it will apply equally 
where legal amenability to Battered Women's Syndrome (BWS) works in a female 
defendant's favour. Where BWS is cited to defend a woman who has killed her spouse 
against the charge of murder-the original circumstances of legal amenability to BWS-
it is her spouse who is most likely to appear as the self-assailing, pseudo-victim. 
48Wolfs account acknowledges the problem of victim-blame (Fire With Fire, 192-193) but, 
as we will see at a later point in this chapter, this problem can not be said to be 
integrated into her account of victimisation. I will be arguing that her 'power feminist' 
emphasis upon 'taking responsibility' redraws the gesture of victim-blame. 
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Roiphe uses the word 'victim' to refer to the very kind of 'bad agent' we have 
traced in the concept of victim precipitation: in this case, a fully-fledged, 
calculating and duplicitous agent engaged in a cynical feminist performance. 
As we saw in Chapter 1, in Roiphe's telling feminism first implants the 
idea that women are victimised, then encourages women to play out the role 
of the victim. This delivers the strange formulation that women who believe 
they have experienced sexual violence or harassment are to be regarded as 
self-assailing subjects who are 'performing feminism': 
At the most uncharted moments in our lives we reach instinctively for 
the stock plots available to our generation, as trashy and cliched as 
they may be ... [n]ow, if you're a woman, there's another role readily 
available: that of the sensitive female, pinched, leered at, assaulted 
daily by sexual advances, encroached upon, kept down, bruised by 
harsh reality. Among other things, feminism has given us this.49 
In suggesting that sexual violence and harassment are 'stock plots' scripted 
by feminism rather than social realities that feminists agitate against, 
Roiphe confuses the valid argument that feminists can not claim to be 
dispossessed of discursive power as they engage such agitation with the 
anachronistic view that women who claim to have experienced sexual 
violence are blameworthy, untrustworthy and duplicitous. The logic and 
logical outcome of the concept of victim precipitation are thereby redrawn. 
That these accounts exhibit a tendency to behave like the concept of 
victim precipitation explains why, in their dealings with feminist work on 
sexual violence, they contain little or no mention of the problem of victim-
blame: that is, little or no mention of the main problem feminists were 
pressing against as they sought to make the law more hospitable to women 
who believe they have experienced sexual violence. In the context of these 
49Roiphe, The Morning After, 172. My emphasis. 
VICTIMHOOD AND ITS (DIS)CONTENTS 122 
accounts, an admission that compelling reasons lay behind feminist efforts to 
make it more possible for more women to legally be regarded as 'victims' 
would work against their representation of such efforts as unwholesomely 
resentful celebrations of victimhood. Moreover, withholding such admission 
enables a blindspotting of the fact that in their efforts feminists were 
attempting to shore up a viable line of agentic action for women, in the form of 
legal redress.SO 
We turn now to two further conceptions ofvictimhood, both of which may 
be regarded as meditations on the question raised by the matter we have 
been discussing: How can one speak of the agentic capacities of the victim-
in Minow's words, their capacity to "behave differently"-without blaming the 
victim?SI Criminological victimology and feminist victim acti:vism share an 
interest in formulating a conception ofvictimhood which can lend visibility to 
the agentic capacities of victims, and which can avoid a connotation of 
permanent incapacity, without taking a slide into victim-blame. In addressing 
these, we will be able to illuminate the extent to which feminism's relationship 
with the category 'victim' has in fact been one of careful negotiation rather 
than uncritical embrace. We turn first to victimology. 
2.4 Within and Beyond Dualism: victimology 
Of the four critics addressed in the previous chapter it is Hoff Sommers who 
adopts the term 'victimology' to describe the form of feminism she critiques. 
50This point is indebted to Jenny Morgan. In her chapter 'Sexual Harassment: where did 
it go in 1995?' (in Bodyjamming: sexual harassment, feminism and public life, ed. Jemma 
Mead (Sydney: Random House, 1997), 101-115), Morgan suggests that pursuing redress 
upon the experience of sexual harassment or sexual violence should be regarded as a 
form of "agency" and "resistance", rather than as a gesture which betrays a desire to 
wallow in victimhood. Morgan points out that in their responses to the Ormond College 
case (see Chapter 1, note 152) the Australian media in general and Helen Garner in 
particular failed to recognise "the agency the [Ormond College] women had in fact 
exercised" (Ibid., 114) and were instead intent upon registering the complainants as 
self-appointed victims. 
51Minow, 'Surviving Victim Talk,' 1417. 
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As we saw in that chapter, when Hoff Sommers refers to "resenter feminists" 
who play "the victimology game" she means to render their brand of feminism 
as one which focuses exclusively on, and which exaggerates, women's status 
as passive victims, where such focus works to obscure women's status as 
capable self-determining agents and indeed to discourage women from 
assuming such status.52 While respecting Hoff Sommer's prerogative to load 
the term with her own particular meaning, let us note that 'victimology' in the 
criminological sense actually refers to a theoretical approach which is 
attuned precisely to a conception of the victim as an active subject. 
Since its advent in the 1950s-and its development into the title of an 
expert discourse in the 1970s-the term 'victimology' has had a dual meaning 
in criminological settings. Firstly, a victimology is a list of the names of those 
victimised by one person or by a particular kind of crime; secondly, 
victimology names that approach to the study of criminality which trades 
exclusive focus on the perpetrator for a focus on the intersubjective dynamics 
of the criminal-victim relationship, a focus which encompasses the victim's 
role in and perspective on the crime.53 As Anne McLeer notes, the word 
'victim' in criminological settings generally denotes "recipient or object of 
criminal action".54 Without challenging the distribution of culpability 
embedded in this definition, victimology seeks to overturn its rendering of the 
victim as a mere 'passive object' who has little to offer the investigative 
process. That is, victimology seeks to reinscribe victimhood as a subject 
position which, if recognised and examined as such, can yield significant 
information about the nature and ramifications of the crime and, therefore, 
52HoffSommers, Who Stole Feminism?, 79. 
53The two meanings of 'victimology' are related: part of the practice of victimology is to 
generate statistical data on crime victims, which in turn are referred to as 'victimologies.' 
54 Anne McLeer, 'Saving the Victim: recuperating the language of the victim and 
reassessing global feminism,' Hypatia Vol. 13, No. 1(Winter1998): 42. 
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the agency of its executor. Victimology's focus on the victim is not intended to 
overhaul conventional understandings of criminal responsibility, but rather to 
elaborate more nuanced geographies and demographies of crime in the 
interests of improved predictive and preventative measures and enhanced 
ratiocinative technique. 
Anne McLeer's account of victimology is especially interesting for our 
purposes as it is directly concerned with feminism's relationship with the 
category 'victim.' McLeer argues that the particular manner in which 
victimologists conceive of victimhood is useful for feminist theorists primarily 
because it elaborates a method for recognising and examining the "role" a 
victim plays in their victimisation, and the ways in which a potential victim 
might resist or prevent victimisation, while managing to avoid a slide into 
victim-blame. Before we address the grammar of victimisation through which 
victimology attempts this, we should note that Martha Minow for one 
remains unconvinced by victimology's capacity to succeed where the concept 
of victim precipitation fails to avoid victim-blame. For Minow, victimology's 
side-stepping of victim-blame is really only achieved by fiat, and "in their very 
disclaimer, victimologists confess how close their work is to blaming victims 
themselves for failing to avoid situations in which they are victimised."55 
McLeer, however, offers a subtle distinction between victimology and the 
concept of victim precipitation: while the former examines victim subjectivity 
with a view "to explain the agency of the criminal", the latter performs such 
examination so as to "defiect agency from the criminal".56 
According to McLeer, victimology seeks to provide "a neutral and 
elucidative construction of victim subjectivity".57 This involves a manoeuvre 
55Minow, 'Victim Talk,' 1417. 
56McLeer, 'Saving the Victim,' 43. My emphasis. 
57Jbid., 44. 
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through which the victim/agent dichotomy is at once preserved-it still sets 
the terms of engagement-and reworked as its dualist identification of 
victimhood as a lack of agency is called into question. To forward this 
reworking, victimology offers a definition of the word 'victim' which is 
inherently unstable. In accord with the fact that the 'role' of victims in events 
of victimisation "varies from passive to quite active", victimologists offer a 
definition of the word 'victim' wherein the capacity for action, resistance and 
prevention on the part of the victim is posited as variable, and the word is 
dislodged from any necessary tie with either pole of the active/passive 
dichotomy.58 The victim is not prohibited from agency by this definition, yet 
to retain the sense in which victimisation involves a deprivation of agency a 
third term is introduced into the equation, a term which captures the not-
necessarily-passive and yet typically non-agentic character of victimisation: 
'subjectivity.' Following victimologists, McLeer mainly reserves 'agency' to 
describe the perpetrator while employing the terms "active subjectivity" and 
"subjectivity" in referring to the victim.59 Adopting this language in the 
following passage, McLeer indicates that within the victimological framework 
the victim/agent dichotomy is both preserved and, in view of the complexity of 
victimisation, reworked: 
Although the victim was the "done-to" (to borrow from the 
terminology of feminist film theory) ... she is not automatically 
presumed to lack subjectivity in this situation. The relationship 
between criminal and victim of a crime is posited as having a more 
complex configuration than that of subject-object, doer-done-to 
dualisms ... the term 'victim' in the language of victimology contains an 
understanding of an active subjectivity that does not imply the 
helplessness and lack of resistance implied by the term in other 
discourses. 60 
58Ibid., 42. 
59Ibid., 51. 
60Ibid., 42-3; 51. 
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McLeer's primary interest in victimology lies with its radical variant. In 
noting this aspect of her account our survey of meanings of the word 'victim' 
begins to come full circle in the sense that radical victimology, in moving 
beyond individual criminal circumstances to allow "institutions and classes to 
be considered within the existing parameters of victimology", encompasses 
the discourse of the victimiser-as-victim and is addressed to the victim of 
systemic (rather than 'incidental') victimisation.61 
Drawing on the work of radical victimologist Lech Falandysz, McLeer 
notes that victimology in its radical variant "not only sees criminals as 
victims of the criminal justice system but uses a class analysis to critique 
the victimising effects of society's existing institutions."62 In radical 
victimology the categories elaborated by victimologists are writ large onto 
relations of power more generally. On this scale, agencies which may be 
regarded as involved in the exercise of domination, for example the state, the 
criminal justice system, or the prevailing religious creed, come to stand in for 
the criminal or perpetrator. Those subjects positioned under their auspice are 
identified as 'victims' in the victimological sense of 'active subject.' The 
interaction between and beyond these figures, the crime, is now writ large as 
oppression. Rendered as such, oppression now can be examined: the agency of 
the perpetrator may be read off the subjectivity of the victim such that the 
victim-their actions, reactions, identity and attributes-becomes the 
heuristic key to an interpretation of their presence within relations of power. 
Although, as we will see, McLeer demonstrates the usefulness of this 
framework by referring to intercultural feminist theorising, let us note that 
61 Ibid., 45. 
62Jbid., 45; McLeer draws on the following from Lech Falandysz, 'Victimology in the 
Radical Perspective,' in The Victim in International Perspective: papers and essays given 
at the Third International Symposium on Victimology 1979 in Munster/Westfalia, ed. 
Hans Joachim Schneider (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1982), 112-113. 
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her recommendation of this framework would carry considerable 
ramifications for the use of the term 'victim' in case of sexual violence. 
If the case of sexual violence is read in accord with the radical 
victimological idea that the criminal justice system may be regarded as an 
agent of domination, the convicted rapist would have to appear in the 
categories 'victim' and 'perpetrator.' In relation to the victim he would stand 
as the perpetrator, but in relation to the criminal justice system he would 
appear alongside the victim in the radical victimological category 'victim.' 
Both are subject to the agency of this system, its categories, assumptions, 
the expert discourses it houses, its individualising case-by-case protocol. For 
the radical victimologist, both would therefore provide information for an 
account of the agency of the justice system as it is brought to bear on the 
adjudication and penal management of sexual violence. Hence the kinds of 
violence recognisable as active within events of sexual violence would broaden 
to encompass factors such as the manners in which these events are 
discursively managed by the justice system, where prerogative positioning 
within public discourses of sexual violence is understood as part of the 
"agency" and "role" of that system. 
Here, radical victimology can be made to open onto the kind of analysis of 
sexual violence that poststructuralist feminists have recently beckoned. 
Laura Hengehold beckons such an analysis when she tables the following set 
of questions: 
Where does the injustice that characterises rape lie? What 
characterises its eventfulness? Does it take place between individual 
bodies or within the discourses that allow those bodies to be 
interpreted in certain ways and not in others? ... Does the law 
participate in the violence of rape when it treats a black or Hispanic 
victim as less credible than a white victim? ... Is the violence practised 
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in prisons and the violence that jails a disproportionate number of 
minority men part of the injustice of rape?63 
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This kind of analysis asks for a feminist perspective on sexual violence which 
can address intersections of sexism and racism, in part by recognising the 
ensemble of potential victim/perpetrator relations that sexual violence may 
encompass.64 These would include the relationship between the convicted 
rapist and the prison system,65 the rape victim and the police force or media, 
the relation of rapist and raped to gender norms which see violence 
masculinised and vulnerability feminised, the relation of rapist and raped to 
racial norms which attach innocence to whiteness and perniciousness to 
blackness, and the role of the legislature in constituting, rather than merely 
transparently expressing, a living grammar of sexual violence. When we 
return to poststructuralist perspectives on sexual violence in the final stages 
of this chapter we will see that they, like the accounts of 'victim feminism,' 
ask for a feminism which can relax the woman-as-victim/man-as-victimiser 
configuration, but that unlike those accounts they do so in a manner which 
interrogates rather than employs the legitimacy of existing public discourses 
of sexual violence and the familiar turns of victim talk. 
To argue for the usefulness of radical victimology's modus operandi for 
intercultural feminist theorising, McLeer employs as an example the 
(outlawed) Hindu practice of sati (the ritual burning of women upon their dead 
husband's funeral pyre). McLeer argues that conventional interpretations of 
63Hengehold, 'Remapping The Event,' 192. Second emphasis added. 
64Michel Foucault's piece 'About the Concept of the "Dangerous Individual" in Nineteenth-
century Legal Psychiatry' would be among the key texts for this line of inquiry, Essential 
Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Volume Three, ed. James D. Faubion (London: Penguin 
Books, 2000), 176-200. 
65rt is estimated that 25 per cent of young men in prison in New South Wales have been 
raped, in some cases on a daily basis. Australia's rate of incarceration is rising 
(currently at 150 persons incarcerated per 100, 000) but is a long way from reaching the 
North American rate (700 persons incarcerated per 100, 000). These figures are drawn 
from Greg Bearup's excellent piece 'The Jungle Inside,' The Sydney Morning Herald, 
October 19, 2002: 'Good Weekend,' 20-24. 
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the victim of sati-including western feminist ones-have tended to employ a 
narrow conception of the victim as a non-subject for whom the capacity to 
resist is foreclosed. As a consequence, the victim of sati alternately has been 
represented as either "a victim of unthinking adherence to Hindi culture" or 
as "a pathetic victim of fanatics".66 This use of the term 'victim' has worked 
to "void that subjectivity of agency" and to suggest a permanence and 
inevitability of incapacity, where these connotations appear as symptoms of 
an imperialistic attitude which confirms rather than interrogates the 
distance between indigenous women and their capacities to negotiate cultural 
tradition agentically. For McLeer, these are the very connotations of the word 
'victim' that victimology overcomes so as to invite a new mode of 
interpretation, one which neither denies the victim subjectivity and agency 
nor blames the victim: 
Placing the sati in the role of the victim of victimology, where she is 
assumed to have both role and function, allows us to go beyond the 
limiting questions of motivation. Victimology asks, who is the victim, 
what are her attributes and how do they influence the circumstances 
of the crime? In India there is no tradition of widowers burning 
themselves on their wives' funeral pyres. In victimological terms, the 
sati is a victim because she is a woman living in a specific system of 
patriarchal oppression. Seeing her in this way opens up for discussion 
the question of who plays the role of the perpetrator in the case of 
sati.67 
McLeer concludes that by refiguring, along radical victimological lines, the 
process of interpreting traditional cultural practices which involve violence 
66McLeer, 'Saving the Victim,' 48. McLeer's use of sati as an example in her discussion of 
feminism and discourses of victimisation draws on three key pieces of postcolonial 
feminist scholarship: Lata Mani, 'Contentious Traditions: the debate on sati in colonial 
India,' in Recasting Women: essays in Indian colonial history, eds. Sangari Kumkum and 
Sudesh Vaid (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1990); Rajeswari Sunder 
Rajan, Real and Imagined Women: gender, culture and postcolonialism (New York: 
Routledge, 1993); and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 'Can the Subaltern Speak?' in 
Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: a reader, ed. Patrick Williams and Laura 
Chrisman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). 
67Ibid., 51. 
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against women, feminists will be positioned to "reinstat[e] the idea ofwoman-
as-victim" without voiding the agentic potential of victims and with a view to 
illuminate the culturally specific patterns of male domination to which they 
are subject and which they may resist. For our purposes, McLeer's account of 
victimology offers two important and interrelated insights. Articulating these 
insights will enable us to answer two of the questions noted at the outset of 
this survey of meanings: What is the power of the word 'victim' such that it 
may be referred to as a "term of abuse"? and What is a victim? 
As we have seen, one of McLeer's motivations for locating an alternative 
language of victimhood is that use of the word 'victim' (in the non-
victimological sense) to describe women who are subject to traditional 
practices involving violence against them may be regarded as an imperialist, 
patronising and injurious gesture, one which bespeaks a power relationship 
between the one who describes the 'victim' and the one who is described as a 
'victim.' In McLeer's terms, this gesture works to "void that subjectivity of 
agency". That is, unreflective use of the word 'victim' can itself perform a 
second-order victimisation. First, in being victimised, one is separated from 
what one can do; second, as one's 'victim-status' is registered by another, 
one's separation from one's capacities becomes what one is, what one is called, 
what one is identified with. The word 'victim,' then, can work to (re)perform 
what it purports to describe and as such can take on the character of a 
performative utterance. Hence Charlene Smith's 'hatred' of the victim label: 
she disappears beneath its testimony to the lasting success of her assailant, 
and it fails to identify-and as such threatens-her successful efforts toward 
recovery. For our purposes this first insight raises the question as to whether 
feminist use of the word 'victim' in the sphere of sexual violence has in fact 
been unreflectively complicit with this performative dimension of the word. 
This question may be addressed in relation to the second insight to be gleaned 
from McLeer. 
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The second insight McLeer offers is simply that when one uses the word 
'victim'-or the notion of 'woman-as-victim'-one need not necessarily be 
referring to a subject for whom the capacity to exercise agency is foreclosed. 
That is, for McLeer, it is possible to use this word in an actively reflexive 
manner such that its performative dimension, as outlined above, is curtailed. 
This much is evident from McLeer's elucidation of victimology's attempts to 
construe the victim as an active subject and to bear witness to their 
potential to resist victimisation. Much of the force of the popular feminist 
accounts of victim feminism is drawn from the idea that when feminists use 
the word 'victim' they do indeed mean to identify women as devoid of agency. 
They argue that this identification is both damaging and substantially 
untrue.68 Then, as Pamela Haag describes, they move to counter this 
identification by identifying women instead as "John-Wayne-like individuals, 
fully self-determining nonvictims."69 But is it the case that feminist dealings 
with the notion of woman-as-victim-particularly in the case of sexual 
violence-have in fact centrally involved identification of women as utterly 
powerless in the first instance? For Haag, the slide that the popular press 
critics make from "the victim" to "the individual" is problematic because this 
pair of figures, "insofar as they require full abjection or full self-determination, 
respectively, are both distortive models of subjectivity and social roles."70 
However, Haag agrees with the popular press critics that feminists 
concerned with sexual violence have indeed regarded women as utterly 
powerless in the first instance: "The feminists of identity politics ... stylise the 
victim, exaggerating her vulnerabilities and indignities to enshrine her as a 
68Jn terms of the 'damaging' character of this identification, Denfeld noted, for example, 
that it is as a form of "assault" which does women "great harm". The New Victorians, 
77; 89. 
69Pamela Haag, "'Putting Your Body on the Line": the question of violence, victims, and 
the legacies of second-wave feminism,' differences Vol. 8, No. 2 (1996): 61. 
70Ibid .. 
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singularly damaged subject who deserves cultural and legal redress."71 I 
would argue, however, that feminist use of the word 'victim' in the sphere of 
sexual violence has been a good deal more reflective, and more cognisant of 
the subjective and social distortion Haag mentions above, than either she or 
the popular press critics suggest. 
As we have seen, victim talk certainly is set up for the popular feminist 
critics to argue for this transition from 'the victim' to 'the individual' as the 
generic subject of feminism. Excepting its original definition and that 
attributed to it by victimologists, the word 'victim' is generally taken to refer 
to one who is momentarily or repeatedly (systemically) separated from what 
they can do-or, more specifically, separated from their capacity to be self-
determining.72 This conception of victimhood assumes the presence of an 
exterior or, in the case of victim precipitation, an interior agent who forces the 
separation, and its normative function assumes the existence of an anterior 
and potentially posterior subject who was not and will not be separated from 
what they can do: an agentic, self-determining individual whose action, will 
and circumstance are, in normal conditions, in agreement. 
For the critics of victim feminism, whose dealings with the word 'victim' do 
not extend beyond this general definition, victimisation-taken to mean a 
complete deprivation of the capacity for self-determination-is to be regarded 
as an exceptional rather than an endemic circumstance in liberal democratic 
settings. From within this understanding ofvictimhood, feminist dealings with 
71Ibid .. 
72The phrase 'separation from what one can do' is drawn from Gilles Deleuze's account of 
Nietzsche's concept of ressentiment in his book Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh 
Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 123. Elizabeth Grosz also 
adopts this phrase, highlighting its relation to ressentiment, for her discussion of the 
processes constituting 'oppression' in her book Space, Time and Perversion: the politics of 
bodies (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1995), 213-215. We will reconnect with this figuration of 
a subject separated from what they can do in the dissertation's analysis of ressentiment 
in Part 3. 
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the category 'victim' will indeed appear as exaggerated negations of women's 
capacities. I want to argue, however, that feminist usage of the word 'victim' 
actually has had more in common with the victimological meaning of that 
term, and that the popular press critics have had to misrepresent feminist 
dealings with the category 'victim' so as to lend ground to their corrective 
counter-image of women as 'John Wayne-like individuals.' Let me illustrate 
this point with the first of several examples of such misrepresentation to be 
offered in this chapter. 
We noted earlier that the word 'victimology' performs a different labour in 
Hoff Sommer's account to that which it performs among criminologists. For 
Hoff Sommers, this term describes a relentless feminist practice of 
delineating female powerlessness and incapacitation. Among other salient 
examples of such a practice that Hoff Sommers employs is Sandra Bartky's 
article 'Towards a Phenomenology of Feminist Consciousness.' The following 
quotation is drawn from Bartky's piece: italicised is the only portion of the 
article quoted in Hoff Sommers' book: 
Feminist consciousness is a consciousness of victimisation ... to come 
to see oneself as a victim, to have such an altered perception of oneself 
and of one's society is not to see things in the same old way while 
merely judging them differently ... [t]he consciousness of victimisation 
is a divided consciousness. To see myself as a victim is to know that I 
have already sustained injury, that I live exposed to injury, that I have 
been at worst humiliated, at best diminished in my being. But at the 
same time, feminist consciousness is a joyous consciousness of one's 
own power, of the possibility of unprecedented personal growth and 
the release of energy long suppressed. Thus, feminist consciousness is 
both a consciousness of weakness and a consciousness of strength. But 
this division in the way we apprehend ourselves has a positive effect, 
for it leads to the search both for ways of overcoming those 
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weaknesses in ourselves which support the system and for direct 
forms of struggle against the system itself. 73 
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Bartky envisages the subject of feminist consciousness as at once produced 
by and struggling against masculinist social norms, which designates this 
subject as neither pure victim nor pure individual. Her use of the category 
'victim' is complex and does not accord with popular associations of this word 
with innocence, weakness, passivity and deflection of responsibility. This is 
because Bartky presents the realisation of victimisation as an opening onto a 
realisation of strength, and with racism and imperialism in mind goes on to 
warn against the realisation of victimisation operating to blindspot the extent 
to which one may be "implicated in the victimisation of others."74 This victim, 
then, is both non-innocent and strong. 
Hoff Sommers may be correct in objecting to the prerogative positioning 
Bartky initially gives to the 'consciousness of victimisation,' and in any case 
her own political world view is bound to stand in basic disagreement with 
Bartky's idea that there is actually a 'system' of male dominance-as 
opposed to a limited set of gendered inequalities-which feminism must 
oppose. Nonetheless it is clear that in order to locate Bartky as emblematic 
and symptomatic of a broad feminist tendency to identify women as non-
agents, Hoff Sommers has had to omit Bartky's clear articulation of the 
consciousness of victimisation as standing in productive tension with a 
"consciousness of strength", the latter being replete with connotations of 
power, agency, positivity, creative self-making and responsibility. As we will 
73Sandra Bartky, 'Towards a Phenomenology of Feminism Consciousness' [originally 
published 1976] Femininity and Domination: studies in the phenomenology of oppression 
(New York and London: Routledge, 1990), 15-16. The highlighted portion of the quote 
appears in Hoff Sommers, Who Stole Feminism? 42. 
74Jbid., 16. The tendency for realisation of victimisation to blindspot implication in racism 
is identified and deftly critiqued by bell hooks in her piece 'Sisterhood: political solidarity 
between women,' Feminist Theory: from margin to centre (Boston: South End Press, 
1984), 43-66. 
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see, this form of strategic omission runs through the accounts of victim 
feminism, and is most potently evident in their general omission of the 
feminist ethic of survivorship in their representations of feminist victim 
activism qua 'victim feminism.' 
2.5 Being a Victim, Becoming a Survivor: feminist 
victim activism 
In the previous section I argued that we have good reason to rethink the idea, 
forwarded in the popular feminist accounts, that feminism is marked by 
uncritical adoption of the category 'victim' to describe 'women.' Further 
reason for this argument will be found in this section as we explore the ethic 
of survivorship within feminist victim activism centred on the issue of sexual 
violence. This arena of activism is marked by politicised and therapeutically-
oriented interventions upon popular and legal languages ofvictimhood. Hence 
our task to discern what 'victim' denotes in this arena is relatively 
straightforward: the word is charged with a definite set of meanings and 
connotations, as is the word often put in its place to describe those who have 
experienced sexual violence, 'survivor.' That said, this arena of activism also 
is marked by an ethos of self-definition. Like victimologists, feminist victim 
activist dealings with victimhood are concerned not just with the 'moment' of 
victimisation but with the aftermath of, or process of recovery from, 
victimisation. 
The victim activist emphasis on self-definition comes as part of the idea 
that victimisation involves a loss of control over one's fate and identity. 
Concentrating on self-definition, then, is designed to restore a sense of self-
control. This in turn represents a strategy for displacing the historically 
prerogative positioning of the male expert (psychologist, psychiatrist, 
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psychoanalyst) in the therapeutic encounter such that analysands may 
become "theorist[s] of their own experience."75 Here we uncover one of the 
characteristic tensions of feminist victim activism. On the one hand, its 
general ethos and attendant literature offers a fairly definite taxonomy of 
what might constitute the meanings and identities of 'victim' and 'survivor,' 
as well as what one's passage from the former to the latter might look like.76 
Yet this form of activism is, on the other hand, committed to self-definition, 
meaning that the potentially normative and prescriptive character of its 
taxonomy-its role in 'conducting' recovery-must permanently be subject to 
revision and contestation. 
In view of this tension, our best guide through this arena of activism is the 
research of Dawn McCaffrey.77 McCaffrey's in-depth interviews with women 
who have experienced sexual violence, have used feminist victim activist 
support services and who have, in some cases, become activists themselves, 
offers insight into their various processes of negotiation with the two key 
terms in this arena, 'victim' and 'survivor.' Let us note from the outset that 
none of the women in McCaffrey's sample "wished to be labelled a victim".78 
Contrary to the argument shared among the popular press critics that this 
realm of activism "urges women to identify with powerlessness", those taking 
recourse to, and working within, this realm tend, rather, to disidentify with 
the word 'victim,' the powerlessness it connotes and the pity it may elicit. 
75 Alcoff & Gray, 'Survivor Discourse,' 283. 
76The key text here is Liz Kelly, Surviving Sexual Violence (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1988). We will see, however, that Kelly's recent work argues for a 
move beyond the victim/survivor dichotomy. 
77Dawn McCaffrey, 'Victim Feminism/Victim Activism,' Sociological Spectrum, Vol. 18, No. 
3 (1998): 263-284. Many thanks to Jennifer Curtin for directing me to McCaffrey's 
research. 
78Ibid., 272. 
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McCaffrey's main finding is that this pair of terms, 'victim' and 'survivor,' 
have two distinct sets of meanings among the women interviewed, and in this 
arena of activism more generally. The first set of meanings recalls the 
original definition of the term 'victim.' For some, this word simply denotes the 
dead: sufferers of fatal assault or abuse. Hence the original equation of 
victimhood with death is echoed here (this is also the sense in which this word 
is used in Holocaust vernacular). In accord with this understanding of what a 
'victim' is, a 'survivor' is simply to be regarded as one who literally survives 
assault or abuse. As McCaffrey describes, this "defacto" conceptualisation of 
survivorship "ascribes that status to any woman who has experienced sexual 
violence and is alive to talk about it".79 It also accords certain kinds of 
inherent qualities to such women for having lived through assault or abuse, 
including strength, skill and perseverance. 80 Recalling that the popular 
feminist accounts of victim feminism surveyed in Chapter 1 are replete with 
references to this realm of activism as a key site for the representation of 
women as powerless victims, let us note that in accord with this first set of 
meanings the only 'victims' in view are in the hereafter, while the 'survivors' 
are not understood as powerless but rather as inherently powerful. As 
McCaffrey notes, the women in her sample "strive to minimise feelings of 
weakness and vulnerability by emphasising strength and agency in the 
definition of survivorship."81 This is true also of the second set of meanings 
attached to the terms 'victim' and 'survivor.' 
The second set of meanings is most interesting for our purposes since it 
will allow us to broach an element of victimhood which has gone largely 
unmentioned and unexamined not just in the popular press accounts of victim 
79Ibid., 271. 
80Ibid., 271-272. 
81Ibid., 273. 
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feminism, but in victim talk more generally. That is, self-blame. In this 
second set of meanings, 'victim' and 'survivor' refer to forms of self-identity 
and are lent meaning through reference to emotional states, mental attitudes 
and behavioural practices. 'Victim identity' is rendered as indigenous to the 
experience of victimisation in being cast as a kind of generic starting point, 
stage or phase. It is posited that the task of the victim is to survive not just 
victimisation, but the 'victim identity' which tends to follow in its wake. This 
identity is understood to have very particular components: it is associated 
with those mired in an initial stage wherein they "blame themselves," "carry 
shame" and "continue to let others victimise them."82 That is, within this 
second set of meanings, self-blame, shame and acquiescence are regarded as 
the typical components of victim identity, and as the typical immediate 
effects of victimisation. Here, 'victim' is made to refer to one whose 
experience of victimisation threatens to become a central and abiding aspect 
of their self-identity and social being. Self-blame is situated as that which 
lends victim identity a self-perpetuating character since the logic of self-
blame ('I deserved it') can set the scene for repeated victimisation ('I deserve 
more'). 
In feminist victim activist accounts, self-blame (or the 'internalisation of 
blame' as it is also called83) is not represented so much as a conscious choice 
or reasoned adjudication. Rather it is understood either as an effect of an 
abuser's manipulative tactics, a reflection of a wider cultural tendency 
toward victim-blame-in both cases it emerges as an especially cruel 
technology of victimisation-or indeed as an effort on the part of the victim to 
retrospectively regain some measure of control over their situation (the logic 
82McCaffrey, 'Victim FeminismNictim Activism,' 272. 
83Liz Kelly, Sheila Burton and Linda Regan, 'Beyond Victim or Survivor: sexual violence, 
identity and feminist theory and practice,' in Sexualising the Social: power and the 
organisation of sexuality, eds. Lisa Adkins and Vicki Merchant (London: Macmillan 
Press, 1996), 92. 
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here being that if one caused one's victimisation one did not lose command 
over oneself). This latter explanation situates self-blame as an attempt to 
shore up an impression of agency in the moment of, and so as to deny the 
actuality of, victimisation. McCaffrey's findings reflect those of victim 
support workers more generally: victims of sexual violence are, at least 
initially, much more likely to direct blame internally than externally.84 
This stands in stark contrast to how the 'victim' is understood in the 
popular feminist accounts, namely as a figure marked by a reflex to deflect 
responsibility and a tendency to entertain a mode of perpetual accusation. 
For the popular feminist critics, victim identity is characterised by deflection 
of responsibility, which ensures continued passivity. For feminist victim 
activists, however, victim identity is characterised by self-blame, which 
ensures continued passivity. This raises the question as to whether it is 
survivorship, the feminist victim activist alternative to victim identity, which 
hosts the call to deflect responsibility through the making of accusations that 
the popular feminist critics describe. We will find, however, that although the 
ethos of survivorship is attuned to reversing self-blame such that 
appropriate accusation (as distinct from a generally accusatory attitude) 
may be made, it also institutes a gesture much called for among the popular 
press critics, namely that of 'taking responsibility' for one's situation out of 
cognisance of one's potential or present capacities. 
84Alcoff and Gray also comment on this phenomenon: "Too many survivors feel no ... rage 
and experience only self-directed anger", 'Survivor Discourse,' 286. This tendency among 
victims of sexual violence has been explored by a number of researchers. See, for 
example, Bonnie L. Katz and Martha R. Burt, 'Self-Blame in Recovery from Rape: help 
or hindrance?' in Rape and Sexual Assault II, ed. Ann Wolbery Burgess (New York: 
Garland, 1988), 151-168; Robert Kidd and Ellen Chayet, 'Why Do Victims Fail to 
Report? the psychology of criminal victimisation,' Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 40, No. 1 
(1984): 39-50; and Esther Sales, Martha Baum and Barbara Shore, 'Victim 
Readjustment Following Assault,' Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 40, No. 1 (1984): 117-
136. 
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We saw that within the first set of meanings survivorship is accorded a 'de 
facto' status since it refers to one who literally survives sexual violence. 
Within the second set of meanings, however, survivorship is regarded as an 
'earned status' since its achievement involves certain existential manoeuvres 
attuned to overcoming the mire of victim identity. Whereas victim identity is 
understood as indigenous to the experience of victimisation, survivorship is 
understood as an active intervention upon or interruption of the experience of 
victimisation and, in this, as a reclamation and exercise of agency. Noting 
that feminist victim activism is centrally concerned to "redefine what it 
means to be victimised by sexual violence" by making available alternative 
discursive constructions of such victimisation, McCaffrey observes that: 
... survivor constructions seem designed to evoke respect or 
admiration. Survivor rhetorically establishes that one has been 
victimised, yet also implies that one should be recognised for 
overcoming the often debilitating effects of sexual victimisation. The 
women in this sample used the power of discourse to transform a 
stigmatised identity, victim, into a valorised self-definition, survivor. 85 
This process of transformation is especially visible within the construction of 
survivorship as an earned status. According to McCaffrey's findings, survivor 
status is earned by its proponents through a process of "taking responsibility 
for ending dysfunctional patterns in their lives, desisting in self-blame, and 
focusing on emerging from a traumatic event alive."86 
Before returning to this combination of "taking responsibility" and 
"desisting in self-blame", let us register some further elements of this 
understanding of survivorship. McCaffrey notes further that "[u]nder the 
survivor-as-earned-status configuration, each woman decides for herself 
whether and when she becomes a survivor", citing as an example a woman 
85Ibid., 278-279. 
86McCaffrey, 'Victim FeminismNictim Activism,' 273. 
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who apprehends herself as having just "one foot in the survivor kind of 
realm."S7 Another common element of this conception of survivorship is 
politicisation. McCaffrey notes that survivorship or its pursuit often involves 
converting the experience of sexual violence into a "political tool" for 
movement against sexual violence.SS Such politicisation tends to entail a 
willingness to speak publicly about the experience of sexual violence, a 
practice regarded as "empowering" by women in the sample owing to the 
break it signals with the shame associated with victimisation as well as its 
subversive potential to disrupt what Alcoff and Gray have described as "the 
smooth flow of patriarchal social commerce."S9 Although the popular feminist 
critics argue that the public work of activists against sexual violence 
represents attention-seeking behaviour, glamorises victimisation, and sets 
up a competitive scenario which will reward those most victimised, 
McCaffrey's findings suggest that such work-proceeding as it does at the 
risk of re-stigmatisation-is done not so much for personal gain but out of a 
commitment to raise public awareness about the nature and effects of sexual 
violence so as to "effect change in the larger social structure."90 
We must pause at this point to register that the combination of "taking 
responsibility'' and "desisting in self-blame" is a curious aspect of this second 
conception of survivorship. Even as it may make sense experientially, it does 
appear to be something of a working contradiction. A survivor's ability to 
transcend self-blame is understood to issue from two things: the ability to 
attribute guilt to the victimiser and so cease to blame oneself; and secondly a 
preparedness to 'take responsibility' for protecting oneself from further 
S7Ibid., 272. 
SSThis can mean anything from volunteer work in rape crisis centres and participation in 
speak-outs against sexual violence through to policy work for the education system, 
police force or government. Ibid., 276. 
S9Ibid., 277; Alcoff and Gray, 'Survivor Discourse,' 286. 
90McCaffrey, 'Victim FeminisrnNictim Activism,' 276. 
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victimisation, most notably through employment of one's newly realised or 
developed capacities to be resourceful, discerning, active, strong, courageous, 
skilful and resistant. 'Taking responsibility' is presented, then, as a vigorous 
form of empowerment, but by its own logic it also stands as a reinstallation of 
the possibility of self-blame. The women in McCaffrey's sample conceive of 
'taking responsibility' as the means by which one's 'allowance' of further 
victimisation might be overcome, which in the context of this survey of 
meanings is starkly reminiscent of the language and logic of victim 
precipitation.91 
Here again we encounter the difficulty associated with speaking of the 
agentic capacities of the victim without blaming the victim. 'Self-blame' and 
'taking responsibility' generally are presented as diametrically opposed in the 
victim activist taxonomy of victim and survivor identity in order to retain the 
sense of achievement, progress and overcoming that a leap from victim to 
survivor must be made to promise. Nonetheless the two are kindred, 
conceptually at least, since both posit that 'responsibility' for potential future 
victimisation is not only on the heads the potential victimisers, but 
responsible survivors and acquiescent victims as well. This would explain why 
there is a debate among victim activists regarding the dichotomising of victim 
and survivor identities. 
According to Liz Kelly, Sheila Burton and Linda Regan, positioning 
individuals as "either 'victim' or 'survivor' ... misrepresents both material and 
emotional reality'' primarily because traits associated with both identities 
can be experienced simultaneously: 
91For example, one interviewee notes that "You're a victim if you ... blame yourself in any 
way, shape or form ... [because] the perpetrator is 100% wrong ... I've got one foot in 
the survivor kind of realm, where I'm not being abused, not opening myself up to any 
kind of ... abuse." (my emphasis). As McCaffrey puts it, this "opening up" of the self is 
equal to "continu[ing] to let others victimise" that self. Ibid., 272. My emphasis. 
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Anyone who has worked on their own experiences, and/or with 
individuals who have experienced sexual violence knows that the two 
sets of understandings/feelings/responses/meanings [attached to the 
categories 'victim and 'survivor'] co-exist; that strong, courageous 
children and adults can simultaneously feel hurt and damaged. We 
also know that the balance between these shifts, and that not all of 
the issues which experiences of abuse raise emerge at the same time. 
There is no absolute resolution, since changes in life experience and 
over the life cycle produce new areas of difficulty.92 
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We may note here the similarity between these author's representation of 
the experience of victimisation and that presented in Bartky's account of 
feminist consciousness. Both tread a dualist terrain-weakness and strength, 
incapacitation and power, fear and courage-while at the same time pressing 
against dualism in resisting an unequivocal, unambiguous description of the 
experiential state with which they are concerned. Kelly, Burton and Regan 
argue that the dichotomising of 'victim' and 'survivor' identities, insofar as it 
involves rendering victimhood as wholly negative and survivorship wholly 
positive, works to reinforce rather than challenge the stigmatisation of 
victimhood.93 They point out that such dichotomisation has worked to deliver 
up an injunction which has found increasingly broad purchase among 
clinicians and within popular culture more generally: an injunction to "stop 
behaving like a victim".94 Like the injunction to 'take responsibility,' this 
injunction, they argue, works in turn to redraw self-blame and victim-
blame.95 
With feminist victim activist understandings of and debate about 'victim' 
and 'survivor' identities in view, we are now positioned to reflect critically 
upon the representation of this realm of activism in the accounts of victim 
92Kelly, Burton and Regan, 'Beyond Victim or Survivor,' 94. My emphasis. 
93Jbid., 92. 
94Ibid .. 
95Jbid .. 
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feminism surveyed in Chapter 1. We already have seen that the victim as 
the popular press critics construct her-a resentful figure who deflects 
responsibility, denies the agency she possesses and adopts an accusatory 
posture-is not obviously present in the realm registered by these critics as 
one of her primary domains, feminist victim activism. 
This suggests two things. Firstly, it suggests that this realm has been 
misrepresented in popular feminist accounts of victim feminism. What 
remains to be discerned is the purpose that misrepresentation of this realm 
serves for the accounts of victim feminism, and the extent to which this 
misrepresentation may in fact be necessary to the logical integrity of these 
accounts. Secondly, it suggests that there are in fact some salient yet 
necessarily unavowed similarities between feminist victim activism and its 
popular feminist critics. Both express faith in a dichotomy which 
distinguishes the strong from the weak, both reject victim identity, and both 
offer an injunction to women to 'take responsibility' for their situations. In the 
following section, we will pursue these suggestions particularly in relation to 
Wolfs account, where the issues they refer to find stark manifestation. 
2.6 Urging women to identify with powerlessness? 
Let us recall that one of Wolfs central concerns in Fire With Fire is that 
"victim feminism ... urges women to identify with powerlessness" such that 
traditional dissociations of women from power are redrawn, and women are 
discouraged from "taking responsibility for the power they do possess."96 So 
as to ensure that her impugnation of victim identity is not coterminous with 
the claim that women's sexual victimisation is not a serious issue for 
feminism, Wolf writes that "[t]here is nothing wrong with identifying one's 
victimisation. The act is critical. There is a lot wrong with moulding it into an 
96Wolf, Fire With Fire, 148. 
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identity."97 Wolf distinguishes between 'identifying one's victimisation' and 
'identifying as a victim' so as to make the point that women who either 
experience or feel vulnerable to sexual violence or harassment will benefit if 
they refuse to allow fear, passivity and a sense of vulnerability to become 
dominant and abiding aspects of their identities as women. 
This is consistent with other comments Wolf makes regarding the malaise 
of victim identity: 
Victim psychology is bad for women . . . [a] growing body of research 
about the development of the self is proving that defining oneself as a 
victim results in a 'debilitating primary identification': that is, a lousy 
self-image. A person who identifies chiefly as a victim will do less well 
than someone who sees herself chiefly as powerful and effective. If a 
woman sees herself as a victim she becomes less competent, less 
happy, and even more likely to be victimised.98 
We have seen that feminist accounts of victim and survivor identities may be 
placed within the 'growing body of research' Wolf refers to here. However this 
is not mentioned by Wolf, and I want to suggest this is because it would 
interfere with the dissociation her account sets up between feminist victim 
activism and female agency. 
As against the process of identification she describes above, Wolf would 
have women adopt a 'power feminist' ethos whereby they might retain or gain 
cognisance of their strengths and capacities. It would appear, then, that the 
dichotomy which runs through Fire With Fire-'victim feminism' versus 
'power feminism'-bears a strong resemblance to the victim/survivor 
dichotomy of feminist victim activism. Wolfs portrait of 'power feminism' has 
much in common with feminist victim activist understandings of survivorship 
insofar as both constructions seek to ontologise women as capable agents 
97Ibid., 148. 
98Ibid., 228. 
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who might transcend 'victim identity.' Why, then, is there no discussion of the 
victim/survivor dichotomy in Wolfs account? What does Wolf have to say 
about feminist victim activist elaborations of female agency? To address 
these questions we must turn to Wolfs "case study" of victim feminism.99 
In seeking to provide an exemplary case study of victim feminism in 
action, Wolf offers an account of the internal climate of the rape crisis centre 
in which she worked as a volunteer over a two year period.100 The case study 
operates emblematically to describe the general political culture of feminist 
victim activism. It is a story of bad politics, bad air and bad decor, of a place 
suffering "the hangover of an obsolete femininity"-partly on account of a 
lingering attachment to consensus decision-making but primarily, it seems, 
because of a negative central focus upon weakness, trauma and pain:101 
[I]t was not the traumas themselves that were sucking the oxygen out 
of the rooms, but the way in which we pursued the fight against them 
... the shabbiness of the centre reinforced the 'moral' of the rape: you 
were made to feel like nothing by the crime; now come and try to 
recover in a place where we treat ourselves like nothing, too. Even 
worse than the decor was the political culture of the place ... since 
consensus involved hearing from everyone, our level of irritation with 
one another rose exponentially ... [t]he emotional culture of the place 
seemed to cling to pain in a way that made us ever more ineffectual ... 
in time, looking only at our weaknesses, and never at our strengths, 
wore us down ... [florbidden as we were to compete or to do battle in 
public, overt ways-through elections, or with conflicting points of 
view-our little group turned those repressed impulses inward and 
evolved a hierarchy of miserable saintliness.102 
Survivorship is mentioned in Wolfs case study only insofar as those using the 
centre's services are referred to as "survivors". In other words, any 
99Ibid., 164. 
100Ibid., 164-169. 
101 Ibid., 169. 
102Ibid., 165-169. Emphasis in original. 
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distinction that might exist between 'victim feminism' and 'feminist victim 
activism'-given the latter's investment in the elaboration of female agency 
under the rubric of survivorship-is obscured, leaving no impediment to the 
argument that this form of activism does indeed appropriately exemplify 
victim feminism. 
This habit of using the term 'survivor' without avowmg the ethos 
underpinning it is shared by Hoff Sommers and Roiphe (the term is simply 
omitted from Denfeld's account), although these critics cloak the term with a 
tone of cynicism which is not evident in Wolfs account.103 Careful not to 
impugn the survivors serviced by the centre, Wolf levels her criticisms at 
fellow volunteers whose victim feminist edicts, she suggests, brought about 
the centre's eventual closure.104 She writes, "[i]t was not the survivors who 
drained us; their resilience was energising. It was the volunteers themselves 
whose culture of hopelessness was so different from the quality with which 
survivors brought themselves back into life."105 Although this distinction 
between 'volunteers' and 'survivors' is deceptive in the sense that, as 
McCaffrey's work shows, many women volunteering in this arena of activism 
are survivors themselves, Wolf renders her fellow volunteers as mired in 
victim identity, suggesting that this mire threatens rather than facilitates 
l03For example, drawing on articles from The Washington Post and The New York Times 
attuned to debunking the 'myth' of date rape, Hoff Sommers writes "On most campuses, 
date-rape groups hold meetings, marches, rallies. Victims are "survivors," and their 
friends are "co-survivors" who also suffer and need counselling. At some rape awareness 
meetings, women who have not been raped are referred to as "potential survivors." Their 
male classmates are "potential rapists."" Who Stole Feminism?, 218. This is Hoff 
Sommers' only mention of survivorship. The tone of cynicism I refer to is conveyed 
through the use of apostrophes ("survivors"). Hoff Sommers' association of survivorship 
with suffering and the need for counselling enables her to blindspot its actual 
association with strength and agency. Roiphe's cynicism is expressed slightly differently. 
She writes that survivor speak-outs prompt "rhapsodies of self-affirmation" through 
which it becomes "entirely acceptable to congratulate yourself for bravery ... and to 
praise yourself for getting out of bed every morning and eating breakfast." The Morning 
After, 36-37. Here, survivorship's connotations of agency and strength are recognised but 
trivialised as the vanities of an ersatz religion, Ibid., 38. 
104Ibid., 169. 
105Jbid., 169. 
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the recovery process of survivors (who heal autonomously, bringing 
"themselves back to life"). 
My concern with Wolfs case study has less to do with its veracity than 
with the way it functions in the context of her overall argument and the 
extent to which it recalls the mode of strategic omission identified earlier with 
Hoff Sommers' treatment of Sandra Bartky's concept of feminist 
consciousness. I take the case study to be an accurate rendition of Wolfs 
perspective on the politics of one rape crisis centre, but am concerned with its 
emblematic function, the movement it is designed to make from the 
particular to the general. A particular narrative strategy that Shane 
Rowlands and Margaret Henderson have observed in Denfeld's account is 
relevant for our purposes here.106 Rowlands and Henderson observe that 
Denfeld's account employs a "zoom lens effect" which involves a process 
whereby "an event, a tendency, a version, a current, a localised practice 
becomes magnified and distorted into the current condition of feminist politics 
and activism everywhere."107 The zoom lens effect is evident in Wolfs 
treatment of feminist victim activism in the sense that the task of her case 
study is to operate as a commentary on the general culture and politics of 
feminist victim activism (qua victim feminism). In Wolfs case, the zoom lens 
effect enables a particular form of misrepresentation. 
In Wolfs account, a sleight of hand is performed in which the strengths of 
feminist victim activism, in particular its elaboration of and investment in 
the agentic capacities associated with survivorship, are taken out of view and 
divorced from feminist victim activists themselves, only to reappear, at a 
later stage in Fire With Fire, as the novel insights offered as part of Wolfs 
106Shane Rowlands and Margaret Henderson, 'Damned Bores and Slick Sisters: the 
selling of blockbuster feminism in Australia,' Australian Feminist Studies, Vol. 11, No. 
23 (1996): 9-16. 
107Jbid., 12. 
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inauguration of 'power feminism.' That is, Wolfs 'power feminist' goal to 
promote among women the kinds of capacities associated with 
survivorship-strength, autarchy, self-definition, agency-is not so much a 
radical and timely departure from but a legacy of the very form of feminism 
Wolf, through her case study, impugns. This sleight of hand is not incidental 
but necessary to the logical integrity of Wolfs account. Had Wolf 
acknowledged the ethos of survivorship, her representation of 'power 
feminism' and 'victim feminism' as opposed forms of feminism would have 
been unsustainable since the political form her case study lofts as 'victim 
feminism' actually may be regarded as characteristically 'power feminist.' 
In her commentary on Roiphe's book, bell hooks makes a similar 
observation.108 hooks observes that by focusing exclusively on moments of 
"feminist excess" Roiphe consistently avoids mentioning existing feminist 
debate about the very issues or moments of excess to which her book is 
addressed. This strategy, hooks notes, "makes it appear that [Roiphe's] ideas 
offer a new and fresh alternative to feminist dogmatism."109 hooks then 
contends that "[h]ad [Roiphe] insisted on acknowledging the range of 
dissenting voices within feminism, the multi-dimensional critiques that 
already exist, the underlying premise of her book would have lost its bite."110 
Put together with hooks' observations as well as those of Rowlands and 
Henderson, a clear image of a particular narrative strategy, one which is 
shared across the accounts of victim feminism, emerges. With this strategy, 
longstanding feminist efforts to elaborate and encourage alternatives to 
'victim identity,' along with feminist debate about victimhood and agency, are 
omitted in the interests of delivering an unequivocal image of a feminism 
108hooks, Outlaw Culture, 104-105. 
109Ibid., 104. 
l lOibid., 105. My emphasis. 
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whose ideology-'gender feminism,' 'new Victorianism,' 'politically correct 
feminism,' 'victim feminism'-disavows female agency and must be rejected 
on that basis. With the complexity of feminism's relationship to the category 
'victim' thereby written out of their accounts, existing yet disavowed feminist 
discourses of agency are then repackaged as the novel elements of a new 
feminism. 
In Wolfs case, neglecting a thorough-going engagement with the 
victim/survivor dichotomy means that her account also elides the 
complexities surrounding the term 'victim.' Wolf employs 'victim' to denote a 
resentful person who lays blame and deflects responsibility, suggesting that 
the key to adopting 'power feminism' is withholding blame and taking 
responsibility. But as feminist victim activists point out, the problem with 
victim identity is self-blame, precisely the inability to lay blame on others. 
The 'victim' who remains a 'victim' because they blame themselves for their 
victimisation-that is, see themselves as a 'bad agent' who actively caused 
their victimisation-is absent from Wolfs account. Thus her account inherits 
the problematic relationship noted earlier between 'self-blame' and 'taking 
responsibility,' and neglects the crucial question as to how power feminism, or 
indeed any feminist version of agency, might be approached from the 
disposition of self-blame. Similarly, her dichotomisation of 'victim' and 'power' 
feminism inherits the problems identified earlier with the victim/survivor 
dichotomy. Such dichotomisation, insisting as it does on the complete 
negativity ofvictimhood, risks redrawing self-blame and victim-blame as part 
of its injunction to 'stop behaving like a victim.' Even as power feminism is 
represented as a timely successor to obsolete dogmas, it actually may be 
regarded as a regressive reassertion of a dichotomy that, as Kelly, Burton 
and Regan show, feminist victim activists already have begun to rethink. 
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2.7 Worthy and Unworthy Victims 
We have seen that victimology and feminist victim activism are 
characterised by an effort to destabilise and rework dominant conceptions of 
victimisation and victimhood, which in the case of feminist victim activism 
extends to the construction of a counter-discourse of women as admirable, 
capable survivors rather than pitiable incapacitated victims. I have argued 
that the critics of victim feminism strategically omit the complexity of 
feminism's relationship with the category 'victim' in general, and feminist 
victim activist articulations of survivorship in particular, because these 
would interfere with the seamless construction of a 'victim feminism' that 
their accounts are set up to require. In offering a final set of remarks 
regarding the mode of critique of the accounts of victim feminism in this last 
section of the chapter, I will argue further that popular feminist accounts of 
victim feminism do not acknowledge or enjoin the project to destabilise 
dominant conceptions of victimisation and victimhood because they 
themselves employ these conceptions and so require that they remain stable. 
Grounds for this argument emerge when we discern the status of the 
accounts as reverse victimologies which mimic the very strategy of victim-
centred politics which they associate with feminism.111 
Insofar as the accounts base much of their political purchase on pointing 
to and speaking for a new population of victims-the victims of 'victim 
feminism'-they require that the word 'victim' perform its traditional labour 
11 lThis argument initially formed part of my early work on the accounts of victim 
feminism, where the questions these accounts pose were taken up as part of an 
undergraduate art history study of self-presentation in Australian feminist art. See 
Rebecca Stringer, 'Feminism and Victimology,' Feminism In Transit 2: Conference 
Occasional Paper Series, ed. Fiona Symington (Melbourne: Monash University Centre for 
Women's Studies, 1994): Paper No. 27. Upon returning to this material at a later stage, 
I was positioned to revise the argument and connect it to the question of ressentiment in 
Rebecca Stringer, "'A Nietzschean Breed": feminism, victimology, ressentiment,' in Why 
Nietzsche Still? Refiections on drama, culture and politics, ed. Alan D. Schrift (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2000), 247-273. 
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of naming a deserving pop11:lation whose freedom has been sacrificed to the 
exercise of another's agency and whose unfreedom must be brought to light. 
Hence these accounts open rather than answer the question as to what we 
are to object to: a particular cast of victim-centred politics, that which they 
albeit deceptively identify with feminism, or the very idea of victim-centred 
politics, of which they themselves partake. Recognising that these accounts 
partake of victim-centred politics has an important corollary: it interrupts 
their construction of liberal feminism and victim-centred politics as mutually 
exclusive. 
We noted earlier in the chapter that one of the characteristic elements of 
feminist victim activism is its move to "break the silence" about sexual 
violence. Survivors of such violence are construed as alienated from and 
silenced by the status quo such that their dissonant speech promises to 
interrupt the "smooth flow of patriarchal social commerce."112 The critiques 
of victim feminism, motivated in large part by concern about the 
consequences of such survivor discourse, are crafted via the very same 
conception of political purchase, their aim being to interrupt the smooth flow 
of victim feminist social commerce. Their authors maintain that they are 
writing as against an injunction to silence and construct victim feminism as 
pervasive, fashionable and powerful, an illegitimate orthodoxy which presents 
itself as the bearer of moral and therefore incontrovertible truth, and which 
thereby wards against dissent, silencing its detractors. We registered in 
Chapter 1 that this leads Roiphe to adopt 'victim' as an authorial location.113 
But Hoff Sommers also makes this move: 
The women currently manning-womanning-the feminist ramparts 
do not take well to criticism ... male critics must be "sexist" and 
l 12Alcoff and Gray, 'Survivor Discourse,' 286. 
113bell hooks also comments on this aspect of Roiphe's account in Outlaw Culture, 105. 
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"reactionary," and female critics "traitors," "collaborators," or 
"backlashers." This kind of reaction has had a powerful inhibiting 
effect. It has alienated and silenced women and men alike.114 
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Anticipating and so preempting criticism in advance in the same way as 
victim feminism is said to do, the accounts of victim feminism, like their 
object, are pitched in accord with a logic of apostasy. Let us register what 
other commentators have made of this mode of critique before considering the 
idea that it involves the creation of what I term reverse victimologies. 
In her engagement with Wolf, hooks notes that Wolfs "construction of a 
monolithic group of "mainstream women" who have been so brutalised by 
feminist excess they cannot support the movement seems to exploit the very 
notion of victimhood [Wolf] decries."115 Kathryn Abrams makes a similar 
observation. For Abrams, the accounts of Roiphe and Camille Paglia, and to a 
lesser extent Wolf, take recourse to a mode of critique which was pioneered by 
champions of anti-political-correctness Rush Limbaugh and Dinesh 
D'Souza.116 This mode of critique is marked by an effort to "present those 
who are privileged as under siege, and those who occupy normative, as 
opposed to marginal, social roles as courageously defending those roles and 
their attendant norms against a powerful radical onslaught."117 This has the 
effect of making "qualities or ways of life that are utterly mainstream appear 
114Hoff Sommers, Who Stole Feminism?, 18. 
115hooks, Outlaw Culture, 99. My emphasis. 
116Kathryn Abrams, 'Sex Wars Redux: agency and coercion in feminist legal theory,' 
Columbia Law Review, Vol. 95, No. 305 (1995): 331. As Abrams explains, Dinesh 
D'Souza wrote Illiberal Education: the politics of race and sex on campus (New York: Free 
Press, 1991) which "assails the ostensibly ascendant and coercive force of the movement 
for "political correctness" on college campuses" (Abrams, 331). Abrams notes further that 
"Rush Limbaugh is a popular [North American] talk radio commentator who 
popularised the term "feminazi" to describe the threatening and coercive pressure 
toward homogenisation imposed by feminists" (Abrams, 331). In the Australian context, 
the radio talkback host John Laws appropriated Limbaugh's term, and as part of his 
anti-feminism infamously ran a policy at his radio station 2GB whereby female 
employees were asked to wear skirts or dresses rather than trousers. See John Laws, 
The Book of Irreverent Logic (Sydney: Pan Macmillan, 1994). 
117Jbid., 331. 
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transgressive."118 According to Abrams, in the case of the popular feminist 
critics of victim feminism, the mainstream way of life in question is 
heterosexuality, the 'natural pleasures' of which are construed as threatened 
by victim feminist attentiveness to the overrepresentation of men as 
perpetrators of sexual violence.119 We saw in Chapter 1 that this theme was 
especially evident in Denfeld's argument that 'lesbian rights' be demoted 
within feminism's political agenda given that heterosexual women form a 
'majority.' Just as Margaret Walters sees the accounts of victim feminism as 
a "backlash within feminism", so too Anne-Marie Smith conceives of the 
accounts as "anti-feminist feminism", describing their mode of critique in 
terms similar to those of Abrams: 
These discourses have been masterfully constructed as the rebellious 
underdog voices against an omnipotent 'Goliath'-the mythical 
'feminist establishment'-when they are, of course, serving the 
hegemonic neo-conservative and anti-feminist forces quite nicely.120 
A similar reading of the accounts of victim feminism is made by Mark Davis, 
who regards them as agents of the "moral panic business" and draws 
particular attention to their portrayal of men "as under siege by 
feminism."121 
118Jbid .. 
119Jbid .. 
120Margaret Walters, 'American Gothic: feminism, melodrama and the backlash,' in Who's 
Afraid of Feminism? seeing through the backlash, eds. Ann Oakley and Juliet Mitchell 
(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1998), 56; Anne-Marie Smith, 'Feminist Activism and 
Presidential Politics,' 34. 
121 Mark Davis, 'Crying in Public Places: neoconservatism and victim panic,' in 
Bodyjamming: feminism, sexual harassment and public life, ed. Jemma Mead (Sydney: 
Vintage, 1997), 239. See also Davis' book Gangland: cultural elites and the new 
generationalism (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1997). A number of other commentators share 
Davis' observation that discourses arrayed against 'political correctness' present men as 
'under siege by feminism.' See, for example, some recent accounts of this move as it 
plays out in the political discourses of fathers' rights organisations: Miranda Kaye and 
Julia Tolmie, 'Discoursing Dads: the rhetorical devices of fathers' rights groups,' 
Melbourne University Law Review, Vol. 22 (1998): 163-194; and Marian Sawyer, 
'EMILY's List and Angry White Men: gender wars in the nineties,' Country and Calling, 
No. 62 (2001): 1-9. 
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These critics, rightly I think, situate the accounts of victim feminism as a 
revenge of the mainstream against the visibility and redistributive potentials 
of radical political movement. This revenge mimics the general form radical 
politics customarily assumes, hence as Smith notes its proponents are 
positioned to "represent themselves as more 'democratic' and more 'feminist"' 
than their radical-democratic and feminist opponents.122 In Wolfs account, 
this recasting of the mainstream as the radical, besieged underdog is most 
evident during her critique of "radical cynicism" about liberal democracy's 
ability to institute its ideals of inclusion, equality and freedom from 
exploitation.123 We saw in Chapter 1 that, without engaging with any of the 
debates surrounding this issue, Wolf simply casts American liberal 
democracy as the "most 'radical' system imaginable", and renders capitalism 
as an unproblematic economic stage on which female power can, at long last, 
be performed.124 Liberal democracy and capitalism are imbued with an 
extraordinary innocence of power, while their radical-democratic critics are 
portrayed as "self-defeating" bearers of "the skills of the weak."125 
To build on the line of critical engagement initiated by the commentators 
mentioned above, I want to suggest that the mode of critique operative within 
in the popular feminist accounts of victim feminism. draws heavily upon a 
feature of popular media texts identified in the late 1980s by Edward Herman 
and Noam Chomsky in their book Manufacturing Consent. Herman and 
Chomsky argue that a primary means by which media texts secure public 
sympathy on behalf of elite interests is through strategic representation of 
populations of victims as comparatively 'worthy' or 'unworthy': 
122Smith, 'Feminist Activism and Presidential Politics,' 34. 
123Wolf, Fire With Fire, 126. 
124Wolf, Fire With Fire, 127. 
125Ibid .. 
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Our hypothesis is that worthy victims will be featured prominently 
and dramatically, that they will be humanised, and that their 
victimisation will receive the detail and context in story construction 
that will generate reader interest and sympathetic emotion. In 
contrast, unworthy victims will merit only slight detail, minimal 
humanisation, and little context that will excite and enrage.126 
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Although Wolfs account, unlike those ofRoiphe, Hoff Sommers and Denfeld, 
exhibits sensitivity to the legerdemains of the mass media, the strategy of 
representation Herman and Chomsky describe is evident in all four accounts 
to the extent that each are invested in the production of a reverse victimology 
comprised of 'worthy' victims who can be cast as such when others are 
implicitly or explicitly deemed 'unworthy.'127 As Davis suggests above, men 
feature prominently in this reverse victimology given what the critics deem to 
be victim feminism's capacity to inspire false accusation, reverse sexism, 
intellectual authoritarianism, and lack of consideration for the difficulties men 
experience as they find themselves policed by legally endorsed feminist 
mores.128 Aside from the spate of sexual harassment cases Hoff Sommers 
retells solely from the perspective of the accused, a case in point here is 
Wolfs lofty humanisation of "the Naked Guy", a student whose rejection of 
the status quo inspired him to wear "nothing but a sun hat and sandals" to 
class each day. In laying down "his power along with his clothes", he had 
126Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, 35. Herman and 
Chomsky refer to this form of strategic representation mainly in relation to mass media 
accounts of international and domestic political relations. Hence one ordinarily would 
apply this analysis to, for example, representation of the Palestine/Israel conflict or the 
playing out of unemployed beneficiary/employed taxpayer tensions at budget time. The 
events of September 11, 2001 provided an especially rich example of this mode of 
representation. In mass media accounts of these events, the suffering of American 
victims was intensely humanised and richly textured while the suffering of Vietnamese, 
Cambodian, Laotian, Indonesian, Chilean, Argentinian, El Salvadorian, Nicaraguan, 
Lebanese, Libyan, Iraqi, Haitian, Palestinian, Mexican, Cuban, Russian and Somalian 
civilians killed, maimed or otherwise detrimentally affected as a result of American 
foreign policy since 1965 remained, as always, unspecified, dehumanised or invisible. 
127See chapter seven of Fire With Fire, entitled 'Media Omission and Intellectual 
Polarisation: how to suffocate the ideas of a revolution,' where Wolf offers a critique of 
how feminism is represented in the popular media, 83-118. 
128See for example Hoff Sommers, Who Stole Feminism?, 112-117 and Wolf, Fire With Fire, 
197. 
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"offered himself up naked to the female gaze" and was "tender", "honest", 
"vulnerable" and "beautiful". A generous, full-page description of him is 
followed by a short paragraph in which a familiar media move to equate 
feminism with dogmatic humourlessness is used to impugn the "women 
students" who exhibited an inability to feel "affection" "amusement" and 
"pleasure" when they had him "forcibly clothed in the name of feminism".129 
But the reverse victimology which emerges from these accounts is largely 
comprised of women whom the popular feminist critics think are harmed in 
various ways by victim feminism. This includes groups of women-variously 
demarcated as 'young,' 'ordinary,' 'mainstream,' 'normal,' 'powerful,' 'equality-
oriented' and/or 'heterosexual'-whom victim feminism alienates and 
disenfranchises when it fails to represent their experiences. It also includes 
women identified as ensnared by victim feminist ideology, whom Wolf affords 
sympathy given her forecast that when women's wills to power are cloaked in 
the mantle of victim identity they will become "less competent, less happy, 
and even more likely to be victimised."130 But the most salient kind of victim 
that these accounts seek to represent is the Real Victim of sexual violence, 
harassment or discrimination. From Wolf and Roiphe's shared observation 
that some testimonies at sexual violence survivor speak-outs strike "a false 
note",131 through to Denfeld and Hoff Sommers' repudiation of statistics 
regarding the scale and frequency of sexual violence generated by feminist 
researchers, the accounts exhibit an anxiety that sites of genuine, law-
worthy innocence cease to be locatable in, and are trivialised by, victim 
129According to Wolf the students argued that some women experienced the Naked Guy's 
nakedness as a form of sexual harassment. Wolf, Fire With Fire, 198. 
130Jbid., 228. 
131Wolf, Fire With Fire, 207; Roiphe, The Morning After, 29-50. Wolfs account of survivor 
testimonies is greatly more generous than is Roiphe's, although I concur with hooks that 
the distance Wolf places between her account and that of Roiphe is more finessed than 
substantial. hooks, Outlaw Culture, 94. 
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feminism's broadened definitions of what might constitute sexual violence, 
harassment or discrimination. This anxiety about a flood of unworthy victims 
stems not so much from a will to contribute productively to the jurisprudence 
of victimhood, but rather from a will to abide by the general structure of the 
victim/agent dichotomy so as to maintain a conception of Real Victimisation 
as an exceptional circumstance which may be encountered by liberalism's 
otherwise self-determining citizen-subjects, as against a 'radical' conception 
of victimisation as a pervasive yet sociologically, discursively and 
existentially complex element of male domination. This is perhaps nowhere 
more clearly evident than in the last popular press offering that we will 
examine: Denfeld's proposed 'realpolitik' solution to the problem of sexual 
violence in the United States. 
In the fourth section of this chapter, I ref erred to an emergent 
poststructuralist feminist approach to sexual violence. I want now to bring 
this approach back into focus as a way to situate Denfeld's proposal. Like the 
critics of victim feminism, poststructuralist feminists also have directed 
critical attention to the nexus of sexual violence, the law, and feminism's 
relationship with the category 'victim.' However, what we find in 
poststructuralist accounts is not an anxiety that feminism will flood the 
courts with unworthy victims, but rather that the feminist strategy of 
marshalling the agency of the law so as to eliminate sexual violence involves 
a renaturalisation of sexual violence as well as ratification of the law's status 
as an appropriate and neutral arbiter of socio-sexual culture. This line of 
inquiry opens discussion of the rape trial not only as a site in which victims 
experience a second-order victimisation but, relatedly, as a site where a 
particular form of agency-namely a capacity to separate a female agent 
from her capacity to resist-is masculinised, in some circumstances 
racialised, and is in turn both confirmed and punished, naturalised and 
outlawed. This view recognises that the law then confers a similar but this 
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time legitimate agency upon itself as its dispensation of punishment 
promises to enact a separation of the male agent from his capacities, where 
the threat of such emasculation is designed to deter men as a group from 
practising sexual violence. 
According to Sharon Marcus and Renee Heberle, the main ramification of 
this strategy to "stop rape through legal deterrence" is that it entails writing 
into law an assumption "that men simply have the power to rape", where this 
assumption constitutes men as naturally capable of rape and women as 
natural victims of this capacity.132 For Marcus, this "concede[s] this primary 
power to [men], implying that at best men can secondarily be dissuaded from 
using this power by means of threatened punishment from a masculinized 
state or legal system".133 On this view, representation of men's capacity to 
rape as "written into the nature of things" has two problematic 
ramifications.134 Firstly, it renders rape as the inevitable effect of a power 
men always already have over women, rather than as a practice through 
which men apply for this power so as to shore up an impression of its 
permanence.135 Here, Marcus suggests rape be rethought as "a process of 
sexist gendering which [women] can attempt to disrupt."136 The second 
ramification is that this representation functions to legitimate state 
employment of domination: if male violence is 'inevitable,' state domination of 
men-and protection of women from men-is lent a perennial mandate.137 
132Sharon Marcus, 'Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words: a theory and practice of rape 
prevention,' in Feminists Theorist the Political, eds. Judith Butler and Joan W. Scott 
(New York: Routledge, 1992), 385-403; Renee Heberle, 'Deconstructive Strategies and 
the Movement Against Sexual Violence,' Hypatia, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Fall 1996): 63-76. 
133Marcus, 'Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words,' 388. 
134Hengehold, 'Remapping the Event,' 194. 
135 As Laura Hengehold puts this point, "the fact that men rape women reveals that 
masculinist social institutions are never complete and that their power over women is 
never finalised but must be constantly demonstrated and reinforced," Ibid., 194. 
136Marcus, 'Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words,' 391. 
137 A third ramification is articulated by Christine Helliwell in her article "'It's Only a 
Penis": rape, feminism and difference,' Signs, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Spring 2000): 789-816. 
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Hence for Heberle, feminist recourse to "state-centred, bureaucratic, and 
legalistic strategies" can have the counter-intuitive effect of doing "more to 
normalise violence as a constitutive aspect of political life than to prevent 
sexual violence as a constitutive aspect of social life."138 
For both theorists, the strategy of law reform keeps feminism focused on 
the aftermath of, rather than prevention of, sexual violence. Insofar as this 
strategy involves associating sexual violence with sheer facticity, it 
forecloses rather than invites a radical reconceptualisation of sexual 
somatics which might render rape unthinkable when it constitutes women as 
capable of taking "the ability to rape completely out of men's hands".139 
Although neither theorist appreciates the extent to which the ethic of 
survivorship attempts this very kind of reconceptualisation, their work has 
an important ramification for our understanding of feminism's relationship to 
the category 'victim.' Their line of inquiry suggests that feminist 
representation of women as victims in the sphere of sexual violence may or 
may not reflect feminist belief that women are natural victims, but most 
certainly does reflect the strategy of law reform, which necessarily involves 
tactical identification of women with a recognisable script of victimhood so as 
to demonstrate their law-worthiness and shore up political purchase. On this 
view, feminism is constituted as a victim-centred politics not so much prior 
to, but upon, its encounter with the law. 
Pointing out that the naturalisation of sexual violence goes hand in hand with its 
universalisation, Helliwell argues that feminist universalisation of rape as a distinctly 
female fear tends to involve a "racist iconography" whereby specifically Western 
conceptions of sexual difference are projected onto non-Western cultural settings: 
"Because the practice [of rape] is widespread in "civilised" Western countries, it is 
assumed to pervade all other societies as well, since these latter are understood as 
located closer to the savagery end of the evolutionary ladder." 793-794. Referring to her 
field work in a Dayak community whose conception of sexual difference could not host a 
Western conception of sexual violence, Helliwell emphasises that feminist accounts of 
rape need to be local in character, 798. 
138Heberle, 'Deconstructive Strategies,' 69. 
139Marcus, 'Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words,' 388. 
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Let us now consider, in comparative mode, Denfeld's proposed solution to 
the problem of sexual violence. Throughout her book Denfeld's impugnation of 
feminist 'victim mythology' fuels an argument for a return to a traditional 
conception of 'real rape' so that the law-trivial complaints of pseudo-victims 
can be filtered out. In tune with her concern that feminism's broadened 
definitions of sexual violence do real, worthy rape victims "great harm" since 
"[t]heir experiences, lost in numbers that include consensual sex, are 
trivialised", her proposal is centred on a conception of 'real rape' as evidently 
"brutal".140 This departs from traditional rape law only to the extent that 
Denfeld allows that aggravated rape may be practiced by an acquaintance or 
husband, not necessarily a stranger. Her proposal combines this return to a 
more traditional understanding of rape with measures to bolster state power 
such that convicted rapists may spend "lots more time" in jail.141 Arguing 
that rape victims deserve to have this crime taken seriously, Denfeld adopts 
a recognisably Clintonite policy recommendation in taking a 'three strikes 
and you're out' line: 
Sentence first-time rapists to at least ten years with the possibility of 
parole, if they complete a treatment program. On the second offence, 
double the sentence with no chance of parole. On the third offence, 
recognise that they will always pose a threat and throw away the 
key.142 
Denfeld devotes a chapter of her book to impugning the efforts of feminist 
sexual violence awareness campaigns on the grounds that they manufacture 
and disseminate 'victim mythology' and intrude upon the private lives of the 
citizenry.143 Her own proposal, however, emphasises the need for "[s]ocial 
education" since "we need to make it clear that sexual assault is not 
140Denfeld, The New Victorians, 89; 275. 
141Denfeld, The New Victorians, 276. See also 88-89; 274-276. 
142Ibid .. 
143Ibid., Chapter 2, 58-89. 
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acceptable, no matter if it's by a date, acquaintance, husband, or 
stranger."144 Denfeld risks negating her own previous analysis in failing to 
detail how such social education may avoid 'victim mythology' and intrusion, 
but what is more interesting is that she goes on to note that such public 
awareness campaigns will be of limited efficacy in any case because rape is 
to be regarded as an inevitable element of human society. Even though 
Denfeld rejects feminist claims that the particular form of male domination 
prevailing in western industrialised countries fosters a 'rape culture,' as she 
nears the end of her proposal she asserts: "We will never be able to rid our 
society of rape completely."145 
When set against the poststructuralist feminist approach to sexual 
violence discussed above, Denfeld's proposal stands out as a generic law and 
order-driven victim's rights position, rather than as a fully critical perspective 
on public discourses of violence, justice and victimisation. Like Marcus and 
Heberle, Denfeld problematises the extent to which feminist law reform has 
extended the purview of the law in the realm of sexuality. However this 
extension is problematised on entirely different grounds in their respective 
lines of critical engagement. Working from an overarching concern to 
relegitimate "good, old fashioned liberalism" Denfeld's proposal situates 
feminist law reform as a misappropriation of the law on behalf of unworthy 
victims, which protects the role of the law in the sphere of violence from 
critique.146 This stands in contrast to Marcus and Heberle's interrogation of 
the appropriateness of the law for the adjudication of sexual violence given its 
corollary constitution of women as natural victims. Denfeld impugns feminist 
representation of women as victims who require protection, and yet sanctions 
144Jbid .. 
145Jbid .. 
146Jbid., 244. 
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the law's constitution of women as violable subjects who naturally require its 
protection. Denfeld affirms the law's prerogative to determine who will and 
will not count as a law-worthy rape victim, yet this reinstates the myth of 
feminine duplicity and the idea that victims of sexual violence can not reliably 
explain their experiences in the absence of impartial paralegal experts. 
In other words, the only forms of female agency apparent in Denfeld's 
proposal are either conferred and secured by a paternalistic state or evident 
in a decision to name everything but aggravated rape 'consensual sex.' 
Ultimately, Denfeld enjoins, rather than departs from, feminist anti-rape 
discourses which, as Marcus and Heberle argue, run the risk of foreclosing 
women's capacities to prevent rape when they partake of a legalistic 
discourse which will affirm the inevitability and naturalness of rape. This 
explains why Denfeld's proposal-like the feminist campaigns to redefine 
sexual violence that she apparently opposes-emphasises legal deterrence 
rather than strategies which "will empower women to take the ability to rape 
completely out of men's hands".147 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have situated the popular feminist accounts of victim 
feminism within a broader field discourses on victimhood and victimisation so 
as to refute their joint alignment of radicalism with victim-centred politics 
and liberal reformism with a move beyond such politics, and also in order to 
reveal their (neo)conservative character. Their alignment of radicalism with 
victim-centred politics is problematic since, in the case of feminist victim 
activism especially, existing feminist efforts to disrupt and rework the 
language of victimisation so as to reveal and encourage the agentic capacities 
of 'victims' can be found in the place where the popular feminist critics claim 
147Marcus, 'Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words,' 388. 
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there is only a maudlin celebration of non-agentic victimhood. The popular 
feminist critics' alignment of liberal feminism with a move beyond victim-
centred politics is deceptive in the sense that the mode of critique these 
accounts employ redraws the moves of such a politics in giving rise to a 
reverse victimology which exhibits traces of a generic brand of victims-rights 
discourse. Finally, these accounts are (neo)conservative in the sense that 
they may be regarded as surface intervention-styles of victim talk which 
abide by the general structure of the victim/agent dichotomy and ratify a 
dominant conception of victimhood as a simple deprivation of agency, where 
this works to recuperate a legalistic discourse of claims to victim status as 
either real or pseudo, worthy or unworthy, in character. 
These accounts do raise valid concerns regarding feminist protectionism 
and the inability of a simple victim/victimiser dichotomy to capture the 
relation gender to power. However they omit existing feminist debate about 
these matters so as to present their own insights as novel, negate the 
complexity of feminism's relationship with the category 'victim,' and muddy 
the waters of what is taken to be feminist moralism only to shore up a newly 
clean place to stand. On this basis we may conclude that feminism's 
relationship with the category 'victim' requires more nuanced treatment than 
it is given in the popular press accounts. In pursuit of such treatment we will 
evaluate, in the following part of the dissertation, the ways in which the 
issues that the popular feminist accounts raise have been taken up among 
feminist political theorists. 
PART TWO 
Fetninistn and Ressentirnent 
3 
Ressentiment, Radicalism and Reform 
However ugly it is as a politics on its own, Nietzsche's 
theory of ressentiment offers an antidote to the 
sanctimonious inclinations of any politics of the oppressed. 
-Joan Cocks.I 
Women have quite reasonably wanted power, but perhaps, 
entangled in the spirit of ressentiment, we have failed to be 
sufficiently critical about what it was we wanted in wanting 
power. We wanted what we believed others had: power 
over. 
-Marion Tapper.2 
Introduction 
All of the popular feminist accounts examined in Part 1 situate academic 
feminist theory as something of a headquarters for 'victim feminism.' 
However, it actually is the case that the category 'victim,' in tandem with the 
category 'women,' was subject to extensive rethinking among feminist 
theorists during the 1980s and, perhaps more intensively, the 1990s. In this 
part of the dissertation we will examine four select contributions to this 
process of rethinking, each of which address the question of feminism's 
relationship with the category 'victim' under the aegis of Nietzsche's concept 
of ressentiment. So as to introduce these accounts effectively, let us outline 
the general context in which they have appeared and briefly register the 
ground they share, and do not share, with the popular feminist accounts 
examined in Part 1. 
1 Joan Cocks, 'Augustine, Nietzsche and Contemporary Body Politics,' differences Vol. 3, 
No. 1 (Spring 1991): 145. 
2 Marion Tapper, 'Ressentiment and Power: some reflections of feminist practices,' in 
Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory, ed. Paul Patton (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 
1993), 134. 
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Put schematically, rethinking the categories 'victim' and 'women' came as 
part of two broad and deeply interconnected developments within feminist 
theory: engagement with the politics of difference among women, and 
interrogation of the equation of power with domination which informed much 
second wave radical feminist theorising of women's subordination. These 
developments worked to challenge some of the leading ideas of second wave 
radical feminist thought, most notably the idea that gender is to be ranked 
first among the forms of oppression to which women are subject, and that 
this primacy might serve as a basis for common identity, and so political 
unity, among women. The often stark vision of male dominance and female 
subordination at play in these ideas was critically engaged on two 
interconnected fronts. Firstly, the centrality of Western middle-class 
whiteness to the manner in which this vision defines and prioritises female 
subordination was discerned, a gesture reminiscent of feminism's own 
discernment of the androcentric character of much Western social and 
political thought. The character and purpose of feminist politics necessarily 
were rethought as it became clear that attempts to locate feminism as an 
"encompassing political home for all women" were implicated in practices of 
exclusion and exnomination.3 
Secondly, this process of rethinking necessarily also extended to feminist 
conceptions of power. As Joan Cocks argued in her book The Oppositional 
Imagination, second wave feminist theory is marked by a tendency to lend 
male domination the status of a synchronic and unflinching regime-"the 
primary power relation from which all others spring"-and to conflate power 
with male domination while rendering women as innocent ofpower.4 Generally 
3 Ien Ang, '"I'm a Feminist, But .. .': 'other' women and postnational feminism,' 
Transitions: new Australian feminisms, eds. Barbara Caine and Rosemary Pringle 
(Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1995), 72. 
4 Joan Cocks, The Oppositional Imagination: feminist, critique and political theory (London 
and New York: Routledge, 1989), 5. For an excellent summation of recent feminist 
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speaking, this conception of power and sexual difference has been critically 
engaged for what it obscures and, relatedly, its reifying function. Obscured are 
women's apparent capacities to resist domination (through, for example, 
feminist struggle) and to exercise power over other women and some men 
(through, for example, participation in racism). In relation to this vision's 
reifying function, the subject position 'woman-as-victim' is lent an air of 
inevitability and facticity as this vision affirms in advance, rather than 
intervenes upon, the effectiveness of victimisation as a feminising agent. 
Among academic feminist theorists, it is along these two broad and 
interconnected lines of critical engagement that feminism's relationship with 
the category 'victim,' no. longer seamlessly identifiable with the no-longer-
seamless category 'women,' has been called into question. 
It should be clear from this brief sketch we have good reason to treat with 
suspicion the popular feminist account's clear intimation that their criticisms 
of feminism are novel apostasies. These lines of critical engagement within 
academic feminist theory actually share ground with the popular feminist 
accounts: both are concerned with the reificatory and regressive effects of 
posing an all too neat demarcation between dominant men and victimised 
women. As registered in Part 1, the popular feminist accounts do raise valid 
concerns about this kind of demarcation. But they ignore existing feminist 
engagement with these issues-most notably in the arena of victim 
activism-so as to exaggerate their prevalence, and then they actually adopt, 
rather than deconstruct, the tactics of stark demarcation they associate 
with the feminisms they impugn. It also is the case that, where academic 
feminist theorists problematise the second wave radical feminist vision of 
male domination and female subordination as a false universal, the popular 
debates about the nature of power see Amy Allen, 'Rethinking Power,' Hypatia, Vol. 13, 
No. 1 (Winter 1998): 21-40. 
- i 
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feminist critics we examined problematise this vision as an irrational fiction, 
a move which serves to obscure the extent to which relative male privilege 
does persist. As Wendy Brown, whose work we will examine in this part of the 
dissertation, puts this problem: feminists do require "different tools of 
storytelling than the phenomenon of hegemonic or ubiquitous formations of 
power", but this does not mean that "feminist claims about masculine 
domination ... thereby disintegrate."5 
So in examining four feminist theory accounts of feminism's relationship 
with the category 'victim' across this chapter and the next, we can expect to 
find echoes of the salient themes of the popular feminist accounts, but to find 
also that, for the most part, these themes are framed and treated differently. 
Two themes in particular are shared across the two sets of accounts. Firstly, 
the role of 'resentment' in feminist politics-a theme which formed a shadowy 
but significant presence in the accounts of Hoff Sommers and Wolf-plays a 
more explicit role in the feminist theory accounts we will examine. All of these 
accounts mobilise Nietzsche's concept of ressentiment as a vehicle through 
which to read feminist approaches to the category 'victim.' Forms of 
feminism which reify victim identity are read as 'politics of ressentiment,' and 
each theorist suggests that the future of feminist politics ought to involve a 
move 'beyond ressentiment.' Secondly, then, as with the popular feminist 
accounts, the feminist theory accounts present the 'victim problem' as 
intimately linked to the question as to what kind of political agency and 
direction feminism can and should assume within current politico-economic 
arrangements. 
What is most interesting about how this question about feminism's 
political agency and direction plays out in the feminist theory accounts is 
5 Wendy Brown, States of Injury: power and freedom in late modernity (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1995), 166. 
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that, as the analyses presented in this part of the dissertation will reveal, 
where the popular feminist accounts all construe the 'victim problem' as a 
venue for asserting liberal and neoliberal feminist edicts, the feminist theory 
accounts, although greatly illuminating, nonetheless exhibit fundamentally 
conflicting judgements about what kind of feminism ought to be diagnosed a 
politics of ressentiment in the first instance. For some, feminism engages a 
politics of ressentiment when involved exclusively in liberal reformism; for 
others, feminism engages such a politics when it entertains a more radical 
orientation. The feminist theory accounts show how fruitful an interlocutor is 
Nietzsche, and we will see that his concept of ressentiment is a useful tool for 
feminist auto-critique, a key concept for feminist political theory, and a 
vehicle through which feminism's relationship with the category 'victim' can 
indeed be examined productively. But, as I will argue centrally in this part of 
the dissertation, Nietzsche's concept of ressentiment will require our further 
attention given that the nature of feminism's relationship with ressentiment, 
and the victim politics it inspires, is not lent decisive treatment in the 
accounts we will examine. These accounts open rather than resolve the 
question as to the precise relationship between feminism, ressentiment and 
the category 'victim,' and as such they animate the close and critical re-
reading of Nietzsche's concept of ressentiment undertaken in the dissertation's 
third part. 
So as to illuminate the conflicting judgements evident within the feminist 
theory accounts, the expository work of this chapter and the next assumes 
the form of comparative analysis. The current chapter compares the 
accounts of Joan Cocks and Marion Tapper, while the next chapter compares 
those of Anna Yeatman and Wendy Brown. For the purposes of this chapter, 
the use of comparative analysis helps to reveal that Cocks and Tapper share 
a concern with feminist involvement in a politics of ressentiment which fosters 
an understanding of women as 'victims' and centres on an equation of justice 
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with revenge. However, comparing these accounts also reveals that beyond 
these shared concerns stands a conflict regarding the role of radicalism in 
feminist politics, and a further conflict regarding radicalism's relation with 
ressentiment. 
In this chapter I argue that these conflicts are reflective of a major 
difference in Cocks' and Tapper's respective interpretations of the concept of 
ressentiment. Both theorists offer the idea that a feminism of ressentiment, as 
part of its representation of women as victims and men as victimisers, will 
ally itself with forms of state and institutional power so as to regulate its 
domains of interest. However, for Cocks, the concern is that ressentiment 
ordains a set of reformist preoccupations which subdue radicalism at a time 
when radicalism is precisely what feminism needs, while for Tapper, the 
concern is that ressentiment ordains a brand of radicalism which should, in 
fact, be subdued owing to the level of success feminism already has achieved. 
My comparative analysis will demonstrate, then, that while these theorists 
are united in their recourse to Nietzsche's concept of ressentiment for 
interpreting the 'victim problem' in feminism, their accounts ultimately point 
feminism in vastly different directions in their respective figurations of 
feminism's political future, especially as regards the manner in which 
feminism should negotiate state and institutional power. Joan Cocks' account 
is addressed in the first section of the chapter, and Marion Tapper's in the 
second section. 
3.1 Cocks: embodying ressentiment 
In stark contrast to the aura of grand public declaration with which the 
popular feminist accounts of 'victim feminism' are enunciated, Joan Cocks' 
account of feminist ressentiment begins with a quiet note that the feminist 
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political form it will address "is best crept up on with delicacy and 
indirection."6 The main task of Cocks' article 'Augustine, Nietzsche and 
Contemporary Body Politics' is to offer "a critique of victim politics".7 
However for Cocks, who refers to this task as "a hair-raising enterprise", 
such a critique should not be conducted in a straightforward and direct 
fashion. 8 That is, in this case, critical form must follow critical function: one's 
mode of critique must anticipate and reflect the moral sensibilities and 
sensitivities of victim politics itself. If, as Cocks suggests, victim politics is 
characteristically defensive, if its key move is to place its claim to 
powerlessness beyond reproach and so to register any challenge to this claim 
as further victimisation, then it bequeaths little room for critical negotiation.9 
Thus the critic of victim politics must be strategic and make such room. 
Cocks' strategy is to sidestep the pre-ordained 'pro' and 'anti' of victim politics 
and pursue a circuitous approach. 
Her article and argument are structured around this approach: she begins 
with an analysis of Saint Augustine's The Confessions of St. Augustine, moves 
on to a reading of Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals, before finally 
"meet[ing] head-on" with the object of her critique. In an understated fashion 
when compared with her later descriptions, Cocks initially describes the 
object of her critique as 
a contemporary hatred of the body that masquerades as love, and a 
contemporary suppression of political relations between masters and 
slaves through their rearticulation in psychotherapeutic terms as the 
relations between victims and victimisers.IO 
6 Cocks, 'Augustine, Nietzsche and Contemporary Body Politics,' 144. 
7 Ibid., 158, n. 19. 
8 Ibid., 158, n. 19. 
9 Ibid., 155. 
101bid., 145. 
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As Cocks reveals eventually, the two tendencies she outlines here are, in her 
view, dominant aspects of a broad "degeneration" of "modern radical politics", 
which she also describes as a "malaise of oppositional politics".11 For Cocks, 
ressentimental victim politics has become the primary conceptual and 
rhetorical idiom of modern radical politics. Her particular concern is with 
feminism's degeneration into ressentimental victim politics, and the 
implications of this degeneration for feminist conceptions of power and bodily 
pleasure.12 Let us retrace the lessons she draws from Augustine and 
Nietzsche before meeting up with her critique and diagnosis of feminist victim 
politics. 
Cocks' engagement with Augustine operates as a vehicle through which 
"lessons about power and the body" might be learned.13 Her analysis of 
Augustine's Confessions unveils a disjuncture at the heart of this text 
between "a stylistic embrace and a substantive repudiation of sensuous and 
sensual life": 
... Augustine's attachment to the bodily world is palpable in the 
Confessions not merely and perhaps not even primarily because it is a 
central subject of the text. Any contemporary reader will know how 
easily the body can be killed by the word that writes it. Augustine's 
feverish prose, to the contrary, duplicates the extreme force of bodily 
experience, with the curious result that an invitation to the body is 
11 Ibid., 152. By 'modern radical politics' Cocks is referring specifically to "socialism, anti-
colonial nationalism, and radical feminism", Ibid .. 
12The themes of Cocks' article bear close relation to the themes of the book she published 
two years before this article, The Oppositional Imagination: feminism, critique and 
political theory (London and New York: Routledge, 1989). While an exposition of this 
text is not my task here, it is interesting to note that Cocks does not employ Nietzsche's 
genealogy of morality for the reading of radical feminism she presents in that text, even 
as she is concerned with radical feminism's conceptions of power and bodily pleasure, 
and with the way in which claims regarding female virtue and victimage are bound up in 
these conceptions. Instead, Cocks' analysis identifies "the [non-feminist] theoretical 
avant-guarde ... fascination for Nietzsche" as a "dangerous" development for radical 
feminism, since it created a sensibility which would prohibit in advance radical 
feminism's "political critique of sexuality made in the name of an emancipatory moral 
ethos." The Oppositional Imagination, 126. Thus her turn to Nietzsche in the present 
piece might be understood as a fairly significant shift. 
Bcocks, 'Augustine, Nietzsche and Contemporary Body Politics,' 145. 
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stylistically extended by the text at the same time that it is 
substantively withdrawn.14 
174 
Augustine's Confessions is "voluptuous" and "preoccupied with bodily desires", 
but it is at the same time an ascetic repudiation of bodily pleasure, a 
"spiritualist condemnation of the body".15 Cocks perceives at least two 
lessons which are to be drawn from the contradictory character of this text. 
She surmises that Augustine's "denial of the body" is based on "a love of the 
body and recognition of its multiple delights".16 Here, she writes, "a lesson in 
reversals" can be learned: "a great hatred of bodily pleasure can veil a great 
love of it, from which we can infer that a great love of the body can veil a 
great hatred."17 As we will see, Cocks will go on to identify the latter 
configuration-a love which veils a hatred-with the conception of 
embodiment operative within feminist victim politics. She will argue that this 
political form appears to love the female body as it casts this body as 
vulnerable and in need of protection. However, this will to 'protect' the body, 
operating at a great remove from earlier feminist celebrations of its 
concupiscence, expresses an "urge to bring authoritative power to bear on 
bodily life", and in this betrays its foundation in an essentially ascetic 
malevolence for "bodily intensity and pleasure."18 We will see in the following 
chapter that feminist protectionism also forms a major preoccupation in the 
accounts of both Yeatman and Brown. 
Cocks then draws a further and related "lesson in disjunctures" from the 
Confessions. On the basis of this text's disjuncture between style and 
substance, Cocks surmises that "a substantive repudiation of the sensuously 
14Ibid., 148. 
l5Jbid., 146. 
l6Jbid., 155. 
17Jbid., 145. 
18Jbid., 154; 155. 
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concrete can go hand in hand with a stylistic embrace of it".19 After the 
fashion of the first lesson, Cocks will identify this configuration with the 
treatment of power particular to feminist victim politics. Noting that the 
agents of this political form "speak not in the peevish, hurt tones of the 
victim but in the proud, angry tones of the militant slave", she will argue that 
this politics posits a substantive repudiation of power per se, but one which 
coextends a stylistic embrace of power.20 Contradictorily, that which is 
repudiated ('power') is at the same time that which 'styles' the repudiation. 
This leads Cocks to ask whether "style can signal the will to power", and to 
suggest that it is an underlying, authoritarian will to power which drives the 
"fervent declarations" of those "women who deny the existence of power for 
women and denounce power as a political ideal".21 So in the same way as 
Augustine can be read as stylistically embracing but substantively 
repudiating sensuality, feminist victim politics can be read as stylistically 
embracing but substantively repudiating power: in both cases, 'style' betrays 
an underlying desire for that which is repudiated. 
In terms of how Cocks suggests we interpret the contradictions she 
unveils, it would seem that she casts them in two lights. On one hand, to use 
Penelope Deutscher's term, Cocks treats them as 'operative 
contradictions'.22 Rather than representing them as inconsistencies which 
might be corrected or otherwise neutralised through secondary explanation, 
19Ibid., 145. 
20Ibid., 153. 
21Ibid., 153. It is worth noting here that this is the very kind of paradox I sought, in Part 
One, to identify as operable within the popular press accounts of 'victim feminism': 
victimology is repudiated, but it at the same time styles the repudiation. Given the 
caution Cocks adopts in devising her mode of critique, we might surmise that an 
attempt to resist this disjuncture of style and substance has been formative of her 
account. 
22See the chapter 'Operative Contradiction in Augustine's Confessions' in Penelope 
Deutscher, Yielding Gender: feminism, deconstruction and the history of philosophy 
(London & New York: Routledge, 1997), 141-168. For Deutscher's discussion of Cocks' 
treatment of the Confessions, see Ibid., 151. 
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Cocks allows for these contradictions to be seen as constitutive of the 
feminist conceptions of power and embodiment they enable, with their rival 
terms operating 'hand in hand.' On the other hand, however, Cocks' account 
does seem to suggest that we assume a recuperative approach. In the case of 
the first lesson, we are to understand Augustine's underlying somatophilia 
and feminism's underlying somatophobia as the truth behind the 
contradiction. In the case of the second lesson, her account suggests that we 
consider 'style' to be a more reliable informant of the actual character of the 
text's political disposition and intent. So Cocks' Augustinian lessons, to some 
extent, 'resolve' the contradictions they bring to light by gesturing toward the 
potential consistency the contradictions obscure, where this potential 
consistency rests with the rival term of the contradiction which Cocks takes 
to be closer to the truth. As a result, these lessons prepare ground for the 
psychologistic element of Cocks' interpretation of feminist victim politics. The 
'actual' affective economy of this politics already has been lent a repressed, 
subterranean quality: it can be glimpsed in the fervent style of its advocates 
and is betrayed by the new tyrannies permitted by its ostensibly altruistic 
will to protect the female body. It will take Nietzsche's concept of 
ressentiment to bring this subterranean affective economy fully to the fore. 
Cocks' Augustinian lessons are lent great force when combined with the 
lesson she moves on to draw from Nietzsche. Cocks initially describes the 
lesson Nietzsche offers her analysis in the following way: 
However ugly it is as a politics on its own, Nietzsche's theory of 
ressentiment offers an antidote to the sanctimonious inclinations of 
any politics of the oppressed. Nietzsche shows us how a critique of 
dominative power can turn into a sanctification of powerlessness, a 
celebration of weakness, a championing of victim status, a witch hunt 
against strength, talent, charm, or any other positive distinction, and 
finally, with respect to the body as well as what used to be called the 
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spirit, intellect, and will, a tyrannical suppression of all in life that is 
forceful and fierce. 23 
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While the textual disjunctures which mark Augustinian asceticism enable 
Cocks to unveil the contradictions of feminist victim politics, Nietzsche's 
theory of ressentiment promises to account for how feminism arrived at victim 
politics. Leaving aside, for the moment, certain disagreements with 
Nietzsche's theory that she will eventually tally, Cocks holds that this theory 
will illuminate the process through which feminism has gone from being 'a 
critique of domination' to 'a sanctification of powerlessness'. To put Nietzsche 
to work in this role Cocks provides an account of the basic architecture of 
Nietzsche's theory: his distinction between 'noble' and 'base' modes of 
valuation, between 'master' and 'slave' moralities. 'Ressentiment' designates 
the affective economy which conditions the advent of slave morality. 
Drawing on the first essay of Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals, where 
Nietzsche's task is to write the noble inauguration of the concept 'good' back 
into the history of morality, Cocks explains that the noble mode of valuation 
from which 'master morality' arises consists in active self-affirmation. The 
noble's concept of the 'good' is indigenous to himself, it is elaborated from his 
"own happy condition" and equates "the good with the powerful, the vigorous, 
the joyful, the privileged, the pure."24 This particular 'good' is the "basic 
concept" of the noble, and precedes his conception of 'bad.' As Nietzsche puts 
it, 
[T]he noble mode of valuation ... acts and grows spontaneously, it 
seeks its opposite only so as to affirm itself more gratefully and 
triumphantly-its negative concept "low," "common," "bad" is only a 
23Cocks, 'Augustine, Nietzsche and Contemporary Body Politics,' 145. 
24Ibid., 150. 
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subsequently-invented pale, contrasting image in relation to its 
positive basic concept ... 25 
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These, then, are the 'good' and 'bad' of master morality, the products of the 
noble mode of valuation. As Cocks explains, slave morality can be seen as a 
reversal, or revaluation, of master morality. Where the noble is actively self-
affirming, the slave "derive[s] their notion of themselves and the good only 
reactively".26 The slave achieves self-identity only through negation of the 
master. Cocks draws on the following from Nietzsche for this point: 
In contrast to [the noble man's reverence for his enemy], picture "the 
enemy" as the man of ressentiment conceives him-and here precisely 
is his deed, his creation: he has conceived "the evil enemy," "the Evil 
One," and this in fact is his basic concept, from which he then evolves, 
as an afterthought and pendant, a "good one" -himse1f127 
The slave has replaced the noble's less-than-complex distinction between 
'good and bad' with a complex, metaphysical distinction between 'good and 
evil.' Moreover, he has achieved self-identity only through a prior negation of 
the master. Where the master's "value-positing eye" is self-affirming, the 
slave's "venomous eye" is other-negating.28 Unlike the master's autarkic 'I 
am good', the slave's syllogistic 'He is evil, therefore I am good' establishes a 
self-identity which, contradictorily, negates and requires 'evil'.29 As Cocks 
writes, "[t]his reactive constitution of self is the mark of the man of 
ressentiment."30 Elaborated by a self so-conceived, slave morality is, as Cocks 
explains, "founded on [a] transvaluation of good and bad into good and evil, 
25GOM: I, 10. 
26Cocks, 'Augustine, Nietzsche and Contemporary Body Politics,' 150. 
27GOM: I, 11. 
28GOM: I, 10. Cocks does not draw on these terms in her exposition of Nietzsche, however 
owing to their explanatory value I have inserted them here. 
29 As Nietzsche puts it, "in order to exist, slave morality always first needs a hostile 
external world; it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at 
all-its action is fundamentally reaction." GOM: I, 10. 
30Cocks, 'Augustine, Nietzsche and Contemporary Body Politics,' 150. 
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and the derivation of the good of those who suffer from the evil of those who 
make them suffer."31 That is, the slave is only 'good' insofar as they 'suffer': in 
this way, Nietzsche's theory shows how a 'critique of dominative power' can 
become an essentially non-transformative 'sanctification of powerlessness'. 
One would expect that at this point Cocks will go on to identify the general 
condition of Nietzsche's "slave" or "man of ressentiment" with the state of 
feminism in particular, and modern radical politics in general. Her elaboration 
of the basic architecture of Nietzsche's theory certainly does set things up for 
her to suggest that feminism is mired in 'slave morality,' so described. 
However, while Cocks does make this identification, she also provides room 
for this Nietzschean lesson to be taken a step further. 
In making her move to Nietzsche, Cocks notes that the Confessions is a 
"perfect autobiography" of the religious asceticism Nietzsche vigorously 
maligns in his Genealogy of Morals. 32 Saint Augustine, she suggests, might be 
aligned with the figure of the ascetic priest in Nietzsche's Genealogy. 
Importantly for our purposes, this carries the implication of a further 
alignment of this figure-as distinct from the figure of the slave-with "the 
great orators and writers of victim politics".33 The Confessions, in part an 
argument for "dominative social power", counsels "unquestioning obedience of 
all servants to all masters" and renders such obedience as the slave's 
passage to spiritual virtue. In this, Augustine lends moral value to the 
slave-they will stand in for all that is 'virtuous' and 'good'-while 
simultaneously withdrawing any possibility of factual power from the slave 
since their value is contingent upon their maintenance of slavish obedience. 
Moreover, in this schema, the slave's hatred of the master is redirected back 
31Ibid., 151. 
32Ibid., 151. 
33Ibid., 153. 
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toward the slave themselves: their suffering no longer is interpreted as the 
questionable deed of the master, but as an ill brought on "as punishment for 
their sins."34 Thus, for Cocks, Augustine's Confessions performs that 
"translation of the lowliness and self-abasement of the weak into the humility 
and obedience of the virtuous" which Nietzsche identifies as central to the 
complex spiritual labour of the ascetic priest. 
The ascetic priest 'redirects'35 the ressentiment of the slave and 
encourages him toward self-blame: the power of the master is preserved 
thereby. As Cocks explains: 
For Nietzsche ... religious asceticism ... provides a solution for the 
strong to the ressentiment against them of the weak. By representing 
the natural characteristics of the weak as spiritual virtues, religious 
asceticism flatters the weak without allowing their will to power an 
outward outlet, forcing them instead to stamp out any tendencies to 
pride, strength, and aggression in themselves; teaching them to blame 
themselves for the ills they suffer as punishments for their sins ... 36 
Cocks' Nietzschean lesson does imply that we are to read feminist politics in 
particular, and modern radical politics in general, as having assumed 
something of the role and character of Nietzsche's ascetic priest, as distinct 
from his man of ressentiment.31 While this furnishes her account with 
34Ibid., 151. 
35 As Nietzsche writes, the ascetic priest "alters the direction of ressentiment" GOM: III, 15. 
Emphasis in original. 
36Cocks, 'Augustine, Nietzsche and Contemporary Body Politics,' 151. 
37This echoes an argument made in Daniel Conway's Nietzschean reading of feminist 
standpoint theory wherein the figure of the feminist epistemologist (specifically, Sandra 
Harding) is aligned with the ascetic priest. As Conway explains, "Like the ascetic priest, 
Harding presents herself-qua feminist epistemologist-as the theoretical spokesperson 
for various subjugated standpoints, which she describes as instantiating the position of 
the 'slave'. Attempting to empower these disadvantaged agents as 'slaves', Harding 
resorts to a quick fix. In order to alleviate the pain and alienation of their victimage, she 
promises these 'slaves' the (illusory) epistemic privilege that derives from a 'less 
distorted' perspective on the world. The subjugated standpoints, she insists, afford their 
otherwise dispossessed residents a more accurate glimpse of the world as it really is." 
Daniel Conway, 'Das Weib an Sich: the slave revolt in epistemology,' in Nietzsche, 
Feminism and Political Theory, ed. Paul Patton (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1993), 124. 
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suggestiveness and complexity, it is problematic that Cocks does not pursue 
the implications of these different alignments for her diagnosis of feminist 
victim politics. 
Two points may be made here. First, in Nietzsche's theory, the ascetic 
priest and the man of ressentiment hold distinctly different relationships to 
ressentiment. The former 'conducts' the ressentiment of the latter, and is 
tenuously placed both 'without' and 'within' ressentiment.38 Our understanding 
of feminist victim politics as a 'politics of ressentiment' will differ according to 
which Nietzschean figure is invoked. Secondly and most importantly, as 
Cocks notes the role of the ascetic priest is to conduct ressentiment such that 
the slave will blame themselves for their condition, where this inward direction 
of blame works to protect the powerful from impugnation by the slave: in this 
way, asceticism is a 'solution' for the powerful to the problem of the 
powerless. However, as Cocks also notes, feminist victim politics precisely 
does not direct blame in this way: rather, it directs blame externally, stepping 
up its demands on the powerful, and so undoes the above mentioned 'solution.' 
In Nietzschean terms, to undo this solution is to return ressentiment to its 
'explosive' character, its unruliness, its propensity to effect a radical revolt 
which will oversee the destruction of the higher power.39 
Aside from the question as to whether such explosive power is precisely 
that which Cocks will later invoke when she recommends that feminism 
reignite its radical potential, let us register that, as in the popular feminist 
accounts of 'victim feminism', Cocks leaves the question of self-blame 
entirely unexamined. This undermines her critique of victim politics to the 
extent that, in suggesting that there is a correlation between the ascetic 
38For an account of this contradictory relation of the priest to ressentiment, see Chapter 2 
of Aaron Ridley's Nietzsche's Conscience: six character studies from the "Genealogy" (Ithaca 
and London: Cornell University Press, 1998), 41-63. 
39GOM: III, 15. 
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priest and the 'writers and orators of victim politics,' but then neglecting to 
think through the fundamental difference between these figures as regards 
the matter of self-blame, Cocks sidesteps the sense in which victim politics' 
external direction of blame can be seen as a rejection and reversal of 
injunctions to self-blame prevailing in contexts ofmasculinist domination. We 
will be returning to the matter of self-blame, not only because it surfaces also 
in Brown's account in the following chapter, but because it is of great interest 
in being the one element of victim identity which is most neglected by the 
critics and most unsettling to their accounts. 
Cocks' circuitous route foreshadows the severity ofher eventual critique 
of the state of modern radical politics. In the remainder of her piece, she 
tallies the series of 'degenerations' to which, in her view, radical politics has 
fallen prey. The crucial first degeneration might be summed up as a 
transition from following Marx to illustrating Nietzsche. For Cocks, radical 
political forms initially entertained "a noble hatred for the master" and aimed 
at a "dissolution of mastery and servitude via the slave's political action."40 
This transcendent aim was conceived in relation to the categories of 
oppression, revolution and emancipation, and sought to "posit its own 
transcendence through the activity of the slave."41 But this discourse has 
been replaced with "a discourse that, denying that slave the capacity for 
action, gains its moral purchase through a recitation of the slave's 
suffering."42 As Cocks vividly describes, 
The degeneration ... occurs with the metamorphosis of the 
master/slave relation into a relation of victimizer and victimized. The 
slave relies for its understanding and articulation of enslavement less 
and less on the discordant triptych oppression-revolution 
40Cocks, 'Augustine, Nietzsche and Contemporary Body Politics,' 153; 152. 
41Ibid., 152. 
42Ibid .. 
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-emancipation, more and more on an endless series of synonyms-
violation, degradation, humiliation, abuse-for the passive recipience 
of evil ... there is not a challenge to the master but a stepping up of 
demands to the victimiser: demands for a guilty conscience ("Look 
what you've done to us!") and for reparations ("Look what you owe 
us!") ... the slave's noble hatred for of the master's monopoly on 
freedom and pleasure decays into the victim's determination to outlaw 
for everyone any freedom and pleasure that any kind of victim is 
unable to enjoy.43 
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For Cocks, the shift from a transcendent language of revolutionary political 
change to a litigious language of compensation for pains suffered enables a 
second, then a third, degeneration. The second degeneration consists in the 
appearance of a protectionist brand of authoritarianism which is particularly 
potent in feminist dealings with sexuality. As we saw earlier when retracing 
her Augustinian lessons, Cocks reads the protectionist drive of contemporary 
feminist body politics as 'a hatred of the body which masquerades as love.' 
For Cocks, radical feminism's original "Yes to the body'', its "expansive 
celebration of female eros and of eroticisms conventionally claimed to be 
perverse" has given way to a broad feminist repudiation of "sexual desire per 
se" which offers only "a No, a refusal of power and pleasure to the female 
body for the sake of protecting it from victimisation."44 This will to protect 
the body is, for Cocks, merely a suit of love. It sanctions an authoritarianism 
which contradictorily repudiates and recuperates the very phallocentric 
hatred of the (female) body that radical feminism originally sought to 
counter.45 
Cocks identifies Catharine MacKinnon as a maJor author and 
representative of this perspective on sexuality, and refers also to Andrea 
43Jbid .. 
44Jbid., 154. 
45Jbid., 155. 
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Dworkin and Mary Daly.46 But she notes that this perspective "has its most 
vital life outside of texts"47 and is present more generally in the "speech, 
common sense ... and practice of counter-publics and individuals influenced by 
oppositional ideas."48 Perhaps referring to the proliferation of feminist 
critiques of MacK.innon and Dworkin's anti-pornography campaign, Cocks 
notes that challenges to the perspective they represent "are mainly confined 
to academic texts".49 This, she fears, has not been enough to prevent this 
perspective on sexuality from gaining "increasing purchase in the dominant 
culture and the legal-political arena."50 
Indeed, the amenability of feminist victim politics to the processes of legal 
and state regulation appear to be Cocks' primary concern. She writes that 
this form of politics, in "broaden[ing] the meaning of the body's violation", 
broadens in tandem "the scope for authoritative rule."51 Through the prism of 
sexual abuse, feminist victim politics directs state power toward "strict 
censure" of bodily life.52 While "a fast shrinking up of the instances in which 
sexual pleasure can be said to be good" is set in motion, "condemnation of 
hard passion, fierce bodily meetings, and violent physical contacts" becomes 
more widespread.53 Such contacts are rendered as "constituting by definition 
and without exception the abuse of one body by another."54 
Reminiscent of the thread running through popular critiques of victim 
feminism which holds that the spectre of political correctness has come to 
46Jbid., 157. n.16; n.17. 
47Jbid., 157. n.17. 
48Jbid., 152. 
49Jbid., 154. 
50Jbid .. 
51Jbid .. 
52Jbid., 155. 
53Jbid., 154. 
54Jbid .. 
. I 
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haunt all known privacies, Cocks airs her concern that this second 
degeneration of radical politics casts a suspicion over bodily life which 
commissions strict government of the body: 
... we find in segments of the population hyper-alert to the sexual 
harassment and abuse of women and children (a real enough 
harassment and abuse, to be sure), a suspicion of all socio-physical 
entanglements, a distaste for the confused, opaque jostling in life 
which, barring the grave offence, people must fend for themselves. 
There is an urge ... to question every flicker of reaction on the surf ace 
of one body to another; to interrogate every point at which bodies 
touch; to unmask all libidinal responses to social situations ... to 
prohibit an increasing number of bodily gestures and movements that 
might be expressions of sexual power ... 55 
Therefore, for Cocks, the second degeneration which marks radical feminism's 
descent into victim politics has created a context in which "embodiment 
itself' is "the fundamental crime": "having a body makes one a potential 
victim of physical and sexual abuse and/or a potential abuser".56 The 
contradictory terms of Augustinian asceticism are reversed: feminism victim 
politics "is based not on a love of the body and a recognition of its multiple 
delights, but on a hatred of the body and an insistence on the body's multiple 
horrors. "57 
Cocks does not elaborate in full the third and final degeneration her article 
tables. However the form her article assumes can itself be seen as a direct 
response to it. She explains that this third degeneration oversees a 
transfiguration of politics into psychology. Victim politics trades the "struggle 
for power" for elaboration of "psychotherapeutic techniques for treating and 
55Ibid .. 
56Ibid., 155. She writes "This new twist of body politics, in which having a body makes 
one a potential victim of physical abuse and sexual abuse and/or a potential abuser, 
pits itself directly against the view that having a body makes one a potential subject of 
sensuous experience and giver or taker of sensual passion and delight." Ibid .. 
57Ibid .. 
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eradicating the will to power", while truth-claims which are amenable to 
argument are traded for testimony to subjective feelings which, as such, are 
posited beyond hermeneutics.SS Prohibiting criticism in advance, this latter 
discursive form has necessitated Cocks' circuitous approach. As she writes, 
"in an age of victim politics the subjective feelings of victimisation will always 
have the moral edge."59 As we will see in the following chapter, Wendy 
Brown's use of the concept of ressentiment to read salient features of 
modernist feminist epistemology has the effect of amplifying and developing 
the argument Cocks begins here. 
Cocks' article does not provide a vivid account of how the ground of 
feminist politics might be shifted away from the politics of ressentiment. The 
force of her critique suggests that it is intended to be exemplary rather than 
prescriptive. Two related suggestions can, however, be discerned with 
reasonable clarity. Both gesture toward a positive form of avatism which 
might restore radical politics to radicalism. The first suggestion is that the 
categories of revolution and emancipation, as well as the concept of 
transcendence, sustain precisely the sense of political movement which 
ressentimental victim politics, as a "dead end", curtails.60 While Cocks does 
not advocate an uncritical return to these terms among political theorists,61 
she does cast them as crucial for warding off what she sees as the atrophy of 
ressentiment in radical political life. Thus, in her account, these terms emerge 
as crucial to the maintenance of radical political movement. The second 
suggestion which can be discerned is for a return to a 'harsh' and 'blunt' 
Augustinian "depiction of the world as made of relations between mastery 
ssrbid., 155. 
59Ibid., 155. 
60Ibid., 154. 
61Cocks notes that where radical political activists have eschewed these terms on account 
of their increasing involvement in victim politics, "critical intellectuals have dropped the 
categories of revolution and emancipation for quite different reasons". Ibid., 152. 
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and servitude", but one which eschews Augustine's recommendation of 
obedience.62 Such a depiction, Cocks suggests, might prompt rebelliousness 
in the slave, who in turn might counter not just domination, but the rejection 
of aggressive self-assertion and antagonism which attends the anti-violence 
emphasis of victim politics.63 Ultimately, then, Cocks' account invokes the 
figure of the 'rebel,' the 'militant slave'-who, in style and substance, directs 
their will to power toward the imposition of"a new imprint on the world"-as 
a possible antidote to the malaise she has diagnosed.64 
One final task remains before we cross to an exposition of Marion 
Tapper's account of feminist ressentiment which, as we will see, draws on 
Cocks' account. The task is to register Cocks' disagreements with Nietzsche. 
Given that we bring to Cocks' article a specific interest in the terms on which 
she employs Nietzsche, these disagreements are significant for our purposes. 
The first disagreement has to do with 'master morality'. Cocks notes that 
Nietzsche is "starry-eyed ... about the morality of the master" since it would 
seem that "the substance of the master is determined by the dialectic of the 
master/slave relation and not by physiology or instinct."65 Cocks suggests 
two things here. The first is that we trade a Nietzschean for a Hegelian 
framework in order to understand how mastery is achieved. The second, 
implicit suggestion is that to do so would not affect how we understand slave 
morality, ressentiment, and the vision of politics these concepts might enable. 
That is, to replace Nietzsche's autarkic master with a master-or indeed a 
62Ibid., 156. 
63Ibid .. There is a tension here between this suggestion and the central argument of 
Cocks' book The Oppositional Imagination. In that book Cocks works through Foucault's 
conception of power and argues that feminists can no longer entertain the 'simple' view 
that 'power' equals 'domination' and that the terms 'domination' and 'subordination' 
will provide an exhaustive account of power. In the current article, however, Cocks 
suggests that precisely such a 'simple' account is what is required. 
64Ibid., 152. 
65Ibid., 155. 
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political regime-who requires a debased other for self-recognition would not, 
for Cocks, affect our understanding of the 'reactive constitution of self which 
enables the-politics of ressentiment. Surely, however, once both parties to a 
relation of domination are understood as reactively constituted, our vision of a 
politics of ressentiment would shift to a vision of the politics of emancipation 
as a theatre of competing reactions. That is, our interpretation of feminism 
as a politics of ressentiment would have to take into account the forms of 
reaction and ressentiment feminism presses against. To foreshadow our later 
dealings with this point in Part 3, this suggests that for a full account of 
feminism's relationship with ressentiment we would have to situate feminism 
not just 'within' but 'against' ressentiment, and consider the respective 
characters of these two quite different encounters with ressentiment. 
This brings us to Cocks' second disagreement with Nietzsche. She locates 
radical politics as having been a political form which "Nietzsche would have 
called a noble politics were he able to see nobility in any kind of slave 
revolt."66 However radical politics, in assuming the mantle of victim politics, 
has come to exhibit "degenerations of thinking and valuing reminiscent of 
what made Nietzsche cry out, "Bad air! Bad air!".67 Two things are set in 
place with these comments: something of a disassociation from Nietzsche's 
political views and, relatedly, an invocation of radical politics' noble past. 
Cocks' disassociation from Nietzsche's political views rests on her 
understanding that Nietzsche's concepts of slave morality and ressentiment, 
translated into political philosophy, will not allow for any kind of politics of the 
slave to be read in a positive light. Cocks does, however, want to read the 
original incarnation of radical politics as a positive politics of the slave: it was 
a "vigorous and passionate" project to "sieze freedom, power, and pleasure 
66Ibid., 152. 
67Ibid .. 
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from the monopoly of the master and to impose a new imprint on world".68 
Now, however, it has "succumbed to ressentiment" and is "more aptly called 
resistance politics".69 To resolve her disagreement with Nietzsche over 
whether there can be a noble kind of slave revolt, Cocks intervenes upon 
Nietzsche's theory of ressentiment. Specifically, she distances 'slave morality' 
from 'ressentiment.' She writes "[i]f slave morality is not, as Nietzsche 
supposed, a morality of ressentiment by definition, it is always in danger of 
succumbing to ressentiment ."10 
So Cocks suggests that for the question of feminist ressentiment, we need 
to treat 'slave morality' and 'ressentiment' as separable elements of 
Nietzsche's theory. Where Nietzsche places slave morality and ressentiment 
in a continuum and, on Cocks' reading, casts both of these things as 'bad,' we 
should interrupt this continuum, recuperate 'slave morality,' but maintain 
agreement that ressentiment is 'bad.' Essentially, this is Cocks' strategy for 
negotiating the difficulties of using Nietzsche for radical feminist political 
theory. Situating Nietzsche as a conservative thinker who nonetheless offers 
radicals important truths, Cocks opts for a selective appropriation of 
Nietzsche, suggesting that, for radical ends at least, he can not be 
appropriated 'as is.' Put together with Cocks' disagreement with Nietzsche's 
concept of master morality, and with the tension identified earlier regarding 
her invocations of the ascetic priest and the man of ressentiment, we might 
conclude that Cock's employment of Nietzsche-although packaged as the 
simple extraction of a single lesson-is actually quite complex. Let us now 
consider Marion Tapper's account of feminism, ressentiment and the category 
'victim.' 
68Jbid .. 
69Jbid .. 
70Jbid., 155. 
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3.2 Tapper: feminism in the spirit of ressentiment 
Marion Tapper's chapter 'Ressentiment and Power: some reflections on 
feminist practices' at first appears to be consistent with the formulation of 
feminist ressentiment offered by Cocks. Like Cocks, Tapper casts 
ressentiment as a 'psycho-political' force which has entered the political scene 
upon a recent and regrettable shift in feminist thought and practice. Tapper 
suggests that her account might be seen as operating in tandem with Cocks' 
account.71 Where Cocks covers feminist ressentiment as it plays out in the 
domain of "feminist political and theoretical concerns with the body and 
sexuality'', Tapper's account will cover ressentiment in the case of feminist 
epistemology and institutional practices in the university setting.72 However 
as we unpack Tapper's account, we will see that this notion of a tandem 
operation between she and Cocks is misleading in important respects. While 
these theorists do share some ground, my exposition of Tapper will 
demonstrate that she brings a significantly different political sensibility to 
the question of feminist ressentiment than does Cocks, and that her account 
points feminism in a different, perhaps opposite, political direction when it 
comes to shifting feminism away from the ground of ressentiment. 
Provisionally, let me note that the distance between Tapper and Cocks is 
cleaved by major differences in their respective interpretations of Nietzsche's 
concept of ressentiment and, relatedly, their respective attitudes to the role of 
radicalism in feminist politics. We turn first to Tapper's key claims. 
Tapper's chapter marries Nietzsche's concept of ressentiment with 
Foucault's analysis of power to form the conceptual backdrop of an inquiry 
into contemporary feminist institutional practices. The main argument of 
Tapper's chapter has two key components. The first key component consists 
71Tapper, 'Ressentiment and Power,' 133. 
72Jbid .. 
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of the claim that there has been a major shift in the practices of feminists 
located within educational institutions, among other professional contexts. 
Where feminist practices were oriented by the laudable goal of 'equality,' they 
are now motivated by a problematic desire for 'power over.' Tapper will 
represent this as a shift from a liberal feminist agenda to a radical feminist 
agenda. 73 The second key component of Tapper's argument consists of the 
claim that the kinds of (radical) feminist institutional practices issuing from 
this shift represent a "specific feminist configuration of power/knowledge", 
and should be understood as "motivated ... by the spirit of ressentiment".74 
As we will see, Tapper argues that feminist institutional practices, now 
oriented by a ressentimental desire for 'power over,' have come to co-opt rather 
than resist the disciplinary powers of the institutions they seek to reform. In 
this, they bring a "specific feminist configuration of power/knowledge" into 
being. In combination, these two key components deliver the thesis Tapper 
notes early in her chapter: 
The thesis is that some feminist practices, in so far as they are 
motivated by the spirit of ressentiment, have been preoccupied with 
power as control and that this involves a double-edged danger. On the 
73Tapper's treatment of the categories 'liberal feminism' and 'radical feminism' in the 
present article differs markedly from her earlier piece of writing 'Can a Feminist be a 
Liberal?' (Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Supplement to Volume 64 (June 1986): 
37-47). In that piece, Tapper runs a critique of liberal feminism's recourse to the 
strategy of de-gendering, arguing that a rhetorical erasure of sexual difference will leave 
the liberal subject and the public/private dichotomy dangerously in tact (a position close 
to that of Carole Pateman in The Sexual Contract [Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988]). As 
we will see in what remains of this chapter, in the current article, written six years 
later, Tapper's critical eye is turned not to liberal feminism, but to radical feminism as 
it is practiced by feminists in institutional settings (who, owing to their institutional 
locations, might be called 'radical liberals'). As we will find as the chapter's exposition of 
Tapper unfolds, one of the ramifications of Tapper's argument is the idea that such 
feminists need to acknowledge the success of liberal feminism, the achievements won 
through equal opportunity, anti-sex discrimination and sexual harassment legislation. 
In her former article, however, such legislation is identified with the inevitable failures of 
the de-gendering proposal. Similarly, whereas in the former piece Tapper aims suspicion 
at the liberal feminist goal of equality, in the current piece this goal is affirmed and 
protected from critique (Ibid., 37). In short, in the current chapter on feminist 
ressentiment, Tapper occupies the very position she had subject to critique in her earlier 
article. 
74Tapper, 'Ressentiment and Power,' 130. 
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one side it risks playing into the hands of, rather than resisting, the 
modern mechanisms of power that Foucault identified as operating by 
techniques of surveillance, normalization and control. On the other, it 
involves blindness to or forgetfulness of other forms of the will to 
power which are positive, those active forms concerned with self-
formation and autonomy.75 
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In general, then, Tapper's chapter aims to provide a critique of feminist 
institutional practices which is cast along the lines of a cautionary tale about 
feminism's relationship with institutional power. One thing which needs to be 
noted from the outset about this cautionary tale is that it exhibits a degree of 
internal lability. Perhaps as part of the sensitive nature of victim politics 
which, as we gleaned from Cocks, can trouble its critics, Tapper's 'pro and 
contra' is not always clear nor stable. Her sympathies seem to shift which, at 
times, creates interesting and contradictory tensions for her path of 
argumentation. With this in mind, let us examine the two key components of 
her argument in greater depth. 
We begin with the first key component of Tapper's argument: that 
feminist institutional practices have undergone a major shift. Tapper 
describes this shift as a movement from "identifying and seeking to redress 
injustices to finding 'evil' everywhere ... from wanting equal power within 
existing institutions to attacking these institutions themselves, from 
criticizing practices and discourses to finding everything 'evil' ."76 In her 
description of this shift, Tapper posits feminism's relationship to the goal of 
equality as a key factor in determining a tenable direction for feminist 
politics. Moreover, she suggests that recent feminist movement beyond 
"wanting equal power" has enabled an untenable form of feminist radicalism 
to emerge. As the above quote indicates, in Tapper's view, this form of 
75Jbid .. 
76Jbid .. She notes further that this shift can be conceived as one from "resisting power" to 
being "complicit in it." Ibid., 131. 
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radicalism has launched a generalised attack on "everything", reads this 
"everything" as "evil", and is not prepared to work non-combatantly "within 
existing institutions". In seeking to substantiate her claim regarding the 
occurrence and the nature of this shift toward radicalism, Tapper will 
critically appraise feminist institutional practices, encompassing the 
bureaucratic and the pedagogical. However, in focussing on feminist practices, 
Tapper's analysis does not exclude critical consideration of feminist thought. 
To the contrary, Tapper will suggest that the shift she perceives in feminist 
institutional practices has been precipitated by a prior shift in feminist 
epistemology. We turn, then, to her treatment of feminist epistemology. 
The general shift in feminist epistemology Tapper considers is reminiscent 
of Sandra Harding's figuration of a movement from 'the Woman Question in 
science' to 'the Science Question in feminism.'77 Of course, Harding endorses 
this movement: a cursory account of her schema can be used to illustrate 
what Tapper will critique. In Harding's schema, a feminist project oriented by 
'the Woman Question in science' will craft a responsiveness to exclusion and 
injustice primarily through a language of equal representation and 
opportunity. While seeking to counter androcentric bias, this politics will not 
necessarily or centrally challenge the epistemological and institutional 
architecture it will earn women the right to inhabit. Such a challenge is 
offered when feminism refigures its concerns and arrives at 'the Science 
Question in feminism'. In the introduction to her book The Science Question in 
Feminism, Harding tells us that the variety of political projects enabled in the 
name of this question will engage broad examination of the values and 
politico-ontological situations which have conditioned the very formation of 
77Sandra Harding, 'From the Woman Question in Science to the Science Question in 
Feminism,' The Science Question in Feminism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 
15-29. 
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existing epistemologies.78 Such projects will prise open the question as to 
"what kind of experience should ground the beliefs we honor as knowledge".79 
In so doing they shift the ground of feminist inquiry from the question as to 
"how women can be more equitably treated within and by science" to the 
question as to "how a science apparently so deeply involved in distinctively 
masculine projects can possibly be used for emancipatory ends."80 
While she does not refer to Harding's schema, Tapper's first example of a 
general shift in feminist epistemology, drawn from the arena of feminist art 
history, traces precisely the contour of this schema. Tapper writes, 
Take, for example, art history. Earlier art historical critiques were 
concerned to establish that women artists were ignored, excluded from 
institutions and from recognition through critical appraisal of the 
formation of canons. In the process they discovered or retrieved and 
documented the work of women artists and argued that they should be 
included in the canon. It is worth noting that the fact that this was 
possible showed that, despite being excluded and ignored, women 
artists were not rendered powerless, much less non-existent. Since the 
early 1980s the focus of attention has shifted from getting women 
included in the canon to questioning the process of canon formation. 
More specifically it is claimed that the problem is not so much that the 
history of art and the practice of art history excludes women artists. 
The problem concerns the reason why art criticism and art history 
needs to assert a feminine stereotype, sensibility and art.81 
We might say that, as with the feminist epistemologists Harding endorses, 
feminist art historians have, according to Tapper, moved beyond 'the Woman 
Question in art' and toward 'the Art Question in feminism.' So too, Tapper will 
add, have feminist philosophers made such a move. 
78Ibid .. 
79Ibid., 24. 
80Ibid., 29. 
81Tapper, 'Ressentiment and Power,' 132. Tapper cites the work of feminist art historians 
Rosika Parker and Griselda Pollock as examples of the latter tendency. See Parker and 
Pollock, Old Mistresses: women, art and ideology (London: Routledge, 1981). 
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Approvingly, Tapper notes that feminists philosophers started out by 
engaging in a project to "catalogue the absurdly sexist remarks made by male 
philosophers about women" and to "re-read the canon to reveal sexist bias in 
even those texts that said nothing explicit about women."82 Tapper then 
asserts that this project "has been completed".83 That is, 'the Woman 
Question in philosophy' has been addressed successfully now that sexism and 
male bias in the history of philosophy have been exposed, and women's 
inclusion within philosophy has been sanctioned. However, rather than rest 
on their completed work, feminist philosophers have shifted their sights to 
'the Philosophy Question in feminism', engaging deep and radical questioning 
of the very formation of philosophical knowledge in relation to sexual 
difference. 
Tapper's suggestion as to why feminists have made this shift toward a 
more radical project is important for our purposes. Tapper muses that 
''perhaps in part because [their initial project] has been completed", feminist 
philosophers have moved on to generate "much more broadsweeping" and 
"wilder" claims about philosophy than their previous project called upon them 
to make.84 These include the claim that "philosophy itself-logic, 
metaphysics, epistemology, philosophical forms of argument and analysis-is 
patriarchal."85 Tapper's suggestion is that this move among feminist 
82Ibid., 133. 
83Ibid .. 
84Ibid .. My emphasis. 
85Ibid .. Tapper refers to the work of two feminist philosophers to evince her claim: 
Genevieve Lloyd, The Man of Reason: 'male' and 'female' in Western philosophy (London: 
Routledge, 1993 [second edition]) and K. B. Jones, 'On Authority: or, why women are not 
entitled to speak,' in eds. Diamond and Quinby, Feminism and Foucault: reflections on 
resistance (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1988). It seems important to note 
that, as against Tapper's intimation that an analysis such as Lloyd's casts the practice 
of reason as 'patriarchal' and therefore deserving of feminist rejection, Lloyd actually 
argues that the practice of reason is recuperable despite its implicit metaphorical and 
symbolic association with maleness. In addition to this detail, it is worth noting here 
that Tapper's treatment of feminist epistemology actually is quite startling. Tapper 
accords value to feminist philosophers and art historians only when they are performing 
the labour of 'discovering,' 'retrieving,' 'documenting,' 'cataloguing,' and 're-reading': that 
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philosophers toward 'the Philosophy Question in feminism' has not so much 
been prompted by compelling and legitimate concerns, but rather by the 
prospect that feminist philosophy's reason for being vanished upon the 
completion of feminist philosophy's initial project.86 As a corollary, then, 
Tapper is casting feminist philosophy's initial, liberal project as its only real 
or legitimate project, and its subsequent, radical project as illegitimate and 
somewhat gratuitous. Tapper is hesitant about making this suggestion (thus 
her qualification: "perhaps in part because ... "),and at this stage she does not 
posit it as a definitive explanation of the shift feminists have made. However, 
as we will see, Tapper's suggestion that feminists have shifted their 
epistemological outlook in order to preserve a reason for being in the face of 
completed work actually plays a crucial role in her analysis. This is because it 
forms the basis for her use of Nietzsche's concept of ressentiment. But for now 
let us address Tapper's view that the emergence of 'broadsweeping' and 'wild' 
claims among newly radical feminist epistemologists has precipitated a shift 
in feminist institutional practices. 
is, precisely not when they are interpreting, philosophising or historicising on the basis 
of the material they have discovered, regardless of how agreeable or otherwise the 
substance of their interpretations, philosophies and historicisations might be. 
86rt is appropriate at this juncture to supplement Tapper's account with some indication 
as to why a number of feminist philosophers have not been content to rest on 'including' 
women in the philosophical enterprise while leaving the character of that enterprise 
itself unchallenged. A brief account of Michele le Dceuffs exemplary argument in her 
chapter 'Long Hair, Short Ideas' should suffice (The Philosophical Imaginary, trans. Colin 
Gordon (London: The Althone Press, 1989), 100-128). This chapter analyses the terms 
on which women have been included within the philosophical enterprise, offering the 
persuasive argument that philosophy's permissiveness toward women has been a "sly 
form of prohibition" (Ibid., 103). Philosophy's amenability to the inclusion of 'less 
knowledgeable others' (a category which might include children, the 'common man' and 
'savages' no less than women) operates crucially to maintain the conception of the 
philosopher as the bearer of complete knowledge: less knowledgeable others operate as 
a source of contrast against which philosophers can perceive themselves as complete 
knowers, since knowledge alone does not foster this self-perception. In this way, the 
strategy of 'inclusion' can operate to "atrophy", rather than counter, women's marginality 
within philosophy. In the context of Tapper's analysis, Le Dceuffs argument alone would 
lend the move toward what I am calling here 'the Philosophy Question in feminism' 
considerable legitimacy. 
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Although Tapper already has suggested that the shift in feminist 
epistemology might be ('perhaps in part') bereft of legitimate foundation, she 
writes that "whatever the meaning and validity" of the claims of newly 
radical feminist epistemologists, and "whatever [their] intentions", the 
negative effects of the shift they have made prevail in the university setting. 
Most immediately, Tapper points out the pedagogical ramifications of this 
shift. She notes that it has had a "baneful effect" on women students, who 
now can use feminist antipathy toward the canon "to justify refusing to read 
the classics of philosophy on the ground that they are written by men and 
hence patriarchal."87 Tapper laments that the new feminist epistemology 
has created "a form of discourse in which it is enough to say that a text is 
written by a man to dismiss it."88 But Tapper is primarily concerned that the 
shift in feminist epistemology has played an at least precipitous role in 
reformulating non-pedagogical feminist institutional practices. She argues 
that this shift has contributed to "the likelihood of [a] shift from wanting a 
place in [the] academy to wanting power in that academy."89 
In questioning the foundations of knowledge through a prism of sexual 
difference, and through principled rejection of the prospect of mere 'inclusion,' 
feminist epistemologists have precipitated feminism's practical trade of an 
equality-oriented desire for institutional place, for a radically-oriented desire 
for institutional power. In the following passage Tapper makes it clear that 
she sees this as a shift from a liberal to a radical feminist agenda, and she 
also offers a vivid portrait of the brand of radicalism with which she is 
concerned: 
87Tapper, 'Ressentiment and Power,' 133. 
88Jbid .. 
89Jbid., 133; 134, my emphasis. By her conclusion, Tapper will have placed feminist 
epistemology and feminist institutional practices in a praxis relationship, referring to 
the "specific power effects ... induced" by feminist epistemology (Ibid., 142). 
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In general we might say that early liberal feminists, and their 
contemporary counterparts, saw themselves as arguing within a 
theory of justice and social practices for the transformation of those 
practices so that women could share in the good things available while 
the bad things were removed. In contrast some contemporary radical 
feminists tend to proclaim themselves against the whole of western 
discourse and society. We find wholesale denunciations of men, 
patriarchy, sex, language, philosophy, and so on. We find claims that 
men have all the power and women none and that men use that 
power to repress women; differences are acknowledged between 
women and men and between women, but not between men; 
everything considered unacceptable is associated with men; and 
monolithic univocal explanations of this are proposed: either by such 
concrete things as 'the nature of men' or more abstractly, the 
institution of 'compulsory heterosexuality'.90 
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Unlike liberal feminists, the new radical feminists exhibit a penchant for 
"wholesale denunciation", entertain misandrism, and lend the character of 
their political opponent/s a "monolithic" quality. In describing these factors in 
an aghast tone, Tapper makes it clear that they are outrageous in her view. 
But Tapper's aim is not just that of exposition-as-critique. She aims to 
provide a concrete connection between the emergence of this kind of feminist 
thinking and a shift in feminist institutional practices. 
Her analysis asks after the institutional function of this tendency toward 
"wholesale denunciation". To answer this inquiry, Tapper argues that 
feminists "with institutional power" who work in contexts wherein "women 
have roughly achieved equal power" (ie. universities) have a vested interest in 
shifting beyond the liberal feminist project of inclusion and toward a radical 
feminist project which involves "wholesale denunciation". Wholesale 
denunciation, Tapper reasons, will lend such feminists renewed political 
90Ibid., 134. It should be noted here that Tapper does not provide textual evidence in 
support of her claims regarding the character of these lines of feminist critique. It may 
be that she is drawing on personal experience and wanting to avoid singling out 
particular feminist proponents of the view she describes. 
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purchase now that (liberal) feminism's goals "roughly'' have been achieved, 
and feminism has been "reasonably successful". She writes: 
Where those with institutional power cannot justifiably claim that 
they are being discriminated against at the level of actions and 
practices they can maintain their political integrity, their claim to 
ideological purity and sense of powerlessness by resorting to finding 
'evil' and injustice in wider and wider circumstances and at deeper and 
more concealed levels.91 
This passage suggests that Tapper would have us interpret the views of 
newly radical feminist epistemologists as gratuitous and indeed self-
interested. Feminists are conducting an increasingly broad and deep search 
for traces of political opposition in order to furnish themselves with renewed 
political purchase and professional longevity. Where Cocks argued that 
feminists are "broaden[ing] the meaning of the body's violation" and so 
broadening "the scope for authoritative rule", Tapper contends that feminists 
are broadening their conception of sexist injustice so as to maintain a political 
foothold and gain institutional power. Tapper's argument, then, is that 
feminist claims that androcentrism and sexism have a deep and endemic 
rather than a superficial and incidental presence in institutionalised 
knowledges, functions institutionally to extend feminism's reason for being at 
a time when liberal feminist successes threaten this reason for being. As 
such these claims operate as a mandate for further practical reforms which 
will lend feminists not just institutional 'place,' but institutional 'power.' 
Tapper examines a range of feminist institutional practices in this light. In 
the following passages, she maps out what she sees as the practical shift 
mandated by feminism's epistemological shift: 
What started out as a campaign to get women appointed and 
promoted, to introduce women's studies courses and to eliminate sexist 
91Jbid .. 
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and: 
bias from teaching practices and course content has now become 
somewhat different-and in accordance if not collusion with broader 
changes in the academies. These broader changes involve an 
increasing bureaucratisation which operates with definite techniques 
of surveillance and normalisation ... [f]eminists are co-opting these 
procedures. The academic must now establish that they teach, 
research and administer not only in a way in general acceptable to 
bureaucrats but also in a way which is deemed satisfactory to feminist 
bureaucrats ... [c]ourse content must be relevant to women, teaching 
materials must not be sexist, students' essays must not use sexist 
language, all committees must include at least one woman, and so 
on.92 
At least some feminist academics now want all courses and preferably 
all appointments, at least in arts faculties, to incorporate or evidence a 
concern for women's issues. And mention is even made of the need to 
retrain male staff about disciplinary masculinism.93 
92Jbid., 137. 
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93Jbid., 132. One aspect of Tapper's view deviates from my expository task but is 
nonetheless noteworthy. It has to do with the character of affirmative action in the 
Australian setting. For the portrait of feminist institutional practices Tapper provides 
here, she is relying on two sources (aside from her experience as an academic): Judith 
Allen's article 'Women's Studies in the 1990s: problems and prospects' and Jill 
Matthews and Dorothy Broom's article 'Orphans of the Storm: the attrition of the ANU 
women's studies program,' both in The Australian Universities' Review Vol. 32, No. 2 
(1991). In interpreting the practical recommendations made in these articles as 
manifestations of a shift in feminist epistemology, Tapper is to some extent eliding the 
political, or legislative, context in which these articles appeared. In particular, Tapper 
does not make mention of the distinctive character of affirmative action in the 
Australian context, as per the Affirmative Action (Equal Opportunity for Women) Act of 
1986 (AAA). The distinctive feature of the Act is its non-punitive, non-prescriptive and 
indeed non-regulatory approach to countering sexual discrimination in the workplace, 
where this approach was designed to leave some room for employers and employees to 
take responsibility for interpreting the Act as per their existing business practices, 
among other factors. As such the Act invited-indeed demanded-secondary 
interpretation. I would suggest that Allen, Matthews and Broom, along with many 
others working in the public and private sectors in the wake of the Act, were responding 
to this invitation as they formulated their proposals for institutional change. Thus 
Tapper's argument that a shift toward radicalism within feminist epistemology accounts 
for the kinds of recommendations these authors offer is not, in my view, an adequate 
explanation. For an account of the AAA see Valerie Braithwaite, 'Designing the Process 
of Workplace Change through the Affirmative Action Act,' in Gender and Institutions: 
welfare, work and citizenship, eds. Moira Gatens and Alison MacKinnon (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988): 107-130. 
• I 
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In tune with the new feminist epistemology, which envisages a monolithic and 
omnipresent enemy, feminist practices are broadening so they might 
encompass every aspect of institutional life, from "what we teach and how" 
through to professional behaviour, appointments procedures and research 
criteria.94 
However it must be noted that Tapper's description of this shift in 
feminist institutional practices is problematic since the very same kinds of 
practices appear on both sides of the opposition she sets up. For example, in 
the first passage, she notes approvingly that feminists first attempted to 
"eliminate sexist bias from teaching practices and course content", but that 
they have moved on to an apparently more radical insistence that "teaching 
materials must not be sexist". Similarly, in affirmative actions settings, 
attempts to "get women appointed and promoted" have tended to go hand in 
hand with insistence that "all committees must include at least one woman", 
meaning that the opposition Tapper sets up here between such elements of 
the feminist affirmative action agenda is not altogether convincing. 
The point that does come across clearly here is that "feminists are co-
opting" the procedures and techniques which attend the "increasing 
bureaucratisation" of universities. We will inspect this point more closely as 
Tapper expands on it through her use of Foucault for the second key 
component of her argument. Nonetheless we must recall that Tapper's initial 
description of the feminists practices she critiques cast them as "attacking ... 
institutions themselves". Tapper contrasted this with the liberal feminist 
project to reform institutions. Thus a tension opens up here within Tapper's 
representation of the practices she critiques. 
94Tapper, 'Ressentiment and Power,' 139. 
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We are to understand that radical feminists are at once "attacking 
institutions themselves" and "co-opting", in apparently reformist mode, the 
institution's procedures (as Tapper notes, they are "using the rules and 
regulations of the institution to achieve [their ends]"95). That is, the feminists 
Tapper critiques as radically anti-institutional also appear to adopt the 
feminist strategy to which she has explicitly offered sympathy: liberal 
feminist reformism. It could be that this contradictory tension belongs to the 
feminist phenomena Tapper is engaging with, rather than to her textual 
representation of it.96 However, given that her argument explicitly relies on a 
clear demarcation of radical feminist attack from liberal feminist reform, the 
apparent co-existence of attack and reform in the radical feminist practices 
she critiques would seem to have required further explanation. This problem 
can be left aside as we address the further criticisms Tapper makes of 
feminist institutional practices. 
For Tapper, insofar as feminists have come to lend their political 
opponent/s a monolithic and omnipresent character, they have crafted a 
mandate for a wide-ranging set of reforms to the institutions they inhabit. 
Over and above her albeit hesitant criticism that these reforms may well 
have their basis in an illegitimate epistemological vision, Tapper tables 
95Jbid., 137. 
961 would suggest that the feminist phenomena Tapper is engaging with is "femocracy" or 
what Hester Eisenstein has called "official feminism", where these terms refer in general 
to self-identified feminists who agitate from within government institutions, for example 
from with universities as academics, by occupying key government positions and/or 
contributing significantly from a variety of positions to the policy-making process. A 
related term here is "insider strategy", thus the title of Eistenstein's book on the topic 
Inside Agitators. The tension between a radical feminist sensibility and a liberal 
feminist strategy is a salient theme in the literature on femocracy in the Australian 
context. Although not referred to in Tapper's analysis, the key texts in this literature at 
her time of writing include: Hester Eisenstein, 'Femocrats, Official Feminism and the 
Uses of Power,' in Playing the State: Australian feminist interventions, ed. Sophie 
Watson (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1990), 87-103 (and, more recently, Inside Agitators: 
Australian femocrats and the state (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1996)); Marian Sawyer, 
Sisters in Suits: women and public policy in Australia (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1990); 
Anna Yeatman, Bureaucrats, Technocrats, Femocrats: essays on the contemporary 
Australian state (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1990). 
RESSENT/MENT, RADICALISM AND REFORM 203 
several criticisms of feminist institutional practices which are designed to 
mitigate against disciplinary masculinism and to promote affirmative action. 
She argues that these practices would be both "ineffective" and 
"dangerous".97 They would be ineffective insofar as they extend demands 
which too easily are met with disingenuous tokenism. For example, if 
feminists insist that all researchers and job applicants exhibit a concern for 
women's issues, "every ambitious candidate, or anyone with any sense, will 
tack on to whatever else they do a project concerning women's issues."98 
These practices would be dangerous since, in authoritarian mode, they would 
introduce feminist concerns into areas where they are not relevant: "[s]ome 
research areas have no immediate socio-political implications, much less any 
particular relation to women as a group, mathematics and some areas of 
philosophy for example."99 Here, Tapper perceives room for a troubling 
development: that feminism's institutional presence will take the form of "a 
kind of intellectual authoritarianism, or at least an excessive privileging of 
some interests".100 It is at this point-when she tables this criticism-that 
Tapper's position exhibits internal lability and indeed inconsistency. 
On one hand, Tapper will then go on to note that she is not "ethically ... 
opposed" to the idea that, "in the present context", "special consideration" 
should be extended to female applicants for academic positions, nor to the 
idea that disciplinary masculinism is to be countered.101 That is, the 
practices Tapper has been critiquing on the basis that they are gratuitous in 
a context in which liberal feminist reforms have been satisfactorily 
successful, now are validated as in some way viable "in the present context". 
97Tapper, 'Ressentiment and Power,' 138. 
98Ibid .. 
99139_ 
lOOJbid .. 
lOl Ibid .. 
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It is not immediately certain whether this is a qualification lending subtlety to 
her position on the nature of the context at her time of writing and how 
feminists should negotiate it, or whether it is a different position to the one 
she has been adopting. Tapper's comments are to some extent consistent 
with her note at the beginning of her article that she sees the present context 
as one in which feminism's actions have been "reasonably successful, though 
by no means completely. (In any case at least it is clear what further would 
be required to fulfil the intentions of these actions.)".102 But Tapper's 
bracketed qualification suggests that all that is required for feminism's 
success to be completed is for liberal feminist actions to run their course, as 
they have done in the case of feminist philosophy, whose project now "has 
been completed".103 Is Tapper suggesting that feminism's success is 
incomplete but guaranteed? Although Tapper seemingly makes explicit her 
position on the status of feminist success, she does not offer a satisfactory or 
stable answer to this question. Thus the issue as to whether feminist political 
action is still required in the settings with which she is concerned is 
unresolved in her analysis. 
On the other hand, however, through her mention of "intellectual 
authoritarianism", Tapper also is setting things up to make the rest of her 
argument, in which she returns to her position that the radical feminist 
approach to institutional reform is invalid. But Tapper will return to this 
position from a different angle this time. Rather than argue that these 
feminist practices are invalid on account of their gratuitousness in the 
present context, Tapper will argue that their authoritarian bent is 
102Ibid., 131. 
103Tapper provides further reason to read the meaning of her bracketed qualification in 
this way when she argues that the incomplete status of equal gender-representation in 
the academy "has a largely historical explanation in that it is only relatively recently 
that women have been undertaking postgraduate degrees and applying for jobs in large 
numbers." Ibid .. 
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unreflectively "complicit with modern modes of power" which operate via 
"techniques of surveillance, normalization and control".104 Here, Tapper's 
position is that radical feminist practices might attract ethical sympathy (or, 
at least, not attract our ethical opposition), but that the 'means' they 
employ-institutional techniques of surveillance, normalization and control-
do not justify the 'ends' they seek. 
This why I suggest that Tapper's chapter contains internal lability: this 
latter argument is quite different, perhaps contrary, to her previous one. 
Feminist institutional practices have gone from being invalid owing to their 
gratuitousness in the present context, to being in some way valid in the 
present context except for the "means" they are employing. Moreover, and as 
we have seen, Tapper has moved from criticising feminist practices for 
rejecting liberal reformism, to criticising these practices for taking on a 
classically reformist gesture: employing existing institutional procedures and 
techniques (or 'means') in order to reshape the institution. It is this somewhat 
inconsistent move which takes Tapper into the second key component of her 
argument, to which we now turn. 
As noted earlier, Tapper's perception that feminists have adopted an 
increasingly radical perspective in order to preserve a reason for being in the 
face of nearly-completed work forms the basis for her use of Nietzsche's 
concept of ressentiment. In her analysis, the role of Nietzsche's concept of 
ressentiment is to "explain ... why it is that now that women have achieved 
considerable formal and substantial equality-at least in the institutions I 
am concerned with-this has not proven enough."105 Why, Tapper has asked 
throughout her piece, have feminists become 'radical' when a reasonable 
degree of-perhaps "enough"-success has been achieved? Her question 
104Ibid., 130. 
105Ibid., 134-135. 
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lights up the issue as to whether feminism's success-as long as we agree 
that success means the achievement of a degree of "formal and substantial 
equality"-has not also brought about the demise of feminism's necessity. In 
Tapper's account, questions about feminism's relationship to ressentiment are 
bound up with questions about whether feminism has, in an evidential or 
empirical sense, succeeded. Does successful attainment of formal equality 
not mean the demise, at least the erosion, of the necessity of feminist political 
action? Is formal and substantial equality, at least in some key domains, not 
success enough for feminist political action to cease to be necessary, and 
certainly cease to be radical? Is it not ressentimental to persist with, or turn 
to, a radical feminist perspective in light of such feminism's success? This is 
why it is significant that Tapper vacillates on the question as to whether 
feminism, in the present context, actually has been satisfactorily successful. 
As we will see, Tapper's argument that feminism has become "entangled in 
the spirit of ressentiment" relies on the idea that feminist success in the 
attainment of formal equality is success "enough" to at least erode 
feminism's necessity, its political reason for being.106 
In introducing Nietzsche to her analysis, Tapper explains that a main 
feature of ressentiment is 
an inability to 'let go', to forget ... [ressentiment] is both a backward-
looking spirit-it needs to keep on remembering past injustices-and 
an expansive spirit-it needs to find new injustices everywhere ... [t]he 
person motivated by the spirit of ressentiment looks for 'evil', needs to 
recriminate and distribute blame, to impute wrongs, distribute 
responsibilities and to find sinners. As Nietzsche says, they want 
others to be evil in order to be able to consider themselves good.107 
106Ibid., 135. 
107Ibid., 134. 
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Drawing on Nietzsche's characterisation of the man of ressentiment as one 
who "understands ... how not to forget" and is endowed with a "prodigious 
memory", Tapper interprets Nietzsche's concept of ressentiment as describing 
a political spirit steeped in remembrance of past injustices, and bent on 
'discovering' new injustices (GOM: I, 10). The main implication of this 
interpretation is that such a political spirit will have a history of oppression, 
but will lack contemporary oppression (owing, in this case, to its successful 
elimination of oppression through the attainment of equality). This spirit 
'needs' to have injustice, evil, wrong and sin-these phenomena provide the 
contrast which has enabled its self-identification as 'good'-but, importantly, 
such things do not necessarily exist outside of its 'need' for them. Its perception 
of evil and injustice arises out of its 'need' for evil and injustice. Thus its 
complaint about contemporary evil and injustice, as distinct from the 
historical evils and injuries it has suffered, can be seen as gratuitous. 
This interpretation of the concept of ressentiment fits neatly with Tapper's 
argument that feminists have come to entertain a radical vision of a 
pervasive and subtle political enemy on account of the need to "maintain 
their political integrity, their claim to ideological purity and sense of 
powerlessness".108 Entertaining such a vision in a context which (according to 
108Jbid .. Before its publication in Paul Patton's collection Nietzsche, Feminism and 
Political Theory, Tapper's article originally appeared in Arena Magazine (l, October 
1992: 41-45). It was soon followed up with a reply article by Zoe Sophia ('Position Envy 
and the Subsumption of Feminism,' Arena Magazine (April-May 1993): 34-36). Sophia 
rebuffs Tapper's argument that feminists are entertaining radicalism so as to renew 
their political purchase. Sophia suggests that the kinds of thinking and practices Tapper 
interprets as symptoms of ressentiment can instead be interpreted as responses to the 
"subtle a covert forms of anti-feminism" which appear in contexts wherein anti-feminism 
is "no longer sayable in policy". She writes: " ... feminist philosopher Marion Tapper 
criticised a feminist tendency to 'ressentiment', hanging on to old grudges and self-
definitions as victims, refusing to accept that desired reforms have taken place. In 
universities at least, Tapper proposed, feminists do exercise power in the form of moral 
censorship, determining limits to what is and is not sayable. Yet attainment of this 
moral legitimacy means that the tactics in what Joanna Russ called 'the suppression of 
women's writing' have been partly superseded by what I am calling 'the subsumption of 
feminism', efforts to contain and minimise the damage feminism might wreak on male-
centred norms, especially in the academy. Feminist moral authority acts as a censoring 
super-ego, forcing resistance into devious and ambivalent forms. No longer sayable in 
policy, anti-feminism is marginalised, like the unconscious, into unofficial or disguised 
I 
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Tapper) is marked by the achievement of formal and substantial equality 
requires explanation: the concept of ressentiment provides the explanation 
that feminists require this vision so as to maintain their self-identity as 'good.' 
In elaborating on this point, Tapper notes that ressentiment "makes sense of 
two aspects of feminist thought": 
First, the need to see women as helpless victims, as abused, 
misrepresented, as powerless in the face of such an onslaught of 
sexist, patriarchal, male power in every dimension of life and thought. 
Second, in the now frequently asserted claims of women's moral 
superiority: that women are caring, nurturant, their relations non-
hierarchical, and so on.109 
Not only has the achievement of equality "not proven enough", this 
achievement actually stands in the way of feminism's self-identity, insofar as 
it threatens to shift the character of that social being ('victim') feminism 
identifies with the category women. This achievement leaves feminism bereft 
of those forms of sexist injustice against which its politico-moral purchase as 
a counter-force to women's victimisation might be constituted. Thus 
bereaved, feminists are "resorting to finding 'evil' and injustice in wider and 
wider circumstances and at deeper and more concealed levels", where the 
term "finding" here can be said to connote 'imagining' since the actual 
existence of sexist injustice in a context marked by feminist success is in 
question. 110 
The main ramification of Tapper's particular operationalisation of 
ressentiment is that agreement with the idea that feminism is ressentimental 
entails simultaneous agreement with the idea that sexist injustice does not 
expressions-for example, what's said when feminists aren't in the room. What looks 
like feminist 'ressentiment' may well be a response to covert and subtle forms of anti-
feminism." Ibid., 34. 
109Tapper, 'Ressentiment and Power,' 135. 
llOibid., 134. 
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necessarily exist outside of feminism's 'need' for it, that it may no longer be a 
contemporary issue requiring political opposition. That is, commitment to 
Tapper's interpretation of feminism as a politics of ressentiment requires 
tandem commitment to the interpretation of feminist success, and the albeit 
unstable evaluation of this success as reasonably secure, offered in her 
analysis. As a corollary, Tapper's interpretation of ressentiment carries the 
implication that feminist ressentiment would be unproblematic if sexist 
injustice could be said to exist independently of feminism's 'need' for it. If 
sexist injustice persists even in contexts in which women are formally and 
substantively accorded equal status, then the ressentimental notion that 
feminism's political opponent is more pervasive and subtle than the goal of 
equality allows for emerges as reasonable rather than imaginative or 
gratuitous. 
This point aside, we are positioned now to note that it is in light of Tapper's 
interpretation of ressentiment that the distance between she and Cocks is 
most visible. As we have seen, Cocks reads ressentiment as anathema to 
feminism since it replaces a vitally needed radicalism which actively will fight 
injustice, with a comparatively tame and reactively authoritarian 
sanctification of powerlessness. Contrastingly, Tapper reads ressentiment as 
anathema to feminism since it fosters a form of radicalism which actively 
obscures feminist success in maintaining that injustice still exists, that 
women still are victims, that 'evil' has not effectively or assuredly been 
vanquished. Put another way, Cocks objects to the interpretation of injustice 
which ressentiment inspires, whereas Tapper objects to the imagining of 
injustice which ressentiment inspires. Thus the role of 'radicalism' in 
feminism's relationship to ressentiment is conceived in opposite ways in their 
analyses. For Cocks, if ressentiment is be overcome, radicalism must be 
restored. For Tapper, if ressentiment is to be overcome, radicalism must be 
disbanded. 
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In Tapper's analysis, ressentiment not only lends feminists eyes with 
which to perceive the forms of injustice they are 'looking for.' Relatedly, 
ressentiment also provides a particular way of seeing power. In gauging the 
"extent to which the spirit of ressentiment may be shaping the form and 
direction of feminist struggles", Tapper asks: 
May it not be that, under the sway of reactive forces, we have been too 
inclined to seek power ... to want to dominate? That this might be so 
would be invisible to us while we think of power as power over, while 
we think that whatever men do is exercising power or control over us 
such that if we are to become powerful we will have to gain control ... 
it would also ... make it difficult to see how the ways in which we are 
exercising power may be complicit in larger strategies of power that 
we otherwise might object to, such that instead of resisting domination 
we are creating another form of it.111 
Tapper's point is that ressentiment encourages feminists to entertain a 
narrow conception of 'power' as 'power over' or, more specifically, male 
domination. When this conception of power is in effect, feminist attempts to 
redistribute power will be directed toward the reversal of existing power 
relations since gaining power is conflated with ascending to dominance. Thus 
ressentiment leads feminists to "want what we believed others had: power 
over."112 
This point provides the main ground on which Tapper will connect her 
Nietzschean argument regarding feminist ressentiment and her Foucauldian 
argument regarding feminism's relationship with institutional power. In 
combination, these arguments enable Tapper to describe a situation in which 
ressentiment has furnished feminism with the goal of "seeking power over 
men" at the same time as "an increasing bureaucratisation" of the university 
111 Ibid., 136. 
l 12Jbid., 135. 
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delivered feminists the very means by which they could gain such power.113 
As noted earlier, these 'means' include "techniques of surveillance, 
normalisation and control". In co-opting these techniques, feminists enter into 
"unreflective complicity" with the institutional will to govern academic life.114 
In "supporting and proposing criteria and techniques of surveillance and 
appraisal", feminists are aiding the established processes through which 
institutions are "undermining the autonomy of individual academics".115 
For Tapper, these developments lay the ground for a "specific feminist 
configuration of power/knowledge" to emerge.116 I quote her at length as she 
fleshes out this point: 
Some feminist bureaucrats and academics are providing [Australian 
universities] with further criteria of acceptability and avenues for 
surveillance and in the process are gaining power for themselves ... 
[a]s with other areas of disciplinary power which employ experts to 
label and make us conform, these new procedures will require and 
produce a new set of experts and a new regime of power/knowledge. 
As Foucault says relations of power require the production of 
discourses which involve an ensemble of rules according to which the 
true and the false are separated and which have specific effects of 
power attached to them. And this is what we are already beginning to 
see. Arguments from authority-a feminist text says that Plato is 
sexist, so he is, that logic is masculine, so it is; women's studies 
research shows that multiple choice tests disadvantage females and 
that males and females employ different learning styles, so they do. 
Will the content of a course be challenged because its text is sexist and 
so the teaching of it discriminatory? Will certain methods of teaching 
and assessment be banned? Women claim that if they feel harassed 
113Ibid., 136; 137. 
114Ibid., 139. 
115Ibid., 140. 
116Ibid., 130. 
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then they have been harassed, and if need be will call in a range of 
experts to assert that this is so.117 
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In allowing the institution to bestow upon them an unchallengeable form of 
authority, and in feeding the institutional processes which increasingly 
circumscribe academic life, feminists are positioned to consummate their 
ressentimental desire for power and control. Tapper notes that the forms of 
power and control she thinks feminists are exercising are not equivalent to 
"the sort of power that those who manage institutions have. Clearly very few 
women are senior managers, professors, deans or heads of department."118 
Rather, feminists are exercising "forms of power which operate by 
structuring the possible field of actions of others": they are erecting 
regulatory norms of discourse and behaviour which are effectively dominative 
for the manner in which they will 'conduct' the individual.119 
In the final stage of her analysis, Nietzsche's concept of ressentiment 
combined with Foucault's analysis of power deliver Tapper to the heart of 
what might be termed the 'master's tools' debate in feminism. As befits Audre 
Lorde's famous phrase "the master's tools will never dismantle the master's 
house", Tapper is addressing the question as to what exercises of power or 
'tools' are fit for feminist appropriation.120 Should feminists employ the tools 
provided by the institution to make their arguments for institutional change, 
or should they reject these tools where they ordain exercises of power which 
1l7Ibid., 140-1. Tapper notes that her characterisation of Foucault's position draws on the 
following: Michel Foucault, Power I Knowledge: selected interviews and other writings 
1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980). 
118Ibid., 136. 
119Ibid .. 
120Audre Lorde, 'The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House,' The Audre 
Larde Compendium: essays, speeches and journals (London: Pandora, 1996 [originally 
published in Sister Outsider, 1984]), 158. 
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are at odds with the feminist goal to "rule out oppressive ways of structuring 
fields of action"?l21 
In tune with this question, and as she approaches her conclusion, Tapper 
entertains the idea that it might be necessary for feminists to "use the tools 
of the enemy" as part of their attempt to institute women's autonomy. 
Leaving aside the question as to who feminism's enemy might be-for, by this 
stage of her analysis, Tapper has at least destabilised the notion that 
feminism still has an effective and recognisable enemy122-Tapper considers 
that it might be unreasonable to expect feminists to step outside of "how 
power works" so their contestation of domination might itself stay clean of 
unsavoury exercises of power.123 However Tapper is not convinced of this. 
Her ultimate conclusion is that, in the case she has been considering, "the 
tools of the enemy" are unfit. Returning to the radical epistemological vision 
which mandates the feminist institutional practices she has critiqued, Tapper 
concludes that feminists are simply reproducing domination: 
If we reject as patriarchal any discourse that is committed to truth and 
objectivity or any model of intellectual inquiry that requires formal 
logic or aims for unambiguous, precise modes of articulation then it is 
not clear how such feminists could conduct themselves in the academy 
without denying the autonomy of most of its members. If feminism 
started out with the laudable intention of increasing the kinds of 
individuality available and acceptable, and to dissociate them from 
forms of domination, it is now, I suggest, in danger of doing the 
opposite. The use of feminist discourse, the specific power effects it 
has induced, and its deployment in and use of existing structures of 
121Tapper, 'Ressentiment and Power,' 137. 
122Here it might be countered that Tapper's analysis has alerted feminists to the idea 
that the forms of institutional power they have co-opted actually are their proper enemy. 
However, on my reading, Tapper does not necessarily call on feminists located in 
institutions to resist these powers as feminists, but as academics, since she does make 
the argument that feminism might now be disbanded fairly clearly. 
123Jbid .. 
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power in institutions is not acting as a 'road block' to repression but 
introducing a new form of it.124 
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Tapper's closing contention, then, is that feminism's ressentimental 
complicity with institutional power involves feminism in a form of mimesis: 
by way of such complicity, feminism has sketched anew the relation of power 
it contests. 
On this point, Tapper's account is in accord with Cocks' account, as well 
as those to be examined in the next chapter. The mimetic character of 
ressentiment is a major theme in the feminist ressentiment literature-in 
Cocks' account, it is figured as feminist victim politics' reinstallation of the 
phallocentric hatred of the female body-and as such will it require our 
attention in Part 3. Before we may depart from Tapper's account, one final 
point regarding her conclusion must be tabled. 
There does appear to be room to question Tapper's claim that feminist 
critique of traditional epistemological categories such as truth, objectivity and 
formal logic necessarily will deny proponents of these categories their 
autonomy. Our agreement with this might only be secured by way of two 
prior agreements. First, we must agree that feminists actually do "reject" 
these categories on the basis that they are "patriarchal". That is, we must 
agree that feminists do not aim to transform these categories in light of their 
hitherto androcentric character. Second, we must agree that these traditional 
epistemological categories are not themselves implicated, to an extent which 
requires some redress, in the repression of subjugated knowledges and so the 
denial of autonomy and authority to those not cut from the cloth of the 
classic 'one who knows.' That is, we must agree to follow Tapper into an 
application of Foucauldian and Nietzschean insight into the production of 
124Ibid., 142. 
RESSENTIMENT, RADICALISM AND REFORM 215 
knowledge which counter-intuitively is exclusive, indeed defensive, of 
traditional knowledge. What is to be made of this aspect of her conclusion? 
A main feature of our engagement, in Part 1, with the popular feminist 
accounts of'victim feminism' was the argument that these accounts trade on 
a dichotomy between worthy and unworthy victims. This dichotomy also can 
be traced in Tapper's account to the extent that her critique of feminist 
interventions upon traditional epistemology also acts as a defence of 
traditional epistemology, where such a defence is by no means a necessary 
element of her account. In Tapper's account, feminist claims to the status of 
'worthy victims' are rebuffed, but it can not be said that this status is itself 
thoroughly problematised. Rather, it ultimately and implicitly is cast as 
proper to feminism's opponents: those engaged in traditional knowledge-
making and, one might also suggest, those who no longer would "dare" to 
engage in sexual harassment owing to the unquestioned authority the 
institution apparently now bestows upon victims of such harassment.125 
Tapper does suggest that feminism's ressentimental policy drives have 
become the object of ressentiment on the part of men: "now that women are 
getting jobs and so on we can see the same type of response on the part of 
men: she got it only because of affirmative action policies or because of her 
sexual behaviour."126 Here, men do not emerge as the new innocents in any 
direct sense, for we are presented with what I suspect is an apt vision of 
competing ressentiments. However it must be noted that the very analysis of 
feminist affirmative action Tapper presents-that is, affirmative action as a 
means by which feminists might exercise power over men through the 
regulatory curtailment of their physical and cerebral behaviours-would 
seem to validate men's ressentiment. Thus I conclude with the suggestion that 
l25Jbid., 131. 
126Ibid., 135. 
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a subtle version of a popular press manoeuvre is evident here: the 'right to 
ressentiment,' like to 'right to victim politics,' is withdrawn from feminism but 
is redistributed rather than deconstructed. 
This matter connects directly to another point on which Tapper's analysis 
(unlike that of Cocks and, as we will see in the next chapter, those of Brown 
and Yeatman) is reminiscent of the popular accounts. That is, Tapper's 
interpretation of ressentiment as a political form which needs, and so 
imagines, injury, where the imaginary status of such injury is confirmed in 
light of feminist success. For Cocks, it is the mode of interpretation and 
response to sexual discrimination, harassment and abuse offered by feminist 
victim politics which is to be problematised, but these injuries remain "real 
enough, to be sure".127 However in Tapper's analysis, despite explicit 
statements to the contrary,128 the manner in which feminists interpret and 
respond to injury is not the central issue. The central issue-... explicit in the 
first component of her analysis and largely implicit in the second-is the 
contemporary facticity of injury, whether there actually still are injurious 
events to which feminists might respond, or whether existing feminist 
reforms successfully have eliminated the conditions of possibility for such 
InJUrleS. 
Conclusion 
Despite the significant differences between Cocks and Tapper which have 
been delineated in this chapter, one clear and consistent aspect of 'feminist 
127Cocks, 'Augustine, Nietzsche, and Contemporary Body Politics,' 154. 
128Tapper notes that her primary interest is "in why and in what ways women have not 
been satisfied with [an extensive] level of institutional reform", 131-2. She also notes 
that her primary question is "What are feminists doing in the way in which we are 
attempting to redress [ ... ] injustices?", Ibid., 139. However, as we have seen, Tapper's 
account actually argues that women should be satisfied with the level of reform 
feminists have achieved. And Tapper's goal to separate questions regarding the means 
feminists employ and the ends they seek is not achieved in the sense that these ends 
are, from the outset, negated by the 'fact' of feminist success. 
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ressentiment' has emerged from their accounts. According to both, a feminism 
motivated by ressentiment will represent women as victims whose 
requirement of protection or redress sanctions feminist alliance with 
repressive and authoritarian forms of power. In both cases, this alliance is 
understood as paradoxical and contradictory. For Cocks, the amenability of 
ressentimental victim politics to the processes of legal and state regulation 
leads ultimately to a recuperation of the very attitude toward the body which 
feminism contests, namely, phallocentric hatred for the wilfully concupiscent 
female body. For Tapper, when feminist attempts to institute women's 
autonomy proceed in the spirit of ressentiment, the achievement of such 
autonomy is equated with the exercise of power over men, an equation which 
"plays into the hands" of the institutional will to govern academic life.129 Thus 
autonomy is sought through recourse to a form of power which ultimately will 
thwart autonomy. To distil this aspect of feminist ressentiment into a working 
shorthand, we might say that, according to these accounts, a feminism 
motivated by ressentiment conceives of justice as revenge (or indeed affirms a 
prevailing, official conception of justice as revenge). This equation sanctions 
the turn to a higher power-the state, the law, the administration-readily 
equipped to administer prohibitions, compensations, punishment and, of 
particular concern to Cocks, well-positioned to affect the popular imagination. 
In Tapper's account, the equation of justice with revenge is betrayed in 
institutionally-administered feminist exercises of power over men. Heavy 
with the memory of women's history of oppression, feminism's achievement 
of justice no longer resides with the attainment of"equal power", but with the 
attainment of "power over". In Cocks' account, the equation of justice with 
revenge is betrayed in the compensatory drive of victim politics. Justice-as-
revenge voices not an active call to arms but an uninspiring plaint: "'Look 
129Ibid., 130. 
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what you owe us!"'.130 As we will see in the following chapter, the theme of 
justice as revenge also is pronounced in the accounts of Yeatman and Brown. 
Although a definite moment of commonality between Cocks and Tapper 
can be found in their joint repudiation of justice-as-revenge, we nonetheless 
can conclude that these accounts differ in crucial respects. Their different, 
indeed contrary, treatment of the role of radicalism in feminist politics 
arguably is linked to their different interpretations of Nietzsche's concept of 
ressentiment. Cocks is certain that feminism is joined by a variety of 
radicalisms in being overcome by ressentiment. And she is certain that this 
has resulted in a mode of politicisation wholly inadequate for the task of 
combating domination. But she is not certain why this has occurred. She 
ventures the suggestion that this development reflects "a general shift in the 
Zeitgeist of the West", and is underpinned by "a complex sets of reasons" .131 
Tapper, on the other hand, is certain that feminism has been overcome by 
ressentiment and so has become radical, and in this has not just combated but 
reversed relations of domination in the institutional settings with which she is 
concerned. Tapper also is quite certain as to why this has occurred: 
successful attainment of equal power has left feminism bereft of political 
purchase. In other words, Cocks interprets ressentiment as a dangerous 
source of consolation for the powerless when their political goals are far from 
being achieved, while Tapper interprets ressentiment as a revenant spirit 
which acts to deny political success and, therefore, demise. The line of inquiry 
opened up he!e will require that we ask: How is ressentiment to be situated in 
relation to feminist radicalism? Is radicalism, as a political disposition which 
urges movement beyond equality within existing arrangements, inevitably 
130Cocks, 'Augustine, Nietzsche, and Contemporary Body Politics,' 152. 
131Jbid .. 
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bound up with ressentiment or, as Cocks suggests, does its transcendent 
orientation promise antidotal release from ressentiment? 
4 
Ressentiment, Identity and Difference 
[B] ecoming something other than that which we presently 
are is after all the sine qua non of movements for social 
change. 
-Moira Gatens.1 
Whoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process 
he does not become a monster. 
-Friedrich Nietzsche.2 
Introduction 
This chapter considers two further accounts of feminism's relationship with 
ressentiment, those of Anna Yeatman and Wendy Brown, adopting the 
strategy of comparative analysis employed in the last chapter. The accounts 
of Yeatman and Brown bear many points of confluence with those examined 
in the last chapter, including diagnostic use of Nietzsche and concern for the 
equation of justice with revenge apparantly attendant upon feminist 
attachment to victim identity. However, where the accounts addressed in the 
previous chapter were centred on specific issues-sexual politics, university 
politics-the accounts addressed here locate the question of feminist 
ressentiment on broader terrain, namely feminism's relationship with liberal 
democratic politics and theory. They open up the question of feminist 
ressentiment to the categories of universal and particular, identity and 
difference, state and citizen-subject, and they put the concept of ressentiment 
to work for a reading of feminism as an identitarian moralism which may be 
regarded as 'undemocratic.' In this, both Yeatman and Brown offer much 
1 Moira Gatens, Imaginary Bodies: ethics, power and corporeality (New York: Routledge, 
1996), 77. 
2 BGE: 4, 146. 
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amplification on what, as we saw in the last chapter, is a key issue for the 
question of feminist ressentiment. That is, the link between identity and the 
'non-transformative' character of ressentimental politics. In her account of 
Nietzsche's theory of ressentiment, Cocks wrote of how the morality of 
ressentiment works to fix the identity of the powerless: the powerless are 'good' 
so long as they 'suffer'.3 In a different vein but to the same effect, Tapper 
wrote of ressentiment as a spirit which oversees feminism's continuing 
identification of women as "helpless victims".4 
Yeatman and Brown, each in their own way, provide accounts of how this 
non-transformative character of ressentiment is set in place. Yeatman offers 
an analysis of how, as she puts it, ressentiment works to hypostatise identity 
and so to "foreclose politics" in liberal democratic settings and 'within' 
feminism.5 On a different but related tack, Brown's analyses of modernist 
feminist epistemology and identity politics probe the resubordinating effects 
of politicising disenfranchised identities. In both their analyses, ressentiment 
emerges as the motor of an identitarian moralism which takes as its 
signature a substitution of democratic political argument promising 
identificatory transformation and political change, for undemocratic moral 
plaint which preserves victim identity and thwarts even as it calls for change. 
Hence, as in the last chapter, questions regarding the sorts of claims 
feminism should make, how these claims are to be couched, and what sort of 
political agency feminism might assume within existing configurations of 
power are called up by and might be addressed in relation to their accounts. 
However, as will be argued as part of the comparative analysis forwarded in 
3 Cocks, 'Augustine, Nietzsche and Contemporary Body Politics,' 145. 
4 Tapper, 'Ressentiment and Power,' 135. 
5 Anna Yeatman, 'Voice and Representation in the Politics of Difference,' in Feminism and 
the Politics of Difference, eds. Sneja Gunew and Anna Yeatman (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 
1993), 229. 
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the chapter, the commonality between Yeatman and Brown's figurations of 
the relation between feminism, liberal democracy and ressentiment ends with 
their shared argument against undemocratic moral plaint. 
Over and above this shared argument stand vastly different treatments 
of ressentiment in relation to liberalism. Simply put, while Yeatman proposes 
that feminism will overcome ressentiment and return to a more properly 
democratic politics when it works (re)constructively within the established 
liberal-democratic political order, Brown treats this established political order 
as a configuration of powers which work to incite ressentiment, and in this way 
beckons a challenge to this order which far exceeds that presented in 
Yeatman's analyses. As my comparative analysis will demonstrate, the 
major ramification of this is that Yeatman's and Brown's respective 
figurations of feminist politics beyond ressentiment pull in significantly 
different political directions with respect to liberalism. It also will be argued 
that Brown's treatment of liberal democratic settings as precipitative of 
ressentiment cuts new ground for the question of feminist ressentiment and 
stands in tension with the diagnostic use of the conception of ressentiment 
evident in engagements with this question, including her own. We turn first to 
Yeatman's work, beginning with an examination of her article 'Voice and 
Representation in the Politics of Difference', before addressing a later article 
which continues and develops the work of the first, 'Feminism and Power'. 
4.1 Yeatman: ressentiment and the location/locution of 
politics 
As her point of departure in this first article, Yeatman refers to the fact that 
"the contemporary era of multiply contested oppressions" has thrown into 
relief the partial character of feminist politics. This, she writes, has meant a 
'loss of innocence' for feminism: 
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... feminism has been forced to lose its innocence . . . [it] has had to 
discover its partiality in a context where its insistence on the primacy 
of gender oppression is incommensurable with the emphases of 
emancipatory movements oriented to different axes of oppression.6 
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Feminism's sense of innocence was attendant upon is claim to universality, 
its positioning of itself as the political force which can discern and represent 
the interests of the category 'women.' When conceptualised on the basis of 
the assumption that gender oppression is to be prioritised, the category 
'women' emerges as an identity group sharing roughly the same interests vis-
a-vis men. Such a conceptualisation would, for example, place racism below 
sexism on feminism's political agenda, effectively demoting or indeed 
blindspotting the interests of women for whom racism looms large.7 
Although a well-intentioned politicisation of the category 'women' which 
aspires to political unity among women so as to effect their emancipation, 
this claim to universality at worst obfuscates and at least de-emphasises 
differences and indeed incommensurabilities among women.s As Yeatman 
writes, the assumption of the primacy of gender oppression "is always going 
to be most compelling for those women who do not experience ethnicity, race 
6 Ibid., 228. Jane Flax also conceives of the realisation of feminism's partiality as a loss 
of innocence. See Jane Flax, 'The End of Innocence,' in Feminists Theorise the Political, 
eds. Judith Butler and Joan W. Scott (New York: Routledge, 1992), 455-463. 
7 In speaking of 'women for whom racism looms large' I do not wish to suggest that racism 
is an issue for those subject to racism alone. That is, I support perspectives on racism 
which offer a corrective formulation of whiteness as a racial identity which is lent an 
unmarked status only on account of the subordination of other racial identities, where 
this formulation works to emphasise the responsibility of those in the priviledged 
category to problematise and combat racism whether or not they understand themselves 
as 'direct practitioners' of it. See, for example, Aileen Moreton-Robinson's formulation of 
"racism as a relationship" in her book Talkin' up to the White Woman: indigenous women 
and feminism (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 2000), 126-149. 
8 In referring to the aspiration of polity unity among women I have in mind the second 
wave feminist idea-captured in the phrase "sisterhood is powerful"-that the 
achievement of female political unity would carry revolutionary force since it would 
transgress a very basic patriarchal ruse by which women are divided from, and set in 
competition with, one another. See, for example, Robin Morgan, ed., Sisterhood is 
Powerful (Boston: Beacon Press, 1976) and Mary Daly's concept of 'conflagration' in 
Gyn/ Ecology: the metaethics of radical feminism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978). 
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and class as additional bases of oppression."9 Hence the loss of innocence: 
feminism discovered its partiality by way of the realisation that a 
prioritisation of gender oppression comes at the expense of adequate 
cognisance of other bases of oppression, and adequate acknowledgement of 
the role of women, including feminist women, as direct and indirect 
practitioners of such oppressions. Most importantly for Yeatman's purposes, 
and as is widely acknowledged in the literature on feminism and the politics of 
difference, the realisation of feminism's partiality yields the idea that feminist 
universalism hitherto has been tailored to the particular interests of white 
Western and middle-class women. For Yeatman, much can be gained in the 
way of knowledge of the political as a result of this realisation and its 
attendant loss of innocence. 
As a thematic, 'feminism and the politics of difference' has a double 
meaning. Traditionally, feminism is a politics of difference, an emancipatory 
political project concerned with inequality in relation to sexual difference. 
Feminism also 'houses' a politics of difference, "a politics of contestation in 
respect of dominant and marginalized voices within feminism." 10 Among 
other things, Yeatman's article offers a substantial rethinking of feminism's 
work as a politics of difference in view of its internal politics of difference. 
Specifically, Yeatman will rethink feminism's customary apprehension of its 
primary political interlocutor, the "custodians of the established order", in 
9 'Voice and Representation,' 228. This quote suggests that Yeatman adheres to the 
'additive' model of social identity, an approach which has been widely problematised in 
the literature on subjectivity and identity. However, Yeatman actually offers her own 
critique of this approach elsewhere in her work, hence her alignment with it in this 
quote is grammatical rather than conceptual. See her piece 'Interlocking Oppressions,' in 
Transitions: new Australian feminisms, eds. Barbara Caine and Rosemary Pringle 
(Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1995), 42-56. 
lO'Voice and Representation,' 229. Yeatman's description of feminism as a nation-like 
grouping which houses an internal politics of difference has been problematised by Ien 
Ang in her piece "I'm a Feminist, but .. .': 'Other' Women and Postnation Feminism,' in 
Transitions: new Australian feminisms, eds. Barbara Caine and Rosemary Pringle (New 
York: St Martin's Press, 1995), 57-73. 
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view of the positioning of white, western, middle-class feminists as the 
custodians of feminism's established order.11 Yeatman's leading suggestion is 
that recognising the correspondence of position between these two sets of 
custodians offers a new perspective on the interplay of 'interest' and 'ethics' in 
the politics of emancipation. Yeatman notes that emancipatory movements 
typically have viewed custodians of the established order as interested, where 
interest is that which precludes ethics. With this view, the custodian's 
attachment to an "ethical universal" such as equality emerges as a mere 
"rhetorical mask for interest": 
For reasons of their critical rejection of established policy, 
[emancipatory movements] focus their attention on how the 
custodians ... discursively cast the universals of politics in ways which 
preserve their own privileged relationship to voice and representation. 
When it is understood that the universal has to be particularised in 
order to exist, it is all too easy to assume that there is no universal 
dimension to politics, but only 'interest.'12 
Yeatman goes on to note that this assumption that interest alone drives 
politics is "easy and even comforting" for those whose positioning as 
emancipatory subjects is not obviously complicated by implication 1n 
custodianship. However, no such comfort is afforded to those "positioned as 
custodians of the established order within an emancipatory politics ... [y]et 
this is precisely the positioning of white, western and middle-class women 
within contemporary feminism."13 Given that the emergence of a politics of 
difference within feminism has cast light on the extent to which the 
universals of feminism have been particularised around the interests of this 
category of women, and given also that these same women are answerable to 
the demand that this particularisation be recast, their position complexly 
ll'Voice and Representation,' 229. 
12Ibid., 229. 
l3Jbid .. 
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combines 'interest' and 'ethics', where the latter denotes an "ethical 
orientation" to such recasting.14 Yeatman will identify this same complex 
combination of interest and ethics with feminism's interlocutor, the 
custodians of the established political order. To grasp the import of this 
identification we must first work through the basics of Yeatman's political 
theory. 
Drawing on the work of Jacques Ranciere, and arguably occupying a 
kindred relation with recent radical democratic thought, Yeatman provides a 
very clear definition of 'politics' in this piece, one which emphasises its 
relational and dynamic character.IS I quote her at length as she provides the 
basic schema of this definition: 
14Ibid., 231. 
15Yeatman refers to the following piece by Ranciere: 'Politics, Identification and 
Subjectivization,' October 61 (Summer 1992): 58-65. The themes and presuppositions of 
Yeatman's political theory, including its Arendtian geist, are largely in accord with the 
project of 'radical democracy' as formulated by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, 
initially in their book Hegemony and Social Strategy: towards a radical democratic 
politics (London: Verso, 1985). Reminiscent of Isaiah Berlin's insistence on the inevitable 
plurality of human values, and drawing of a cast of philosophers of power and difference 
from Wittgenstein, Nietzsche and Heidegger to Lacan, Derrida and Foucault, this theory 
of democracy presses against rationalist attempts to lend democracy's universal 
principles a final ground and meaning. Generally speaking, the central task of 
poststructuralist, post-Marxist radical democratic thought is to theorise a form of 
democracy capable of conducting a pluralist mode of coexistence without, on the one 
hand, suppressing antagonisms arising from difference in the interests of achieving final 
harmony and, on the other hand, treating differences as given identities which simply 
require valourisation (as in 'interest group' pluralism and identity politics). The goal of 
achieving final harmony, of establishing a state of unanimity in which every citizen-
subject is 'at home' in identity with the whole, is understood on this view as a disavowal 
of the exercise of power and exclusion attendent upon any attempt to craft a 'one' from 
the 'many'. In Chantal Mouffe's telling, radical democracy does not rescind the goal of 
collective identity. Rather it asks that its necessary construction of a constitutive outside 
be avowed and that the antagonisms such construction invokes be affirmed as bases for 
an ongoing process of political contestation and deliberation. Hence the 'achievement' or 
reificatory substantiation of such identity is never complete, power, antagonism and 
contestation are affirmed as ineradicable elements of a properly democratic politics, and 
interlocutory political argument is cast as the political currency of democracy. As Mouffe 
explains: "To acknowledge the existence of relations of power and the need to transform 
them, while renouncing the illusion that we could free ourselves completely from power: 
this is what is specific to the project that we have called 'radical and plural democracy' 
... In a democratic polity, conflicts and confrontations, far from being a sign of 
imperfection, indicate that democracy is alive and inhabited by pluralism." Chantal 
Mouffe, 'Democracy, Power and the "Political'", in Democracy and Difference: contesting 
the boundaries of the political, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1996), 248; 255. See also Mouffe's The Return of the Political (London: Verso, 
1993) and The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000). Although, as we will see in 
RESSENTIMENT, IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE 
Political contestation is always in the name of an ethical universal, 
equality in this case. Equality is claimed but its achievement is 
perpetually deferred. This is because each reforming achievement, 
which transforms policy in the name of equality, establishes a new 
regime of governance. All governance works in terms of a bounded 
community, a community of identity, and thus establishes insiders and 
outsiders. Reformed policy may radically alter the established political 
community's identity and thus the nature of its distinction between 
insiders and outsiders, but this distinction is always generated by 
policy. 16 
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The ethical universals which express the values of a democratic polity 
(participation, freedom, equality) "must be particularised in order to exist", 
where particularism necessarily undercuts universalism. Thus the proper 
achievement of an ethical universal such as equality is perpetually deferred. 
But with particularity comes the possibility of 'politics.' Particularism, in 
establishing a bounded community which centres some while marginalising 
others, calls into being or "interpellates" contestation from the margins. That 
is, particularism always wrongs the universal it particularises, where this 
wrong-doing positions custodians of the bounded community as answerable to 
the wronged who, in being wronged, are positioned to show how this 
community's political discourse "fails to live up to its own professions of 
universalism. "17 
Articulation of the wrong on the part of the emancipatory subjects, and 
answerability to the wrong on the part of the custodians, comprise the 
"interlocutory" relation that is 'politics.' As Yeatman elaborates: 
Politics is the space between established policy and an emancipatory 
movement's claims on equality. These claims are made through 
the following section, Brown uses the phrase 'radical democracy' to describe her political 
orientation, this must be distinguished from the radical democratic project of Laclau and 
Mouffe. See Brown's States of Injury, 11-14 for her critical commentary on this project. 
16'Voice and Representation,' 229. 
17Ibid., 231. 
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And: 
showing how policy wrongs the emancipatory subject by excluding or 
marginalizing the category of persons to whom the subject belongs. 
Politics requires and depends on the interlocutory and performative 
dynamics of what is a contestatory relationship, demanding an ethical 
response from both those who are positioned as privileged by policy 
and those who are positioned as wronged by policy.18 
Universalism not only interpellates the contestatory other but, when 
this contestatory other argues that established policy wrongs equality, 
this process and relationship of contestation is politics.19 
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This places 'politics' as that process which is brought into being by and will 
intervene upon the wrongs particularism must commit. By extension, 
democracy is here understood as constitutively unstable: between the 
promise and failure of universalism lies what must be a site of restless 
contestation. 
In locating 'politics' in this way, Yeatman seeks to establish that 
professions of universalism on the part of custodians of an established order 
do not proceed solely in the name of interest. Rather, all such professions 
have an "ethical component" insofar as they are "continually accountable to 
politics", so described.20 However, this is not say that this ethical component, 
or indeed the demand that it be brought to account, necessarily will engage 
politics. Yeatman also details the various ways in which politics can be 
"foreclosed" by either party to a political relation-the custodians and the 
emancipatory subjects-where foreclosure is that which stills the relational 
dynamism necessary for politics to occur. As we will see, this is where 
Nietzsche's concept of ressentiment enters her analysis. 
18Ibid., 230. Emphasis in original. 
19Ibid., 234. 
20Ibid., 234; 230. 
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Reminded that Yeatman's account of politics and its foreclosure has a 
dual purpose-it is applied to feminism's work as a politics of difference and to 
the politics of difference within feminism-we look first at the way in which 
the custodians might foreclose politics, where 'custodians' here refers equally 
to those in custody of the established political order and those in custody of 
feminism's established order. Noting that "[t]he first temptation of the 
custodians of established policy is to monopolise the arbitration of how this 
policy is to be interpreted in the face of ... contestation", Yeatman elaborates 
two ways in which custodians can operate to foreclose politics: 
Such foreclosure can happen [through] the simple re-assertion of 
established policy and a correlative refusal to listen to the 
contestatory voices of emancipation; or a more subtle version, the 
appropriation of the contestatory and emancipatory voice by the 
custodian subject voice.21 
The second mode of foreclosure-appropriation of the contestatory voice-is 
Yeatman's primary concern. The latter part of her piece is concerned with 
demonstrating how this mode of foreclosure has operated within Australian 
feminism, specifically through the appropriation of indigenous women's voices 
on the part of non-indigenous feminists.22 But both modes of foreclosure 
exhibit the same symptom: an unwillingness to engage in the "act of 
listening", where this act entails opening up political space to the full 
participation of contestatory voices so as to enable their articulation of the 
wrong.23 For Yeatman, the act oflistening on the part of the custodians is key 
to the possibility of politics. When performed, this act is transformative in its 
necessary renegotiation of "the established procedures of who gets to 
21Ibid., 235. 
22Ibid., 238-243. 
23Ibid., 236. 
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participate within the process of governance".24 Indeed, a further aspect of 
Yeatman's political theory can be tabled here. 
As we have seen, achievement of the ethical universal 'equality' is 
perpetually deferred since its proper ontologisation necessarily is undercut by 
particularism. However, as part of this vision of the workings of universal and 
particular Yeatman offers the insight that "[e]quality exists only within the 
relationship of political contestation."25 Alternative to the view that equality 
is the outcome of politics, this insight allows politics, an "equalising process", 
to be regarded as that moment in which equality might be glimpsed.26 As a 
relaxation of custodianship which renegotiates existing strictures on 
participation, the act of listening and the politics it allows have the effect of 
"equaliz[ing] the voices of those who represent respectively both established 
policy and the emancipatory movement."27 Of course, Yeatman holds that 
the act of listening is vital as a starting point for politics. Its renegotiation of 
political participation properly is consummated when an invitation is 
extended to the contestatory voices to work with the custodians "to 
determine how established policy needs to change to become more 
inclusive."28 When engaged, the act of listening and its corollary (the 
extension of such an invitation) actualise the "ethical component" of the 
custodians' political position, which can not therefore be reliably reduced to 
'interest.' Yeatman writes of the custodians: "theirs, then, is by no means a 
consistently conservative role even if, at the point at which they enter the 
24Ibid .. 
25Ibid., 235. My emphasis. 
26Ibid .. 
27Ibid .. 
28Ibid., 236. 
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universalism of an equality-oriented politics, their mode of entry must always 
be inflected by their privileged discursive positioning."29 
On the part of the emancipatory subject, Yeatman holds that politics is 
foreclosed precisely when the ethical component of the custodian's position is 
not recognised. Yeatman will argue that this failure tends to precipitate a 
conversion of the "politics of emancipation" into a ressentimental "politics of 
identity", where the latter is in fact to be regarded as a "pseudo politics".30 
She writes: 
Politics can be foreclosed from the other direction, by the 
emancipatory subject when it attributes to the custodians of the 
established order nothing more than an interest in perpetuating it. 
The result of this type of foreclosure is that the subject is forced to 
define itself in terms of the status of exclusion, namely as lying outside 
positive, political capacity. A politics of ressentiment follows whereby 
the emancipatory subject turned victim alternately practices moral 
appeal to and blackmail of what is now hypostatised as the dominant 
subject custodian of the established order. This is a pseudo-politics 
oriented to the exercise of force, moral terror in this case. 3 l 
This moment in Yeatman's analysis is significant for our purposes, and so 
warrants careful exposition. We look first at Yeatman's treatment of identity 
before considering the nexus of ressentiment, victimhood and morality as it 
appears above, and as it articulated and developed in her later piece, 
'Feminism and Power'. Yeatman describes a situation in which politics is 
foreclosed through a certain 'hypostatisation' of identity. Yeatman already 
has established that the identity of the emancipatory subject is to be 
regarded as interpellated ("these are movements of subjects who have been 
interpellated within the terms of modern democracy as immature, emotional, 
29Ibid .. 
30Ibid., 237. 
31Ibid., 230. Here, Yeatman draws on the following work of Joan Landes to evince the 
interpellated character of modern feminism: Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of 
the French Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988). 
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irrational and uncivilised.").32 In the context of this piece, the concept of 
interpellation is used to override identity understood as the outward 
expression of an authentic personhood which precedes and will abide the 
political encounter, in favour of identity understood as the unstable 
achievement of particularism's subjectivising labour. The identity of the 
emancipatory subject-the outsider, the other, the minority-is not found but 
conferred by particularism as it nominates, necessarily and contentiously, a 
specific humanity as the insider, the one, the majority.33 For Yeatman, the 
point of emancipatory politics is to challenge and destabilise this conferral of 
identity, to take its enunciation of difference to task in a move toward 
subjective resignification and political reconstruction. However, she argues, 
emancipatory political efforts typically have confirmed and stabilised the 
work of particularism in claiming 'outsider status' as a first and last political 
posture. Registering such a posture as a conversion of "marginality into an 
oppositional relationship to established political discourse", Yeatman argues 
that "[w]hen these movements 'stand outside looking in' they act to confirm 
[their] interpellated identities, not to challenge them."34 
In Yeatman's telling, this conversion of marginality into oppositionality, 
which involves the assumption of what I will call 'antagonistic outsidership' 
32Ibid., 233. 
33In Joan Scott's words, particularism might be understood as "a process of enunciation of 
cultural difference" (Joan W. Scott, 'Multiculturalism and the Politics of Identity,' in The 
Identity in Question, ed. John Rajchman (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 11). 
Scott's use of Stuart Hall's account of 'black' as an identity to illustrate what she 
describes as the "historical conferral" of identity is noteworthy here (Ibid., 11). Hall 
writes: "The fact is "black" has never been just there either. It has always been an 
unstable identity, psychically, culturally, and politically. It, too, is a narrative, a story, a 
history. Something constructed, told, spoken, not simply found. People now speak of the 
society I come from in totally unrecognisable ways. Of course Jamaica is a black society, 
they say. In reality it is a society of black and brown people who lived for three or four 
hundred years without ever being able to speak of themselves as "black." Black is an 
identity which had to be learned and could only be learned in a certain moment. In 
Jamaica that moment is the 1970s." Stuart Hall, 'Minimal Selves,' Identity: the real me 
(London: ICA, 1987), 45; cited in Scott, 'Multiculturalism and the Politics of Identity,' 6. 
34•voice and Representation,' 231; 233. 
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on the part of the emancipatory subject, is where emancipatory politics run 
aground. Like photographic fixer which stills light sensitivity so as to render 
the image permanent, such oppositionality renders static-'hypostatises'-
the identities which comprise the political relation. In turning to how such 
oppositionality plays out politically, Yeatman argues that it involves a 
political strategy which is in fact to be regarded as pseudo-political, as a 
foreclosure of politics, on account of its non-transformative character. For 
Yeatman, this strategy involves a reduction of politics to economics, by which 
she means that politics comes to be regarded as "a contest ultimately settled 
by force, where force is directed by interest."35 As we have seen, Yeatman's 
concern is that antagonistic outsidership fosters non-recognition of the 
ethical component of the custodian's position. The custodian is fixed as the 
enemy who has and inevitably will "subordinate claims on equality to their 
interest in conserving their privileges".36 According to Yeatman this is the 
starting point for what she terms a "no-change politics": 
When (in this way) the politics of emancipation is converted into a 
politics of identity, the potential for change contained in the former is 
made over into a no-change politics. For if those who are positioned 
differently, in terms of privilege and its lack within a politics of 
emancipation, are simply articulating given and opposed interests, 
there can be no change. One interest must dominate the other, and 
politics be subordinated to economics.37 
One of the concrete manifestations of this no-change politics is its production 
of a necessary but insufficient critique of the status quo. 
Arguing that antagonistic outsidership involves the assumption of a 
fundamentally contradictory position which combines "dependency on and 
critical rejection of the status quo", Yeatman notes that the antagonistic 
35Ibid., 232. 
36Ibid., 237. 
37Ibid .. 
RESSENTIMENT, IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE 234 
outsider's critique of the status quo rarely develops into "a positive 
contribution to contemporary policy debate about how the extant institutions 
and culture of democracy need to be changed so as to become more 
inclusive."38 For, Yeatman notes, such a contribution 
would have to be linked into an explicit appreciation of what has 
already been achieved by way of these institutions, and thus into a 
metaphor of building on and extending these achievements. This 
would accord what is typecast as the oppressor/exploiter dominant 
group something other than that status, namely one of possessing a 
more or less shared ethic with the minority movement.39 
We might note that at least some of the critiques of the status quo Yeatman 
may be referring to here are likely offer a vision of how the existing culture of 
democracy might be changed. If I am right in thinking that she has socialist 
critiques in mind-those which are commonly referred to as 'crude 
economism'-their vision is one in which democracy is sundered from 
capitalism and moves from representative government to a form of direct 
participatory democracy in which the majority govern society. This aside, let 
us note that in Yeatman's schema, critique of the status quo is registered as 
crucial to the emancipatory subject's articulation of the wrong. However, 
where such critique remains antagonistic rather than interlocutory-where it 
is accompanied by a refusal to admit of "common ground" and a concomitant 
unwillingness to "contribute positively and creatively to the reconstruction of 
a democratic polity"-it forecloses politics and is to be regarded as pseudo 
political.40 
But there is another layer to this account of the antagonistic outsider's 
foreclosure of politics in favour of a 'no-change politics.' This is through their 
38Ibid., 233; 232. 
39Ibid., 232-3. Emphasis in original. 
40Ibid., 232; 233. 
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assumption of "victim" identity. So far, we know that 'no-change politics' 
involves fighting fire with fire: what is interpreted as the custodians' 
inevitable enforcement of interest is met with the antagonistic outsider's 
employment of counter-force in the name of counter-interest, which Yeatman 
sees as a reduction of politics to economics. But we are not yet at the stage of 
understanding precisely how it is that the emancipatory subject comes to 
wreak "moral terror" and, in this, to perform a tandem reduction of politics to 
victim-centred moralism.41 In the passage cited earlier, Yeatman wrote of 
the emancipatory subject's identification with outsidership as entailing self-
definition "in terms of the status of exclusion, namely as lying outside 
positive, political capacity."42 Here, then, is the idea that with such self-
definition the emancipatory subject confirms and stabilises their existing 
position of relative exclusion from political participation. Yeatman then 
registers this gesture as the assumption of "victim" identity: "a politics of 
ressentiment follows whereby the emancipatory subject turned victim 
alternately practices moral appeal to and blackmail of... the dominant 
subject custodian".43 To unpack this claim thoroughly we shall have to turn 
to Yeatman's more developed articulation of it in her subsequent piece 
'Feminism and Power'. However, before we do this, let me raise three issues 
which have emerged so far. 
Firstly, on the face of it, this image of 'moral appeal' and 'blackmail' does 
not immediately correspond with the image of 'counter-force' addressed 
above. Neither live up to Yeatman's model of an emancipatory politics which 
seeks to work with the custodians toward a reconstructed polity. But 
counter-force suggests a form of staunch insubordination tuned to active 
41Ibid., 230. 
42Ibid .. 
43Ibid .. 
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resistance of authority, whereas moral appeal and blackmail suggest 
passive-aggressive, oddly obedient forms of extortionary plaint. Is Yeatman 
crafting something similar to Cocks' distinction between the 'style' and the 
'substance' of ressentimental victim politics, meaning that counter-force 
degenerates into, or is outwardly expressed as, moral appeal and blackmail? 
Does this mean (contra Cocks this time) that we are asked here to regard 
those forms of radical politics which eschew co-operativeness to the extent 
that their ultimate investment resides with a vision of broad socio-economic 
transformation as inevitably non-transformative, pseudo-political and 
ressentimental? If so, how are we then to read those courageously confident 
and creatively vital dimensions of such radical politics-as Saturnalian 
moments ultimately trapped in a power relation they themselves, perversely, 
affirm?44 In any case, as we continue to address the emancipatory subject's 
ressentimental assumption of victim identity we shall have to track its 
apparently Janus-faced resistance so as to achieve a clear view of the range 
of radical political dispositions Yeatman interprets as ressentimental. 
Secondly, to some extent Yeatman's analysis so far depends on the 
making of a compelling distinction between such moral appeal and what is 
interpreted as the emancipatory subject's properly ethico-political 
441 have an admixture of examples of radical political creativity and courage in mind here: 
the audaciously critical humour often encountered in political posters and cartoons; the 
craft of banner-making practiced by 'pit crew wives', recently recalled in the work of 
Spanish-Australian artist Raquel Ormella; Joseph Beuys' entire oeuvre; the 'community 
art project' undertaken by picketing Melbourne wharfies in April 1998, which saw them 
piling and welding railway tracks in the way of scab labour; the ripe blend of hilarity 
and gravity which characterised those feminist demonstrations outside beauty pageants 
during the 1970s; the burlesque arts of parody, satire and mockery evident in many 
street demonstrations; the non-violent, direct action themes-days of 'embrace the base' 
and 'reflect the base' at Greenham Common in the 1980s [for accounts of these see 
Sasha Roseneil, Common women, Uncommon Practices: the queer feminisms of Greenham 
(London: Cassell, 2000) and Barbara Harford and Sarah Hopkins, eds. Greenham 
Common: women at the wire (London: Women's Press, 1984)]; the strange, confusing, 
temporary, affinity-based coalitions of en masse demonstrations such as, in recent times, 
those of Seattle, Genoa, Melbourne, Prague, and Seoul; newly emergent practices such 
as culture-jamming and adbusting, as well as videography and other independent 
media practices, largely employed for radical political ends. 
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articulation of the wrong. It is clear that, in the passage cited above, Yeatman 
is situating moral appeal as issuing from an identity politics which, as it were, 
confirms in advance the failure of that appeal, meaning that the plaint of the 
''victim" is, in effect, a speaking silence. But how might we reliably distinguish 
between such moral appeal and the cadence of the properly ethico-political? 
How might we reliably discern the difference between the moral speech of the 
self-identified "victim" and the ethical speech of the emancipatory subject 
who wishes to transform their status as "victim"? To what extent is this 
distinction drawn in the ear of the arbiter? 
On a related tack, and admittedly at the risk of simply reinstalling the 
hypostatised identity of the custodian-subject as more interested than 
ethical, let me suggest that a cast of questions concerning the reception and 
regulation of dissonant political speech is opened up here. Yeatman envisages 
a political speech which is not appropriated but actively heard by its 
custodian-audience. But could it be that such speech would require some prior 
appropriation in order for it to be heard? Insofar as it issues from a voice 
positioned as liberal democracy's constitutive outside, it would seem to 
require the assumption of a pre-ordained format in order to be 'assimilable.' 
Hence it would engage a necessarily paradoxical dissonance: a disobedience 
which pledges obedience to the format, a transformativeness which is 
transfixed by the imperative to be assimilable (no-longer-Other) in some 
measure. This is not a paradox ofYeatman's making, but it could be that we 
encounter here a problem with the status of "change" (and "no-change") in 
her account. The distinction drawn between ressentiment's "no-change" 
pseudo-politics (its speaking silence, its already thwarted plaint) and the 
emancipatory subject's properly transformative politics (its listenable voice) 
would seem to de-emphasise, or elide, the level of no-change, of making-same, 
required for the latter. 
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Thirdly, Yeatman writes of the respective manners in which the 
custodians and the emancipatory subjects foreclose politics, but does not 
detail what actions the latter might take when the former enact their 
foreclosure: that is, when the custodians' ears appear merely decorative. Of 
the two modes of foreclosure, this would appear to be the decisive one owing 
to the custodian's prerogative positioning. Could it be that this is the moment 
in which emancipatory politics are most prone to the resort to moral plaint, 
the entertainment ofSaturnalian separatism, and the exercise of force? If so, 
would the question then become not how these gestures are to be exorcised 
from feminism's political future, but how they might be rethought into 
tactical rather than foundational roles? Moreover, might these already 
represent tactics borne of persistence? 
In her later piece 'Feminism and Power', Yeatman provides an expanded 
account of the emancipatory subject's ressentimental assumption of victim 
identity, and so it is to this piece that we turn in order to unpack this aspect 
of her engagement with modern emancipatory politics.45 Here, Yeatman's 
task is to examine feminism's encounter with the liberal democratic state by 
way of a delineation of the manners in which feminism, among other 
emancipatory movements, have conceptualised power. Through such 
delineation, Yeatman will demonstrate the role an emancipatory movements' 
conception of power plays in shaping the kinds of claims it makes on, and the 
relationship it assumes with, the state. Noting from the outset that many 
salient forms of social change achieved by feminism have involved recourse 
to "the state's power of legitimate domination", Yeatman takes on a 
particular concern with what she sees as an unresolved tension between 
feminism's desire that the state paternalistically "protect" the personhood of 
45 Anna Yeatman, 'Feminism and Power,' in Reconstructing Political Theory: feminist 
perspectives, eds. Mary Lyndon Shanley and Uma Narayan (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1997), 144-157. 
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women, and its desire that the state democratically "respect" such 
personhood. 46 
As we will see, Yeatman draws a relationship between claims on 
paternalistic protection and negative conceptions of power which proceed 
from ressentiment, while claims on democratic respect are seen as issuing 
from a positive conception of "power as capacity".47 Hence, as we address 
what Yeatman sees as negative conceptions of power and the kinds of claim 
they animate, we shall gain a closer view of the aforementioned reduction of 
politics to moralism. Perhaps most importantly, we also will gain a more 
starkly articulated version of an idea which assumed a quieter presence in 
the piece addressed above: that ressentiment is to be regarded as a 
fundamentally undemocratic economy of affect. This piece is structured 
around a delineation of three conceptions of power: "coercion", "protection", 
and "capacity". Let us pursue this schema and address each conception in 
turn, with primary focus on the first. 
'Feminism and Power' continues the work of the first piece we addressed in 
establishing early on that emancipatory political movements run aground 
when they fail to assume a "positive relationship to a democratic politics" 
owing to a conviction that "the powerful have no interest in democratic 
process, but manipulate a pseudo-democratic process to serve their own ends 
of domination."48 However in this piece Yeatman deepens her objection to this 
rendering of the powerful by exploring its basis in what she sees as an 
unnecessarily narrow conception of their power as purely coercive. This 
reduction of power to undemocratic coercion, she argues, elides the positive, 
democratic form that state domination can assume: namely, a 
46•Feminism and Power,' 145. 
47Ibid., 145. 
48Ibid., 146. 
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"nonextractive" form which serves to enhance (rather than curtail or 
'extract') the powers and capacities of citizen-subjects.49 
Yeatman argues that emancipatory movements too often have neglected 
this aspect of state domination in favour of a conception of such domination 
as limited to "all the coercive and non-benign senses of "power over.""50 She 
argues that this narrow conception of power fosters the following political 
v1s1on: 
... the emancipatory movement sees itself as representing those who 
are dominated by some kind of ruling class: the bourgeoisie, the 
colonialists, men, etc. The focus for change thereby becomes this 
movement's efforts to throw off this relationship of domination and 
exploitation by a mix of various means: ideological contestation of this 
relationship, mobilisation of mass resistance, revolutionary struggle. 
Since power is equated with force, counter-power has to be a counter-
force. This being the case, the emancipatory movements including 
feminism tend to pursue an undemocratic and often non-political 
practice of counter-force ... [t]his is a politics which cannot discern 
within modern statist systems of domination the difference between 
the democratic and undemoctratic features of such systems.SI 
Yeatman then offers a battery of points to flesh out her subsequent 
alignment of this political vision with the "moral-political passion and world 
view of ressentiment".52 Before addressing a selection of these points let me 
note that this passage speaks to our interest in the range of political 
dispositions Yeatman interprets as ressentimental. Clearly, Yeatman is here 
49Here Yeatman is drawing on Paul Patton's exegesis of Hobbes' account of power in his 
article 'Foucault's Subjects of Power,' Political Theory Newsletter Vol. 6, No. 1 (1994): 64-
5 and refers also to Patton's 'Politics and the Concept of Power in Hobbes and 
Nietzsche,' in Nietzsche, Feminism, and Political Theory ed. Paul Patton (Sydney: Allen 
& Unwin, 1993), 144-161. It would seem that the form of power Yeatman refers to here 
belongs to the order of powers Foucault registers as 'productive' in operating through 
certain forms of regulation and discipline. However in the context Yeatman sets up this 
power is clean of the quite grim character it wears in Foucault. 
SO'Feminism and Power,' 145. 
51Ibid .. Emphasis in original. 
52Ibid., 147-8. 
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casting the many forms of leftist non-electoral political agitation grouped 
under banners such as socialism, anarchism, anti-colonialism and feminism 
as implicated in the politics of ressentiment. 
Yeatman argues that such a political vision closes itself off from a positive 
relationship to power not just in eliding the state's ability to 'enhance' the 
power of its citizen-subjects but, relatedly, in preempting any appreciation of 
the instructive "historical achievements in regard to self-government" that 
the powerful have made.53 Rather than ask "what [these] constructions of 
freedom of action may offer us now", those engaged in a politics of 
res sentiment 
. . . locate their resistance to their relatively powerless status in a 
hatred of those to whom they attribute all power, and, it follows, all 
evil ... [a]ll that is identified with the world of the powerful is rejected 
as participating in the oppressor's evil. Thus, feminism tends to 
identify all that is worldly with the evil of patriarchy, and thereby to 
reject all values-including reason, an individualised striving for 
excellence, heroism, dispassionate judgement, ambition-that are 
associated with the "triumphant self-affirmation" of the powerful 
class, men.54 
As we will see, in theorising the uses of power as 'capacity,' Yeatman will 
argue that the historically aristocratic form of active affirmation Nietzsche 
associates with the figure of the master is worthy of appropriation and may 
be approximated in liberal democratic settings when the state constitutes 
citizen-subjects as self-regulating persons. But for now let us note that the 
foil for the repudiation of the values and capacities of the powerful Yeatman 
53Ibid., 146. 
54Ibid., 147; 148. Yeatman draws the term "triumphant self-affirmation" from Nietzsche 
(GOM: I, 10). We might note here the confluence between Yeatman's argumentation and 
Tapper's association of ressentiment with a radical feminist rejection of the categories of 
traditional epistemology. Indeed, in this and the other piece we addressed Yeatman 
refers to the article by Tapper examined in the last chapter: 'Feminism and Power', 156, 
n.5; 'Voice and Representation,' 245. 
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describes above consists in the emancipatory movement's celebration of all 
that is associated with the oppressed. 
Perceiving in feminism the signature move of ressentiment, a move which 
Nietzsche describes as "a radical revaluation of [the] enemies' values", 
Yeatman writes:55 
... a feminism oriented by rancor and ressentiment casts women as 
good, men as evil. Such a feminism . . . accords value to the oppressed 
subject because it views the subject as beyond domination ... the 
confusion of power with domination means that the emancipatory 
movement ends up celebrating as virtues all those aspects of the 
identity of the oppressed which are associated with strategic self-
preservation in a condition of weakness: acuity of perception of the 
other's feelings; the masking of assertive and direct modes of 
leadership in those of indirect suggestion and persuasion; the assertion 
of power through goodness where this works to occlude the subject's 
interest in power and makes it appear that all they are doing is 
operating on behalf of the needs of others.56 
At this point we are positioned to register that, in Yeatman's telling, the 
politics of ressentiment proceeds in two stages. First, the power relationship 
this politics will contest is lent a Manichean character insofar as the political 
field is carved up into two, mutually antagonistic and homogenous groups: 
one victimises, the other is victimised. Second, this figuration of the political 
field is overlaid with a moral drama wherein the powerful-and 'power' itself-
is cast as 'evil' while the powerless, on account of their powerlessness, claim 
monopoly on the 'good.' Here lies ressentiment's substitution of politics for a 
pseudo-political and 'undemocratic' moralism. Yeatman suggests that these 
contestatory acts of interpretation betray an "interest in power", but that 
this interest necessarily is masked as altruism owing to the repudiation of 
55GOM: I, 7. 
56'Voice and Representation,' 148. 
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power and the assumption of a position which putatively is outside of and 
against power. 
To link this back to Yeatman's concern in the previous piece with 
feminism and the politics of difference, and keeping in mind Nietzsche's 
characterisation of ressentiment as that which "says No to what is "outside," 
what is "different," what is "not itself"', it is clear that a feminism which 
proceeds along the lines of ressentiment would act to suppress differences 
among women, especially where these differences betray the complexity of 
relations of power.57 To take a straightforward example: racism on the part 
of white women is either rendered illegible or is made legible as a practice 
implanted by the powerful, where both of these act to permit an eschew al of 
responsibility. 
We must note, however, that Yeatman does not portray engagement in 
the politics of ressentiment as a matter of calculated deliberation, although 
she does suggest that this politics can and must be rethought from the inside. 
Nor does she connect her diagnosis with an allegation that the relations of 
power from which ressentiment emerges are less dominative than a politics of 
ressentiment announces them to be, even as she would dispute ressentiment's 
subsequent equation of power with coercion as well as the idea that the 
dominated are to be understood as innocent of power. Rather, she notes: 
A politics of ressentiment is a politics which makes sense to a subject 
who is systematically brutalized and exploited by more powerful 
forces, and who proceeds to translate a reactive project of survival into 
the more generalized moral-political passion and world view of 
ressentiment. 58 
57GOM: I, 10. 
58'V oice and Representation,' 14 7. 
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Here, Yeatman is making a point very similar to Naomi Wolfs point 
encountered in Part 1: that ressentiment, or in Wolfs terms "victim 
feminism", can be understood as a first-base strategic response to conditions 
of inequality, exclusion and oppression. This suggests that politicised 
ressentiment be regarded as a form of emotional labour attendant upon such 
conditions. But this disturbs Yeatman's characterisation of ressentiment as 
'undemocratic' in raising the question as to what it means to interpret 
something which consistently emerges within a political regime as not of that 
regime. Insofar as democracy's necessary acts of particularism posit as 
constitutive its failure to fulfil the promises of universalism, its mode of 
perpetual deferral would seem to provide a potent condition of possibility for 
ressentiment. Read this way, the affective economy of ressentiment emerges 
not as foreign to democracy, but as first base on its never-quite-levelled 'level 
playing field'. It would seem, then, that there is a conflict between Yeatman's 
earlier emphasis upon democracy's necessary acts of particularism, and her 
subsequent distancing of ressentiment from democratic politics proper, as in 
her claim that ressentiment is an 'undemocratic' form of conduct. 
Before turning to the second conception of power-protection-let me 
make some foregrounding comments, again regarding the status of 'change' 
and 'no-change' in Yeatman's account. We have seen that, for Yeatman, the 
politics of ressentiment, in the form of antagonistic outsidership and armed 
with a conception of power as coercion, is at a stand-off with the state. It 
turns toward the state to voice critique, but turns away from the state to 
resist a despoiling dialogue (again reminiscent of Wolf, specifically her 
reference to the radical who 'tears down and turns away'59). Owing to a belief 
that the powerful are responsible for initiating and perpetuating the causes of 
the suffering it politicises, this politics wants to transcend their regime, but is 
59Wolf, Fire With Fire, 127. 
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blind to the possibility that in the case of the liberal democratic state a 
transcendence of present conditions can be achieved within the regime, 
through the participatory undertaking of reconstructive work. 
So a politics of ressentiment, from this angle, paints itself into a corner. In 
assuming victim identity it confirms its existing exclusion from political 
participation. All its efforts are directed toward maintaining malevolent 
distance from the powerful. However, we also have seen from some of 
Yeatman's comments that this politics does make a certain sort of claim on 
the state: it wreaks moral terror, alternates between moral appeal and 
blackmail, develops an inverted moral vernacular, and harbours an ambition 
for revolutionary upheaval. Can the revaluation of values and 'moral 
activism' involved here properly be registered as "not transformative" such 
that we might conclude, as Yeatman does, that "[a]ll that is permitted a 
feminism oriented by rancor is a separatist retreat from the world"?60 
When we address Brown's work in the following section (and if we recall 
the accounts of Cocks and Tapper in the last chapter) we will see that on her 
reading a politics of ressentiment attempts no less than to 'fashion a culture'61 
amenable to its distaste for violence, inequality, domination, and abuse, and 
which is reflective of its taste for security, formalised lines of redress, equal 
status, predictability and peace.62 For Brown, such fashioning is attempted 
most notably through recourse to the legal system and by turning to the 
state. This might account for Yeatman's quite different statement elsewhere 
regarding the political direction ressentiment pursues: 
60'Voice and Representation,' 148. 
61Here I am paraphrasing Brown, States of Injury, 44. 
62As I will indicate in Part 3, in Nietzschean terms such a culture would be a 'democratic' 
one. One of the central aspects of Nietzsche's genealogy ofressentiment-that democratic 
culture is an expression of ressentiment par excellence-is disregarded in Yeatman's 
characterisation of the politics of ressentiment as 'undemocratic.' 
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... these subjects interpret their powerlessness as moral virtue, and in 
casting their oppressors as evil, seek in some way to be rescued from 
this evil by someone more powerful than they. It is this paradox-that 
the powerful rescue the victims-which underwrites the vicious circle 
in which this kind of powerlessness and its politics are caught.63 
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Nietzsche refers to ressentiment's revaluative labours as an "imaginary 
revenge", but by this he does not mean that revenge is restricted to mental or 
insular enactment.64 So let us note provisionally that, at the least, a question 
mark hangs over the 'transformativeness' of ressentiment. As Gilles Deleuze 
puts it, it achieves a "triumph of the weak as weak": its identity, and that of 
its opponent, are preserved (no-change), but an attempt is made to fashion a 
culture in which its identity is valued over that of its opponent (change, in the 
form of inversion). 65 
Yeatman's statement regarding ressentiment's bid for rescue operates as a 
vignette for her subsequent distillation of the feminist conception of power as 
protection. However, in writing of this conception of power Yeatman does not 
refer directly to ressentiment, but rather to what, as have seen, are its salient 
symptoms: an implication in power and eschewal of responsibility masked as 
selfless benevolence, identification of women as good victims and men as bad 
aggressors, revaluation of non-agentic weakness as feminine goodness, 
paradoxical turn to a higher power for rescue/protection.66 
My assumption, then, is that Yeatman's account contains the suggestion 
that a ressentimental mode of valuation is at work in this conception of power. 
This suggestion perhaps does not appear as an explicit argument since, as we 
have seen, the politics of ressentiment has been represented as steadfastly 
63'Voice and Representation,' 147. 
64QOM: I, 10. 
65Qilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1983), 117. 
66'Voice and Representation,' 151. 
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refusing to work with the state, whereas Yeatman furnishes her account of 
this second conception of power with the example of the feminist turn to the 
state so as to secure its power to protect women against violence, sexual 
abuse and economic dependence within marriage. This is an important 
matter since, as will become clear, in her criticism of this particular turn to 
the state Yeatman actually is describing a second way in which a feminist 
politics of ressentiment preserves rather than transforms victim identity, 
where such preservation serves to perpetuate the power relationship this 
politics is contesting. This time, victim identity is not just the given identity 
to which the antagonistic outsider pledges abiding allegiance, it is the identity 
feminists attach to the women whose interests they represent and which 
they seek to have inscribed into law. As we work through this aspect of 
Yeatman's argument we will emerge with a clear view of her figuration of 
feminism beyond ressentiment be positioned to summarise her account and 
develop some questions in relation to it. 
Yeatman's overall concern with the conception of power as protection is 
that feminist arguments for state recognition of and intervention upon 
circumstances in which women are victimised by men-her particular 
example is spousal violence-have deleterious effects of their own. She 
argues that the moral adjudication often attending such arguments-in 
particular the equation of "women's victim status with goodness, and men's 
aggressor status with badness"-allows an assumption that men always 
already are endowed with "the power to rape and batter women'', and that 
women always already are vulnerable to this power.67 Yeatman notes that 
such reification of men's power and women's vulnerability can only give rise 
to paradox: 
67Ibid .. 
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... democratic state intervention into domestic violence is designed both 
to rescue and protect women from violent men, and to constitute the 
rights of women not to be battered or raped. Whether these rights can 
have any effectiveness under conditions where it is assumed that men 
already have such a primary power to abuse women is a moot point. 68 
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Here Yeatman is working with Sharon Marcus' argument, which we 
encountered in Chapter 2, that feminist politicisations of sexual violence too 
often have focused their efforts on harnessing the prohibitive and punitive 
power of the state so as to dissuade men from practising sexual violence, a 
strategy which has the effect of leaving the decision in men's hands and 
officially inscribing-· thereby naturalising-men as capable of sexual 
violence and women as vulnerable to it.69 
Marcus argues instead for a feminist anti-rape strategy which would 
avoid such reflection of the existing grammar of the rape script. This strategy 
would overturn this script's construction of women as violable property in 
favour of an appropriation of a capitalist-contractualist language of property 
in the person.70 Noting that intraracial subject-subject violence among men 
takes the form of a "gentleman's agreement" which figures the participants 
as involved in a "contractual exchange of aggression", Marcus argues that 
women can disrupt the exclusion of rape from this economy-the relegation 
of rape to subject-object violence-through developing their capacities for 
subject-subject violence, situating themselves as subjects who own, control, 
and are capable of violently defending the property in their persons.71 In 
agreement with the general direction of Marcus' argument, Yeatman holds 
that feminist treatments of domestic violence have tended to reinscribe 
68Ibid .. 
69Sharon Marcus, 'Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words: a theory and practice of rape 
prevention,' in Feminists Theorise the Political, eds., Judith Butler and Joan Scott (New 
York: Routledge, 1992), 385-403. 
70Jbid., 397. 
71Jbid., 396-7. 
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women as "innocent victims" who "lie outside power and [are] powerless", 
where such reinscription works against the positive constitution of women as 
capable, powerful, self-governing agents.72 
Yeatman brings to these matters a concern with the terms on which 
women have and might be admitted to the status of rights-bearing persons. 
Whereas traditional liberal discourse figures the state as that agency which 
recognises men's status as naturally rights bearing, "women's accession to 
the rights of the modern individual is understood to have followed from the 
state's conferral of these rights."73 Yeatman notes further: 
Liberalism interprets state intervention on behalf of women's rights as 
the legitimate extension of state protection to a vulnerable group. This 
being the case, women's rights-bearing status may be a qualified one, 
namely one that exists only to the extent that it is reconcilable with 
the idea of state-sponsored patriarchal protection of women.74 
For Yeatman, feminist employment of the state's power to protect women 
ratifies this general backdrop of democratic paternalism.75 Protectionist 
feminism, she argues, is underpinned by an assumption that "those who are 
weak become powerful only as they are "empowered" by the strong arm of 
the state."76 Hence protectionist feminism emerges in her account as 
72•Voice and Representation,' 151. Here Yeatman refers specifically to 1970s Australian 
feminist arguments for the commitment of public monies to the provision of emergency 
accomodation for women and their children upon separation from a violent spouse, and 
for the establishment of the Sole Supporting Parent Benefit. 
73Jbid., 149. My emphasis. 
74Ibid .. 
751t is worth noting here that we may dispute the gendered metaphorics of Yeatman's 
argument since New Right and neoliberal discourses tends to characterise the 
Keynesian state as the 'nanny state'-a maternally protective figure who, in 
safeguarding the welfare of the citizenry, keeps it in a state of childlike dependence. 
According to this metaphor, self-governance-a competitive risk-taking enterprise-is 
construed as a form of mature masculinity. For an analysis of neoliberal discourses of 
welfare dependency see Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon, 'Decoding "Dependency": 
inscriptions of power in a keyword of the US welfare state,' in Reconstructing Political 
Theory: feminist perspectives, eds. Mary Lyndon Shanley and Uma Narayan (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1997), 25-4 7. 
76Jbid., 151. 
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problematic in its willingness to risk "reproduc[ing] the relationship of 
tutelage between powerful protector and those who, being powerless, are seen 
to need help", and in contributing to the continued exclusion of women from 
equal status with men within the category of 'rights-bearing, self-governing, 
agentic individual.'77 
That Yeatman endorses the third conception of power her article 
addresses, 'capacity,' should by now be clear. This is the conception of power 
which might dislodge feminism from its ressentimental moorings, countering 
its refusal to assume a positive relation to power and its "separatist 
orientation to the virtue of women."78 With this conception of power, 
Yeatman's earlier invocation of the characteristics particular to Nietzsche's 
'master'-autarky, active agency, self-affirmation, self-legislation-come into 
play. Of course, in Nietzschean terms the power of this figure precisely is not 
universalisable: it can be what it is because it is beyond rule, no claim can be 
made on its bearer, and democratic-statist ways of life spell its fate.79 
However, as noted earlier, Yeatman suggests that the defining 
characteristics of such mastery might be approximated when the liberal 
democratic state acts to constitute its citizen-subjects as self-regulating 
persons, employing legitimate domination in non-extractive form so as to 
underwrite their exercise of agency and right, to enable their constitution as 
origins of power. 
As we will see in the following section, there are grounds on which we may 
doubt that the forms of legislation Yeatman calls up to evince this process 
77Ibid., 151; 152. 
78Ibid., 153. 
79For an excellent characterisation of the power of Nietzsche's master and its relation to 
democratic values see Yirmiyahu Yovel, 'Nietzsche, the Jews, and Ressentiment' in 
Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: essays on Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals, ed. Richard 
Schacht (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 214-236. This element of 
Nietzsche's account will be addressed in Part 3. 
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actually represent a break with protectionism, but for the moment let us 
register that Yeatman counsels a move toward a "feminist counter-discourse 
of women as subjects of power" which treats women as "capable of 
[developing and] exercising the full range of agentic capacities", and which 
beckons a democratic state which "respects, not simply protects, the rights of 
women". so This counter-discourse may be understood as a poststructuralist 
reconstruction of the liberal feminist tradition, with the line of feminist 
questioning shifting from primary anchorage in concern for the hitherto 
masculinist character of established democratic freedoms toward a future-
oriented mode of examining and experimenting with the forms of self-
legislating subjectivity such freedoms have and might yet bring into being.SI 
The key here, in fact, consists precisely in futurity: as against ressentiment's 
advance prohibition of change on account of deep investment in the 
preservation of victim identity, what might be termed its calcification of 
interest and identity, this feminism cultivates an openness to future self-
making, to what women might become.82 Let us register, however, that this 
kind of feminist project is presented by Yeatman not just as a timely 
reshaping of feminism's affective drives and political imagination, but also a 
force of circumstance. It is no accident that this would be a neoliberal 
feminism which envisages a deregulated individual whose proclivities might 
weather those of neoliberal government: the de-unionised, managerialist 
workplace and a 'less is more' welfare state, inter alia. 
SO'Voice and Representation,' 154. 
81Ibid., 152. Here, Yeatman might be aligned with the general tenor of recent responses to 
Carole Pateman's The Sexual Contract (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988) which 
problematise Pateman's account on the grounds that it represents women's 
subordination in liberal democratic societies as a fait accompli. Cf. Moira Gatens, 
'Contracting Sex: essence, genealogy, desire,' Imaginary Bodies: ethics, power and 
corporeality (New York: Routledge, 1996), 76-91; and Barbara Sullivan's summary of 
this critique in her chapter 'Carole Pateman: participatory democracy and feminism,' in 
Liberal Democracy and its Critics, eds., April Carter and Geoffrey Stokes (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1998), 188-191. 
82Cf. Gatens, Imaginary Bodies, 77-91. 
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Yeatman notes that such a subject is interpellated by contemporary 
legislation which attaches rights "neither to property nor to protection but to 
personhood", naming "anti-discrimination, affirmative action and equal 
employment types of legislation" as her examples.83 However, it is also the 
case that such interpellation works through the political economy of 
neoliberalism as it forges what Yeatman refers to as an "environment shaped 
by contemporary values of self-regulation", especially with regard to labour 
relations and welfare provision. 84 In this regard, Yeatman ventures a glimpse 
of the political agency this feminism beyond ressentiment might assume in 
contemporary settings. Warning against ressentimental nostalgia for previous 
incarnations of labour and welfare arrangements-indeed, there is a sense in 
which Yeatman issues a general warning against ressentiment's antagonistic 
'against'-Y eatman emphasises the effectivity of a feminism which can work, 
critically but (re)constructively, within the terms set by the established 
order.85 Something of an example of such work is provided in Yeatman's 
discussion of the emergent "equal opportunity approach to income support" 
in the contemporary policy arena, an approach which "withdraws 
paternalistic support from women" and "requires [that] women on welfare 
participate in labor market programs whether they are mothers of small 
children or not." 86 
I suspect that Yeatman is pointing to a dilemma here. On one hand, such 
'equal opportunity' can be justified as an adequate response to feminist 
demands that women be regarded as worthy of self-reliance. On the other 
83'V oice and Representation,' 154. 
84Jbid., 155. For an account of neoliberalism which is tailored to feminist concerns 
specifically see the subsection entitled 'Cultural Management Under Neoliberalism' in 
Chapter 3 of Rosemary Hennessey, Profit and Pleasure: sexual identities in late 
capitalism (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 74-84. 
85'Voice and Representation,' 155. 
86•Feminism and Power,' 155. 
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hand, such a policy is likely to further entrench, then obscure, existing 
unfairness when implemented in a context riven with gendered inequalities 
such as inadequate provision of childcare and the feminisation of poverty and 
low-paid wage labour. Rather than arguing that the clock be turned back so 
that women on welfare are reinscribed as financially dependent upon 
"individual patriarchs or the state as a corporate patriarch", Yeatman 
advises that feminists should "work with rather than against the self-
regulatory features of this situation."87 She notes that this kind of work would 
involve, among other things, arguing that "the employment contract become 
more adequately contractual" through the elimination of employer 
prerogative (so that, for example, women are positioned to negotiate 
effectively the terms of prospective employment).88 Having tabled this 
example let us summarise the trajectory Yeatman's writings have enabled us 
to pursue and pose some questions in relation to it. 
As we have seen, Yeatman makes several criticisms of ressentiment in its 
feminist incarnation: its essentially Manichean reading of power relations 
brings forth a moralism which confirms and preserves individual and 
collective victim identity, furnishing feminism with a false universal and 
87Jbid., 155. 
88Jbid .. It must be noted here that the introduction of individual employment contracts 
and enterprise bargaining in the Australian context (as per the Howard government's 
Workplace Relations Act, 1996) was designed precisely to increase employer prerogative 
rather than provide a platform on which the argument that it be eliminated could be 
made (which is not to deny the possibility of the latter but rather to register its very real 
preemption). Most notably, the Act created a means through which the power of the 
Australian union movement, in particular the Maratime Union Association (MUA), could 
be countered with impunity (thus the tremendous levels of organised protest on the 
wake of the Act, especially the MUA versus Patrick Stevedores dispute between January 
and September, 1998). On this reading, the Act worked to substantiate employer 
prerogative, in part to ensure Australian openness to the free flow of international trade. 
Put in context, the goal Yeatman tables here-to eliminate employer prerogative-
actually is an enormous, indeed revolutionary one. Although the current revitalisation of 
politicised anti-capitalism would have to be registered as ressentimental ifread along the 
lines set up in her writings, the elimination of employer prerogative is one of its central 
goals, particularly as regards the many thousands of women working in Free Trade 
Zones in Taiwan, Korea, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and the Phillipines, and the 
maquiladoras of Central and Latin America. 
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delimiting future femaleness in advance; its attendant antagonism and 
revaluative effort translates as political impotence or else plays to 
democratic paternalism; it recasts democratic politics as moralism or else 
economism, refusing the process of contestation liberal democracy allows: 
'politics.' Having moved through these criticisms, we arrived at Yeatman's 
tentative figuration of feminist politics beyond ressentiment: a form of politics 
which makes a promising shift from 'being' to 'becoming' through openness to 
the possibilities attendant upon the conception of power as capacity. 
But let me suggest, in cautionary mode, that we might also track this 
movement in the following way: the agentic capacities and possible identities 
of the subjects of feminism have broadened in the same measure that the 
agentic capacities and possible identities of feminist politics have narrowed. 
The subjects of feminism, finally dislodged from the twin mires of goodness 
and sameness, are positively constituted as potential subjects rather than 
objects of fear, as bargaining subjects rather than bargained objects, as 
many and changing rather than ultimately the same. Simultaneously, 
however, feminist politics is reigned into what may be regarded as an 
essentially conciliatory posture within the established order, its field of 
movement and vision delimited by the liberal democratic nation state and the 
category of citizenship. 
While the significance of this field and category is not to be 
underestimated-I would not suggest they should or could be disregarded-
this does raise the question as to whether we can have the former without 
being limited to the latter, and the further question as to what prior set of 
political decisions is underpinning the baseline level of support for the 
established liberal democratic order, and its unmentioned marriage with 
RESSENT!MENT, IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE 255 
capitalist economic arrangements, offered here. 89 To employ the language of 
existentialism, it would seem that feminism here risks an exchange of one act 
of bad faith for another: the possibility of authenticity is returned to feminist 
representations of women while feminist dealings with current politico-
economic arrangements court Fukuyamaesque inauthenticity.90 Is it that 
feminism, as an affinity-based collectivity of politicised agents, is to advocate 
for the individual exercise of power as capacity but pose particular advance 
constraints on its own exercise of such power? Moreover, is it that feminist 
conceptions of power as capacity are to be based on an existing, statist 
imagining of this power, such that the self-regulating subject of 
neoliberalism-whose self-regulation, we must be reminded, is an effect of a 
specific mode of state regulation, a conducted conduct9l_emerges as a 
workable trade for Nietzsche's self-legislating subject of mastery? 
In view of these matters we might conclude that Y eatman's emphasis 
upon the general conception of power as capacity as a break from 
ressentimental conceptions of power is highly convincing, but that the 
particular conception of such power called up threatens to undercut this 
general valence in being closely tied to a curtailment of feminism's political 
possibilities and an insufficiently critical embrace of a distinctly neoliberal 
rationality of government. Indeed, this particular conception of power as 
capacity would seem to exhibit traces of what Brown, to whom we now turn, 
89For an account of the process through which radical democratic theory works to sunder, 
at the level of theory, the liberal democratic nation state from capitalist political 
economy see Hennessey Profit and Pleasure, 209-28. 
90 According to Sartre, his concept of bad faith is kindred with Nietzsche's concept of 
ressentiment. See Sartre's discussion of 'the Not' and the man of resentment, Being and 
Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (London: Methuen, 1969), 47-8. By the term 
'Fukuyamaesque' I refer of course to Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the 
Last Man (New York: The Free Press, 1992). 
91For an exacting account of the discourse of self-regulation in the Australian context as 
per the case of the 'unemployed citizen' see Mitchell Dean, 'Administering Asceticism: 
reworking the ethical life of the unemployed citizen,' in Governing Australia: studies in 
contemporary rationalities of government, eds. Mitchell Dean and Barry Hindess 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 87-107. 
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calls an "attachment to unfreedom": an ostensibly emancipatory gesture 
which risks resubordination in ceding political freedom to the state.92 
Moreover, as we will see, Brown's analysis gives reason to suspect that the 
discourse of self-regulation to which Yeatman refers fosters not power as 
capacity but ressentiment when it prevails in a context marked by the 
combined dominative workings of liberalism, capitalism and disciplinarity: 
that is, a context in which self-regulation forms the "assumed nature" of the 
liberal citizen-subject who simultaneously and unavowedly is regulated by 
and dependent upon forces which increasingly are beyond their control.93 
As we work through Brown's account of the relationship between 
ressentiment, feminism and identity politics we will find a number of 
commonalities with Yeatman's work, most notably a concern with power 
conceived as protection and a characterisation of moral plaint as 
'undemocratic.' Significantly for our purposes, however, we also will find that 
the two political directions which in Yeatman's analyses are situated as 
paths beyond ressentiment-the quest for inclusive reconstruction provoked 
by failed universalism, and state constitution of citizen-subjects as self-
regulating-are regarded by Brown as precipitous of ressentiment. Ultimately, 
this adds up to a very different vision of the relation between the politics of 
emancipation, ressentiment and liberal democracy to that presented in 
Yeatman's analyses. 
4.2 Brown: ressentiment within and without democracy 
Across two consecutive chapters in her book States of Injury, Wendy Brown 
uses the conception of ressentiment as a diagnostic tool as she investigates, in 
the first of these chapters, the terms on which modernist feminist thought 
92Brown, States of Injury, xii. 
93Jbid., 67. 
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opposes postmodernism and, in the second of these chapters, the production 
and direction of political desire in the case of "the dominant political 
expression of the age: identity politics."94 Both of these chapters will be 
examined in this section and, as we will see, the second chapter's reading of 
the relation between emancipatory politics, ressentiment and liberal 
democracy cuts decidedly new ground when compared with the accounts of 
feminist ressentiment examined so far. 
We have seen in this chapter and the last that each theorist of feminist 
ressentiment has noted but not developed the idea that ressentimental political 
expression is an effect of and a reaction to domination. In Cocks' terms, 
political contestation of domination always is "in danger of succumbing to 
ressentiment"; in Tapper's terms, feminist ressentiment is "quite unsurpris[ing] 
given [women's] oppression throughout history"; in Yeatman's terms, 
ressentiment "makes sense to a subject who is systematically brutalised".95 
Brown's analysis develops these ideas in providing an account of the specific 
manner in which ressentiment is "incited" through the paradoxical workings of 
prevailing forces within contemporary liberal democratic contexts: namely 
liberal universalism and individualism, disciplinary-regulatory power, and 
advanced capitalism.96 Hence, with Brown's work, we travel from a relatively 
under-articulated notion that emancipatory politics may be regarded as 
'prone' to ressentiment to a deftly crafted vision of the historically specific 
manner in which the very desire of contemporary emancipatory political 
subjects, and liberal citizen-subjects more generally, is produced as 
ressentiment. 
94Brown, States of Injury, 74. 
95Cocks, 'Augustine, Nietzsche, and Contemporary Body Politics,' 155; Tapper, 
'Ressentiment and Power,' 135; Yeatman, 'Feminism and Power,' 147. 
96Jt should be noted that Brown's work is concerned with the United States in particular 
(thus the triple connotation of the term "states" in the book's title: that nation, the 
ensemble of governmental institutions, a psychic disposition). 
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Most immediately, this aspect of Brown's account has consequences for 
this chapter in contrasting sharply with the treatment of liberal democracy 
in Yeatman's account of ressentimental politics. As the exposition of Brown 
unfolds I will illuminate this contrast so as to delineate the ultimately 
different understandings of ressentiment as 'undemocratic' which may be 
drawn from these theorists. More generally, however, this aspect of Brown's 
account provides something of a springboard for the investigation of 
ressentiment in the dissertation's third part. We turn now to a consideration of 
Brown's chapter 'Postmodern Exposures, Feminist Hesitations', before 
moving on to the chapter 'Wounded Attachments'. 
The central argument of the first chapter under consideration is that 
modernist feminism's rejection of the discourse of postmodernism may in fact 
be regarded as a ressentimental reaction to the condition of postmodernity. 
Brown registers as a "political move" the extent to which postmodernism's 
feminist antagonists neglect the distinction between "postmodern conditions 
and theory, between epoch and politics", and so preempt appreciation of the 
idea that "the "postmodern turn" in political/feminist theory represents, at its 
best, an attempt to articulate and engage the characteristic powers of our 
age". 97 That is, for Brown, feminist antagonism toward postmodernism 
betrays "a desire to kill the messenger".98 In tune with the overarching 
project of her book-to investigate the production and direction of 
emancipatory political desire-Brown's task in this chapter is to delineate 
and diagnose this desire. 
In providing a sketch of characteristically postmodern conditions, Brown 
refers to the proliferation of technical reason, a pervasive sense of temporal 
and spatial disorientation, and the prevalence of reactionary foundationalism 
97 States of Injury, 32; 33. 
98Jbid., 33. 
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as a "coping strategy for our "lost" condition of postmodernity".99 Brown also 
refers to the latter as a "fundamentalism" evident not just on the right but on 
the left of the political spectrum. Such fundamentalism, she argues, functions 
through "moral utilitarianism, presenting and legitimating itself as the 
indispensable threads [sic] preserving some indisputable good, for example, 
Western civilisation, the AmeriCan way of life, feminism, or left politics."100 
Brown will go on to identify this strategy with the responses to 
postmodernism on the part of those attempting scientific consolidation of a 
feminist standpoint or 'women's point of view,' most notably Nancy Hartsock 
and Catharine MacKinnon, and with the politico-epistemological disposition of 
modernist feminism more generally.101 
Hartsock is joined by a great many feminists in contending that the 
discourse of postmodernism is depoliticising in its deconstruction of the 
epistemological technology emancipatory knowledge-making requires if it is to 
be politically effective: a sturdy if revised conception of the knowing subject, 
the esteem of truth, a clear-sighted account of real social relations, the 
objective capacity to discover norms.102 As part of her argument that to 
position postmodernism as the sole deconstructing agent in this configuration 
is to obscure its responsiveness to postmodernity, Brown mounts particular 
objection to the fact that this contention is offered in the name of realpolitik. 
She argues, to the contrary, that "feminist wariness about postmodernism 
may ultimately be coterminous with a wariness about politics", and goes on 
99Jbid., 35. 
lOOJbid., 36. 
101Jbid., 36-7. 
102A similar line of argument is presented by Alison Assiter in her critique of feminist 
postmodemism, Enlightened Women: modernist feminism in a postmodern age (New York: 
Routledge, 1996). For a range of perspectives on the conjunction of feminism and 
postmodernism see Linda Nicholson, ed., Feminism I Postmodernism (New York: 
Routledge, 1990) and Seyla Benhabib, Judith Butler, Drucilla Cornell and Nancy 
Fraser, Feminist Contentions: a philosophical exchange (New York: Routledge, 1995). 
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to show how "feminist panic" in the face of postmodern deconstruction of the 
subject, truth and normativity is less an assault on feminism's political 
health than it is an intervention upon what she terms feminism's "well of 
truth".103 By this term Brown is referring to modernist feminist investment 
in a conception of the oppressed subject as positioned to provide an account 
of the world and of power which has greater truth value in being undistorted 
by interest in power, an investment which operates most clearly in the use of 
consciousness-raising as a method for generating an account of the world 
from 'women's point of view.'104 Brown refers to consciousness-raising as 
"feminism's epistemologically positivist moment": the feelings, experiences 
and perspectives attested to in consciousness-raising are treated as the 
truths which, in their immunity to hermeneutics, can provide feminist 
knowledge with a solid foundation, even where this procedure is accompanied 
by the conflicting doctrine of strong social constructionism which apprehends 
women as "socially constructed to the core".105 
In a move which recalls the division set up between politics and morality 
in the analyses of Cocks and Yeatman, Brown identifies this epistemological 
procedure as an evasion of politics in favour of morality, a denial of 
situatedness within and interest in power in favour of claiming exclusive 
custodianship of Truth and "singular purchase on "the good.""106 In making 
her argument that "much North Atlantic feminism partakes deeply of both 
103Jbid., 37; 39; 40. 
104See especially Catharine MacKinnon's account of the methodological centrality of 
consciousness-raising for feminist theory in Chapter 5 of her Toward a Feminist Theory 
of the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 83-105. 
105States of Injury, 42. In making this point, Brown refers specifically to MacKinnon: 
"Consider Catharine MacKinnon's insistence that women are entirely the products of 
men's construction and her ontologically contradictory project of developing a 
jurisprudence based on "an account of the world from women's point of view." 41. Here, 
Brown cites the following from MacKinnon: Feminism Unmodified: discourses on life and 
law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), 48-50. 
106States of Injury, 47. Brown provides an expanded account of the division between 
politics and morality in Chapter 2 of her most recent book Politics Out of History 
(Princeton University Press, 2001), 18-44. 
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the epistemological spirit and political structure of ressentiment", Brown 
demonstrates how this epistemological procedure follows that which 
Nietzsche associates with ressentiment: a procedure which lodges Truth "on 
the side of the damned or the excluded" such that it is cast as "always clean 
of power, but therefore also always positioned to reproach power."107 As she 
explains: 
In Nietzsche's account ... [r]ather than a codification of domination, 
moral ideas are a critique of a certain kind of power, a complaint 
against strength, an effort to shame and discredit domination by 
securing the ground of the true and the good from which to 
(negatively) judge it.108 
In offering the conclusion that "[p]ostmodernity unsettles feminism because 
it erodes the moral ground that the subject, truth and normativity coproduce 
in modernity", Brown poses the question as to whether feminism can develop 
a "politics without ressentiment", whether it can prevail without that "moral 
apparatus" which preoccupies its host "with discerning and discrediting the 
nature of what it seeks to undercut", and proceed instead on "the strength of 
an alternative vision of collective life" .109 
Figuring postmodernity as an "opportunity to radically sever the problem 
of the good from the problem of the true", Brown urges feminists beyond 
preoccupation with developing a science of woman, with "assumptions or 
arguments about "who we are"", and toward an exercise of "political 
judgement" centred on ""what we want"".110 There is a sense in which Brown 
already has answered her question regarding whether feminism can develop a 
politics beyond ressentiment, not just in providing a glimpse of what such a 
101States of Injury, 46. 
108Jbid., 44-5. For Brown's account of Nietzsche's genealogy of morals and concept of 
ressentiment see Ibid., 43-45. 
109Jbid., 48; 47; 44; 47. 
llOJbid., 49. 
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feminism would focus on, but in positioning poststructuralist feminism as the 
politico-philosophical starting point for such a politics. Indeed, one respondent 
to Brown's argument reads it as heralding, as though at long last, the creation 
of a Nietzschean feminism, a "feminism beyond good and evil" which takes its 
bearing in "a postmodernist critique of truth."111 However, for reasons to be 
spelled out shortly, there are grounds for reading Brown as cautious on this 
point. First let us address more closely the specific recommendations Brown 
does make for shifting feminism from the ground of res sentiment. 
Brown makes it clear that her book is not geared toward providing 
blueprints for political action: with a clear-sighted view of the role of political 
theory, she figures the task of the book as one of offering diagnoses of political 
tendencies as grounds for their contestation such that they will not 
"metamorphose unchecked into political expression".112 However in this 
chapter and in the next one we will address, Brown does provide some specific 
insights into the task of shifting feminism from the ground of ressentiment. 
Noting that resistance politics, however vital, is insufficient in being empty 
of vision and direction, she turns to two themes: space and speech.113 Of 
course, both of these factors are central to the practice of consciousness-
raising, but in Brown's recasting of them space is dislodged from its 
connotation of privacy and speech is unmoored from its basis in self-identity 
and confessional locution. Referring to the acute paucity of political space 
especially since the decline of movement politics, Brown tables the task of 
"developing feminist postmodern political spaces" which can house collective 
lllMaudmarie Clark, 'Nietzsche's Misogyny,' International Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 26, 
No. 3 (1994): 12, n. 9. Clark notes that postmodernism is but one direction that such a 
feminism might pursue. Clark's article was published prior to Brown's publication of 
States of Injury: Clarke refers to the version of Brown's 'Postmodern Exposures, Feminist 
Hesitations' which appeared as a journal article in differences 3.1(Spring1991): 63-84. 
l l2States of Injury, xiii. 
113Jbid., 49. 
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conversation about "the nature of "the good" for women" and in which "the 
skills and practices ofpostmodernjudgement" might be cultivated.114 
Brown's treatment of speech clearly is reminiscent of Yeatman's 
distinction between moral plaint and the cadence she associates with the 
emancipatory subject's properly ethico-political articulation of the wrong. To 
this extent, Brown and Yeatman are in accord in respect to their figurations 
of ressentimental politics as undemocratic. In turning to matter of speech and 
speaking positions to convey a sense of non-ressentimental political locution, 
Brown refers to a shift which might be made from identity-based speech 
focused on the self ("who I am") and toward "postidentity", "public" speech 
turned toward the world and the common ("what I want for us").115 This 
latter locutory mode, which Brown also refers to as "political argument", 
moves beyond moral reproach in dispensing with the defensiveness of 
identity-based speech in being relatively impersonal, contestable, and 
accountable. As in Yeatman's account, the latter carries the connotation of 
being properly democratic while ressentimental moral plaint implicitly is 
rendered undemocratic.116 Having tabled these insights, let us return to the 
question of the role of poststructuralist feminism in moving feminism beyond 
res sentiment. 
114Ibid., 49; 50. Emphasis in original. 
l 15Jbid., 51. 
116These associations reach explicit argument in Brown's most recent book Politics Out of 
History. She writes: "Moralism ... is animated by a tacitly antidemocratic sentiment: it 
does not want to talk or argue but rather seeks to abort conversation with its 
prohibition and reproaches.", 38. In that text, Brown revises her treatment of the 
distinction between politics and morality in States of Injury. Specifically, she 
distinguishes 'morality' from 'moralism': by "paying closer attention to the difference 
between a galvanizing moral vision and a reproachful moralizing sensibility" Brown 
singles out moralising as "a kind of posture or pose taken up in the ruins of morality by 
its faithful adherents; it is thus at once a "fall" from morality, a "reversal" of morality, 
and an impoverished substitute for, or reaction to, the evisceration of sustaining moral 
vision." Politics Out of History, 23. 
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Brown undertakes a critical engagement with the work of Catharine 
MacKinnon in a later chapter of States of Injury.II? On my interpretation, 
this engagement with MacKinnon contains the counter-intuitive suggestion 
that, in order to wield political weight, feminism may require some form of 
recourse to the strategy of ressentiment, the effectivity of moral reproach, 
that "weapon" which Brown explicitly has associated with MacKinnon's 
politics in the chapter we have addressed.IIS 
As we have seen, Brown argues that feminists needs to come to grips with 
the condition of postmodernity rather than entertain one of its most 
prominent symptoms, the fetishistic modernism of reactionary 
foundationalism. However, during her engagement with MacKinnon, Brown 
characterises contemporary judicial and governmental power as "formally 
dominated by a modernist political idiom".II9 This suggests that even as we 
are immersed in postmodernity, official politics-its logics, categories, 
procedures, and so forth-itself is still 'modern.' This has consequences for 
how we are to understand the relationship between feminism, state power 
and the imperative to overcome ressentiment: or, more specifically, it raises 
the question as to how or whether a feminism without ressentiment would 
approach state power. 
On my reading, this matter is linked to the doubt Brown expresses in the 
course of her engagement with MacKinnon regarding poststructuralist 
feminism's political purchase: 
Can a radical postfoundationalist feminist political discourse about 
women, sexuality, and the law-with its necessary partial logics and 
II? states of Injury, 77-95. 
I I 8Ibid., 44. 
I I9Ibid., 79. At another point in her book, Brown characterises the US state as "both 
modern and postmodern" (Ibid., 17 4) but this complements rather than contradicts the 
representation of judicial and governmental power currently under consideration since 
the "modernism" of the state would seem to consist precisely in "formal domination". 
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provisional truths, situated knowledges, fluid subjects, and decentred 
sovereignty-work to claim power, or to contest hegemonic power, to 
the degree that MacKinnon's discourse does? Or do the commitments 
of postfoundationalist feminist analysis condemn it to a certain 
political marginalisation, to permanent gadfly status, to a 
philosopher's self-consolation that she is on the side of "truth" rather 
than power?120 
265 
This reversal of the truth/power configuration as it appears in the chapter we 
have addressed sees postfoundationalist feminism associated with "truth" as 
distinct from Truth, and replaced by MacKinnon's modernist feminism in 
association with power. This 'power' stems from the fact that MacKinnon's 
feminism-its self-certainty, jurisprudential acumen, mass translatability 
and moral gravity-speaks the modernist state's language (even as the anti-
pornography campaign she mounted with Andrea Dworkin was largely 
unsuccessful in achieving its stated aims). Brown's argument for a feminism 
without ressentiment is in part an argument for reclaiming feminism's political 
freedom from those who would trade it for partnership with the state's 
punitive, protective and regulatory powers: what Brown calls "uncritical 
statism".121 However this raises the question as to how such a feminism 
might spend its freedom, and whether non-statism or critical statism can 
bring about substantive political change and access that level of effectivity or 
'power' Brown associates with MacKinnon's ressentimental politics. 
At the least, the questions raised here suggest that Brown does not posit 
postfoundationalism/poststructuralism/postmodernism as natural sources of 
political health or effectivity for feminism-as 'messengers' they may enable 
us to see some things more clearly, but that in itself is no guarantee of 
success. At most, it prompts us to consider whether a feminism beyond the 
form of ressentiment Brown describes should not jettison but strategically 
lZOJbid., 79. 
121Ibid., 26. 
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recast or emulate the moral force of ressentiment, where this force is 
understood as a potent source of official political efficacy. I have in mind here, 
for example, the practical considerations involved in negotiating policy-
making environments, and the sorts of rhetorical and methodological 
strategies such environments demand of those who wish to negotiate them 
effectively. To make a convincing argument that a policy needs to change or 
be developed such that the state is made to 'recognise' the 'interests' of a 
particular sector of the population, modernist social-scientific method, both 
quantitative and qualitative, must be deployed. 
To take but one example, recent (and successful) arguments for state 
provision of twelve weeks paid parental leave in the New Zealand context 
relied heavily on three decades worth of data which demonstrated clearly that 
women's labour force participation rates tended to decline sharply upon the 
birth of their first child (adversely affecting earning-capacity and career 
trajectory over the life course), and on an interpretation of this data which 
situated New Zealand women as 'victims' of a discriminatory employment 
culture.122 That is, the argument was persuasive in part because it 'spoke 
the modernist state's language' in providing 'scientifically sound' back up and 
deploying a cause-and-effect logic through which a form of 'morally 
reprehensible victimisation,' construed as an abrogation of entitlement, could 
be proven to exist. 
122Arguments for this policy, public debate about it, and the policy itself also referred to 
men/fathers: either parent can sign up for paid leave (but not both). Indeed, the 
inclusion of men/fathers was an important factor in the public popularity of the policy, 
perhaps on account of the contemporary salience of father's rights discourse no less than 
substantial shifts in men's participation in parenting. However, women formed the 
primary focus throughout, and statistics regarding women's labour force participation 
played a central role, such that it could be argued that the subject of the policy is 
implicitly female. It should be noted further that the policy was devised by a core group 
of feminists of the electoral left Alliance Party which at the time stood in coalition 
government with New Zealand Labour. This formed part of a context wherein 
parliament housed unprecendented numbers of female representatives (34%) and in 
which women occupied most key government positions, from Prime Minister (Helen 
Clark) and Opposition Leader (Jenny Shipley) through to Governor General (Dame 
Sylvia Cartwright). 
I j 
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This manoeuvre is far from satisfying Brown's goal to develop a "vital 
politics of freedom" which contests rather than corroborates existing forms of 
unfreedom (most notably, in this case, the compulsion to engage paid 
employment), but the passage from Brown's engagement with MacKinnon 
that I have cited raises the question as to whether feminism can afford to 
dispense with such a manoeuvre, and the modernist entanglements it entails, 
if it is to avoid auto-marginalisation and make effective, if profoundly 
incremental, improvements to the material conditions of women's lives in the 
present. In the context of Brown's chapter, a reform such as the one I have 
discussed reads as an effect of ressentiment, not just in its deployment of 
distinctively modernist knowledge-making (the world of work from 'women's 
point of view') but in turning to the state as a "neutral arbiter of injury rather 
than as ... invested with the power to injure", especially where this turn is 
understood as an end in itself, as feminism's final political horizon.123 
Contrastingly, in the context of Yeatman's work, this reform's non-
protectionist and pro-entitlement language, as well as its determination to 
work positively with the state to recast, however minimally, the category 
'worker,' reads as a break with the politics of ressentiment. 
This contrast lends the impression that between Yeatman and Brown (as 
with Cocks and Tapper) there are in fact two distinctly different feminist 
political postures-respectively, antagonistic outsidership which preempts 
non-protectionist, participatory reformism, and reformism construed as 
political end-being diagnosed as ressentimental. Hence, with both their work 
in view, the question as to the existing and desired relationships between 
feminist politics, ressentiment and state power appears to remain open and 
indeed vexed as their analyses pull in different directions in respect to 
reformism. We turn now to the second of Brown's chapters to be considered, 
123Ibid., 27. 
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'Wounded Attachments,' where a closer view of Brown's treatment of state-
sponsored reform can be gained. 
The defining element of Brown's approach to the study of emancipatory 
political forms is attentiveness to their symptomatic character: the extent to 
which emancipatory political desires are not autarkically achieved but are 
produced "by and within the regimes of power [they] contest", where the 
consequences of this circumstance include what Brown refers to as 
"resubordination" and "self-subversion".124 For the case of identity politics, 
Brown builds an account of the forces conditioning the production of its 
political animus-its "disciplinary, liberal and capitalist parentage"-which 
elucidates the extent to which this political form works to annex rather than 
confront these forces, and so to curtail its transformative potential in 
reiterating rather than contesting "the "political shape" of domination in our 
time."125 Here, of course, Brown's analysis is especially similar to that of 
Tapper. The terms of Tapper's more microcosmic analysis, which saw 
feminist academics taking recourse to, and so strengthening and legitimising, 
institutional powers they might otherwise contest, are writ large in Brown as 
she describes the foreclosure of political freedom and of thorough-going 
contestation entailed in the identitarian pursuit of legal recognition, 
protection and inclusion.126 We might note, however, that even as their 
analyses pursue similar trajectories, Tapper's view of feminist success as 
exhausted by formal equality and inclusiveness stops well short of Brown's 
interest in cultivating a "vital politics of freedom" whose terms are not set in 
necessary relation with those ofliberalism. 
124Jbid., 3; 55. As Brown notes in her Preface, her analyses "work heuristically from 
Foucault's relatively simple insight that political "resistance" is figured by and within 
rather than externally to the regimes of power it contests." Ibid., 3. 
125Jbid., 62; 28. 
126Ibid., 28. 
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It is also the case that Brown's apprehension of political desire as 
produced recalls Yeatman's insistence on the interpellated character of 
emancipatory politics and politicized identity. However, in Yeatman's frame 
of reference liberal universalism's necessary acts of particularism alone do 
the interpellating, and moreover this labour is affirmed as part of the proper 
workings of liberal democracy: the universal must be particularised, the 
wrong must be politicised, the universal must be re-particularised, and 
politics proper consists in enabling the perpetual replaying of this loop while 
pseudo-politics consists in obstructing it. Brown, on the other hand,127 
envisages the production of emancipatory political desire as a complex and 
contradictory collaborative effort between liberal universalism and its 
"companion powers: capitalism and disciplinarity", and she argues that part 
of the problem with identity politics' politicisation of exclusion is that it 
operates to legitimate its tripartite parentage.128 Both Yeatman and Brown 
take issue with the ratification of outsider identity which identity politics has 
involved, and both read this ratification through the concept of ressentiment, 
but where Yeatman sees politics foreclosed when the disenfranchised refuse 
to work with the custodians toward re-particularisation and so improved 
inclusiveness, Brown sees precisely such work as a depoliticising foreclosure 
of political freedom, especially insofar as it fails to "subject to critique ... the 
economy of inclusion and exclusion that liberal universalism establishes" and, 
as such, requires rather than contests that economy's capitalist measure of 
127In a footnoted discussion of Ernesto Laclau's affirmative treatment of liberal 
universalism's element of perpetual deferral, Brown builds on the critical stance she 
assumes in relation the 'radical democracy' school (States of Injury, 11-13) in penning 
the following question:" ... [h]ow, if universal discourse may always be revealed to have 
this strategic function, can it also be taken seriously as a substantive value of 
democracy?'', 57, N.7. Brown's critical stance contrasts with Yeatman's embrace of the 
general heuristic direction of radical democracy, producing important differences between 
these theorist's treatments of identity politics in universalist political culture. 
128Ibid., 57. 
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exclusion: "the white masculine middle-class ideal."129 Let us now address 
Brown's account of identity politics' self-subversive reiteration of the powers 
which condition its production, noting from the outset that Brown's account is 
intended to intervene upon and rewire rather than critique and oppose the 
political form to which it is addressed.130 
Complementing yet departing from the work of cultural theorists who 
take recourse to a "linguistic frame" in their analyses of identity formation, 
Brown situates her analysis in an "historically specific cultural-political 
register" in order to elucidate the particular context in which identities are 
produced and become available for politicisation.BI Like Yeatman, Brown's 
account of identity's production begins with a discussion of liberalism's 
"detente between universal and particular".132 However, unlike Yeatman, 
this detente is not treated as productive of identities which are available for 
positive and effective politicisation. Rather, aside from a concern with "the 
individuating effects of liberal discourse", Brown locates the production of 
identity primarily with disciplinarity and capitalism, and situates liberal 
universalism as that which works to depoliticise the identities they produce, 
where this movement from production to depoliticisation is understood as the 
circuit in which identity politics is ensnared. For Brown, the potentially 
deconstructive force of politicised identities is curtailed when liberalism 
converts such identities into "essentialized private interest", diffusing their 
l29Jbid., 61. 
130Jbid., 55; 75-6. 
131Jbid.,54-5. Brown cites a number of cultural theorists who have worked productively 
within a "linguistic frame": William Connolly, Stuart Hall, Trinh T. Minh-ha, Homi 
Bhabha, Paul Gilroy, Aiwah Ong, Judith Butler, Gayatri Spivak and Anne Norton, 
Ibid., 54, n. 2. 
132Jbid., 57. 
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potential force in casting them as "generic claims of particularism endemic to 
a universalist political culture."133 
Importantly, then, particularism emerges in her account as liberalism's 
tactic for depoliticisation, rather than as the opening for democratic politics 
proper it represents in Yeatman's account. But in her discussion of 
liberalism's "detente between universal and particular" Brown's aim is to 
describe the specific manner in which its ideological function has been 
"thoroughly unravelled by two features of late modernity".134 These features 
are, firstly, the liberal state's increasingly naked investment in "particular 
economic interests, political ends, and social formations"; and secondly the 
vast proliferation, classification and regulation of particular identities 
performed by disciplinary powers working within and outside the state.135 In 
regards to the latter, Brown names, for example, "classificatory schemes" 
enabling "the welfare state's production of welfare subjects" and "consumer 
capitalism's marketing discourse in which individual (and subindividual) 
desires are produced, commodified and mobilised as identities".136 
Brown's vision, then, is one in which state universality wears increasingly 
thin while the production of particular identities proliferates. These identities 
are to be understood as "available for politicisation because they are deployed 
for purposes of political regulation".137 In describing the emergence of identity 
politics from this configuration, Brown writes: 
In this story, the always imminent but increasingly manifest failure of 
liberal universalism to be universal-the transparent fiction of state 
universality-combines with the increasing individuation of social 
133Jbid., 59. 
134Jbid., 56. 
135Jbid., 57-8. 
136Jbid., 58. 
137Jbid .. 
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subjects through capitalist disinterments and disciplinary productions. 
Together, they breed the emergence of politicized identity rooted in 
disciplinary productions but oriented by liberal discourse toward 
protest against exclusion from a discursive formation of universal 
justice.138 
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From the outset, then, Brown represents identity politics as misdirected and, 
in this, self-subversive. Politicisations of identity categories inhabit and 
confirm rather than interrogate and contest the articulation of these 
categories on the part of disciplinary power, then seal this confirmation in 
tailoring politicisation along the lines set out by liberalism: generic claims of 
particularism baited by failed universalism, excluded orders of interest 
seeking inclusive recognition. Hence, liberalism's mitigation against the 
"articulation of differences as political-as effects of power" is effectively 
obeyed as politicised identity claims emerge as eminently digestible 
complaint-that is, they are depoliticised-rather than as deep challenges to 
the forces which have conditioned their production.139 In this way, liberalism's 
economy of inclusion and exclusion, as distinct from its exclusiveness, is 
protected from critique. Moreover, politicised identity comes to be invested in 
its own exclusion. As Brown explains: 
[P]oliticized identity ... reiterates the terms of liberal discourse insofar 
as it posits a sovereign and unified "I" that is disenfranchised by an 
exclusive "we." ... politicized identity emerges and obtains its unifying 
coherence through the politicisation of exclusion from an ostensible 
universal, as a protest against exclusion: a protest premised on the 
fiction of an inclusive/universal community, a protest that thus 
reinstalls the humanist ideal-and a specific white, middle-class, 
masculinist expression of this ideal-insofar as it premises itself upon 
exclusion from it .... [p]oliticized identities generated out of liberal, 
disciplinary societies, insofar as they are premised on exclusion from a 
138Jbid .. 
139Jbid., 56. 
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universal ideal, require that ideal, as well as their exclusion from it, 
for their own continuing existence as identities.140 
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As we will see, the reiteration of liberalism Brown discerns here connects, 
firstly, to her account of identity politics' protection of capitalism from 
critique and, secondly, to her account of how identity politics, in its recourse to 
the law to redress "social injury", annexes rather than challenges disciplinary 
power. 
Regarding the first connection, and as against the view that identity 
politics centred on gender, sexuality, and race/ethnicity are to be understood 
as "a supplement to class politics" and "an expansion of left categories of 
oppression and emancipation", Brown theorises that the "invisibility and 
inarticulateness of class" evident in this political form is not incidental but 
"endemic".141 Arguing that the white, bourgeois, masculinist ideal functions 
as the yardstick by which politicized identities measure their exclusion and 
envisage their inclusion, Brown suggests that identity politics may be 
interpreted as "a peculiarly shaped and peculiarly disguised form of class 
resentment" which works to displace the injurious effects of capitalism away 
from the category of class and onto the explicitly politicized, non-class 
category. Having noted that identity politics, "like all resentments ... retains 
the real or imagined holdings of its reviled subject as objects of desire", she 
writes: 
... when not only economic stratification but other injuries to the 
human body and psyche enacted by capitalism-alienation, 
140Ibid., 64-5. 
141 Ibid., 59; 61; 60. Nicola Field makes a very similar argument in her analysis of "pink 
economy'' identity politics: 'Identity and the Lifestyle Market,' in Materialist Feminism: a 
reader in class, difference and women's lives, eds. Rosemary Hennessey and Chrys 
Ingraham, (New York: Routledge, 1997), 259-271. However, it must be noted that 
Field's argument that identity politics is premised upon an eschewal of a critique of 
capitalism is figured as a final critique of identity politics while Brown's argument, 
"rather than seeking to oppose or transcend identity investments", ultimately is attuned 
to reworking the structure of its political desire (States of Injury, 76). 
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commodification, exploitation, displacement, disintegration of 
sustaining albeit contradictory social forms such as families and 
neighbourhoods-when these are discursively normalized and thus 
depoliticised, other markings of social difference may come to bear an 
inordinate weight; indeed, they may bear all the weight of the 
sufferings produced by capitalism in addition to that attributable to 
the explicitly politicized marking.142 
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Brown then contrasts this dependence of politicized identities upon "a 
standard internal to existing society" for the formation of their political 
claims with the revolutionary Marxist vision of total transformation through 
the elimination of capitalism.143 
This suggests that the latter's revolutionary orientation be registered as 
prevailing beyond the particular form of resentment Brown addresses here 
(which is not to say it does not involve other orders of resentment144), and as 
such this suggestion is reminiscent of Cocks' point that radical politics' 
original categorical triptych-oppression, revolution, emancipation-
promises release from the atrophy of ressentiment. Like Cocks, Brown is not 
recommending politico-epistemological adoption of this particular 
revolutionary tradition. Rather, on my reading, she is beckoning a renewal of 
the critique of capitalism so as to counter identity politics' "renaturalization" 
of it, and she invokes this tradition's emphasis upon the possibility of total 
142Brown, States of Injury, 60. 
143Jbid., 61. 
144rn the first of Brown's chapters we assessed, Marxism also serves as her object of 
critique to the extent that modernist feminism's epistemological protocols largely are 
drawn from that tradition (cf. 47; for Brown's extensive engagement with Marx's thought 
see especially her discussion of his treatment of identity in States of Injury 96-134 and 
her account of Marx's conception of power and historical materialism in Politics Out of 
History, 62-90). However I would argue that, key to her interest in a "vital politics of 
freedom'', Brown does not discount the revolutionary orientation of Marxism. Arguing 
that a postfoundationalist feminism must break with "Marxism's promise . . . of 
meticulously articulated connections between a comprehensive critique of the present 
and norms for a transformed future", she notes that this promise involves a "science of 
revolution rather than a politics of one" (49) and so, on my reading, retains the latter as 
a viable orientation for radical political projects, as she does here in contrasting 
revolutionary Marxism with identity politics. 
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transformation, and the connotation of autarky, freedom and futurity this 
bears, as an instructive point of contrast with the geist of identity politics.145 
The second connection, Brown's concern with identity politics' annexation 
of disciplinary power, is interesting for our purposes since it proceeds in 
contrast with Yeatman's analysis, specifically her link between feminism 
beyond ressentiment, power conceived as capacity, and legislation which 
engages a relatively transparent process of citizen-subject formation in 
attaching rights to personhood rather than property or protection. This 
contrast will come into view most clearly if we first consider the main point of 
commonality between these theorists. Yeatman and Brown share a concern 
with the reiteration of victim identity entailed in the conception of power as 
protection.146 
Recall that for Yeatman, to beckon the protective powers of the state is 
to risk reproducing "the relationship of tutelage between powerful protector 
and those who, being powerless, are seen to need help."147 Brown makes a 
very similar point in her discussion of identity politics' recourse to the law to 
redress "the "injury'' of social subordination": 
... the effort to "outlaw" social injury powerfully legitimizes law and 
the state as appropriate protectors against injury and casts injured 
individuals as needing such protection by such protectors ... in its 
economy of perpetrator and victim, this project seeks not power or 
emancipation for the injured or the subordinated, but the revenge of 
punishment, making the perpetrator hurt as the sufferer does.148 
145IBrown, States of Injury, 60. 
146Aside from her concern with protectionism in the chapter under consideration, Brown 
also discusses it at length in her chapter 'Finding the Man in the State,' States of Injury, 
166-196. 
147Yeatman, 'Feminism and Power,' 152. 
14Sstates of Injury, 27. 
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Both theorists tie the conception of power as protection to the equation of 
justice with revenge, and to a self-subversive reinscription of victim identity. 
The point of departure between them, however, consists most immediately in 
Brown's extension and Yeatman's retraction of this line of critique to a 
consideration of legislation which attaches rights to personhood (anti-
discrimination, affirmative action and equal opportunity legislation). Where 
Yeatman perceives in such legislation a break with the discourse of natural 
rights and a potentially positive deployment of non-extractive power for the 
constitution of capable, self-regulating citizen-subjects, Brown, as we will see, 
perceives a "strikingly unemancipatory" reiteration of disciplinary power and 
the formation of a "disciplinary subject".149 Where Yeatman detects a leap 
from protected persons to capable persons whom command respect, Brown 
perceives the bid for protection resculpted to suit disciplinary manners of 
writing personhood into law. 
This indicates that their analyses again are pulling in different directions 
in respect to reformism. Yeatman's analysis figures a feminist discourse 
which can beckon a non-paternalistic state, while Brown's analysis, 
especially in its attentiveness to disciplinarity, casts radical doubt upon the 
very idea of turning to the state. In this, it beckons also a rethinking of 
feminism's political agency such that it might practiced at most 
independently of, at least at some remove from, the state's ensemble of 
institutions and discursive formations. 
To flesh out her perception of such legislation as reiterative of disciplinary 
society, Brown refers to an anti-discrimination ordinance "devised and 
promulgated by a broad coalition of identity-based groups" in her local 
149Ibid., 64; 65. 
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political scene.150 The ordinance pursues the format of much anti-
discrimination, equal opportunity and affirmative action codes in naming an 
array of markers of social difference, from height and ancestry to "known or 
assumed homosexuality, heterosexuality, or bisexuality", as unworthy bases 
of discrimination. On the whole, Brown interprets the ordinance as "a perfect 
instance of the universal juridical ideal of liberalism and the normalizing 
principle of disciplinary regimes conjoined and taken up within the discourse 
of politicized identity."151 
Brown's objections to the ordinance are many, but a summary should be 
as follows. Firstly, in relation to difference, the ordinance aims to "count 
every difference as no difference".152 That is, it works to normalize differences 
which emerge as effects of power, and to diffuse the subversive potential of 
differences which issue from a "rejection of culturally enforced norms".153 So 
even as differences are made visible and ostensibly are 'affirmed'-the 
intention of the ordinance-their basis in disciplinary articulations is 
obscured or, alternatively, their political bite is neutralized through a 
universalist gesture of 'acceptance.' Secondly, in relation to identity, the 
ordinance impresses into law a calculus of the subject which reduces and 
then fixes persons to their empirically observable attributes and practices, 
"ensuring that persons describable according to them will now become 
regulated through them".154 Hence, for Brown, the attachment of rights and 
entitlements to personhood installs a fetter where it appears to be removing 
150Brown is referring to a draft of "An Ordinance of the City of Santa Cruz Adding Chapter 
9.83 to the Santa Cruz Municipal Code Pertaining to the Prohibition of Discrimination.", 
65, n.21. The aim of the ordinance was to "ban discrimination in employment, housing, 
and public accomodations on the basis of "sexual orientation, transsexuality, age, 
height, weight, personal appearance, physical characteristics, race, color, creed, religion, 
national origin, ancestry, disability, marital status, sex, or gender." Ibid., 65. 
151Ibid., 65. 
152Ibid., 66. 
153Ibid .. 
154Ibid .. 
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one, constructs a subject where it appears to be allowing for one and, in 
deploying the classificatory tactics of disciplinary power, risks aiding in the 
fabrication of a 'plastic cage': 
When contemporary anxieties about the difficult imperatives of 
freedom are installed in the regulatory forces of the state in the form 
of increasingly specified codes of injury and protection, do we 
unwittingly increase the power of the state and its various regulatory 
discourses at the expense of political freedom? Are we fabricating 
something like a plastic cage that reproduces and further regulates 
the injured subjects it would protect?155 
The final point Brown makes regarding the ordinance is that its negotiation of 
state power is "not simply misguided" but, more complexly, that its self-
subversiveness is symptomatic of the context which has conditioned its 
production.156 
This point takes Brown into a consideration of the extent to which 
constitutive elements of liberalism may be regarded incitations of 
ressentiment, and it is here that her analysis cuts new ground for the 
understanding of ressentiment as an effect of and reaction to domination. Let 
us review this important point by way of conclusion to our engagement with 
her account. 
In drawing up a portrait of the late modern liberal subject as "starkly 
accountable yet dramatically impotent" and, therefore, "quite literally 
seeth[ing] with ressentiment" Brown refers first to the paradox between 
freedom and equality which lies at the heart of liberalism, and secondly to the 
tensions which attend liberal individualism, both of which are situated as key 
to liberalism's "generalized incitement to ... ressentiment", and the latter of 
155Jbid., 28. Here, Brown has revised Samuel Weber's image of an "iron cage'', The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1958). 
156Jbid., 66. 
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which forms her main focus.157 Of the relation of ressentiment to liberalism's 
discourse of sovereign individuals she writes: 
... it is not only the tension between freedom and equality but the 
prior presumption of the self-reliant and self-made capacities of 
liberal subjects, conjoined with their unavowed dependence on and 
construction by a variety of social relations and forces, that makes all 
liberal subjects, and not only markedly disenfranchised ones, 
vulnerable to ressentiment: it is their situatedness within power, their 
production by power, and liberal discourse's denial of this situatedness 
and production that cast the liberal subject into failure, the failure to 
make itself in the context of a discourse in which its self-making is 
assumed, indeed, is its assumed nature. This failure, which Nietzsche 
call suffering, must either find a reason within itself (which redoubles 
the failure) or a site of external blame upon which to avenge its hurt 
and redistribute its pain.158 
In this passage, Brown situates the discourse of social being particular to 
liberalism as an occasion which is, to employ Max Scheler's phrase, "charged 
with the danger of ressentiment."159 That is, at this point in her analysis, 
Brown is not only using the conception of ressentiment as a tool with which to 
diagnose a political condition: she is also providing a specific account of 
ressentiment's conditions of possibility, what Scheler would call a sociology of 
ressentiment .160 
Brown then argues that these conditions of possibility are heightened in 
late modernity as the reach of liberalism's companion powers expands "to 
create an unparalleled individual powerlessness over the fate and direction of 
one's own life, intensifying the experiences of impotence, dependence and 
gratitude inherent in liberal capitalist orders and constitutive of 
157Ibid., 69; 66. 
158Ibid., 67. Emphasis in original. 
159Max Scheler, Ressentiment, trans. William H. Holdheim (New York: Free Press, 1961), 
60. 
160Scheler, Ressentiment, 27-58. 
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ressentiment."161 Let us address Brown's vision of the place of identity politics 
in the condition she describes here before concluding with a delineation of the 
ramifications of this for a comparison ofYeatman and Brown. 
Brown argues that politicisations of identity on the part of markedly 
subordinated subjects emerge as "both product and reaction" to the 
conditions constitutive of liberalism's incitation to ressentiment. 162 She 
situates ressentiment as that which springs from and attempts to ameliorate 
suffering: it reworks pain into enraged righteousness and locates the "cause" 
of suffering, a specific site toward which blame may be directed and pain may 
be redistributed through the dispensation of punishment.163 Hence 
ressentiment engages a vengeful "economy of victim and perpetrator": in the 
case of the ordinance with which she is concerned, "the "injury" of social 
subordination" is made over into a criminal matter of individual enactment 
and case-by-case litigation which "fixes the identities of the injured and the 
injuring as social positions, and codifies as well the meaning of their actions 
against all possibilities of indeterminacy, ambiguity, and struggle for 
resignification and repositioning."164 
The 'self-subversiveness' of this political effort consists in the fixity of 
identity it entails: ressentiment's amelioration of the injuries of subordination 
and exclusion proceeds on the basis that the identity 'subordinated' and 
'excluded' be preserved. In this way, politicised identity becomes "invested in 
its own subjection": 
This investment lies not only in its discovery of a site of blame for its 
hurt will, not only in its acquisition of recognition through its history of 
subjection ... but also in the satisfactions of revenge, which ceaselessly 
l6lStates of Injury, 68. My emphasis. 
162Ibid., 69. 
163Ibid., 68. 
164Ibid., 27. 
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reenact even as they redistribute the injuries of marginalization and 
subordination in a liberal discursive order that alternately denies the 
very possibility of these things and blames those who experience them 
for their own condition. Identity politics structured by ressentiment 
reverse without subverting this blaming structure: they do not subject 
to critique the sovereign subject of accountability that liberal 
individualism presupposes, nor the economy of inclusion and 
exclusion that liberal universalism establishes.165 
281 
With Brown's interpretation of identity politics in full view, we are positioned 
to register that her characterisation of this political form's ressentimental 
structure as self-subversive exists in tension with her account of liberalism's 
incitation of its subjects to ressentiment. In what sense is a politics 
responsibly self-subversive if the political field which conditions its production 
is responsible for inciting it to 'self-subversion'? Of course, this is a productive 
tension insofar as it reinforces the need to subvert the "blaming structure" 
Brown refers to above: Brown refuses to lend neither the 'self-subverting' 
subject nor the forces which are 'precipitous' of its self-subversion-
liberalism, capitalism, disciplinarity-a clean place to stand, and in this way 
Brown's own account eludes ressentiment's economy of perpetrator and 
victim. 
However, the concern which arises here is that this economy is not 
necessarily overcome. For this economy may be preserved by the most 
subtlest of gestures: the making of perpetrator and victim into one in the 
same subject, that is, self-blame. It is clear from Brown's account that 
emphasising the extent to which ressentimental political postures are self-
subversive works to place the possibility of overcoming such subversion 
firmly within the grasp of the politicised subject. This connects to Brown's 
hortatory call, in the first chapter we examined, for feminists to "assume 
165Ibid., 70. 
RESSENTIMENT, IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE 282 
responsibility for our situations".166 In agreement with this, Moira Gatens' 
response to Brown urges feminists to "take responsibility for what we are" 
and to begin a reconceptualisation of"notions of complicity, responsibility and 
accountability", presumably so that the politically marginalised may 
examine their complicity in their own marginalisation and indeed in the self-
subversive failures of their political efforts.167 
Here again we meet with the injunction to those engaged in emancipatory 
politics to 'take responsibility.' Neither Brown nor Gatens articulate any 
distinction between the assumption of responsibility and the gesture of self-
blame which attends ressentiment-that moment in which the subject "find[s] 
a reason within itself'.168 As I see it, there is room here for a troubling 
development: leaving this distinction unarticulated sets up this auto-critical 
discourse on feminist ressentiment as yet another venue in which the 
"markedly disenfranchised" are led back into self-blame, a scenario which 
surely presses against Brown's concern to see those engaged in emancipatory 
politics "critique the sovereign subject of accountability that liberal 
individualism presupposes".169 It is clear from this that the relation between 
ressentiment, politicisation and self-blame will require our further attention. 
Conclusion 
To conclude, let us draw one final comparison between Yeatman and 
Brown before summarising the accounts of feminist ressentiment we have 
examined in this part of the dissertation. The situation Brown describes when 
she provides a sociology of ressentiment is one in which the "contemporary 
values of self-regulation" to which Yeatman refers work to intensify the 
l66Jbid., 51. 
167Gatens, Imaginary Bodies, 88. 
168States of Injury, 67. 
169Jbid., 70. 
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incitation to ressentiment.170 This is especially so given that neoliberalism's 
discourse of self-regulation features alongside a vast, upward and arguably 
gendered redistribution of wealth facilitated by its sharp reversal of the Robin 
Hood principle as well as the pronounced increase in employer prerogative 
attendant upon the shifts in industrial relations it oversees.171 
In view of the general valence ofYeatman's emphasis upon the conception 
of power as capacity as an opening onto a feminist discourse of women as 
self-legislating subjects of power, yet mindful of Brown's figuration of such a 
discourse as precipitous of ressentiment when it prevails in a context marked 
by unavowed forces of domination, it is reasonable to conclude that any 
feminist conception of self-legislative capacity must take into account the 
political and economic forces which mitigate against self-legislative efforts, 
and must reckon with the task of curtailing these forces. To refer again to 
Gatens, who invokes Brown and Yeatman's ideas in combination: she argues 
that feminists must "theorize power as a positive capacity as well as 
acknowledge and fight against power that takes the form of dominance and 
submission."172 
In view of the foregoing comparison of Yeatman and Brown, we might 
revise this directive such that the theorization of power as capacity and the 
fight against domination emerge not as discrete projects which may proceed 
concurrently but as crucially interlinked and indeed mutually dependent. If, 
as Brown argues, ressentiment's reinscription of incapacity prevails where 
capacity is assumed yet unavowedly undercut, then reckoning with that 
l 70y eatman, 'Feminism and Power', 155. 
l 71The reversal I refer to here is fostered by economic policy which installs tax cuts for 
upper quintile earners and the private sector and pro-employer industrial relations 
legislation set in combination with welfare policy attuned to downsizing (ie. tighter 
eligibility criteria for benefits and cuts to benefit rates). 
172Gatens, Imaginary Bodies, 88. Emphasis in original. 
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which undercuts-liberalism, capitalism, disciplinarity-would seem to be not 
parallel but central to the task of theorising power as capacity. 
As my analysis has demonstrated, the figurations of the relationship 
between feminism, liberal democracy and ressentiment presented by Yeatman 
and Brown are in accord in the following two respects. Firstly, they both treat 
ressentiment as formative of an 'undemocratic' mode of political locution which 
trades political argument for moral plaint. Secondly, they both employ the 
concept of ressentiment to problematise the manner in which the politicisation 
of outsider identity reiterates victim identity and invites a politics of envy and 
revenge rather than a politics of emancipation. However, as my analysis has 
also demonstrated, Yeatman and Brown pursue very different paths from 
this point, both in relation to their diagnoses of feminist ressentiment and their 
visions of feminism beyond ressentiment. As for their diagnoses: according to 
Yeatman, a feminism of ressentiment will evade democratic politics proper in 
undertaking antagonistic outsidership and/or entertaining protectionism; 
according to Brown, such a feminism will engage the depoliticising route of 
democratic politics proper and so forego a more radical critique of liberalism 
and its companion powers. 
As for their counter-images of feminist ressentiment, both theorists 
emphasise futurity and capacity yet Yeatman's particular conception of 
power as capacity may in fact be problematised and revised in light of 
Brown's account ofliberal individualism's incitation to ressentiment. And while 
Brown beckons an extensive critique of liberalism such that doubt is cast on 
whether emancipation is possible within its confines, Yeatman's figuration of 
emancipation and impugnation of antagonistic outsidership would seem to be 
predicated on relinquishing such doubt. Hence Yeatman's and Brown's 
analyses of feminist ressentiment pull in different, perhaps opposing, 
directions with respect to feminism's political future, in much the same way 
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as do the analyses of Cocks and Tapper. With this thought in mind let us 
summarise the accounts of feminist ressentiment examined in this part of the 
dissertation. 
To forward a general and stabilising summary of the accounts of feminist 
ressentiment examined in this part of the dissertation, we would say that they 
all work to interrupt what seems an otherwise reasonable assumption 
regarding the nature of feminist politicisation, an assumption lent clear 
expression in Michele Le Dreuffs dictum: "For feminism does not create its 
object for itself. Sexism comes first".173 Through their use of Nietzsche's 
concept of ressentiment to trace feminism's resubordinating tendencies, its 
identificatory 'requirement' of what it opposes, these accounts do not so much 
overturn as complicate le Dreuff s idea that feminism is strictly pursuant and 
cleanly responsive to forms of sexist injustice. This complication is 
articulated most sharply when Tapper echoes the popular feminist critics' 
claims in arguing that feminist complaint about sexist injustice has reached 
fever pitch at a time when such injustice is least in evidence, and more gently 
yet no less resolutely in Cocks', Yeatman's and Brown's joint 
problematisation of the reiterative attachment to victim identity they 
discern in feminist protectionism. 
To abstract from their particulars, we may note that what these 
accounts put on the table is the idea that a feminist politics which takes its 
bearings in a ressentimental mode of valuation, empowerment and identity-
formation will recreate its object for itself. So sexism may come first, but we 
are to assume that precisely how feminism evaluates sexism-how it 
interprets its object for itself, the nature of its reaction to its object-is key to 
173Michele Le Doouff, 'Ants and Women, or Philosophy Without Borders,' Contemporary 
French Philosophy, ed. A. Phillips Griffiths (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987), 41. 
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whether feminism will actively counter or reactively require and so 'recreate' 
its object. 
Insofar as the concept of ressentiment can be interpreted as describing a 
mode of politicisation which facilitates the triumph of the slave as slave, a 
feminism of ressentiment will facilitate the empowerment of victims as 
victims, where this paradoxical transformation spells melancholic dependence 
upon the contrasting, victimising 'evil.' Feminism's recreation of its object is 
not limited to its identificatory requirement of it: relatedly, these analyses 
suggest that a feminism of ressentiment will, in Brown's terms, "redraw" the 
very forms of domination it ostensibly opposes, where this may be traced 
most clearly in feminism's recourse to a higher power (the state, the law, the 
administration), its utilitarian ratification of that power's equation of justice 
with revenge, and the subsequent formation of what Tapper refers to as 
"specific feminist configuration[s] of power/knowledge".174 
This much may be said in the way of a general and stabilising summary of 
the accounts of feminist ressentiment we have examined. What, then, are we 
to make of the differences between these accounts, those which have been 
exposed through this and the last chapter's employment of comparative 
analysis? What of the different political directions in which these accounts 
point feminism: toward and away from abetting state and institutional power, 
toward and away from 'radical' posturing, toward greater cooperativeness 
within existing politico-economic arrangements, toward reigniting radical 
problematisation of these arrangements? What of the conflicts about which 
kind of feminism may be regarded as either implicated in or able to overcome 
ressentiment, and the sheer plurality of ressentimental figures these accounts 
present: Cocks' sanctimonious yet strident writer and orator of victim 
174Tapper, 'Ressentiment and Power,' 130. 
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politics, Tapper's hypersensitive femocrat, Yeatman's anti-statist outsider 
and statist protectionist, Brown's modernist feminist and statist identitarian? 
In short, what of the instabilities which can be traced in this discourse on 
feminist ressentiment? Can they all be right, or does the plurality evident in 
this literature suggest a deeper relationship between feminism, politics and 
ressentiment which none of the accounts by themselves capture? This is the 
first of two related sets of questions that these accounts pose. 
The second set of questions has to do with the concept of ressentiment 
itself. In Elsbeth Probyn's response to Brown's account of feminist 
ressentiment it is argued that this account should be expanded to include 
consideration of "all facets, and all generations of feminist thought today".175 
Probyn's enthusiasm is to be affirmed but may also be redirected. If it is the 
case that the concept of ressentiment has a crucial and broad part to play in 
feminist theory, so far in the direction of feminist self-appraisal, then an 
examination of the concept of ressentiment itself is required. Each of the 
accounts we have addressed provide some description of the concept, but it 
seems worthy to propose, as I will in the following part of the dissertation, 
that diagnostic use of the concept of ressentiment, even as it enables what 
Foucault has called a critical ontology of ourselves, nonetheless serves as a 
lightening rod which ushers critical attention away from close examination of 
the concept itself. Indeed, it would seem that ressentiment is one of the most 
used but the least examined of Nietzsche's major concepts, and in political 
terms this use has been wide-ranging.176 
175Elsbeth Probyn, 'Re: Generation: women's studies and the disciplining of ressentiment.' 
Australian Feminist Studies, No. 13, Vol. 27 (1998): 134. 
176As Richard A. Smith argues, many aspects of the concept of ressentiment are "yet to be 
examined", 'Nietzsche: Philosopher of Ressentiment?' in International Studies in 
Philosophy, Vol. 25, No. 2 (1993): 137. In recent literature one can find the concept of 
ressentiment used to interpret not just feminist politics, but phenomena ranging from far 
right politics in the United States, modern nationalism, the Saturnalian psychology of 
modernity's 'abject hero,' revolutionary politics, and anti-feminism/homophobia. See, 
respectively: Howard Schuman and Maria Krysan, 'A Study of Far Right Ressentiment in 
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The diagnostic procedure pursued by the critics we have examined 
requires that the concept of ressentiment be lent conceptual stability: one 
must demarcate with some precision what ressentiment is so as to match it 
with a particular mode of political expression. But as we have seen in this 
part of the dissertation (and even in part one given Hoff Sommers and Wolfs 
. less overt Nietzscheanism), each critic forwards a slightly different version of 
what ressentiment is and, between them, are able to perceive ressentiment at 
work within at least two primary and ostensibly conflicting modes of 
politicisation available to feminism: radical antagonistic outsidership bent on 
revolutionary transcendence of the status-quo, and liberal co-operative 
insidership content to work within existing configurations of power (liberalism, 
capitalism, disciplinarity). 
Conversely, between these accounts we also find that both modes of 
politicisation are registered as lying 'beyond' ressentiment. In Brown's terms, 
which may be aligned with those of Cocks, a feminism beyond ressentiment 
will "fight for a world rather than conduct process on the existing one", while 
both Tapper and Yeatman consider that we will glimpse a feminism beyond 
ressentiment precisely when feminism lets go of the idea that another world is 
possible and limits itself to "wanting equal power" within existing 
arrangements.177 Hence the discourse on feminist ressentiment that we have 
examined offers fundamentally conflicting judgements regarding the nature of 
feminism's relationship with ressentiment, and yields fundamentally differing 
strategic avenues for feminist politics. Among other things, this suggests 
America,' International Journal of Public Opinion Research 811 (1996): 10-30; Leah 
Grenheld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1992); Michael Andre Bernstein, Bitter Carnival: ressentiment and the abject hero 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Mark N. Katz, Reflections on Revolutions 
(New York: St Martin's Press, 1999), 57-74; Anna Marie Smith, 'The Regulation of 
Lesbian Sexuality Through Erasure: the case of Jennifer Saunders,' in Feminism and the 
New Democracy: resiting the political, ed. Jodi Dean (London: Sage, 1997): 181-197. 
177Brown, States of Injury, 28; Tapper, 'Ressentiment and Power,' 130. 
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that the word 'ressentiment', like the word 'victim,' plays a polysemic role in 
this literature. 
Aside from this predicament, it also is the case that the analyses of Cocks 
and Brown suggest that further examination of the concept of ressentiment is 
required. Recall that Cocks' diagnostic use of the concept of ressentiment 
prevailed even as she registered concern regarding the stark typology on 
which it is based: the self-defining master versus the inauthentic slave. And 
consider Brown's brief but highly suggestive construction of a sociology of 
ressentiment. How does this approach differ from diagnostic employment of 
the concept of ressentiment and, if developed, what bearing might this 
approach have on our understanding of the relationship between feminist 
politics and ressentiment? Both caveats will be taken up in the following part 
of the dissertation as we examine the concept of ressentiment with a view to 
address the above noted sets of questions. 
PART THREE 
Reading Ressentirnent 
5 
Ressentiment Reconsidered 
The position of subordination, while it requires the loss or 
absence of many of the rights and privileges of the 
dominant position, also produces certain skills and modes of 
resourcefulness, the capacity precisely for self-sustenance 
and creativity that are lost for the dominator. They become 
complaisant and self-satisfied, while the subordinated must 
sharpen their wits and continuously develop themselves or 
succumb to their oppressed positions. 
-Elizabeth Grosz. I 
There are indeed many precautions to imprison a man in 
what he is, as if we lived in perpetual fear that he might 
escape from it, that he might break away and suddenly 
elude his condition. 
-Jean-Paul Sartre.2 
Introduction 
Given that the accounts of feminism's relationship with ressentiment 
examined in Part 2, while illuminating in many respects, exhibit conflicting 
judgements regarding the relationship between feminism and ressentiment, 
the task of this part of the dissertation is to address the questions which arise 
from this predicament by way of a close and critical reading of Nietzsche's 
concept of ressentiment. This reading seeks to deepen our understanding of the 
relationship between feminism and ressentiment, although I do not claim to 
present a final or exhaustive account of this relationship nor of the concept of 
ressentiment itself. My guiding proposition simply is that the plurality evident 
in the literature we have examined indicates that the relationship between 
1 Elizabeth Grosz, Space, Time and Perversion: the politics of bodies (Sydney: Allen & 
Unwin, 1995), 209. 
2 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (London: Methuen, 
1969), 59. 
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feminism, politics and ressentiment is more complex, dynamic and multivalent 
than the accounts in that literature acknowledge. I also bring to this reading 
a suspicion that when Nietzsche's concept of ressentiment is employed 
diagnostically, as in the accounts we examined, only part of the story of 
ressentiment is told. This diagnostic gesture asks that we take at face value 
what Henry Staten refers to as Nietzsche's "official attitude of 
condemnation" toward ressentiment, but it is by no means clear that this 
approach to ressentiment is the best way to put this concept to work for 
political reflection.3 
By adopting an exegetical approach to the concept of ressentiment across 
this chapter and the next, the aim is to bring out features of ressentiment 
which have been elided in the literature we have addressed, and which have a 
significant bearing on our interpretation of the modes of politicisation 
diagnosed as ressentimental in this literature. This part of the dissertation is 
arranged into two chapters which work together to broaden our perspective 
on ressentiment by bringing into view the other key elements of Nietzsche's 
articulation of this concept-Nietzsche's thesis on the moralities of master 
and slave, his account of the dynamic struggle between master and slave, the 
distinct modes of self-relation Nietzsche associates with their respective 
morallties, and the role of legalism and religious asceticism in mediating 
between them. As we will see, our perspective on ressentiment shifts 
considerably once the general political schema informing Nietzsche's 
impugnation of ressentiment is in view. Diagnostic use of the concept of 
ressentiment, as in the accounts we examined in Part 2, tends to isolate that 
concept from the remainder of Nietzsche's account. By addressing not just 
ressentiment but the other key elements of Nietzsche's theory, we will be 
positioned to rethink Nietzsche's condemnatory attitude toward ressentiment 
3 Henry Staten, Nietzsche's Voice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 59. 
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and, therefore, the manner in which we conceive of the relationship between 
feminism and ressentiment. My analysis also suggests that we rethink how we 
use the term 'ressentiment' itself: it demonstrates that this term does not 
occupy a stable presence in Nietzsche's account, but rather describes a 
dynamic process of slave revolt which proceeds in at least three distinct 
stages. 
The current chapter is divided into two sections, the first of which 
addresses the struggle between master and slave from the perspective of 
master morality, the second of which concentrates on slave morality and 
ressentiment. The chapter's analysis calls into question three main 
assumptions about ressentiment made in the literature we have examined: 
that ressentiment is unambiguously 'bad,' that it ordains a 'non- \ 
transformative' politics, and that it is something to which the politics of the 
oppressed are 'prone'. In relation to this last assumption, my analysis does 
not refute it so much as demonstrate that the very existence of a 'politics' of 
the oppressed betrays that a ressentiment existed prior to this politics, a 
ressentiment which 'became political' and, as such, refused to be contained by 
the regime which conditioned its production. While the accounts we have 
examined hold that feminism may be regarded as 'motivated by,' 'steeped in' 
and 'prone to' ressentiment, where these are construed as points of serious 
political weakness, the analysis presented in this chapter confirms the 
motivating role ressentiment plays in the politics of emancipation, but shows 
how this works as a political strength, and demonstrates as well that feminist 
politicisation is amelioratively, perhaps transfiguratively, responsive to 
ressentiment. By examining that strand in Nietzsche's account which 
associates ressentiment with those whose lives are in large part and in non-
trivial ways determined by the wills of others, my reading seeks to illuminate 
the positively and justifiably subversive properties of ressentiment. This cuts 
against the emphasis, in the literature we have examined, upon ressentiment 
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as a necessarily self-subversive style of politics which entrenches the 
distance between the oppressed and positive political capacity.4 
Taking Nietzsche at his word when he associates ressentiment with a 
dynamic process of political revolt, my analysis will highlight the role of 
ressentiment as the affective venue in which the factually powerless craft 
positive political capacity as well as the ability to articulate, problematise, 
and attempt to ameliorate their experience of, and vulnerability to, 
victimisation. With this dimension of ressentiment in view, we will be 
positioned to see that ressentiment is neither a novel nor a wholly negative 
element of feminist politics, but rather forms a basic element of the impulse 
toward feminist politics-such that it may be said that all feminisms take 
their bearings in what Nietzsche called ressentiment, and are attuned to 
transforming the conditions under which their ressentiments are made 
possible. Seen in light of this argument, the two main political strategies 
associated with ressentiment in the literature we have examined emerge not 
as novel moments in which feminism and ressentiment meet, but rather as 
two strategies available to feminism in its necessarily broad campaign 
4 To my knowledge, apart from Zoe Sofia's initial critical response to Tapper's account 
(Zoe Sophia, 'Position Envy and the Subsumption of Feminism'), the diagnosis of 
feminism as a politics of ressentiment has been subject to critical re-appraisal in one 
other text. In an excellent work of feminist theory, Vikki Bell takes up Brown's account, 
and refers also to Tapper's, asking "Is ressentiment the basis of feminism?" (Vikki Bell, 
Feminist Imagination: genealogies in feminist theory (London: Sage, 1999), 41). 
Essentially, Bell agrees with Brown's understanding of what feminist ressentiment looks 
like (a Manichean moralism which impugns yet envies the attributes and possessions of 
its opponent), but then challenges the exhaustiveness of Brown's reading by moving to 
locate moments in feminist thought when its parameters exceed those of ressentiment. 
More specifically, Bell offers a reading of the relationship between Simone de Beauvior 
and Richard Wright, identifying moments in Beauvoir's thought when the centrality of 
women's suffering and the primacy of gender cede to "modes of connectivity across race 
and gendered boundaries" (15). There are two main differences between my critical re-
appraisal and that of Bell. Firstly, as established in Part 2, I do not accept that we 
have achieved a stable portrait of what feminist ressentiment is, nor a stable account of 
how ressentiment plays out politically. Rather, my analysis has found that the concept of 
ressentiment exhibits political mobility and diagnostic elasticity. Secondly, our critical 
reappraisals take different points of depaifiire: iii. my case, analysis of Nietzsche's 
articulation of the concept of ressentiment; in Bell's case, analysis of moments in 
feminism which exceed the parameters of Brown's particular diagnosis. Bell's argument 
is presented in Chapter 3 of Feminist Imagination (40-61). 
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against the forces whieh produce those resseritiments to which women still 
occupy a discernibly privileged relation-most notably the ressentiments 
incited by heavily circumscribed access to the pleasures of self-government 
and the exercise of worldly power. 
Over the course of the chapter we will move from thinking of ressentiment 
as a psycho-political state which exhibits a particular and unchanging set of 
symptoms, to regarding ressentiment as a dynamic process which is 
interpellated by, and which has the capacity to transform, the power relation 
from which it springs. This interpretation of ressentiment provides the division 
of labour between this chapter and the next. The next chapter is concerned 
with the mature stage of ressentimental revolt, and focuses on the strategies 
Nietzsche identifies as those which aid the powerful in disarming the threat of 
ressentiment: legalism and religious asceticism. I will argue in that chapter 
that this stage is of greatest significance for feminist political reflection, and 
as I address this stage I will reconnect with the accounts of feminist 
ressentiment that we have examined and make my concluding arguments 
regarding the relationship between feminism, ressentiment and the category 
'victim'. In this chapter and the next, my analysis of ressentiment draws on 
two particular texts: Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil (1886, hereafter 
Beyond), where he first presents his thesis on the moralities of master and 
slave, and On the Genealogy of Morals (1887, hereafter Genealogy),5 where 
5 I will be focussing on these books given their centrality for understanding what the 
concept of ressentiment offers Nietzsche's treatment of morality. However by focussing on 
these books I do not suggest that the complex of ideas within them are novel to them. 
See, for example, Richard Ira Sugarman's analysis of the consitutive themes of 
'ressentiment' as they are expressed in Nietzsche's early work, especially in his treatment 
of the pre-Socratic philosophers, in Rancor Against Time: the phenomenology of 
ressentiment (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1987). Other noteworthy contributions to 
the literature on ressentiment include: Bernard Reginster, 'Nietzsche on Ressentiment and 
Valuation,' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 57, No. 2 (June 1997): 281-
305; Irving Wohlfarth, 'Resentment Begins at Home: Nietzsche, Benjamin and the 
university,' in On Walter Benjamin: critical essays and recollection, ed. Gary Smith 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1990), 224-259; Claudia Crawford, 'Nietzsche's 
Mnemotechnics, the Theory of Ressentiment, and Freud's Topographies of the Psychical 
Apparatus,' Nietzsche-Studien Band 14 (1985): 281-297; and Eric Gans, 'The Culture of 
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this thesis is developed as Nietzsche introduces the concept of ressentiment to 
his account of morality.6 
5.1 The Fragility of Strength 
Because our encounter with Nietzsche's concept of ressentiment has been 
filtered through the diagnostic employment of that concept on the part of the 
theorists we have examined, we come to this exegetical approach with fairly 
mixed messages about how ressentiment plays out politically, but also very 
little discussion of the form of morality Nietzsche contrasts with ressentiment: 
master morality. Recall that Yeatman's analysis lofts master morality as a 
worthy model for feminist theorisations of power as capacity, while Cocks' 
analysis registered doubts about master morality. Nietzsche, Cocks 
suggests, is "starry-eyed" about the self-evaluative integrity he associates 
with master morality.7 Following an initial commentary on Nietzsche's 
Resentment,' Philosophy and Literature, Vol. 8, No. 1 (April 1984): 55-66. I also should 
note that I take up the question of ressentiment on the level in which it appears in the 
accounts of feminist ressentiment examined in Part 2: that is, the empirical or, as 
William Connolly puts it, "civic" level (Political Theory and Modernity (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1988), 171-172). This means that I concentrate on Nietzsche's account of ressentiment as 
it plays out in socio-political relations, rather than what Connolly calls the "existential" 
level where the question of ressentiment centres on the relationship between mortality 
and time, transience and eternity. I do not insist that these levels are strictly separate, 
rather this dissertation's particular remit restricts me to the former. Sugarman provides 
an excellent reading of the existential element of Nietzsche's concept of ressentiment, in 
which time is figured as the 'original injury,' in Rancor Against Time. Works by Nietzsche 
of particular relevance to ressentiment, time and metaphysics include his treatment of 
Anaximander in PTG: 1-4, his treatment of Socrates in TI: The Problem of Socrates, and 
his comments on ill-will against time in TSZ: II, On Redemption. 
6 The term 'ressentiment' first appears in one of Nietzsche's unpublished notebooks from 
1875 (Nietzsche, Kritische Gesamtausgabe: Werke, ed. Colli & Montinari, Berlin, 1973-, 
Band IV/l, 256), 12 years before it was to appear in his published work (GOM: I, 10). 
In that notebook Nietzsche writes up a critical appraisal of Eugen Diihring's book Der 
Werth des Lebens: eine philosophische betrachtung [The Value of Life: a course in 
philosophy] (Breslau: 1865). This is the same Diihring that Frederick Engels critiqued in 
his book Anti-Duhring: Herr Eugen Duhring's revolution in science (Moscow: Progress 
Publishers, 1969 [originally published 1894)). As will be discussed Chapter 6, Nietzsche 
gleaned the term 'ressentiment' from Diihring. Although Nietzsche loads the term with 
his own meaning, his penchant for using the French ressentiment was, contrary to 
popular understanding, borrowed from Diihring. For an account of this see Robin Small, 
'Ressentiment, Revenge, and Punishment: origins of the Nietzschean critique,' Utilitas, 
Vol. 9, No. 1 (March 1997): 39-58, and Chapter 10 of Small's book, Nietzsche in Context 
(Burlington: Ashgate, 2001), 171-188. 
7 Cocks, 'Augustine, Nietzsche and Contemporary Body Politics,' 155. 
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approach to the question of morality, the point raised by Cocks in particular 
is addressed in this section as we begin our exegetical approach with an 
analysis of master morality, deferring full engagement with slave morality 
and ressentiment until the following section. 
In On the Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche intervenes upon the modern 
democratic imagination in presenting a thesis which runs counter to its self-
understanding as aristocracy's decisive historical opponent. Read through 
Nietzsche's genealogy, modern democracy's apparent redistribution of power 
to the people appears as one among many reverberative consequences of an 
original "slave revolt" which began two thousand years earlier, a "protracted" 
revolt which "we no longer see because it-has been victorious."8 The project 
of the Genealogy is to make the slave revolt's victory visible, critically expose 
its manifold and protean effects, and recall what it conquered. The realm of 
moral values, treated as a window onto the "structure" of the human soul, is 
the primary ground on which this project is undertaken, for the victory of the 
slave revolt consists in its having usurped "master morality" to gain the 
dominion of "slave morality".9 Slave morality has come to stand in for 
morality as such, its value and its values taken "as given, as factual, as 
beyond question" .10 In directing a "corrosive scepticism" toward reigning 
moral values-their mode of distinguishing good from evil, faith in the greater 
value of the "good man" over the "evil man", their "unegoistic" instincts of 
"pity, self-abnegation, self-sacrifice"-Nietzsche will reveal their roots in 
slave morality. But his task is not merely that of ''hypothesis-mongering ... on 
the origin of morality''.11 
8 GOM: I, 7 
9 "The values of a human being betray something of the structure of his soul and where it 
finds its conditions of life, its true need." BGE: 268. 
lOGOM: P, 6 
1 lGOM: P, 4, 5, 6. 
. · 1 
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Nietzsche will ask "under what conditions did man devise these value 
judgements good and evil?", but also will venture a deeper line of inquiry: 
... what value do [these value judgements] themselves possess? Have 
they hitherto hindered or furthered human prosperity? Are they a sign 
of distress, of impoverishment, of the degeneration of life? Or is there 
revealed in them, on the contrary, the plenitude, force and will of life, 
its courage, certainty, and future?12 
By returning to the "twofold prehistory of good and evil", a prehistorical co-
existence of master and slave moralities, our 'morality as such' can be 
revealed in its particularity, its values and value can be judged against its 
original competitor, and our investment in it can be rethought. Nietzsche's 
gesture of returning to prehistory so as to disconcert our current and future 
investments is central to the project of the Genealogy. For Nietzsche, 
modernity's "good man" may live "more comfortably, less dangerously'' than 
did the masterful ancient, but his slavish mediocrity is bound to preempt "the 
type man" from attaining the "highest power and splendour" possible to 
him.13 For the prudent comfort and warm security of our "good man", man's 
potential is sacrificed. Hence Nietzsche perceives within our conception of 
good and evil "a symptom of regression ... likewise a danger, a seduction, a 
poison, a narcotic" through which the present lives "at the expense of the 
future" .14 
Nietzsche's laborious decipherment of "the entire long hieroglyphic 
record ... of the moral past of mankind" has been conducted in the service of a 
future in which "a man who justifies man" might find conditions of 
possibility .15 In calling for readers capable of like acts of exegetical 
12GOM: P, 3 
13GOM: P. 6; I, 11. 
14GOM: P, 6. Emphasis in original. 
15GOM: P, 7; I, 12. Emphasis in original. 
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decipherment, esoteric readers with ears for the future he beckons, Nietzsche 
invests his book with a potent role in generating this future. 16 Hence, as a 
number of commentators on the Genealogy have argued, this text has a 
performative dimension and, with all the vigour of a manifesto, aims to incite 
a level of self-reflection in the reader.17 The Genealogy is something of a pirate 
ship cutting through the finer sensitivities of the modern soul, exposing the 
antecedent forms, indeed the inception, of that soul, and moving to call its 
orientation toward the values of liberal democracy into question.18 
Nietzsche's first specific mention of the moralities of master and slave 
appears in the closing stages of Beyond, and the twofold prehistory of 
morality then forms the subject of the Genealogy's first essay.19 Let us turn 
first to what Nietzsche has to say about these moralities in Beyond, for he 
adds an interesting range of qualifications to his thesis. Nietzsche writes of 
having wandered through "the many subtler and coarser moralities which 
16GOM: P, 8. 
17See, for example, Richard White's argument that the Genealogy is a performative 
critique in his chapter 'The Return of the Master: an interpretation of Nietzsche's 
Genealogy of Morals,' in Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: essays on Nietzsche's Genealogy of 
Morals, ed. Richard Schacht (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 63-75 (A 
revised and developed version of this piece forms Chapter 6 of White's book Nietzsche 
and the Problem of Sovereignty (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1997), 124-149). Kelly 
Oliver's insightful reading of the Genealogy highlights that the performative dimension of 
this text begins with the act of reading it: " ... just as Nietzsche proposes an active and 
a reactive morality in Genealogy, he proposes an active and a reactive reading." 
Womanizing Nietzsche: philosophy's relation to the "feminine" (New York: Routledge, 
1995), 18. Malcolm Bull makes a similar observation in his account of strategies for 
reading Nietzsche, 'Where is the Anti-Nietzsche?,' New Left Review No. 3 (May/June, 
2000): 121-145. 
18There is a broad literature on Nietzsche's treatment of liberalism. The following 
selection of references give some sense of the scope: David Owen, Nietzsche, Politics and 
Modernity: a critique of liberal reason (London: Sage, 1995); Fredrick Appel, Nietzsche 
Contra Democracy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999); Ofelia Schutte, Beyond 
Nihilism: Nietzsche without masks (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); Mark 
Warren, Nietzsche and Political Thought (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988); Tracey B. 
Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1975); see also William Connolly's discussion of 
Nietzschean ethics in relation to liberal democracy in his book Political Theory and 
Modernity as well as the exchange between he and Mark Redhead on this topic: William 
E. Connolly, 'Reworking the Democratic Imagination,' and Mark Redhead, 'Nietzsche 
and Liberal Democracy: a relationship of antagonistic indebtedness?', The Journal of 
Political Philosophy 512 (June 1997): 183-193; 194-202. 
19BGE: 260. See also BGE: 195, 261 and HAH: 45. 
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have so far been prevalent on earth" until he "finally discovered two basic 
types [of morality] and one basic difference."20 I quote him at length as he 
introduces this discovery and qualifies it: 
There are master morality and slave morality-I add immediately that 
in all higher and mixed cultures there also appear attempts at 
mediation between these two moralities, and yet more often the 
interpenetration and mutual misunderstanding of both, and at times 
they occur directly alongside each other-even in the same human 
being, within a single soul. The moral discrimination of values has 
originated either among a ruling group whose consciousness of its 
difference from the ruled group was accompanied by delight-or 
among the ruled, the slaves and dependants of every degree.21 
In this passage Nietzsche presents us with a dyad of two discrete types, 
inhabiting discrete realms within one social order (ruling and ruled), before 
leading us to imagine these types "mixing" (or, as he puts it in the following 
aphorism, "intermarrying"22): mediating with one another, interpenetrating 
yet misunderstanding one another, co-existing alongside one another, and all 
of this not just within the bounds a single culture but, most interestingly, a 
single human being. 
This is not surprising in the sense that Nietzsche's discernment of two 
distinct types does not bind him to a vision of them as static or statically 
discrete, and his argument in the Genealogy that one type has overthrown the 
other, as well as his albeit less straightforward concern with overcoming 
slave morality, necessarily involve envisioning their interaction. Unlike 
Hesiod, Nietzsche resists separating and serialising the master and slave 
types, and their respective perspectives on the same social order, into 
20BGE: 260. 
21 BGE: 260. 
22BGE: 261. 
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distinct epochs: rather, his point of departure is the co-existence of and 
struggle between these types (within cultures, within persons).23 
These qualifications form a prelude to the drama Nietzsche will weave 
around these typical moralities in the Genealogy, a drama which works at one 
level to place us as the heirs of slave morality, cut off from the masterful 
ancients and left to consider whether and how this chasm may be breached. 
But one of the means by which Nietzsche injects the Genealogy's drama with 
performative energy is by returning to a firmly dyadic articulation of the 
master and slave types, confining their co-existence to prehistory, and 
treating the struggle between these types as the beginning of the end for 
master morality. So Nietzsche makes a shift away from an initial openness, 
in the passage from Beyond cited above, to slave and master morality's 
various modes of co-existence, toward a firmly dyadic typology in the 
Genealogy. Let us register, then, that diagnostic use of Nietzsche's thesis 
draws specifically on the latter text since such use imposes the impression of 
stasis and static discretion Nietzsche mitigates against with these initial 
qualifications, avoiding consideration of what co-existence and admixture of 
these types might look like or mean, and buttressing a conception of the 
object of diagnosis-a culture, a person, a politics-as unified, purely one or 
the other 'type'. 
Nietzsche's first articulation of his thesis in Beyond foreshadows the 
etymological labour of the Genealogy's first essay in discussing the 
contradistinction between the noble mode of distinguishing 'good' from 'bad' 
and the slavish mode of distinguishing 'evil' from 'good'.24 As we will see, in 
sketching these distinct modes of valuation Nietzsche allows us to envisage 
two distinct forms of self-relation and paths to self-affirmation. But let us for 
23For Nietzsche's comments on this move of Hesiod see GOM: I, 11. 
24BGE: 260. 
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the moment note that Nietzsche maintains from the outset that the concept 
'good' has a double origin (hence there is no universally true 'good'), and that 
'bad' and 'evil' are of different origin (noble and slavish respectively). To 
further advance his alternative account of morality, Nietzsche also moves to 
counter the view prevalent among historians of morals that the origins of the 
concept 'good' lie in the positive evaluation of beneficial acts on the part of 
those who benefit from them (and contrawise for the concept 'bad').25 
Disputing this belief in an inextricable link between morality and utility, 
Nietzsche claims, rather, that "moral designations were everywhere first 
applied to human beings and only later, derivatively, to actions."26 This point 
is especially important for clearing the ground so as to foster recognition of 
the mode of valuation Nietzsche will uncover in the case of master morality. 
Firstly this is because master morality is a mode which posits values: "the 
noble type of man experiences itself as determining values; it does not need 
approval ... it knows itself to be that which first accords honor to things; it is 
value-creating."27 The noble derives his values autarkically and authentically, 
without need of external criteria-"approval"-of any kind. The evaluative 
perspective of those who benefit or suffer from his deeds does not figure in his 
evaluation of his deeds, he is not "selfless" in that sense. Indeed, Nietzsche 
will attribute the eventual centrality, within moral thought, of the utilitarian 
distinction between selfless and selfish actions to the triumph of slave 
morality-which is, he notes in Beyond, "essentially a morality of utility"-
and will in turn construe the victory of the value of selflessness as the matrix 
of asceticism, of self-denial. 28 
25BGE: 260, GOM: I, 2, 3, 4. 
26BGE: 260. Emphasis in original. 
27BGE: 260. Emphasis in original. 
28BGE: 260. 
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Secondly, the point that moral designations originally were applied to 
human beings rather than actions is important for fostering recognition of 
master morality since it is a mode of valuation which begins with self-
evaluation. As befits the noble's evaluative autarchy, nobility is both the 
matrix and first object of valuation: "Everything [the noble] knows as part of 
itself it honours: such a morality is self-glorification."29 The 'good' of master 
morality-and, moreover, the first origin of the word 'good,' as Nietzsche's 
etymologies show-pertains, therefore, to the nobles themselves: 
... the judgement "good" did not originate with those to whom 
"goodness" was shown! Rather it was "the good" themselves, that it to 
say, the noble, the powerful, high-stationed, and high-minded, who 
felt and established themselves and their actions as good, that is, of 
the first rank, in contradistinction to all the low, low-minded, common 
and plebeian. It was out of this pathos of distance that they first seized 
the right to create values and to coin names for values: what had they 
to do with utility!30 
Key to Nietzsche's distinction between the moralities of master and slave is 
their respective manners of directing the evaluating look. The mastery of the 
master's "value-positing eye"31 consists in its having been directed firstly 
toward self-evaluation, where it posits 'good' as "its positive basic concept-
filled with life and passion through and through-'we noble ones, we good, 
beautiful happy ones!"'.32 Nietzsche notes further that "the noble man ... 
conceives the basic concept 'good' in advance and spontaneously out of 
himself',33 The crucial point here is that the noble's high self-regard does not, 
therefore, require a foil. As Gilles Deleuze puts it, "no comparison interferes 
29BGE: 260. For Nietzsche's further characterisations of nobility in this vein see also BGE: 
265, 287 and 293. 
30GOM: I, 2. Emphasis in original. 
31GOM: I, 10. 
32GOM: I, 10. 
33GOM: I, 11. 
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with the principle" of the master's affirmative self-evaluation.34 Rather, 
Nietzsche writes: 
the noble mode of valuation seeks its opposite only so as to affirm 
itself more gratefully and triumphantly-its negative concept "low," 
"common," "bad" is only a subsequently-invented pale, contrasting 
image in relation to its positive basic concept ... 35 
Deleuze's analysis insists that the ordering of valuation-the sequential 
manner in which the evaluating look is directed-is crucial for Nietzsche's 
account. As Deleuze puts it, what distinguishes the master is that he "begins 
by saying: 'I am good' ... [he] does not wait to be called good."36 Working from 
Nietzsche's language in Beyond, we might say that the noble's evaluative 
perspective has a foreground and a background. 37 In the foreground lies the 
noble's celebratory experience of himself as politically, existentially and 
abundantly powerful: "the feeling of fullness, of power that seeks to overflow, 
the happiness of high tension, the consciousness of wealth that would give 
and bestow".38 In the background (beyond, below, at a distance) lies his 
"subsequently-invented pale": the low, the common, the 'bad'-that is, the 
ruled. Nietzsche notes that the noble despises and feels contempt for the ruled, 
where these terms enhance his spatial metaphor. As distinct from the term 
hatred, which Nietzsche reserves to describe the attitude of the slave, 
'despise' and 'contempt' connote "looking down from a superior height".39 
Hence the 'good' and 'bad' of master morality pertain, respectively, to "'noble' 
34Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Colombia 
University Press, 1983), 120. 
35GOM: I, 10. 
36Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 119. Emphasis in original. 
37BGE: 260. For a discussion of the use of foregrounding and backgrounding as a trope in 
Nietzsche's writing see Penelope Deutscher, "Is it not remarkable that Nietzsche ... 
should have hated Rousseau?' Woman, femininity: distancing Nietzsche from Rousseau,' 
in Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory, ed. Paul Patton (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 
1993), 162-188. 
38BGE: 260. 
39BGE: 260, GOM: I, 10. 
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and 'contemptible"', and that at this stage these pertain, respectively, to 
rulers and ruled, high and low.40 
Shortly we will consider Joan Cocks' scepticism about the evaluative 
autarchy Nietzsche identifies with the figure of the master. But let us for the 
moment register that, for Nietzsche, the master's mode of evaluation makes 
possible a self-relation which appears to be characterised by perfection and, 
relatedly, honesty. This relation is 'perfect' in the sense that it appears to 
enable an absolute form of self-appropriation. To employ Derrida's term, this 
masterful self does not have a constitutive outside. His 'opposite,' Nietzsche 
argues, is not necessary to his affirmation of self, making his self-relation 
non-dialectical: his 'good and bad' is not a unity of opposites, his mode of 
valuation is in this sense aneconomic as it need not trade on a debt to the 
other. The other is not "needed" but rather is "sought" as a further source of 
self-affirmation: the other provides a "contrasting shade" rather than a 
contrast as such.41 Nietzsche's notes on the happiness of the well-born 
exemplify this: "The 'well-born' felt themselves to be 'happy'; they did not have 
to establish their happiness artificially by examining their enemies, or to 
persuade themselves, deceive themselves, that they were happy".42 
The 'perfect' character of the master's self-relation links directly to the 
'honest' character of this relation. This can be seen most clearly in 
Nietzsche's discussion of nobility in relation to that mode of self-deception he 
calls vanity-it is no accident that his first presentation of his thesis on the 
moralities of master and slave in Beyond is followed immediately by a 
40BGE: 260. 
41GOM: I, 11. 
42GOM: I, 10. Emphasis in original. 
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discussion ofvanity.43 In Beyond, Nietzsche suggests that vanity is unknown 
to nobility: 
Among the things that may be hardest to understand for a noble 
human being is vanity: he will be tempted to deny it, where another 
type of human being could not find it more palpable. The problem for 
him is to imagine people who seek to create a good opinion of 
themselves which they do not have of themselves-and thus also do 
not "deserve" -and who nevertheless end up believing this good 
opinion of themselves ... He will say, for example: "I may be mistaken 
about my value and nevertheless demand that my value, exactly as I 
define it, should be acknowledged by others as well-but this is no 
vanity ... " 44 
These comments effectively foreshadow Nietzsche's portrayal, in the 
Genealogy, of the master as one who "lives in trust and openness with 
himself'.45 The master, at once self-defining and self-affirming, is essentially 
impervious to others, leaving no room for him to deceive himself about 
himself since he defines and affirms all that is and of his self.46 
So while the master may be egoistic and self-glorifying, he is not vain. 
Nietzsche construes vanity as a form of self-deception rife among those 
unused to "positing values" and, therefore, unacquainted with the arts of 
autarchic self-definition-the 'bad,' the common, the weak, the low and, 
interestingly for our purposes, women.47 This distinction between noble self-
honesty and slavish self-deception, between truth and mendacity, also has its 
basis in Nietzsche's etymological labours. As part of his unpacking of a range 
of words denoting 'good' he finds that noble self-designations, mostly notably 
those of ancient Greece, associate nobility with truthfulness: "we truthful 
431 am grateful to Ruth Abbey for discussing this aspect of Nietzsche's account with me. 
44BGE: 261. 
45GOM: I, 10. 
46GOM: I, 10. 
47BGE: 261. A discussion of 'feminine ressentiment' is undertaken via Max Scheler's work 
on ressentiment in the following chapter. 
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ones".48 This is complemented by a conception of "the common people" as 
"liars". 49 
The key feature of Nietzsche's distinction between the moralities of 
master and slave is the inability of the slave to value himself without first 
devaluing the master-the slave thereby reverses the evaluating look, 
pursuing a path to self-affirmation which begins, rather than ends, in 
negation of the other.50 As we will note in more detail in the following section, 
the slave's sense of self is predicated upon an initial devaluation of the 
master, hence this sense of self depends upon another (Nietzsche writes: "this 
need to direct one's view outward instead of back to oneself-is of the essence 
of ressentiment"5l ). As such it can only proceed as an artificially contrived 
vanity, a counterfeit version of the master's truly autarchic mode of 
valuation-the slave lacks integrity, in both senses of the term. This places 
the evaluative autarchy of the master at the centre of Nietzsche's distinction 
between the moralities of master and slave as modes of self-relation. But will 
this centre hold? It is precisely this autarchy which Cocks would have us call 
into question. Nietzsche, she argues, is "starry-eyed ... about the morality of 
the master" since it would seem that "the substance of the master is 
determined by the dialectic of the master/slave relation and not by physiology 
or instinct."52 Cocks is suggesting that the "substance" of the master-his 
position within an order of rank as evaluatively equal to dominance, and his 
ability to affirm this experience-is achieved relationally and, in Nietzsche's 
sense from above, 'artificially,' rather than autonomously and naturally. 
Hence, for Cocks, the master can only be posed in being opposed, he can only 
48GOM: I, 5. 
49BGE: 260, GOM: I, 5. 
50GOM: I, 10. 
51GOM: I, 10. Emphasis in original. 
52Ibid., 155. 
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appear to himself and to others as 'good' by standing in contrast to that which 
he devalues as 'bad,' making his 'good and bad' a unity of opposites-a unity 
to which Nietzsche would not readily admit.53 
Cocks does not want to allow Nietzsche to confound a conception of 
dominance as wrought through a system of valuation in which a devalued 
alterity provides the condition of possibility for the politically superior's 
apparently inherent preeminence-a conception of dominance which, since 
Simone de Beauvoir, has been central to feminist understanding of the 
relation between sexual dualism and male domination.54 Here, Cocks goes 
against Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche. For Deleuze, Nietzsche's treatment of 
the relation of master to slave aims precisely to press against dialectic 
treatment of this relation.55 Moreover, to correct Nietzsche's treatment of 
this relation through recourse to the dialectic is to apprehend this relation 
through the eyes of the slave: the dialectic, Deleuze argues, is "the ideology of 
ressentiment."56 However, there is support for Cocks' point. To begin with, 
53Jn a similar claim, Richard Solomon notes that Nietzsche's account of the struggle 
between master and slave vindicates Hegel's treatment of the lordship/bondsman 
rel-ation.-See Sel-omon's 'One Hundred Years of Ressentiment: Nietzsche's-Genealogy of -
Morals,' in Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: essays on Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals, ed. 
Richard Schacht (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 105. 
54 As Beauvoir writes, "The terms masculine and feminine are used symmetrically only as a 
matter of form, as on legal papers. In actuality the relation of the two sexes is not quite 
like that of two electrical poles, for man represents both the positive and the neutral, as 
is indicated by the common use of man to designate human beings in general; whereas 
woman represents only the negative, defined by limiting criteria, without reciprocity .... 
She is defined and differentiated with reference to man and not he with reference to her; 
she is the incidental, the inessential as opposed to the essential. He is the Subject, he is 
the Absolute-she is the other .... Things become clear if, following Hegel, we find in 
consciousness itself a fundamental hostility towards every other consciousness; the 
subject can be posed only in being opposed-he sets himself up as the essential, as 
opposed to the other, the inessential, the object." Simone de Beauvior, The Second Sex, 
trans. H. M. Parshley (London: Picador, 1988 [originally published 1949]), 15-17, my 
emphasis. In de Beauvoir's schema, man's situation as the One is conditional upon 
woman's alterity. 
55Deleuze argues centrally that Nietzsche had a "profound knowledge of the Hegelian 
movement, from Hegel to Stimer", and that it is against this movement that Nietzsche 
directs his "polemic" (Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals carries the subtitle 'A 
Polemic'), Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 162. 
56Ibid., 121. In this vein, Deleuze notes: "Underneath the Hegelian image of the master 
we always find the slave." Ibid., 10. 
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Nietzsche's etymological labours reveal a "rule" in which "a concept denoting 
political superiority always resolves itself into a concept denoting superiority 
of soul."57 This rule reconvenes the process of evaluation Nietzsche, and 
certainly Deleuze's Nietzsche, associates with the master. With this rule, the 
master's political superiority, his commanding position, his capacity to 
inspire obedience-that is, his distance from and contrast with the slave-in 
turn is cast by the master as evidence of his essential superiority. In view of 
this rule, the master's self-affirmative movement from, as Deleuze describes, 
'I am good therefore he is bad' appears to contain a further move: 'I govern 
him, therefore I am good and he is bad.'58 
This is not the reactive constitution of self that Nietzsche will identify 
with slave morality. However there is a basic reactivity within this self-
evaluation, a "need to direct one's view outward," an other against which this 
self-constitution must press, and most significantly an other present in the 
first moment of evaluation. The master does not wait for the other to call him 
good, but in calling himself good he is indebted to the other's distant 
demonstration of reverent obedience, which signifies his goodness to him.59 
This is the role of the relational pathos of distance in this mode of evaluation. 
It would seem, then, that the master's self-evaluation is not so much 
independent of the other, but differently dependent upon the other. Hence 
Nietzsche's characterisation of aristocracy's elite class as dependent upon 
the lower orders for their capacity to achieve "higher states of being"-as in 
his statement in Beyond that this class "needs slavery".60 
57GOM: I, 6. 
58Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 119. 
59J suspect this is why Rosalyn Diprose argues that the "one limitation" of Nietzsche's 
approach to self-constitution is his suggestion that "an aesthetics of self can avoid 
incurring a debt to the other." The Bodies of Women: ethics, embodiment and sexual 
difference (New York: Routledge, 1994), 101. 
60BGE: 257. My emphasis. 
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Further support for Cocks' desire that the relation between master and 
slave be read as containing a dialectical movement can be found when we 
pursue her suggestion that the political superiority of the master is, for 
Nietzsche, based on "physiology'' and "instinct".61 In pursuing this element of 
Nietzsche's portrait of the master we will collect the basics for a reading of 
the relation of non-reciprocal recognition between Nietzsche's master and 
slave as directly precipitous of the slave's ressentiment. Nietzsche's 'official 
attitude of condemnation' toward the slave, I will suggest, wears most thin 
when we discern that the form of nobility he prizes has, by his own account, 
the character that Jacob Burckhardt ascribed to Renaissance despotism: 
"As despotisms rise, grow, and are consolidated, so grows in their midst the 
hidden element which must produce their dissolutions and ruin."62 
Cocks' claim regarding the role of physiology and instinct in Nietzsche's 
account suggests that Nietzsche naturalises the political superiority of the 
master, presenting him as inherently equal to rule. What is the basis of this 
interpretation? It proceeds from Nietzsche's reference to this figure as the 
consummate embodiment of the will to power in its healthiest, strongest and 
least fettered guise. 63 At several points in Beyond and the Genealogy, the 
noble is presented as an unregulated, uncalculated, naturally occurring 
creature, a piece of fate conducting instinctive drive and will, whose animal 
capacity for active, violent creativity is bound to inspire fear and obedience 
in, so as to impose ordered form upon, those of weaker physiology and more 
peaceful disposition. In these moments Nietzsche sets the noble in relation to 
61Jacques Derrida and Henry Staten also raise questions about the presence of dialectic in 
Nietzsche's treatment of nobility/enslavement, strength/weakness, activity/ reactivity. 
See Jacques Derrida and Maurizio Ferraris, A Taste for the Secret, trans. Giacomo Donis 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), 34 and Chapter 1 of Staten's Nietzsche's Voice, 8-39. 
62J acob Burckhardt, The Civilisation of the Renaissance in Italy (London: Phaidon Press, 
1995 [originally published 1860]), 7. 
63Jn this vein, Nietzsche characterises the body politic of the noble class as "an incarnate 
will to power", BGE: 259. 
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a primordial Barbarism reflective of man in his bestial state-hence his use 
of the image of lightening to capture the violence and spontaneity of action of 
this figure ("they appear as lightening appears"64), as well as his reference to 
him as a bird and beast ofprey.65 For Nietzsche, this primordial incarnation 
of the noble-"whose nature was still natural", who was "still in possession of 
unbroken strength of will and lust for power"-acts as life itself acts. 66 Life, 
he writes, 
is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and 
weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of one's own forms, 
incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitation ... life simply is 
will to power. 67 
Nietzsche's alignment of the noble with the essential operation of life forms a 
core theme within Nietzsche's account of the inception of politically organised 
society at the beginning of history-an account which aims to displace "that 
sentimentalism which would have [the state] begin with a "contract"".68 
In tune with his alignment of the noble with life, Nietzsche uses maternity 
as a metaphor to describe "how the 'state' began on earth".69 The natural, 
instinct-governed process of reproduction aligns with the "instinctive", 
"involuntary, unconscious" artistry of the noble-Barbarian as he performs a 
violent imposition of formal organisation upon (European) humanity.70 
64GOM: II, 17, see also GOM: I, 13. 
65See GOM: II, 17 and BGE: 257. 
66BGE: 257. 
67BGE: 259, Nietzsche makes the same claim in GOM: II, 11: "To speak of just or unjust 
in itself is quite senseless; in itself, of course, no injury, assault, exploitation, destruction 
can be "unjust," since life operates essentially, that is in its basic functions, through 
injury, assault, exploitation, destruction and simply cannot be thought at all without 
this character." 
68GOM: II, 17; see also BGE: 257, where Nietzsche refers to such sentimentalism as 
"humanitarian illusion". 
69GOM: II, 17. 
70GOM: II, 17. A number of Nietzsche's feminist commentators have provided excellent 
accounts of the role of maternity in Nietzsche's metaphorics. See, for example: Kelly 
Oliver, Womanizing Nietzsche, 129-193 and 'Nietzsche's Abjection,' in Nietzsche and the 
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Nietzsche describes this process in the following passage from the 
Genealogy's second essay: 
... the welding of a hitherto unchecked and shapeless populace into a 
firmer form was not only instituted by an act of violence but also 
carried to its conclusion by nothing but acts of violence-[ ... ] the oldest 
"state" thus appeared as a fearful tyranny, an oppressive and 
remorseless machine ... I employed the word "state"; it is obvious what 
is meant-some pack of blond beasts of prey, a conqueror and master 
race which, organised for war and with the ability to organise, 
unhesitatingly lays its terrible claws upon a populace perhaps 
tremendously superior in numbers but still formless and nomad ... He 
who can command, he who is by nature "master," he who is violent in 
act and bearing-what has he to do with contracts! One does not 
reckon with such natures; they come like fate, without reason, 
consideration, or pretext ... wherever they appear something new soon 
arises, a ruling structure that lives ... Their work is an instinctive 
creation and imposition of forms; they are the most unconscious artists 
there are ... They do not know what guilt, responsibility, or 
consideration are, these born organisers; they exemplify that terrible 
artists' egoism that has the look of bronze and knows itself justified to 
all eternity in its "work," like a mother in her child.71 
In Nietzsche's telling, the inception of politically organised society proceeds 
from the noble-Barbarian's imposition of custom through the establishment 
of an order of rank ("a ruling structure that lives"), an imposition which 
performs a transfiguration of beast and prey ('artist' and 'raw material') into 
master and slave. 
Feminine, ed. Peter J. Burgard (Virginia: University of Virginia Press, 1994), 53-67; 
Sarah Kofman, 'A Fantastical Genealogy: Nietzsche's family romance,' Nietzsche and the 
Feminine, ed. Peter J. Burgard (Virginia: University of Virginia Press, 1994) 35-52; 
Caroline Joan S. Picart, Resentment and the "Feminine" in Nietzsche's Politico-Aesthetics, 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4; Alison Ainley, "'Ideal Selfishness": Nietzsche's metaphor of 
maternity,' in Exceedingly Nietzsche: aspects of contemporary Nietzsche interpretation, eds. 
David Farrell Krell and David Wood (New York: Routledge, 1988); and Jean Graybeal, 
'Ecce Homo: abjection and "the feminine",' in Feminist Interpretations of Friedrich 
Nietzsche, eds. Kelly Oliver and Marilyn Pearsall (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1998), 152-172. 
71GOM: II, 17. 
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Let us attend to two striking features of Nietzsche's account of this event. 
The first is Nietzsche's emphasis upon the guiltless character of the noble-
Barbarian's violent and oppressive deeds. The moral technology required to 
derive the concept of guilt so as to interpret these deeds as blameworthy-
that is, as the deeds of one who could have behaved otherwise-is yet to 
appear, and as we will see it will only appear when the ressentiment of the 
slaves becomes creative and conditions the possibility of "bad conscience" 
through the formation of the concepts of guilt and free will. At this stage, 
then, the noble-Barbarian is a guiltless imposer of form. As violent and 
oppressive as he is, he literally can do no 'wrong': to rail against his deeds 
would be as fruitless as asking lightening not to flash or a lion not to feast. 
The second striking feature, however, is Nietzsche's persistent switching 
between the language of nature and that of second nature or culture. Any 
sense that these may exist in a strictly dichotomous relation is displaced as 
the noble-Barbarian appears at once as "beast" and "artist"-the odd 
juxtaposition of the two is captured in the phrase "born organiser"-while the 
state, we are to assume, arises organically from the instinctive deeds of the 
noble-Barbarian, but is referred to via the decidedly inorganic term 
"machine". At this point, we certainly have the option of dismissing these 
intimations that the noble-Barbarian is more than a creature of instinct and 
confirming Cocks' interpretation that, for Nietzsche, the political superiority 
of this figure simply is based on his being a naturally superior beast of prey. 
Alternatively we can, as I suggest, ask after the complicating factor of 
Nietzsche's apparent equivocation on this point. 
In the passage above, as in others, Nietzsche does appear to engage a 
straightforward naturalisation of the nobility of the noble by presenting his 
political superiority as an organic fait accompli. But there is also something 
disingenuous about this presentation of the noble-Barbarian as an utterly 
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unrepressed pure medium of natural instinct. The noble-Barbarian may be a 
''born organiser" but his "ability to organise" signifies a capacity to mediate-
ie. control, repress, hold in check, regulate-instinct: it signifies, in short, that 
the noble-Barbarian does not just initiate the cultivation of a second nature in 
man through his state-building artistry, but has himself already made a leap 
into a second nature. Perhaps, as the initiator of socio-political organisation, 
the noble-Barbarian must necessarily be regarded as a liminal figure who 
oversees rather than fits neatly into one side of the divide between "beast of 
prey" and "civilised animal".72 
This explanation finds support when we consider those moments in which 
Nietzsche's characterisation of the noble-Barbarian simply does not square 
with his presentation of him as an unrepressed, instinct-governed beast of 
prey. In these moments Nietzsche upholds his characterisation of the noble-
Barbarian as guiltless-ie. free of bad conscience-but he nonetheless 
attributes "conscience" to this figure. In the Genealogy he calls it an "innocent 
conscience", while in Beyond he calls it "good conscience", noting that the 
"predominance" of original noble castes "did not lie mainly in their physical 
strength but in strength of soul".73 Moreover, in a passage from the 
Genealogy's first essay Nietzsche presents the nobles as "men who are held 
so sternly in check inter pares [among equals] by custom, respect, usage, 
gratitude" and who "in their relations with one another show themselves so 
resourceful in consideration, self control, delicacy, loyalty, pride, and 
friendship".74 Nietzsche's attribution of conscience, soul and self-control to 
the noble-Barbarian is at odds with his presentation of him as incalculably 
bestial. Lions and lightening are, by his own account, lacking in these, and 
72GOM: II, 11. 
73GOM: I, 10, BGE: 258, 257. My emphasis. 
74GOM: I, 11. 
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conscience necessarily implies some repression of and mastery over instinct, 
some level of subjective intentionality and calculation, some development of a 
faculty through which instinct may be 'held in check' so as to permit 
deliberation in relation to custom. 
This explanation is confirmed and developed by Aaron Ridley in his 
illuminating reading of the Genealogy. Ridley reveals that Nietzsche's 
equivocation about the noble-Barbarian's relation to conscience is an effect of 
Nietzsche's effort to maintain the Genealogy's firmly dyadic articulation of 
the master and slave types. Because the Genealogy sets up an exclusive 
relation between the slave and the possibility of bad conscience (the 
consciousness of guilt, an understanding that one could have chosen to 
behave otherwise), Nietzsche strategically but confusingly understates that 
"neutral, ubiquitous"75 form of conscience that the noble-Barbarian shares 
with the slave: a form of conscience "that man, insofar as he is at all social" 
possesses.76 This neutral, ubiquitous form is the bad conscience "in its 
beginnings", conscience in its "raw state": a minimally formed capacity for 
self-reflection and self-directed action attendant upon an initial repression 
and internalisation of instinct.77 Even though we can not doubt his 
admiration for the noble in his bestial guise, Nietzsche's presentation of the 
noble as a pure conductor of untrammelled instinct is a textual device which 
serves a conceptual purpose. Ridley explains that to forward his effort to 
"distinguish the nobles from the slaves ... as sharply as possible", Nietzsche 
"decides to make his nobles as unrepressed as he can: he turns them into 
75Aaron Ridley, Nietzsche's Conscience: six character studies from the Genealogy (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1998), 19. See also David Owen and Aaron Ridley, 'Dramatis 
Personae: Nietzsche, culture and human types,' in Why Nietzsche Still? refiections on 
drama, culture and politics, ed. Alan D. Schrift (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2000), 136-153. 
76Jbid., 21. This element of Nietzsche's account also is discussed in Bruce Detweiler's book 
Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1990), 123-125. 
77GOM: II, 17. 
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beasts".78 Ridley then pinpoints the conceptual issue which arises from 
Nietzsche's presentation of the noble as a beast of prey: "the problem, of 
course, is that only the custom governed-that is, the repressed-can 
become custom imposers."79 Ridley's corrective posits that the "bad 
conscience in its 'raw state' ... characterises nobles and slaves alike. Both are 
repressed to some degree, both are internalised to some degree."80 After 
noting the significance of the terms 'repression' and 'internalisation' in 
Nietzsche's account of man having been "'imprisoned in the "state"", we will 
see that the political situation which ensues from the noble's state-building 
artistry is characterised by degrees of repression determined by class 
stratification.81 This, I will suggest, is where a dialectic movement can be 
traced in the civilising process Nietzsche describes. 
The concept of repression is key to Nietzsche's account, in the Genealogy's 
second essay, of the particular cast of human experience and the particular 
kind of human potential made possible by "the most fundamental change" 
man has experienced: "that change which occurred when he found himself 
finally enclosed within the walls of society and of peace."82 This enclosure 
initiates a "forcible sundering [of man] from his animal past ... a leap and 
plunge into new surroundings and conditions of existence, a declaration of war 
against the old instincts upon which his strength, joy, and terribleness has 
rested hitherto."83 
Nietzsche's answer to the question as to how man's relation with instinct 
shifted during this fundamental change is very precise. The "wild" instincts-
78Ibid., 20. 
79Ibid., 20. 
80Ibid., 22. 
81GOM: II, 22. 
82GOM: 16. 
83GOM: II, 16. 
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"hostility, cruelty, joy in persecuting, in attacking, in change, in 
destruction"-were repressed, "turned inward", such that the quality and 
quantity of their force was directed against man himself: 
All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly turn 
inward-this is what I call the internalisation of man: thus it was that 
man first developed what was later called his "soul." The entire inner 
world, originally as thin as if it were stretched between two 
membranes, expanded and extended itself, acquired depth, breadth, 
and height, in the same measure as outward discharge was 
inhibited. 84 
Nietzsche conceives of the civilising process as a form of sickness which 
proceeds as frustrated yet generative self-torture. The instincts, in being 
repressed, nonetheless retain their force: "they had not suddenly ceased to 
make their usual demands! Only it was hardly or rarely possible to humor 
them: as a rule they had to seek new and, as it were, subterranean 
gratifications."85 The instincts are present yet inhibited by social straight 
jacketing and the threat of punishment, and action increasingly is mediated 
through consciousness. This generative state of tension creates a mode of 
being marked by an expanded interiority, which is in turn the seat of a new, 
second nature range of human capacities and potentials. Hence Nietzsche's 
characterisation of this "animal soul turned against itself' as ''pregnant with 
a future".86 Importantly, the agents of this process of internalisation are 
"those fearful bulwarks with which the political organisation protected itself 
against the old instincts of freedom-punishments belong among these 
bulwarks."87 
84GOM: II, 16. Emphasis in original. 
85GOM: II, 16. 
86GOM: II, 16. Emphasis in original. 
87GOM: II, 16. 
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For our purposes, this signals that the narrative of Nietzsche's second 
essay is one in which the state-building artistry of the noble appears as the 
primary agent of that "paradoxical task" which forms the subject of that 
essay: "To breed an animal with the right to make promises-is not that the 
paradoxical task that nature has set itself in the case of man?" 88 The 
generative self-torture enacted within the walls of society makes possible an 
agentic human who is "calculable, regular," who can "think causally'' and 
posit goals, who has "a real memory of the will" with which to "ordain the 
future in advance".89 Nietzsche suggests that the telos of this process, which 
has not yet been attained, is the sovereign individual: a new breed of noble90 
in whom "responsibility''-"power over oneself and one's fate"-has become 
"the dominating instinct."91 However in the Genealogy's first essay Nietzsche 
already has foreshadowed his account of how the journey toward this 
sovereign individual was derailed: the slave and his "descendants", in resisting 
their oppression, took over as the "instruments of culture", thus initiating a 
"regression of mankind". 92 
Keeping the second essay's treatment of repression in mind, when we 
return to the first essay's account of the struggle between master and slave 
we can read this struggle as one between a noble class which is minimally 
88GOM: II, 1. Emphasis in original. 
89GOM: II, 1. Emphasis in original. David Owen provides an illuminating account of this 
process in his book Nietzsche, Weber, Foucault and the Ambivalence of Reason (London: 
Routledge, 1994), 33-62. 
90r conceive of the sovereign individual as a new breed of noble owing to the language 
Nietzsche uses in the one aphorism in which he sketches this figure. This language has 
a discernible rapport with the first essay's characterisation of the original nobles as fear-
inspiring and superior: "This emancipated individual, with the actual right to make 
promises, this master of a free will, this sovereign man-how should he not be aware of 
his superiority over all those who lack the right to make promises and stand as their 
own guarantors, of how much trust, how much fear, how much reverence he arouses-he 
"deserves" all three-and of how this mastery over himself also necessarily gives him 
mastery over circumstances, over nature, over all more short-willed and unreliable 
creatures." GOM: II, 2. Emphasis in original. 
91GOM: II, 2. 
92GOM: I, 11. Emphasis in original. 
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repressed and a slave class which is maximally repressed. One of the sources 
of Nietzsche's admiration of the original noble is that the particular form his 
rule assumes within the aristocratic polis is one which allows him a flexible, 
active and agentic relation with the civilising process, not only as he imposes 
this process upon others but as it is imposed upon his own self. The noble's 
delight in cruelty is sated as he imposes civilising form upon "some other man, 
other men" (ie. the previously "shapeless populace") but it is sated also as he 
imposes civilising form upon himself and, in so doing, exercises that mode of 
autarchic self-making Nietzsche casts as the sacred labour of nobility: 
"enhancement of the type 'man' ... the development of ever higher, rarer, 
more remote, further-stretching, more comprehensive states."93 
Aristocratic arrangements furnish the noble with the pathos of distance 
required for him to cultivate a rich inner distance. Nietzsche describes this 
self-making as a "secret self-ravishment", an "uncanny, dreadfully joyous 
labour of a soul voluntarily at odds with itself that makes itself suffer out of 
joy in making suffer".94 Importantly for our purposes, at several points 
Nietzsche further illuminates the agentic relation the noble assumes with the 
civilising process by referring to his ability to step outside of it and 
"compensate" himself for its painful effects. Nietzsche shows us this 
capacity in the following passage: 
... once [the nobles] go outside, where the strange, the stranger is 
found, they are not much better than uncaged beasts of prey. There 
they savor a freedom from all social constraints, they compensate 
themselves in the wilderness for the tension engendered by protracted 
confinement and enclosure within the peace of society, they go back to 
the innocent conscience of the beast of prey, as triumphant monsters 
who perhaps emerge from a disgusting procession of murder, arson, 
rape, and torture, exhilarated and undisturbed of soul, as if it were no 
93GOM: II, 18, BGE: 257. 
94GOM: II, 18. 
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more than a student's prank, convinced they have provided the poets 
with a lot more material for song and praise ... the hidden core needs 
to erupt from time to time, the animal has to get out again and go back 
to the wilderness.95 
320 
This freedom of action and movement, this ability to exercise agency over 
one's relation to civility, is in turn characterised by Nietzsche as the means 
by which the noble remains immune to ressentiment: "Ressentiment itself, if it 
should appear in the noble man, consummates and exhausts itself in an 
immediate reaction, and therefore does not poison ... Such a man shakes off 
with a single shrug many vermin which eat deep into others ... "96 Unlike the 
slave, the noble has, as Nietzsche puts it in Beyond, recourse to "drainage 
ditches" for his affects: means of venting the frustration, distress and 
suffering which attend the civilising process.97 This is the key to his mastery 
over this process and his immunity to its worst depth: its potential to inspire 
the rancorous frustration of ressentiment. The noble is entitled to 'act his 
reaction,' while the slave is denied precisely this: he is, as Nietzsche puts it, 
"denied the true reaction, that of deeds".98 
In turning to the slave in the following section we will see how the slave 
conjures "secret paths and back doors" to escape imprisonment and 
95GOM: I, 11. Emphasis in original. It is worth noting here that the concept of 
reconnecting with the wild so as to vent repressed energy remains a vivid theme in 
contemporary Western practices of masculinity. Apart from the sports arena, this is 
evident in a range of fictional narratives of masculinity. For example, the protagonist in 
the film Fightclub embodies Nietzsche's notion of an 'animal soul taking sides against 
itself with uncanny precision, and this theme also finds potent expression in the male 
protagonist of Bret Easton-Ellis' American Psycho (London: Picador, 2000 [originally 
published 1991]) no less than the protagonists of Dostoyevsky's Notes From 
Underground (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999 [originally published 1864]) and 
Crime and Punishment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999 [originally published 
1866]). The beginnings of an account of the rapport between practices of masculinity and 
Nietzsche's treatment of mastery and the man of ressentiment appear in Michael Andre 
Bernstein's study of the modern 'abject hero' in his book Bitter Carnival: ressentiment 
and the abject hero (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), see especially his 
chapter on Charles Manson, 157-184. 
96GOM: I, 10. Emphasis in original. 
97BGE: 260. 
98GOM: I, 10. 
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anaesthetise his pain.99 But what we have gleaned so far is the reason why 
these paths and doors must be conjured. We noted earlier that Nietzsche's 
presentation of the noble as a beast of prey is a textual device which serves a 
conceptual purpose. Let us now elucidate the twofold conceptual purpose this 
device plays. Most immediately, I suggest, Nietzsche's insistence on the 
noble's aura of animal innocence, his insistence that he could not have 
behaved otherwise, serves the conceptual purpose of discouraging an 
interpretation of his account in which the noble's state-building artistry-
that is, his violent institution of a system of oppression which situates the 
slave as maximally repressed-is understood to have directly precipitated the 
slave's ressentimental invention of the bad conscience, the innovation with 
which the slave will "confound" and "overthrow" the noble.100 
Two comments from Nietzsche are especially telling for this reading: 
... one can see who has the invention of the "bad conscience" on his 
conscience-the man of res sentiment! 101 
They do not know what guilt, responsibility, or consideration are, 
these born organisers ... it is not in them that the "bad conscience" 
developed, that goes without saying-but it would not have developed 
without them, this ugly growth ... 102 
Let us note that Nietzsche deploys the innovations of the bad conscience in 
these moments. He is concerned to assign guilt for the invention of the 
concept of guilt, and in fact the paradoxical character of this move informs 
Nietzsche's condemnatory attitude toward the slave at every turn. The 
question Nietzsche is addressing in both quotes is: Who has the invention of 
the bad conscience on his conscience? When the two responses are 
99GOM: I, 10. 
l00GOM: I, 11. 
101GOM: II, 11. 
102GOM: II, 17. 
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juxtaposed (they appear five aphorisms apart in the second essay) they lend 
ground to an interpretation of the bad conscience as the joint 'responsibility' 
of master and slave, as a product of their particular relation, which assumed 
the form of domination and submission. Both master and slave have blood on 
their hands, and the waters between them are irretrievably muddy: the bad 
conscience, as a co-production, "could not have developed without" the 
masters. But this narrative of Nietzsche's is not stable in the sense that he 
has already 'blamed' the slave, who alone has the bad conscience "on his 
conscience". The slave is blamed for perverting the course the noble's artistry 
could or should have taken for humankind. In singling out the slave for 
impugnation, Nietzsche distracts attention from the noble's share of 
responsibility for the development of ressentiment and the invention of the bad 
conscience, and his status as a character whose actions effectively ensured 
his own political demise.103 
This is why it has been suggested in the literature on Nietzsche that in 
singling out the slave for impugnation in this way he "blames the victim".104 
Indeed, this interpretation may be extended by pointing out that Nietzsche 
not only blames the victim, but fully reverses the customary democratic 
victimology informing interpretations of the master/slave relation by 
presenting the master as the victim of the slave. As Rosalyn Diprose puts it, 
Nietzsche singles out a "sole aristocratic victim" in his account of how slave 
morality overthrew master morality using the invention of the bad 
conscience as its weapon.105 
103 As Ridley puts this point, "The original noble was doomed from the moment he 
oppressed the first slave." Nietzsche's Conscience, 133. 
104Lynne Tirrell, 'Sexual Dualism and Women's Self-Creation: on the advantages and 
disadvantages of reading Nietzsche for feminists,' in Nietzsche and the Feminine, ed. 
Peter J. Burgard (Virginia: University Press of Virginia, 1994), 161. 
105Rosalyn Diprose, 'Nietzsche, Ethics and Sexual Difference,' Radical Philosophy 52 
(Summer 1989): 31. 
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Why does Nietzsche strive to keep the master clean in this way, 
positioning him as the 'real victim' of the struggle between master and slave? 
Is this reversed victimology symptomatic of a melancholic attachment to a 
thwarted form of nobility, and testimony to the idea that aristocratic 
relations of domination form the essential political orientation of Nietzsche's 
philosophy?l06 We have seen that Nietzsche's laudatory attitude toward the 
... noble does lend groundto.the.inte:rp:retation-these questions.imply. As Henry 
Staten puts it, throughout his work "Nietzsche continually reiterates his 
belief that there are higher human beings who are more valuable than the 
mass and for whose sake the mass exists and may be sacrificed."107 However, 
a competing interpretation emerges when we consider the effect Nietzsche's 
reversed victimology is designed to have on his liberal democratic readers.108 
Here, a further conceptual purpose for Nietzsche's laudatory treatment of 
master morality may be discerned. This reversed victimology works as an 
effective shock tactic to those "innocent" and "effeminate" [read: liberal 
democratic] ears he was anticipating as he penned Beyond and the 
Genealogy .109 As Diprose elucidates, "It was the noble man, embellished by a 
memory of Greek nobility, who, more than any other, symbolised what was 
thrown into relief by the rise of the liberal individual in the nineteenth 
century."110 Glorifying the noble and blaming the slave forms a central part 
of Nietzsche's narrative strategy for forwarding his project to disconcert our 
democratic political orientation and have us rethink the value of our values. 
106For a subtle reading of the role of the aristocratic polis in Nietzsche's treatment of 
human potential see Chapter 2 of Daniel Conway's Nietzsche and the Political (New 
York: Routledge, 1997), 28-42. 
107Staten, Nietzsche's Voice, 123. 
108See GOM: I, 9 where Nietzsche refers to his hypothetical reader/interlocutor as an 
honest "democrat." 
109BGE: 265, GOM: III, 19. 
l lODiprose, 'Nietzsche, Ethics and Sexual Difference,' 31. 
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On this view, Nietzsche's reversed victimology may or may not be 
received as an expression of his political sympathies, but most certainly can 
be interpreted as a device through which he aims to disturb our political 
sympathies. Nietzsche notes that we may be "quite justified ... in being on 
[our] guard against" the tyrannical noble, but he urges us nonetheless to 
reconsider our investment in the forces which served to expel the noble's 
particular form of autarchy from the world-forces which are more readily 
discerned when the noble's role in his own demise is consistently 
understated.Ill Let us consider the ramifications of this interpretation for our 
reading of feminism before moving on to examine the perspective of the slave. 
In the schema Nietzsche sets out in the Genealogy, master morality is 
that which thrives outside democracy, it is consummately 'undemocratic,' 
while slave morality, the 'triumph of the mob,' lays the groundwork for the 
European human's eventual orientation toward liberal democracy. With this 
schema, Nietzsche casts liberal democracy as a political regime which 
effectively 'enslaves' distance, distinction and difference: hence the critique 
which runs through his work of the normative function and levelling effect of 
liberalism's ethics of equality. For our purposes, two points may be deduced 
from this schema. Firstly, we may deduce that the figure of the master 
represents a form of self-relation and self-world relation which is monstrous 
from a liberal democratic perspective-not just on account of its tyrannical 
tendencies, but also on account of its unruly capacity for freedom of action 
and autarchic self-definition. Read in this way, the figure of the master can be 
made to operate metonymically for orders of difference which are 
unassimilable within the confines ofliberal democracy. 
111GOM: I, 12. 
RESSENTIMENT RECONSIDERED 325 
As Diprose's analysis suggests, feminist claims to female agency evince 
precisely this kind of unassimilable character. Liberal democracy can digest 
female agency so long as it is not marked as 'female,' so long as it may be 
aligned with "the rational subject as he is positioned at the norm of a politics 
of equality"-an alignment that in any case will enjoy only partial success so 
long as femaleness provides the devalued other against which liberalism's 
normative subject is wrought.112 Although we have good reason to treat 
Nietzsche's views on feminism with caution, this reading shares something 
with Nietzsche's own critique of the feminism of his day, specifically that 
element of his critique which held that the masculine norm women aspired to 
"imitate" was not worthy of their efforts.113 His critique of feminism, like his 
112Diprose, 'Nietzsche, Ethics and Sexual Difference,' 27. 
113BGE: 239. For a variety of perspectives on Nietzsche's critique of feminism in relation 
to the ethic of equality see: Rosalyn Diprose, 'Nietzsche, Ethics and Sexual Difference,' 
27-33; Adrian Del Caro, 'The Pseudoman in Nietzsche, or The Threat of the Neuter,' 
New German Critique, No. 50 (Spring/Summer 1990): 133-156; Kathleen J. Wininger, 
'Nietzsche's Women and Women's Nietzsche,' in Feminist Interpretations of Friedrich 
Nietzsche eds., Kelly Oliver and Marilyn Pearsall (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1998), 236-251; Fredrick Appel, 'The ubermensch's Consort: Nietzsche 
and the 'eternal feminine,' History of Political Thought, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Autumn 1997): 
512-530; Ofelia Schutte, 'Nietzsche's Psychology of Gender Difference,' in Modern 
Engendering: critical feminist readings in modern Western philosophy, ed. Bat-Ami Bar On 
(Albany: State University of New York, 1994), 231-245; and Ellen Kennedy "Nietzsche: 
women as untermensch" in Women in Western Political Philosophy: Kant to Nietzsche, 
eds. Ellen Kennedy and Susan Mendus (Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1987), 179-201. 
For accounts of the feminisms contemporary to Nietzsche and influenced by him see: 
Carol Diethe, 'Nietzsche and the Early German Feminists,' Journal of Nietzsche Studies 
No. 12 (Autumn 1996): 69-82 and 'Nietzsche and the Woman Question' History of 
European Ideas, Vol. 11 (1989): 865-875; Steven E. Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy in 
Germany, 1890-1990 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 85-127; R. Hinton 
Thomas, Nietzsche in German Politics and Society 1890-1918 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1983); Ricarda Schmidt, "Dissonance is the Voice of the Future': Lily 
Braun's Memoiren einer Sozialistin,' in German Women Writers, 1900-1933: twelve essays, 
ed. Brian Keith-Smith (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1993), 93-114; Richard J. 
Evans, The Feminist Movement In Germany 1894-1933 (London: Sage, 1976); Werner 
Thonnessen, The Emancipation of Women: the rise and decline of the women's movement 
in Germany social democracy 1863-1933 (Frankfurt: Pluto Press, 1973); and Renate 
Bridenthal, Atine Grossman and Marion Kaplan, eds., When Biology Became Destiny: 
Women in Weimar and Nazi Germany (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1984). For 
further commentaries on Nietzsche in relation to woman, gender and feminism see: Luce 
Irigaray, Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche, trans. Gillian C. Gill (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1991); Jacques Derrida, Spurs I Eperons: Nietzsche's Styles, trans. 
Barbara Harlow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979); Jacques Derrida and 
Christie McDonald, 'Interview: Choreographies,' The Ear of the Other: otobiography, 
transference, translation (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), 163-186; Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak, 'Displacement and the Discourse of Woman,' in Displacement: 
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critique of liberalism more generally, is motivated in part by his rejection of 
the subtle violence of this political regime's "certain actual rendering similar": 
its monotheistic reduction of difference to an economy of the same, its 
blunting of all particulars to form an edifice of universalism.114 
Importantly for our purposes, in view of this point feminist wariness 
about liberalism's ethics of equality and the potential loss of political integrity 
attendant upon liberal reformism may be read not as a moment in which 
feminism becomes mired in a politics of ressentiment, but as the juncture at 
which feminists expound most keenly the desire to resist circumstances 
which incite ressentiment: circumstances in which one's own creativity is 
forfeited as one is compelled to adopt values and ways of being that are not of 
one's own making. 
Secondly and conversely, we can deduce from this that the figure of the 
slave and the political shape of liberal democracy stand in a metonymic 
relation in Nietzsche's account, making for an intimate relation between 
Derrida and after, ed. Mark Krupnick (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983), 
169-195; Jane Gallop, '"Women" in Spurs and Nineties Feminism,' Diacritics, Vol. 25, 
No. 2 (Summer 1995): 126-124; Deborah Bergoffen, 'On the Advantage and 
Disadvantage of Nietzsche for Women,' in The Question of the Other: essays in 
contemporary continental philosophy, eds. Arleen B Dallery and Charles E. Scott 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 77-88 and 'Nietzsche Was No 
Feminist .. .'International Studies in Philosophy, Vol. XXVI, No. 3 (1994): 23-31; 
Maryanne Bertram, "'God's Second Blunder": serpent woman and the gestalt in 
Nietzsche's thought,' and Lawrence J. Hatab, 'Nietzsche on Woman,' Southern Journal 
of Philosophy, Vol. 19, No. 3 (1981): 259-277; 333-345; Terri Burney-Davis and R. 
Stephen King, 'The Vita Femina and Truth,' History of European Ideas, Vol. 11 (1989): 
841-847; Diana Behler, 'Nietzsche and Postfeminism,' Nietzsche-Studien, Band 22 
(1993): 355-370; Christine Garside Allen, 'Nietzsche's Ambivalence about Women, in 
The Sexism of Social and Political Theory: women and reproduction from Plato to 
Nietzsche, eds. Lorenne M. G. Clark and Lynda Lange (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1979), 117-133; David Farrell Krell, Postponements: woman, sensuality and 
death in Nietzsche (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986); Tamsin Lorraine, 
'Nietzsche and Feminism: transvaluing women in Thus Spoke Zarathustra' and Alan D. 
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114TI: 91, cited in Diprose, 'Nietzsche, Ethics and Sexual Difference,' 27. 
RESSENT!MENT RECONSIDERED 327 
ressentiment and liberal democracy. We can expect, that is, that Nietzsche's 
figuration of the slave or "man of ressentiment" is designed to hold a mirror up 
to his liberal democratic readers. In seeing how Nietzsche's glorification of the 
noble and impugnation of the slave works with his critique of liberal 
democracy in this way, the characterisation of slave morality and 
ressentiment as 'undemocratic' in the literature we examined in Part 2 is made 
strange.115 So too is Tapper's argument that feminism enjoins ressentiment 
when it moves beyond the liberal project of "wanting equal power" within 
existing politico-economic arrangements, and Yeatman's argument that 
submitting to liberal democracy's politics of equality will overcome 
ressentiment and permit access to Nietzschean mastery. The argument 
common to Tapper's and Yeatman's accounts (and present also in the 
popular feminist accounts examined in Part 1), that feminism becomes an 
ineffectual politics of ressentiment when it holds out for more than equality 
within current conditions, is mooted once we perceive the intimate relation 
Nietzsche sets up between ressentiment and the desire for a normatively 
operative ethos of equality. 
Having registered these points let us note that reading between the lines 
of Nietzsche's laudatory attitude toward the noble does not mean adopting 
this attitude-and adopting, in turn, his condemnatory attitude toward the 
slave. We do not need to enjoin Nietzsche's praise of the noble to glean the 
political message he sends with this figure-that the form of strength which 
hosts the possibility of autarchic self-creation becomes fragile in the presence 
of normativity. We have seen that our reading of the master presents an 
opportunity to metonymically align feminist politics with Nietzsche's master 
rather than with Nietzsche's slave. But the will to rest on a clean alignment 
l 15Recall that this characterisation features in the accounts of Yeatman and Brown, and 
also was apparent in the accounts of Hoff Sommers and Wolf in Part 1. 
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of feminism with one or the other figure is, I suggest, a problematic restriction 
which is imposed when one approaches Nietzsche's account diagnostically. 
As we will see, Nietzsche's account of the slave's attempt to conjure the 
possibility of self-creation within a political regime in which this possibility is 
outlawed for him offers feminists the same kind of political message as does 
his account of mastery's ultimate fragility-a message about how a form of 
weakness which can be made to host the possibility of strength and self-
creation arises and can be thwarted in the presence of domination. 
Nietzsche construes oppression as a circumstance in which one is 
separated from what one can do,116 in which one is "denied the true reaction, 
that of deeds" and, in this, prohibited from achieving self-definition and 
distanced from the possibility of self-affirmation.117 To be oppressed is to 
experience a world in which one's needs, especially as regards the possibility 
of self-making, have been outlawed within the particular political regime one 
inhabits. If one reads the Genealogy without a view to adopt Nietzsche's Pro 
and Con, one can see that this circumstance is to be associated with both the 
master and the slave. Insofar as these figures are incommensurable, the 
empowerment of one is set up as the disempowerment of the other, and 
neither figure can digest the needs of the other. Hence both figures represent 
orders of difference which will be unassimilable within the regime of their 
opponent, meaning that feminism, as a politics of difference, has much to 
learn from both figures. 
116As in Chapter 2, this phrase is borrowed from Deleuze's account, Nietzsche and 
Philosophy, 123. Deleuze associates this separative move with ressentiment's triumph 
over master morality, but on my reading this move pertains equally to the master's prior 
triumph over the slave, hence its appropriateness for a description of oppression. This 
latter use of Deleuze's phrase draws on Elizabeth Grosz' treatment of it in Chapter 13 
of her book Space, Time and Perversion, 207-227. 
117GOM: I, 10. 
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Nietzsche's concept of ressentiment is freighted with a ready made 
prejudice against the slave, a prejudice which is ventriloquised when the 
concept is used diagnostically but which occupies unstable ground given that, 
by Nietzsche's own account, the slave's ressentiment can be interpreted as 
the co-produced effect of the master-slave relation. The political narrative 
attending Nietzsche's articulation of master morality is one in which the 
noble will to power is shaped so as to craft and maintain a ruling structure 
that "lives"-the ruling structure Nietzsche has in mind is an aristocratic 
one, wherein the state is able effectively to enslave the populace and in so 
doing accept "with a good conscience the sacrifice of untold human beings 
who, for its sake, must be reduced and lowered to incomplete human beings, to 
slaves, to instruments."118 As part of his defence of this configuration of 
power-for it enables the nobility, if undisturbed in their nobility, to extend 
human greatness-Nietzsche portrays the original nobles as beasts of prey, 
creatures of untrammelled instinct who 'could not have behaved otherwise'. 
But there are questions which remain unanswered in all this. How, we 
must ask, could the slave have behaved otherwise? Nietzsche registers the 
slave as a figure who "was only what he was considered".119 Even as we may 
share ground with Nietzsche's critique of liberalism, what reason do we have 
to enjoin Nietzsche's blaming lament over the rebellion of the slave, his 
aversion to the slave's formation of the concepts required to counter a social 
fate in which he "was only what he was considered"? What grounds are there 
to uphold an expectation that this is a worldly situation the slave must be 
resigned to perform obediently? We will address these questions in turning 
now to the perspective of the slave. 
118BGE: 258. Emphasis in original. 
119BGE: 261. Emphasis in original. 
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5.2 The Power of the Weak 
As the foregoing discussion has identified, the political situation Nietzsche 
describes in his account of the moralities of master and slave is one in which 
the slave is maximally repressed. The slave shares a level of repression with 
the master insofar as they jointly suffer the "homesickness" which attends 
the civilising process.120 Both have been deprived of a seamless relation with 
instinct's "more natural vent".121 But while the master is able to compensate 
himself for his suffering in commanding the slave and by 'going outside,' the 
possibility of such compensation is denied to the slave. As Ridley comments, 
the slave suffers a comparatively "high degree of internalisation" which 
fosters the development of an ever-sharper "contrast between 'inner' and 
'outer'. The 'inner'-the theatre of his own private torment-is himself; the 
'outer' is that hostile external world which has made him as he is."122 The 
slave's circumstance is one in which rancorous frustration-ressentiment in 
its "brute state"123-mounts and, as Nietzsche puts it, "festers", all the while 
lacking any immediate outlet.124 This is why, by the third essay of the 
Genealogy, Nietzsche will ascribe an "explosive" quality to res sentiment .12s 
The quantity and quality of the force its exerts 'inside' has the potential to 
explode so as to effect an unruly break with obedience and act as the 
potential source of the slave's power in the world. 
Let us observe that we already are encountering the sense in which 
'ressentiment' does not stand as a stable term in Nietzsche's account since it 
describes a dynamic process occurring within an inherently unstable power 
120GOM: II, 16. 
121GOM: II, 22. Emphasis in original. 
122Ridley, Nietzsche's Conscience, 27. 
123Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 126. 
124GOM: I, 10. 
125GOM: III, 15. 
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relationship. It appears that this process is at least threefold, meaning that 
in the Genealogy the term 'ressentiment' is made to refer to at least three 
stages in the development of ressentiment: brute or "noncreative"; creative; 
and explosive/contained.126 We know that ressentiment's brute state attends 
the slave's starting position of maximal repression. As this section's account 
of the slave's perspective unfolds, ressentiment's creative stage will be 
elucidated, while full engagement with the third stage awaits us in the 
following chapter. There I will argue that this third stage, when ressentiment 
exhibits an explosive quality and, as such, begins to present a problem to 
which the powerful will require a solution, is of great significance for feminist 
political reflection, and has a crucial bearing on our understanding of the 
relationship between feminism and ressentiment. 
When he first presents his thesis on the moralities of master and slave in 
Beyond, Nietzsche performs one of the signature moves of his account of 
morality, that of switching between two perspectives on one social order. 
After describing the "morality of the ruling group", Nietzsche takes us into 
the perspective of the ruled, "the minds of those who suffer" from the 
master's cruelty, those whom the nobles deem 'bad',127 The following passage 
is his first elucidation of this perspective: 
Suppose the violated, oppressed, suffering, unfree, who are uncertain 
of themselves and weary, moralise: what will their moral valuations 
have in common? Probably, a pessimistic suspicion about the whole 
condition of man will find expression, perhaps a condemnation of man 
along with his condition. The slave's eye is not favourable to the 
virtues of the powerful: he is sceptical and suspicious, subtly 
suspicious, of all the "good" that is honoured there-he would like to 
persuade himself that their happiness is not genuine. Conversely, 
126The term "noncreative" is drawn from Ridley (Nietzsche's Conscience, 23) who, like 
Deleuze, discerns Nietzsche's implicit distinction between ressentiment in its noncreative 
("brute") stage, and ressentiment in its creative stage when it invents values (slave 
morality). I add a third stage here-explosive/contained. 
127BGE: 260, GOM: I, 11. 
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those qualities are brought out and flooded with light which serve to 
ease the existence of those who suffer ... Slave morality is essentially a 
morality of utility.128 
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By the Genealogy, Nietzsche's characterisation of slave morality is more 
developed and more vehement in tone, and the concept of ressentiment is 
introduced to his account.129 As we will see, within the terms set by the 
Genealogy, the "unfree" begin to moralise when their ressentiment reaches its 
creative stage: slave morality is produced when the ressentiment of the slaves 
"becomes creative and gives birth to values".130 But even without the layer of 
detail that the concept of ressentiment provides, the core feature of 
Nietzsche's definition of slave morality's evaluative creativity remains the 
same between Beyond and the Genealogy. Slave morality performs an 
inversion of master morality and a reversal of master morality's self-other 
order of valuation. As a reversal of the evaluating look, slave morality's point 
of purchase is derived from a negative experience of the world which knows 
itself to be negative owing to the contrast supplied through observation of the 
nobles in their happiness, health, wealth, power and splendour. Hence 
Nietzsche identifies the "need to direct one's view outward" with the "essence 
of ressentiment": the nobility occupy the foreground of the slave's mode of 
evaluation. 
The powerful supply the slave with empirical evidence that not everyone 
suffers in the way he suffers, which in turn delivers the question: 'Why do I 
suffer while they do not?' An evaluative division between that which eases 
suffering and that which causes it may then be developed on the basis of this 
perception of politico-social difference or, we might say, 'inequality': 
128BGE: 260. Emphasis in original. 
129See supra, Note 6. 
130GOM: I, 10. 
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Here is the place for the origin of that famous opposition of "good" and 
"evil": into evil one's feelings project power and dangerousness, a 
certain terribleness, subtlety, and strength that does not permit 
contempt to develop. According to slave morality, those who are "evil" 
thus inspire fear; according to master morality it is precisely those who 
are "good" that inspire, and wish to inspire, fear, while the "bad" are 
felt to be contemptible.131 
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Slave morality's inversion of the value-positing eye furnishes the noble's 
distinction of 'good' from 'bad' with competitive opposition from below. Slave 
morality produces an evaluative distinction in which the 'good' of master 
morality is recast as 'evil,' while the 'bad' of master morality is recast as 
'good'. The noble, having evaluated himself as good, is revalued by the slave as 
evil: the slave interprets the noble as the source of his fear, suffering and 
endangerment. As Nietzsche notes, according to slave morality, the "good 
human being has to be undangerous to the slave's way of thinking."132 Having 
directed his view outward in this way, the slave is then positioned to direct his 
view inward: he revalues himself and all that may ease his suffering-all that 
is "undangerous" to him-as good. Both slave morality's revaluations provide 
self-preserving, utilitarian expediency. Maximally, aligning the noble with evil 
and the slave with good provides the beginnings of a delegitimation of the 
noble's power over the slave and, moreover, a delegitimation of the particular 
shape the noble's will to power assumes (domination, exploitation, 
appropriation, imposition). More immediately, these revaluations provide the 
slave with a path to self-affirmation. However, as we noted in the previous 
section, this is a path which offers a starkly reactive constitution of self. 
The task of the slave is to conjure self-definition and self-affirmation from 
a starting position in which he "was only what he was considered: not at all 
used to positing values himself, he also attached no other value to himself 
131BGE: 260. 
132BGE: 260. Emphasis in original. 
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than his masters attached to him".133 As we know, the value the master 
attaches to the slave renders the slave 'bad': hence the slave's starting 
position is one of self-loathing ('I am bad').134 He is nothing other than what 
he is considered, and the possibility of accepting this fate is eclipsed by the 
suffering this fate brings him. His interpretation of this situation as 
unbearable grows increasingly stark the more 'internalised' he becomes, the 
more his ressentiment mounts and, therefore, the more his intelligence 
grows-Nietzsche notes that slaves are "bound to become eventually cleverer 
than any noble race."135 It is through cleverness that the slave is able to 
make his ressentiment over into a source of creativity: as Ridley puts it, 
"cleverness, born of enforced prudence, is the ace up the slave's sleeve."136 
Slave morality's creative revaluation of the noble's values will remedy the 
slave's situation to the extent that he will be positioned to break with his self-
loathing. However, his starting circumstance itself is not able to host the 
possibility of autarchic self-definition and self-affirmation. In the Genealogy, 
Nietzsche is especially concerned to convey that negation must constitute 
the first evaluative step slave morality takes: 
While every noble morality develops from a triumphant affirmation of 
itself, slave morality from the outset says No to what is "outside," what 
is "different," what is "not itself'; and this No is its creative deed ... in 
order to exist, slave morality always first needs a hostile external 
world; it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to 
act at all-its action is fundamentally reaction ... picture "the enemy" 
as the man of ressentiment conceives him-and here precisely is his 
deed, his creation: he has conceived "the evil enemy," "the Evil One," 
and this in fact is his basic concept, from which he then evolves, as an 
afterthought and pendant, a "good one" -himself! . . . This "bad" of 
133BGE: 261. Emphasis in original. 
134Qn this point I am guided by Ridley's account of the slave's self-loathing in Nietzsche's 
Conscience, 17. 
l35QOM: I, 10. Emphasis in original. 
136Ridley, Nietzsche's Conscience, 26. 
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noble origin and that "evil" out of the cauldron of unsatisfied hatred-
the former an after-production, a side issue, a contrasting shade, the 
latter on the contrary the original thing, the beginning, the distinctive 
deed in the conception of a slave morality-how different these words 
"bad" and "evil" are, although they are both apparently the opposite of 
the same concept "good": one should ask rather precisely who is "evil" 
in the sense of the morality of ressentiment. The answer, in all 
strictness, is: precisely the "good man" of the other morality, precisely 
the noble, powerful man, the ruler, but dyed in another colour, 
interpreted in another fashion, seen in another way by the venomous 
eye of ressentiment.131 
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Both master morality and slave morality begin by evaluating the master. In 
the case of master morality, this valuation is one of positive self-affirmation. 
In the case of slave morality, it is one of negative other-negation. Only on the 
basis of this initial negation of the master can the slave achieve self-
affirmation: 'He is evil therefore I am good.' This places the slave's 
affirmation of self as an immanent perversion of.-rather than transcendent 
alternative to-master morality, a reversal of its terms which, as a reversal, 
remains dependent on those terms. The slave achieves self-affirmation and 
breaks with his self-loathing, but only by changing the terms on which he is 
dependent on the master, not by eliminating this dependence. In short, the 
slave has achieved an immanent form of emancipation rather than 
emancipation as such. 
Nietzsche argues, then, that slave morality, the product of ressentiment in 
its creative stage, transports the slave from being nothing other than what 
he is considered to revaluing what he is considered as good. The slave does not 
dispute the contents of the identity ascribed to him in the social order he 
inhabits, rather he reverses their value: the master's demarcation of the 
slave and all slavish traits as 'bad' is reversed so that they now denote 'good.' 
With slave morality, Nietzsche writes, "weakness" is "lied into something 
137GOM: I, 10, 11. Emphasis in original. 
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meritorious" and "every blackness" is made over into "whiteness, milk, and 
innocence".138 The slaves-"cellar rodents" who anxiously emerge "from all 
the corners and nooks"-revalue as 'good' characteristically 'slavish' traits: 
weakness, powerlessness, impotence, lowliness and cowardice. As Nietzsche 
writes: 
Weakness is being lied into something meritorious ... and impotence 
which does not requite into 'goodness of heart'; anxious lowliness into 
'humility'; subjection to those one hates into 'obedience' . . . The 
inoffensiveness of the weak man, even the cowardice of which he has 
so much, his lingering at the door, his being ineluctably compelled to 
wait, here acquire flattering names, such as 'patience,' and are even 
called virtue itself; his inability for revenge is called unwillingness to 
revenge, perhaps even forgiveness ... They also speak of 'loving one's 
enemies'-and sweat as they do so.139 
This is the point at which Nietzsche's association of the slave with 
mendacity, vanity, counterfeit and self-deception find their meaning. One of 
the slave's primary accomplishments, Nietzsche argues, is to lie his 
circumstance into something good, meritorious, and chosen. The concept of 
free will facilitates this feat of imagination, but let us note first that 
Nietzsche's gesture of naturalisation remerges in this aspect of his treatment 
of the slave.140 
"Weakness", Nietzsche writes, is the "sole ineluctable, irremovable 
reality" of the slave's starting situation.141 But Nietzsche presents the 
138GOM: I, 14. Emphasis in original. 
139GOM: I, 14. Emphasis in original. In this quote Nietzsche is occupying the voice of his 
imaginary reader/interlocutor, in all likelihood the honest democrat summoned in an 
earlier aphorism (GOM: I, 9). The scenario is that his interlocutor is reporting to him 
from 'below,' within slave morality's "dark workshop," on the evaluative transformations 
taking place there. We may assume that Nietzsche's interlocutor, by the time of this 
aphorism, is being seduced to Nietzsche's dire view of the slave. 
140See also Nietzsche's comments on the concept of free will in TI: The Four Great Errors, 
7. 
141GOM: I, 13. 
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weakness of the weak-their "essence"-in two lights.142 Firstly, using terms 
such as "deprived", "oppressed", "lowly" and "failures from the start", he 
refers to the slave's having been socio-politically inscribed as weak. 143 
However he also uses terms such as "ill-constituted', "dwarfed", "atrophied", 
"sick", "born failures" and "physiologically unfortunate" to suggest not just an 
inscription of oppression upon the body, but a prior physical inscription of 
inferiority, a natural predisposition to weakness and, therefore, servility.144 
What is perhaps the key term Nietzsche uses to describe the slave's 
weakness-"impotence"-would seem to straddle this socio-political/natural 
divide: it captures at once a social position which is "denied the true reaction, 
that of deeds" and an imperfect physical state when compared with the 
master's apparently consummate masculinity.145 
Let us return to the role of the concept of free will. Slave morality, 
Nietzsche argues, takes the slave's existing weakness and, through a feat of 
"sublime self-deception", reinscribes it as "a voluntary achievement, willed, 
chosen, a deed, a meritorious act."146 In this way, the "impotence" of the 
slave-his inability to act his reaction, shape his circumstances, and make 
himself-assumes the fictional guise of action. Impotence is recast as the 
circumstance he actively, voluntarily chose for himself and, in turn, this 
choice is cast as testimony to his virtue: 
When the oppressed, downtrodden, outraged exhort one another with 
the vengeful cunning of impotence: "let us be different from the evil, 
namely good! And he is good who does not outrage, who harms 
nobody, who does not attack, who does not requite, who leaves 
revenge to God, who keeps himself hidden as we do, who avoids evil 
142GOM: I, 13. 
143GOM: II, 13; III, 14. 
144GOM: I, 10, 7; III, 14. 
145GOM: I, 10. 
146GOM: I, 13. Emphasis in original. 
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and desires little from life, like us, the patient, humble, and just"-
this, listened to calmly and without previous bias, really amounts to 
no more than: "we weak ones are, after all, weak; it would be good if 
we did nothing for which we are not strong enough" ... 147 
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The slave, Nietzsche argues, makes his situation bearable by deceiving 
himself that he chose this situation and, as such, may be regarded as 
virtuous. His impotence thereby is clothed in the "ostentatious garb of the 
virtue of quiet, calm resignation".148 Recoding the slave's circumstance as a 
product of an active, virtuous choice is one of two primary roles that slave 
morality's concept of free will plays. 
The other primary role the concept of free will plays is as a means of 
potentially constraining the power of the powerful by making expressions of 
their power appear to be chosen or 'deliberate'. The concept of free will 
overlays the master's expression of his power with a moral drama in which 
the master is cast as a subject who chooses to behave in the way he does, a 
subject who is, therefore, free to behave otherwise. Nietzsche argues this in 
one of the more famous aphorisms from the Genealogy, that containing his 
parable of lambs and birds of prey: 
That lambs dislike great birds of prey does not seem strange: only it 
gives no grounds for reproaching these birds of prey for bearing off 
little lambs. And if the lambs say among themselves: "these birds of 
prey are evil; and whoever is least like a bird of prey, but rather its 
opposite, a lamb-would he not be good?" there is no reason to find 
fault with this institution of an ideal, except perhaps that the birds of 
prey might view this a little ironically and say: "we don't dislike them 
at all, these good little lambs; we even love them: nothing is more 
tasty than a tender lamb." ... To demand of strength that it should not 
express itself as strength, that it should not be a desire to overcome, a 
desire to throw down, a desire to become master, a thirst for enemies 
and resistances and triumphs, is just as absurd as to demand of 
147GOM: I, 13. Emphasis in original. 
148GOM: I, 13. 
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weakness that it should express itself as strength ... just as the 
popular mind separates the lightening from its flash and takes the 
latter for an action, for the operation of a subject called lightening, so 
popular morality also separates strength from expressions of 
strength, as if there were a neutral substratum behind the strong 
man, which was free to express strength or not to do so ... no wonder 
the submerged, darkly glowering emotions of vengefulness and hatred 
exploit this belief for their own ends and in fact maintain no belief 
more ardently than the belief that the strong man is free to be weak 
and the bird of prey to be a lamb-for thus they gain the right to make 
the bird of prey accountable for being a bird of prey.149 
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The concept of free will not only enables the slave to unburden himself of pain 
by reinterpreting his situation as virtuously chosen, it also lends him the 
means by which he may take the master's free-flowing strength and impose a 
moral-conceptual schema upon it, thereby divorcing the doer from his deeds 
in such as way that the doer may be construed as "accountable" for his 
deeds. Here, the concept of guilt, the formation of the bad conscience and a 
particular conception of agency as not just calculable but accountable, find 
their beginnings. ISO 
Importantly for our purposes, let us note that this moral-conceptual 
schema gives the slave an opportunity to position himself as a 'victim' for the 
first time, if by 'victim' we mean one whose suffering-the separation of 
oneself from what one can do-is not to be interpreted as a meaningless and 
apparently inevitable element of the natural order of things (in which case 
'victimisation' cedes to 'nature'), but rather as a preventable effect of an 
accountable other's deeds. We can deduce from this that, according to 
Nietzsche's insights, the moral technology underpinning conceptions of 
149GOM: I, 13. Emphasis in original. 
l50David Owen's reading of this aspect of Nietzsche's Genealogy provides an especially 
clear account of how this moment signals a transfer from a consciousness of 'debt' to a 
consciousness of'guilt' (Maturity and Modernity, 38-43). Given Nietzsche's association of 
the sovereign individual with responsibility, 'responsibility' may be read as a refinement 
of guilt and a telos of this transfer. 
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victimhood within modern emancipatory politics do indeed have their roots in 
slave morality. Indeed, we can glimpse here a very basic relation between 
feminism and creative ressentiment. Insofar as modern feminism, whether 
radical, liberal or otherwise, has sought to show that women's subordination 
is neither natural nor inevitable, it has worked from what Nietzsche identifies 
as creative ressentiment's conceptual schema, a schema which lends the 
slave the concepts required to reinterpret their circumstance as contingent 
rather than inevitable. Moreover, to recall our reflection on the issue of sexual 
violence in Part 1, feminist efforts to counter sexual violence have retraced 
the steps of Nietzsche's slave in seeking to separate men from their capacity 
to perform sexual violence, and to counter naturalisation of this capacity. 
That "rape" is listed among the repertoire of violent acts performed by 
Nietzsche's beast of prey should not be lost on a feminist reading of 
Nietzsche's account.151 
Of course, what interferes with this reading is that on Nietzsche's account 
the slave-unlike feminism-apparently does not use the political foothold 
'victimhood' lends him to bring the master into an actual relation of reciprocal 
recognition so as to seek socio-political transformation. That is, the slave 
does not use 'victimhood' as a means to craft a circumstance in which he can 
become something other than a victim. Rather, he recasts his victimhood as 
his chosen virtue, and gives his enforced servitude to a master he hates a 
virtuous name: "obedience". This is why Nietzsche associates creative 
ressentiment with an "imaginary revenge": the slave exacts revenge not 
through direct struggle with the master, but "in effigie", through an imagined 
reckoning.152 
151GOM: I, 11. Nietzsche lists "murder, arson, rape, and torture". 
152GOM: I, 10. 
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In what sense, then, does the slave actually "revolt"? What are we to 
make this aspect of Nietzsche's account, and what does it mean for the 
diagnostic alignments of feminism with creative ressentiment that we 
examined in Part 2? Let us recall that Nietzsche's association of ressentiment 
with the flatly resubordinative gesture of lying impotence into virtue is one of 
the primary aspects of Nietzsche's account that is put to work in the 
diagnoses of feminism as a politics of ressentiment that we examined. One of 
the main themes in those accounts was that ressentiment resutures the 
victim to victim identity, giving rise to a essentially non-transformative 
politics-as conveyed in Yeatman's image of the antagonistic outsider's self-
defeating loyalty to outsidership, and in Cocks' portrait of a degenerative 
feminist radicalism which 'sanctifies powerlessness'. However: each of the 
accounts we examined describe a politics which speaks and acts in the world. 
Cock's writer and orator of victim politics is writing policy and making public 
speeches, as is Tapper's femocrat; Yeatman's antagonistic outsider voices 
critique of the status quo while her statist protectionist makes claims on the 
state; Brown's modernist feminist is conducting revolutionary-oriented 
consciousness-raising groups while her statist identitarian is drafting 
legislation. Nietzsche's "man of ressentiment", meanwhile, has sanctified his 
own worldly impotence and is conducting an imaginary reckoning with an 
effigy of his political opponent. This man, Nietzsche writes, "understands how 
to keep silent".153 
Creative ressentiment, it seems, does not actually revolt. Rather, in 
creating the moral technology through which the slave will be able to rethink 
his circumstance, it precipitates actual revolt, thereby lending the slave's 
ressentiment the potential for a third, explosive stage. This would explain why 
Nietzsche notes that the man of ressentiment is ''provisionally self-
153GOM: I, 10. 
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deprecating and humble."154 Let us note that if ressentiment ceased with a 
silence behind which impotence has been lied into something virtuous-that 
is, if it did not advance to a stage wherein it returns the slave to the capacity 
for action prompted by the idea that his social fate is not inevitable-it 
simply would not be a problem to which the powerful will require a solution. It 
is clear from Nietzsche's account, however, that ressentiment does assume a 
third stage, and that the slave does break his silence and seek an actual 
reckoning with the powerful. Both the second and third essays of the 
Genealogy describe strategies which operate as means by which the powerful 
subdue the threat of ressentiment, which in its third stage becomes "the most 
dangerous of all explosives" .155 
We will be examining these strategies-legalism and religious 
asceticism-in the following chapter. But to conclude this chapter's 
consideration of Nietzsche's account let us be clear as to precisely what the 
threat of ressentiment in its third stage is. Nietzsche notes that the threat of 
ressentiment is "anarchy": the dissolution of the socio-political order which 
brought it into being, the rescinding of "the privilege of the full-toned bell over 
the false and cracked", a radical breach in the pathos of distance, a calamity 
in which "the sick ... make the healthy sick".156 And Nietzsche provides a 
precise answer to the question as to how the threat of ressentiment proceeds. 
Ressentiment will achieve its "ultimate, subtlest, sublimest triumph" when 
the slaves succeed in ''poisoning the consciences of the fortunate with their 
own misery", making the "happy, well-constituted [and] powerful in soul and 
body ... doubt their right to happiness".157 Put another way, ressentiment in its 
third stage fosters the possibility of an actual reckoning between master and 
154GOM: I, 10. My emphasis. 
155GOM: III, 15. 
156GOM: III, 13, 12, 14. 
157GOM: III, 14. Emphasis in original. 
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slave in which the slave agitates for socio-political change and for the right to 
make himself over into something other than what he is considered-an 
agitation which draws its traction from the idea that the master's 
"happiness" has produced, and depends upon, the slave's "misery". 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to broaden our perspective on ressentiment by taking 
into consideration the elements of Nietzsche's account which tend to be 
obscured when the concept of ressentiment is employed diagnostically, most 
notably the dynamic struggle between master and slave through which 
Nietzsche articulates his concept of ressentiment. In countering the tendency 
to regard ressentiment in isolation from the remainder of Nietzsche's account, 
the chapter's analysis has sought to demonstrate that Nietzsche's 
condemnatory attitude toward ressentiment wears thin when the nature of 
this struggle is in view. In view of this struggle, ressentiment appears not as a 
necessarily self-subversive style of politics which is limited to and by an 
entrenchment of the distance between the slave and positive political 
capacity, but rather as a dynamic process of revolt which certainly includes 
the possibility of self-subversion, but which also has the capacity to exceed 
this limit in providing the slave with the moral technology through which an 
ability to challenge subjection can be crafted. 
This reading challenges the assumption, apparent in the literature 
examined in Part 2, that ressentiment is unambiguously 'bad,' and challenges 
as well the notion that ressentiment is inherently non-transformative. On this 
reading, ressentiment is, rather, the very source of dynamism and instability 
within the master-slave relation. Moreover, this reading suggests that the 
slave's conversion of his circumstance into a source of power does not of 
necessity yield 'triumph of the slave as slave'. As I understand it, ressentiment 
is threatening precisely because through it the slave realises that he may 
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become something other than what he is considered-that he may, that is, 
open socio-political being to contingency. 
Over the course of the chapter's discussion of ressentiment we also have 
collected two main points regarding the relationship between feminism and 
ressentiment. Firstly, in elucidating the relation between master and slave I 
identified the sense in which these figures are essentially incommensurable, 
and as such can be put to work in similar ways to reflect on feminism's 
status as a politics of difference. Where feminist claims to female autarchy 
and agency reckon with liberal universalism they capture something of the 
plight of Nietzsche's master in moving against the grain of liberal 
normativity. At the same time, where feminism fights to open definitions of 
femaleness to contingency-to enable women to become something other 
than what they have been considered-they capture something of the plight 
of Nietzsche's slave, whose necessary crisis of authenticity, we might add, 
would seem to have been played out within feminist debates about 
essentialism. 
Secondly, in terms of feminism's political moves, I have argued that we 
can perceive a very basic relation between feminism and the moral 
technology ressentiment elaborates in its creative stage in the sense that this 
technology delivers the idea that the master's power is neither natural nor 
inevitable-he is free to behave otherwise. However I also argued that, in 
speaking and acting in the world, feminism clearly has exceeded the flipside of 
the concept of free will-the slave's flatly resubordinative acceptance of the 
idea that his subordination is virtuously chosen. Even those feminisms which 
redraw patriarchal essentialism and revalue as virtuous traditionally 
feminine traits such as nurturance and pacifism, do not convincingly align 
with Nietzsche's slave as he maintains his silence, contenting himself with an 
imaginary reckoning with his oppressor. It would seem that insofar as we 
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have something called 'feminism,' we are already talking about a ressentiment 
which has gained an explosive quality and earned the capacity to articulate 
and act on a desire for socio-political change. And it is not difficult to imagine 
that the 'slave,' in acting on this desire, will become even cleverer-clever 
enough, that is, to realise the pitfalls of resubordinative essentialism. 
6 
Ressentiment Redirected 
He struggled on with his copy, but when the clock struck 
five he had still fourteen pages to write. Blast it! He 
couldn't finish it in time. He longed to execrate aloud, to 
bring his fist down on something violently ... The barometer 
of his emotional nature was set for a spell of riot. 
-James Joyce.I 
... he fights with cunning and severity and in secret against 
anarchy and ever-threatening disintegration within the 
herd, in which the most dangerous of all explosives, 
ressentiment, is constantly accumulating. 
-Friedrich Nietzsche.2 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter I provided a positive interpretation of ressentiment as 
an effect of domination which has the potential to become an effective 
weapon against domination. In this chapter, as I continue my reading of 
ressentiment into its third stage, I examine the strategies Nietzsche describes 
as providing 'solutions' to the problem of ressentiment, using this material to 
make a specific set of connections back to the accounts of feminist 
ressentiment examined in Part 2 and, to a lesser extent, the popular feminist 
accounts of Part 1. In so doing I present my concluding arguments and 
articulate my view that feminist politics works both 'within' and 'against' 
res sentiment. 
As registered in the previous chapter, that ressentiment reaches a stage 
where it poses a problem for the powerful is evident from Nietzsche's 
elucidation of two strategies-legalism and religious asceticism-which work 
1 James Joyce, Dubliners (London: Penguin Books, 1993), 101. 
2 GOM: III, 15. 
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to diffuse the threat ressentiment presents to the social order which conditions 
its production. These strategies acquire their potential for success from a 
particular property of ressentiment-its capacity to be redirected and, 
thereby, contained. The strategies Nietzsche describes have particular 
significance for our purposes because we already have encountered their 
workings in the analyses of previous chapters. In reviewing these strategies 
across the first two sections of the chapter we will be positioned to forge key 
connections with earlier insights pertaining to feminism and the question of 
reformism versus radicalism and, as we turn to religious asceticism, the issue 
of self-blame. 
The first section of the chapter addresses Nietzsche's account of how the 
strategy of legalism works to redirect ressentiment. I argue that a distinction 
between two modalities in the politicisation of ressentiment can be discerned 
within this account: one modality has a broadly transformative reach while 
the other assumes a reformist posture. In the light of this distinction, I recall 
the two main feminist political strategies at issue in the accounts examined 
in Part 2-liberal feminism's reformist or 'insider' posture and radical 
feminism's more revolutionary or 'outsider' orientation-and argue that these 
do not represent strategies which either draw on or overcome ressentiment, 
but rather may be regarded as two modalities in the direction of 
ressentimental desire, the respective effectivities of which I seek to illuminate. 
In the chapter's second section I turn to Nietzsche's account of how 
religious asceticism works to solve the problem of ressentiment by inducing it, 
under the aegis of the concept of 'sin,' to self-blame. In discerning the role that 
self-blame plays in diffusing the threat of ressentiment, I return to reconsider 
earlier moments in the dissertation in which we encountered the issue of self-
blame and the injunction to those engaged in emancipatory politics to 'take 
responsibility.' I argue that the popular feminist accounts examined in Part 1, 
. I 
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with their efforts to redistribute responsibility and their tendency to permit 
victim-blame, may be interpreted as a form of asceticism. With the intention 
of making a further contribution to the role that Nietzsche's concept of 
ressentiment might play in feminist political theory, I also point out that 
Nietzsche's concept of ressentiment can itself be made to operate ascetically, 
where this provides further reason to rethink approaching this concept 
diagnostically. Finally, the third section of the chapter imposes a qualification 
upon the positive interpretation of the concept of ressentiment offered in this 
part of the dissertation, and seeks to illuminate a further labour the concept 
of ressentiment might in future perform for feminist theory . 
6.1 Ressentiment and legalism 
In this section we are concerned with the first strategy Nietzsche describes 
as a means by which the powerful may subdue the threat of ressentiment-
legalism, the "institution of law".3 This strategy, as Aaron Ridley puts it, 
works to contain ressentiment by furnishing it with "a target and a limit."4 
Given that the anarchic hopes of ressentiment directly threaten the socio-
political order within which it appears, legalism works to make these 
indigestible hopes over into digestible complaint by governing the arbitration 
of injustice, imposing parameters of right and recognition upon phenomena of 
victimisation, and articulating a set of ostensibly repairable wrongs through 
which a ressentimental populace can re-script and re-direct its desires, which 
may be domesticated thereby. Law, on this reading, works for the powerful as 
does the muleta for the matador, enticing and diverting the treacherous ire of 
the bull. 
3 GOM: II, 11. 
4 Ridley, Nietzsche's Conscience, 132. 
I 
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In articulating the strategy of legalism Nietzsche spars with the 
philosopher from whose work he drew the term 'ressentiment,' Eugen Dtihring. 
In his book Der Werth des Lebens: eine philosophische betrachtung (1865), 
Dtihring argued that "all concepts of justice" are to be attributed to "the 
feeling of Ressentiment".5 For Dtihring, justice-the means by which we 
express our distinction between right and wrong-"exists for and springs from 
the ancient sense of vengeance" which is indigenous to humanity.6 Hence a 
central feature of Dtihring's argument is that ressentiment ("a reaction, a 
sensation that belongs alongside revenge and fits with it in the same category 
of emotion"7) is a configuration of affect to which no human is immune-
insofar as one is human, one feels ressentiment. On this basis Dtihring reads 
criminal justice systems as organic extensions of an essentially natural 
doctrine of revenge, a naturally occurring human capacity to distinguish the 
just from the unjust and to contrive a system through which the unjust may 
be avenged and deterred. In forwarding his alternative account of the role of 
the institution of law, Nietzsche appropriates Dtihring's use of the term 
ressentiment but rebuffs his thesis on ressentiment with a "blunt antithesis".8 
Noting that Dtihring presents justice as "at bottom merely a further 
development of the feeling of being aggrieved", Nietzsche counters Dtihring's 
naturalisation of justice systems in arguing that "legal conditions can never 
be anything other than exceptional conditions": 
"Just" and "unjust" exist, accordingly, only after the institution of the 
law (and not, as Duhring would have it, after the perpetration of the 
injury). To speak of just or unjust in itself is quite senseless; in itself, 
of course, no injury, assault, exploitation, destruction can be "unjust," 
5 Eugen Diihring, Der Werth des Lebens: eine philosophische betrachtung [The Value of Life: 
a course in philosophy] (Breslau, 1865), viii, 220. 
6 Ibid., 220. 
7 Ibid., 217. 
8 GOM: II, 11. 
RESSENTIMENT REDIRECTED 
since life operates essentially, that is in its basic functions, through 
injury, assault, exploitation, destruction and simply cannot be thought 
of at all without this character.9 
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In a sense, then, Nietzsche counters Diihring's order of naturalisation with a 
different order of naturalisation. The 'injustices' to which justice systems are 
addressed come as part of the essential operation of life, and as such can only 
be construed as 'injustices' via a kind of anti-nature, a "partial restriction of 
the will to life, which is bent on power".10 This basic disagreement between 
Nietzsche and Diihring as to the relation of nature to law provides the ground 
on which Nietzsche will pose his alternative account of the institution oflaw. 
As opposed to Diihring's "communistic cliche" in which law is understood as 
"a means of preventing all struggle in general"-a means of deterring the 
unjust-Nietzsche proposes that law be understood as "a means in the 
struggle between power complexes".11 Where Diihring apprehends the 
institution of law as an extension of humanity's reactive feelings, Nietzsche 
argues, rather, that the institution oflaw is the means by which the powerful 
"struggle against the reactive feelings" emanating from lower social strata.12 
For our purposes, this indicates that the powerful, on Nietzsche's view, 
contrive "exceptional conditions" through which the explosive ressentiment of 
the lower orders can be diverted and thereby contained. Hence the powerful's 
"need for law": 
... in which sphere has the entire administration of law hitherto been 
at home-also the need for law? In the sphere of reactive men, 
perhaps? By no means: rather in that of the active, strong, 
spontaneous, aggressive. From a historical point of view, law 
represents on earth ... the struggle against the reactive feelings, the 
war conducted against them on the part of the active and aggressive 
9 GOM: II, 11. 
lOGOM: II, 11. 
1 lGOM: II, 11. 
12GOM: II, 11. Emphasis in original. 
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powers who employed some of their strength to impose measure and 
bounds upon the excesses of the reactive pathos and to compel it to 
come to terms. Wherever justice is practiced one sees a stronger power 
seeking a means of putting an end to the senseless raging of 
ressentiment among the weaker powers that stand under it (whether 
they be groups or individuals)-partly by taking the object of 
ressentiment out of the hands of revenge, partly by substituting for 
revenge the struggle against the enemies of peace and order, partly by 
devising and in some cases imposing settlements, partly by elevating 
certain equivalences for injuries into norms to which from then on 
ressentiment is once and for all directed.13 
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For Nietzsche, legal systems do not spring from ressentiment. Rather they 
work to redirect and so quell ressentiment, enabling the powerful to preserve 
their power by compelling a ressentimental populace to "come to terms". In 
this way, legalism works to diffuse the threat of the weak. 
With this strategy Nietzsche appears to be observing a shift in the 
character of rule that sees the powerful concede to a reform so as to preserve 
their power, which now assumes a slightly different guise. The powerful divert 
"some of their strength" toward innovating and administering a legal system. 
There is a clue in this regarding the manner in which the slave revolt 
Nietzsche delineates in the Genealogy proceeds. Even as the Genealogy 
delineates slave morality's 'victory,' at no point in the Genealogy does 
Nietzsche describe a moment in which the slaves simply defeat their masters 
and become masters themselves (although this possibility is not exactly 
excluded). It seems, rather, that the slave revolt proceeds through the threat 
of direct overthrow, which carves out new sites of "need" on the part of the 
powerful (as in their "need for law"). The ressentiment of the slaves, in other 
words, places the rulers in circumstances wherein they either recast their 
power into a new form-in this case, extending it to the institution of law-or 
be directly subject to the wiles of a livid majority. This trajectory of slave 
13GOM: II, 11. 
RESSENTIMENT REDIRECTED 352 
revolt-one of protracted 'decay' rather than swift explosion, in which the 
powerful are bound gradually to lose their capacity for "spontaneity"-sees 
the slaves' incentive and potential for overthrow work to extract concessions 
from the rulers which incrementally will transform the manner in which rule 
is conducted and, therefore, the forms of mastery available to the rulers.14 It 
is in this sense that Nietzsche locates slavish ressentiment as an 'instrument 
of culture' which set the West on a track toward universalist political culture, 
epitomised by liberal democracy's ethos of equality. In tune with his 
representation of the original nobles as consummately masculine, Nietzsche 
conceives of this process as one of emasculation. We will consider the 
gendered component of Nietzsche's account in the final section of the chapter. 
The workings of the strategy of legalism furnish us with a distinction with 
which to address the question as to how ressentiment plays out politically. We 
may surmise that the furthest political reach of ressentiment is a form of 
radicalism which hosts a capacity for overthrow and which is led by a desire 
for a substantially different socio-political order. This is the reach of 
ressentiment Mark Katz associates with "maximum-goal revolution".15 From 
the rulers' perspective, it is this element of ressentiment which is most 
threatening and most in need of containment. Where the strategy of legalism 
performs its labour effectively, a second modality in the politicisation of 
ressentiment appears, a reformist modality which succeeds in forcing reform 
upon the character of rule, but at the cost of redirection, containment, and 
maintenance of the general relation of power informing the status quo. In 
other words, we may regard ressentiment as something of a revolutionary 
spirit which, when contained, assumes the guise of reformism. And it would 
seem that the latter guise depends upon the former. In the absence of 
14See Ridley's lucid delineation of this, Nietzsche's Conscience, 132. 
15Mark N. Katz, Refiections on Revolutions (New York: St Martin's Press, 1999), 64-68. 
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ressentiment's threat of overthrow, the "power complexes" with which 
Nietzsche is concerned would not be engaged in "struggle", and the powerful 
would have no need to cede "some of their strength" so as to change some of 
their colours. With this distinction between two interrelated modalities in the 
direction of ressentimental desire in place, let us register how Nietzsche's 
account of legalism affects our understanding of the relationship between 
feminism and ressentiment. 
We have seen throughout the dissertation that one of the main points of 
tension within the literatures we have examined is whether feminism's 
potential to precipitate radical social change is facilitated or compromised 
when feminism co-opts the agency of the state and the law so as to legislate 
for a non-discriminatory socio-political climate capable of hosting women's 
empowerment. The literature examined in Part 2 was divided on this issue. 
On one side, Brown and Cocks share a perception that feminism has taken a 
litigious turn which curtails its potential to pose a more radical challenge to 
the existing socio-political order. In Brown's terms, feminism's "uncritical 
statism" expresses a will to "inscribe in the law and in other political registers 
its historical and past pain rather than conjure an imagined future of power 
to make itself'.16 As Brown also puts it, involvement in the mode of political 
expression known as identity politics has produced a feminism which does not 
"fight for a world" but rather "conduct[s] process on the existing one."17 Let 
us recall that both Brown and Cocks conceive of feminism's litigious turn as 
the point at which feminism becomes a politics of ressentiment. However, if we 
put to work the distinction noted earlier between two modalities in the 
politicisation of ressentiment, we can see that this turn should be read, rather, 
as a diversion and containment of feminist ressentiment. 
16Brown, States of Injury, 66. 
17Ibid., 28. 
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This suggests that returning feminism to a more radical posture, a return 
Brown and Cocks jointly but non-prescriptively beckon, would not be a 
matter of moving feminism beyond ressentiment, but rather of retaining or 
regaining feminist ressentiment's explosive-that is, fierce, intelligently 
impertinent, uncompromising and plastically creative-dimension. Second 
wave feminism's explosion onto the political scene in the late 1960s may be 
read as a prime exemplar of this dimension of ressentiment, hence the title of 
Ruth Rosen's recent account of the second wave: The World Split Open.IS We 
will return to this point, for in my view Brown discerns the makings of a 
feminist return to a more radical posture in her analysis of how the political 
agenda of identity politics occludes critique of capitalism. 
On the other side of the issue of feminist legalism and statism, while 
Yeatman and Tapper partly enjoin the arguments of Brown and Cocks in 
impugning various aspects of 'femocracy,' they nonetheless jointly insist that 
existing institutions and categories furnish feminism with its final political 
horizon, and that feminism's political agency be reigned to an essentially 
reformist posture. This prescription was shored up by their shared diagnosis 
of feminist radicalism-that which moves beyond wanting equal power within 
current conditions, that which antagonistically resists containment by 
liberalism's political protocols-as motivated by ressentiment. However, on 
the basis of the distinction we discerned earlier between two modalities in the 
politicisation of ressentiment, let us register that accepting this political 
horizon would not, as these theorists contend, spell a break with the politics of 
ressentiment, but rather an acceptance of the kinds of incremental benefits 
that diversion and containment of ressentiment may bring. 
18Ruth Rosen, The World Split Open: how the modern women's movement changed America 
(London: Penguin Books, 2000). 
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Beyond this formal point regarding how the concept of ressentiment should 
apply to the question of reformism lies a more substantive point pertaining to 
feminism's ability to constructively ameliorate ressentiment when it does 
impose reform upon the existing order. The political work of feminism, like 
that of other emancipatory movements, has always at least two kinds of 
task. There is the task of cultivating, through collective engagement and 
debate, a reflexive political imagination willing to ask how the world has 
become what is it and capable of envisioning the world otherwise. And there is 
the task of designing particular politics projects which can serve more 
immediately to improve the present conditions of women's lives. On my view, 
'feminist politics' is the vital effect of the dialogue, disjunctures and 
confluences between the two. The main pro bl em with the will to reign 
feminism's political agency to a reformist or 'insider' posture is that the 
dialogue between these two levels is either muted or becomes one-sided. With 
this posture, the question as to what kind of challenge feminism poses, or 
needs to pose, to the existing order is closed down to the extent that basic 
(although at times unmarked) allegiance to this order is pledged. While 
keeping this point in mind, the main strength of reformism in relation to 
ressentiment should not escape our notice. 
Let us recall that Brown's account of ressentiment cut new ground where it 
discerned that ressentiment may be regarded as an effect of particular 
configurations of power. In Chapter 4 I referred to this moment in Brown's 
analysis as a 'sociology' of ressentiment, a term I drew from Max Scheler's 
work on the concept of ressentiment. I wish to draw attention now to Scheler's 
having placed "woman" at the top of his list of"typically recurrent situations" 
in social life which are "charged with the danger of ressentiment".19 Scheler's 
19Scheler, Ressentiment, 38. Emphasis in original. In attending to women's relationships 
with ressentiment in this way, Scheler echoes several insights drawn from Nietzsche: his 
association of women with the circumstance of the slave (see, for example, BGE: 261, 
RESSENTIMENT REDIRECTED 356 
account of women's ressentiment is by no means pro- or proto-feminist, but in 
this account he offers an important point which speaks to our interest in 
ressentiment and feminist reformism: 
The danger of feminine ressentiment is extraordinarily intensified 
because both nature and custom impose upon woman a reactive and 
passive role in love, the domain of her most vital interest. Feelings of 
revenge born of rejection in the erotic sphere are always particularly 
subject to repression, for communication and recriminations are 
barred by pride and modesty. Besides, there is no tribunal which 
repairs such injuries, provided they violate no civil rights. It must be 
added that women are forced to great reserve by stronger barriers of 
convention and modesty.20 
Scheler's naturalisation of women's "passive role in love" is clearly 
problematic, as are other elements of his portrait of "feminine ressentiment". 
But the point of greatest interest to us in this passage is the connection 
Scheler draws between the role of social convention in forcing women to 
"great reserve"-codes of modesty which 'deny the true reaction, that of 
deeds'-and the potentially ameliorative part a "tribunal" might play in 
countering such reserve and enabling reparation of injury. 
It seems reasonable to suggest that the kinds of legislative reforms 
feminists have argued for, often successfully, over the last thirty years or 
so-for example, in the areas of sexual harassment, sexual violence, sexual 
discrimination, reproductive rights, equal opportunity, affirmative action, 
GOM: III, 14); his observation that bourgeois sexual morality curtails female eroticism 
for the benefit of men (see, for example, GS: 71); and his association of ressentiment with 
circumstances of maximum repression. For a valuable elaboration of 'feminine 
ressentiment' which builds on Scheler's account see Kathleen Streip, 'Psychoanalysis, 
Humor and Ressentiment,' Paragraph 14 (1991): 171-183 and ""Just a Cerebrale": Jean 
Rhys, women's humor, and ressentiment,' Representations 45 (Winter 1994): 117-144. 
For an account of how Nietzsche's characterisation of the slave fits with certain feminist 
understandings of women's oppression see Lynne Tirrell, 'Sexual Dualism and Women's 
Self-Creation,' 167-176. Kathleen Woodward's work on gendered emotive practices in 
relation to feminism is also relevant here. See, for example, Kathleen Woodward, 'Anger 
. . . and Anger: from Freud to feminism,' in John O'Neill, ed. Freud and the Passions 
(Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), 73-95. 
20Scheler, Ressentiment, 43. My emphasis. 
RESSENTIMENT REDIRECTED 357 
employment entitlements such as paid parental leave, and a variety welfare 
benefits-may be conceptualised as counter-forces to ressentiment insofar as 
they seek to open up courses of action ('deeds'), devise means of reparation, 
and articulate entitlements that women can pursue individually. This returns 
us to the point made in Chapter 2 regarding sexual harassment codes and 
victim identity. The notion that such codes invite women to indulge passivity 
is least plausible when we consider that these codes are designed to open 
formal avenues of agentic action where previously such avenues were 
lacking. We may note too that this point highlights the idea that feminism's 
relationship with ressentiment is at least twofold. Feminist reformism, as it is 
interpreted here, represents one of two modalities in the politicisation of 
ressentiment, and at the same time works amelioratively 'against' 
ressentiment. Feminist reformism is a diversion and containment of 
ressentiment in the sense that it agrees to make feminism's potentially 
indigestible hopes over into digestible, codifiable complaint. But in so doing it 
carves out ways in which those circumstances which can incite ressentiment 
within the lives of individual women-employer harassment and 
discrimination, experiences of sexual violence and spousal violence, unwanted 
pregnancy, limited access to education and so forth-may be actively 
addressed and potentially redressed. 
Still working from Nietzsche's characterisation of legalism, we may 
surmise that the strength of reformism nonetheless is attended by certain 
significant weaknesses. Reformism, read through Nietzsche's formulation, 
presents a 'solution' for the powerful-it bends but does not break the 
presiding hegemonic powers. It makes radical instability over into 
constitutive instability. It also involves a loss of control over how women's 
'needs' are codified, re-presented and administered by law and state policy 
and, as Brown and Cocks warn, proceeds at the cost of legitimating and 
abetting judicial and state power. So quite apart from the idea that reformism 
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draws its traction from the prospect that a more radical threat could be 
posed, and even as we recognise its potentially ameliorative responsiveness 
to ressentiment, we have good reason not to construe reformism as a political 
end in itself, as feminism's final political horizon. But Brown provides further 
reason still with her argument that, in liberal democratic settings, reformist 
postures forfeit a good measure of "political freedom" when they direct their 
ire exclusively toward state social policy and the law, eluding direct 
engagement with the social and economic arrangements of capitalism.21 In 
bringing this argument of Brown's back into focus now, I will suggest that in 
discerning the extent to which identity politics-which she locates as an 
essentially reformist posture-eludes engagement with capitalism, Brown 
'updates' Nietzsche's account of how presiding powers can work to diffuse the 
threat of ressentiment by diverting it from direct challenge to its most potent 
sources. 
One of the most important matters Brown raises with regard to identity 
politics is that it may be read as a mode of political expression through which 
"markers of social difference" are made to "bear all the weight of the 
sufferings produced by capitalism" (Brown includes those of economic 
stratification, alienation, commodification, exploitation and displacement).22 
As Rosemary Hennessey elaborates Brown's point, "identity politics 
suppresses the potential to name and know capitalism's deprivations."23 We 
saw in Chapter 4 that Brown's portrait of the late-modern liberal subject as 
seething with ressentiment is informed by the idea that capitalism, working in 
concert with neoliberal discourses of individual self-making and responsibility, 
acts as a potent source of ressentiment.24 Hence an important element of 
21Brown, States of Injury, xi. 
22Ibid., 60. 
23Hennessey, Profit and Pleasure, 227. 
24Brown, States of Injury, 69. 
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Brown's argument is that identity politics is animated in part by 
ressentiments incited by capitalism, but works to divert this component of its 
animus away from its 'source,' directing it instead toward claims on the state 
to recognise orders of injury pertaining to socio-political exclusion and cultural 
invisibility. Such claims are likely to have economically redistributive effects, 
but stand nonetheless as claims in which "sufferings produced by capitalism" 
assume an unmarked and unarticulated presence. Hence Brown, and 
Hennessey after her, suggest that we regard identity politics as a kind of 
political fetishism wherein inclusive, recognitive validation within the liberal 
polis is the ersatz, traded for an undoubtedly more arduous reckoning with 
capitalism.25 
This insight revises Nietzsche's formulation, in which a singular 
formation, "the powerful," recast the character of rule so as contain the 
ressentiment of an asymmetrically opposing formation, "the weaker 
powers".26 Brown's version of this dynamic sees identity politics marshalling 
a broad and complex array of sufferings into a single category of suffering, 
excluded difference, asking that liberalism answer wrongs of 
disenfranchisement and, in shaping the claim in this way, enabling the blows 
of liberalism's companion power, capitalism, to be obscured as social and 
economic policy are symbolically, and conveniently, divorced. When this 
element of Brown's account is read in the light of Nietzsche's formulation of 
legalism, it is clear that Brown observes and presents a more complex 
25Nancy Fraser's association of identity politics with goals of recognition rather than 
redistribution is relevant here. See Chapter 1 of her book Justice Interruptus: critical 
reflections on the ''postsocialist" condition (New York: Routledge, 1997), 11-40 and her 
article 'Rethinking Recognition,' New Left Review 3 (May/June 2000): 107-120. See also 
Ellen Meiksins Wood's critique of identity politics, which pursues a similar trajectory to 
that of Fraser, in Wood's book Democracy Against Capitalism: renewing historical 
materialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), Chapters 8 and 9, 238-
263; 264-283. 
26GOM: II, 11. 
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arrangement than does Nietzsche. Yet the principle remains the same: 
ressentiment is diverted, made digestible, its threat contained. 
In elucidating capitalism's deprivations, and taking care to avoid positing 
an authentic subject of need, both Brown and Hennessey express concerns 
centred on how these deprivations determine and diminish contemporary 
prospects for self-sustenance, self-making and self-legislation, creating what 
Brown refers to as an "unparalleled individual powerlessness over the fate 
and direction of one's own life".27 Brown notes that advanced capitalism's 
processes of commodification work increasingly to dictate and to discipline, 
rather than simply meet, individual and sub-individual needs, wants, desires, 
preferences and tastes. 'Lifestyles' and forms of selfhood increasingly are 
articulated by and through processes of commodification. Hennessey treads a 
broader ground, encompassing generic deprivations which attend the 
commodification of labour power and referring also to those introduced 
through minimum wage setting, longer working hours, high levels of 
unemployment and cuts to health and welfare provision, through to the 
proliferation of regulations for personnel conduct which demand particular 
forms of emotional labour. 28 
Building on Brown's account, and providing a window onto capitalism's 
generation of ressentiment, Hennessey explains that the companion to 
capitalism's production of surplus value is "the production of outlawed 
27Brown, States of Injury, 68. 
28Hennessey draws on Arlie Hochschild's classic study of emotional labour in her 
discussion of the alienation which attends commodification of human emotion in the 
service industry as well as other spheres of work, Arlie Hochschild, The Managed Heart: 
the commercialisation of human feeling (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). 
See also Jennifer L. Pierce's excellent contribution to the literature on emotional labour 
Gender Trials: emotional lives in contemporary law firms (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1995). 
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need".29 Capitalist arrangements forge distinctions between "allowed and 
illegitimate needs", accumulating a ground of "unmet needs" which form 
capitalism's "monstrous", "unassimilable" yet "necessary" outside. 3 o 
Outlawed needs assume a radical character since "they cannot be brought 
back into capitalism without abolishing the very terms of the extraction of 
surplus value."31 Working heuristically from Marx's identification of orders of 
human need and potential which are forfeited when labour power is exchanged 
for wages, Hennessey argues that "human capacities for sensation and 
affect"-no less than needs for "food, clothing, housing, health care, education, 
and time for intellectual and creative development"-be regarded as a 
primary domain subject to the outlawing of need.32 Given Hennessey's overall 
task to provide a political economy of sexuality which delineates the relation 
between commodity capitalism, heteronormativity, and the historical 
production of sexual identities, she includes "sex-affective potentials" within 
this order of human capacities for sensation and affect.33 In other words, 
Hennessey seeks to articulate capital's unarticulated place within identity 
politics centred on issues of gender and sexuality. 
In pointing to these orders of deprivation, both theorists succeed in 
making strange the fact that identity politics-focused as it is on social injury 
and exclusion and on the prospect of inclusive recognition, directed as it is 
toward law and social policy rather than economic policy-is, as Brown puts 
29Hennessey, Profit and Pleasure, 216. In making this argument Hennessey draws on an 
unpublished doctoral dissertation by Deborah Kelsh, Desire and Class: the knowledge 
industry in the wake of poststructuralism (The University at Albany, SUNY, 2000). 
30Hennessey, Profit and Pleasure, 228. 
31 Ibid., 228. 
32Karl Marx, Capital: a critique of political economy, Volume One, trans. Ben Fowkes 
(London: Penguin Books, 1976 [originally published 1859]). Hennessey, Profit and 
Pleasure, 228, 216. For Marx's account of the orders of deprivation which attend the 
commodification of labour power see especially Section 5 of Chapter 10, 'The Working 
Day,' Capital, 375-389. 
33Ibid., 217. 
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it, "the dominant political expression of the age".34 Identity politics addresses, 
in an unmarked fashion, the sufferings which attend the outlawing of need, 
but does so in a way that obscures the mechanisms through which need is 
outlawed-the extraction of surplus value being primary among these 
mechanisms. Neither Brown nor Hennessey trivialise identity politics' 
construction of exclusion as social injury, nor do they underestimate the gains 
identity politics has achieved, the radical significance of which are clear when 
we consider the wars over 'political correctness' this political form brought on 
and the far right animus it has stirred. Rather, their concerns centre on the 
implications of maintaining political quietism in relation to capitalism, of 
perpetuating the "inarticulateness of class".35 
The suggestion which remains implicit in Brown's account but is made 
explicit in Hennessey's is that the most urgent and certainly the most 
arduous task facing contemporary feminist politics, and emancipatory 
politics more generally, is that of (re)politicising capitalism. Hennessey 
argues that the politicisation of identities be reoriented "to begin with human 
needs" so that the articulation of identities through processes of 
commodification is lent centrality, and the question as to "how affect 
accompanies and is organised" by these processes is addressed.36 
34Brown, States of Injury, 74. 
35Ibid., 61. 
36Hennessey, Profit and Pleasure, 224, 214. It should be noted that the kind of project 
Hennessey sketches here has found a strong beginning in the global justice or anti-
capitalist movement. The connection is especially clear when we consider that one of the 
main slogans of this movement is 'human need not corporate greed.' The vast numbers 
of women involved in this movement (women made up well over half the total of 20,000 
delegates at the European Social Forum in Florence, December 2002) has effected a 
revitalisation of feminist activism, and has ensured the movement's attentiveness to the 
ways in which global capital's shifts in labour relations impact women's lives. In this 
regard, women's overrepresentation in the informal sector and as workers in free trade 
zones are of central concern, as is the global sex trade. For an account of this see 
Chapter 4 of David McNally's book Another World is Possible: globilisation and anti-
capitalism (Winnipeg: Arbeiter Ring Publishing, 2002), 96-146, and Carolyn Egan and 
Michelle Robidoux, 'Women,' in Anti-Capitalism: a guide to the movement, eds. Susan 
George, George Monbiot, Lindsey German, Teresa Hayter, Alex Callinicos and Kim 
Moody (London: Bookmarks, 2001), 81-92. Another relevant text here is Angela 
McRobbie's 'Bridging the Gap: feminism, fashion and consumption,' Feminist Review 55 
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Importantly for our purposes, Hennessey conceives of this reorientation as 
one in which "desire, fear, anger, and resistance" might be "marshalled for 
social movement."37 But in sketching the process of "disidentification" which 
will enable the reorientation she beckons, Hennessey is guided by Brown's 
characterisation of ressentiment as a purely resubordinative configuration of 
affect: 
Disidentification is a practice of working on existing ways of identifying 
that we embrace and live by. This "work" is a process of unlearning 
that opens up the identities we take for granted to the historical 
conditions that make them possible. It involves uprooting these 
identities not just from ways of thinking that invite us to construe 
them as natural but also from a history of suffering-the fertile 
ground for resentment to grow-and resituating how we know them in 
a different historical frame, a frame that allows us to see how this 
suffering is the product of a mode of production that outlaws a whole 
array of human needs. The disidentifying subject ... replaces the 
narrow resentment of identity politics with the potentially much more 
powerful and monstrous collective opposition of all capitalism's 
disenfranchised subjects.38 
On the basis of the interpretation of ressentiment offered in this part of the 
dissertation, the process of disidentification Hennessey describes would in 
fact be one of resisting the diversion and containment of ressentiment so as to 
kindle its furthest, most creative, and most threatening political reach, rather 
than one of "replacing" ressentiment with an alternative order of affect. 
Having registered this point, let me note that on my view the political 
direction Hennessey pursues from Brown's account, most notably its 
(1997): 73-89. McRobbie argues that feminist accounts which emphasise the forms of 
pleasure and power made available to women through the practice of conspicuous 
consumption (see, for example, Mica Nava, 'Modernity's Disavowal: women, the city, and 
the department store,' in Modern Times: reflections on a century of English modernity, ed. 
Mica Nava [London: Routledge, 1996]) do so in a manner which serves to maintain the 
invisibility of the off-shore women workers whose increasingly under-paid labour 
produces the fashion goods which inspire such pleasure and power. 
37Hennessey, Profit and Pleasure, 214. 
38Ibid., 229. 
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willingness to interrogate the nexus of affect, identity, commodification and 
politicisation, is highly suggestive and worthy of endorsement. 
6.2 Ressentiment and asceticism 
This section addresses the second strategy identified in Nietzsche's Genealogy 
as providing a solution to the threat of ressentiment from below. This strategy, 
religious asceticism, connects directly to the matter of self-blame which has 
been raised at various points throughout the dissertation, most notably 
Chapters 2 and 4. The strategy involves a preeminent but curious figure in 
the Genealogy: the ascetic priest. The ascetic priest is curious for his liminal 
position between master and slave. He hosts "a ressentiment without equal", 
which positions him as the ultimate slave, yet his "will to power [is] in tact", 
he exhibits "mastery", and he "despises more readily than [he] hates", all of 
which suggests that the ascetic priest is a kind of noble. And where Nietzsche 
insists that master and slave are bound to misunderstand one another given 
that their relation situates their respective realities as fundamentally 
incommensurable, he associates the ascetic priest with an ability to prevail 
equally within, and mediate between, slavish and noble spheres: he is at once 
"profoundly related to the sick" and able to "walk among the other beasts of 
prey with bearlike seriousness and feigned superiority."39 
For our purposes, the key aspect of this liminal figure is the labour he 
performs when he achieves "dominion over the suffering".40 The ascetic priest 
"defends his herd ... [a]gainst the healthy", but he also discourages the herd 
from "envy of the healthy", and this latter element of his labour is the key to 
the priest's ability to stabilise and maintain the power relationship and 
39GOM: III, 15. 
40GOM: III, 15. Emphasis in original. 
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"segregation" between 'sick' and 'healthy.'41 The "essential art" and "supreme 
utility" of the priest, Nietzsche writes, is that in his dominion over the 
suffering he effectively "alters the direction of ressentiment."42 In so doing, the 
priest provides a solution for the powerful to the threat of ressentiment from 
below: 
"I suffer: someone must be to blame for it"-thus thinks every sickly 
sheep. But his shepherd, the ascetic priest, tells him: "Quite so, my 
sheep! someone must be to blame for it: but you yourself are this 
someone, you alone are to blame for it-you alone are to blame for 
yourself!"-This is brazen and false enough: but one thing at least is 
achieved by it, the direction of ressentiment is altered ... You will guess 
what, according to my idea, the curative instinct of life has at least 
attempted through the ascetic priest, and why it required for a time the 
tyranny of such paradoxical concepts as "guilt," "sin," "sinfulness," 
"depravity," "damnation": to render the sick to a certain degree 
harmless, to work the self-destruction of the incurable, to direct the 
ressentiment of the less severely afflicted sternly back upon 
themselves ("one thing is needful")-and in this way to exploit the bad 
instincts of all sufferers for the purposes of self-discipline, self-
surveillance, and self-overcoming.43 
To induce the slave to self-blame, the priest redirects the slave's ressentiment 
back onto himself-a substantially greater solution than that provided by 
law. This redirection reintroduces a spiritualised species of self-loathing which 
renders the slave "harmless". 
The priest directs the sufferer to seek the cause of his suffering "in 
himself, in some guilt, in a piece of the past" such that he will understand his 
suffering "as punishment."44 The "invalid", Nietzsche writes, is thereby 
"transformed into 'the sinner."'45 Nietzsche goes on to enumerate a range of 
41 GOM: III, 15. 
42GOM: III, 15. 
43GOM: III, 15, 16. 
44GOM: III, 20. Emphasis in original. 
45GOM: III, 20. 
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labours the priest performs under the aegis of this interweaving of suffering, 
guilt and sin, each of which are attuned to dispelling the slave's potentially 
unruly "discontent with his lot" by encouraging him toward the kind of 
obedience which promises safe passage to a higher afterlife.46 The slave 
thereby is separated from the capacity for unruly activity ressentiment lends 
in its explosive stage, and his newfound capacity to imagine that the world 
could be otherwise is spiritualised in anticipation of a righteous afterlife. 
When the priest is not administering guilt, he displays "ingenuity in name-
changing and rebaptising" to make the slaves "see benefits and a relative 
happiness in things they formerly hated"-most notably, the compulsory 
undertaking of work. 47 In short, the role of the priest-and, indeed, of religion 
in general48-is to contain the explosive property of ressentiment by returning 
the slave to a form of obedience underpinned by a reinterpretation of his 
suffering as punishment, a source of guilt, a testimony to his sinfulness, and 
as a circumstance to be endured in the name of a higher, transcendental and 
ultimately redemptive purpose. Hence Nietzsche presents the priest as an 
essentially contradictory character who represents "life against life": he 
works on behalf of 'life' in maintaining a social order which segregates the 
'sick' from the 'healthy,' but he does so by intensifying the sickness of the 
sick.49 
The general point we can draw from the priest, then, is that the way to 
effectively disarm ressentiment is to make it blame itself, turn it back on 
itself, compel it into a self-lacerative and resubordinative cast of 
introspection. Indeed, it seems that priestly asceticism may be regarded as 
46GOM: III, 18. 
47GOM: III, 18. 
48Nietzsche observes that the ascetic priest is not specific to Christianity: "consider how 
regularly and universally the ascetic priest appears in almost every age; he belongs to no 
one race; he prospers everywhere; he emerges from every class of society." GOM: III, 11. 
49GOM: III, 13. Emphasis in original. 
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the ultimate incarnation of the concept of victim precipitation. For our 
purposes, two related points regarding the relationship between feminism and 
ressentiment emerge in view of this strategy. The first point has to do with 
how we might reconsider the intra-feminist debate about feminism and the 
category 'victim,' particularly the popular incarnation of this debate 
examined in Part 1, in view of the role of asceticism in redirecting 
ressentiment. As against the idea that this debate represents a timely 
reckoning with outmoded and ineffectual dimensions of feminist politics, what 
I want to suggest is that this debate may instead be interpreted as a moment 
in feminist history when feminist ressentiment was turned back on itself, a 
moment in which those engaged in feminist politics were encouraged to 
entertain a self-lacerative cast of introspection. A moment, that is, in which 
the threat of feminist-led social change-intensified as feminist politics 
reckoned with its own exclusionary practices and sought not only to address 
issues of gender but of race, ethnicity, nationalism, sexuality, and ability-
had been deeply felt. 
Let us recall from Part 1 the main line of argument aired in the more 
publicly visible domain of this debate: that feminist radicalism must be 
countered owing to its having manufactured a false impression of the world as 
a place in which women continue to be systematically disadvantaged and, in 
disseminating this impression, its having produced the victims it would 
represent. The "false and brazen" words of the priest-'you yourself are to 
blame'-resound through this argument, and resound as well in the secular 
asceticisms called up in support of it: traditional rape law's regime ofvictim-
blame, which promises to stem feminism's tide of 'unworthy' victims, and 
neoliberal individualism, through which women's aggregate lower socio-
economic status can be explained as a failure to 'take responsibility' and, 
according to Naomi Wolfs formulation, a failure to develop an appropriate 
'psychology' of wealth. The priest is present too in this argument's re baptising 
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of the presiding hegemonic powers-liberalism and capitalism-as the true 
seats of freedom. This suggests that the accounts examined in Part 1 may be 
read not as attempts to break with what Hoff Sommers referred to as the 
"unwholesome passion" of resentment, but rather as an attempt to disarm it, 
to separate it from what it can do.so 
The second point which emerges in view of the operation of asceticism 
centres on the idea that Nietzsche's concept of ressentiment itself can be 
made to operate in a priestly fashion. In making this point I wish to 
illuminate a risk which attends the diagnostic use of the concept of 
ressentiment, as in the accounts examined in Part 2. I want to suggest that 
where Nietzsche's concept of ressentiment is employed diagnostically, and 
where such diagnosis upholds Nietzsche's condemnatory attitude toward 
ressentiment, a risk is introduced whereby the concept of ressentiment may be 
lent the capacity to induce in the object of diagnosis precisely the form of 
disarming, self-surveillant, self-lacerative introspection Nietzsche associates 
with priestly asceticism. Emancipatory political movements are vulnerable 
to this inducement given that self-loathing and self-blame are typically 
constitutive elements of unfreedom. Such movements require clearly drawn 
distinctions between productive reflexivity and resubordinative self-blame, 
distinctions which remain unarticulated in the accounts of feminist 
ressentiment we examined. 
To flesh out this idea of the concept of ressentiment operating in a priestly 
fashion, I want to offer a rather extreme but especially clear example, drawn 
from Max Scheler's work on res sentiment. Scheler's work is useful in 
illuminating a sociological approach to ressentiment, but troubling for its 
intense conservatism. Scheler notes that ressentiment is "chiefly confined to 
50Hoff Sommers, Who Stole Feminism?, 21. 
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those who serve and are dominated", those who "fruitlessly resent the sting of 
authority."51 Their resentment is "fruitless" because, according to Scheler: 
... it is false to interpret legal inequality as the imperfect expression of 
an underlying ideal of equal rights, which is perverted by factual 
power relations. Quite on the contrary, every factual legal equality 
conceals a basis of inequality of rightful claims which is founded on 
the unchangeable natural difference between "slaves" and "free 
men".52 
For Scheler, those who serve and are dominated become vulnerable to the 
"inner venom of ressentiment" when they harbour thoughts of resistance. 53 To 
prevent being engulfed by ressentiment, Scheler advises, the dominated must 
vent their spleen, but this venting must assume a particular form. In the 
case of the "ill-treated servant", for example, rather than assume the form of 
publicly dissonant speech which openly reckons with the master, the servant 
must "vent his spleen in the antechamber" (as distinct from the parlour).54 
This way, ressentiment can be bypassed and the natural order of things 
maintained. Like the priest, Scheler aims to 'redirect' the unruly affective 
forces emanating from the dominated. But where the priest induces obedience 
by introducing the prospect of guilt before god and by presenting disobedience 
as a path to damnation, Scheler aims to induce obedience by introducing the 
prospect of guilt before nature and by presenting disobedience as a path to 
ressentiment-which, he insists, is "incurable".55 Hence the concept of 
ressentiment itself is made to assume the role that the concept of 'sin' plays in 
priestly asceticism, thus producing a second order asceticism which proceeds 
diagnostically. 
51Max Scheler, Ressentiment, 31. 
52Ihid., 102. 
53Ibid., 31. 
54Ibid., 31. Richard Ira Sugarman also draws attention to this moment in Scheler's 
account, Rancor Against Time, 40. 
55Max Scheler, Ressentiment, 6. 
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In the context of Scheler's study, radical bids for emancipation are 
conceived of as roads to ressentiment, meaning that he uses the concept of 
ressentiment to delegitimate in advance the publicly voiced complaints of 
those whose lives are in large part and in non-trivial ways determined by the 
wills of others. Although published in 1915, Scheler's account echoes 
contemporary claims which cast radical political postures as outside the 
purview of public reason in being governed by negative emotions which ought 
to be vented privately. Examples include the claim that protestations of 
economic inequality are animated by the 'politics of envy,'56 that feminism is 
ultimately an exercise in 'man-hating,' that anti-racism asks for the inversely 
racist 'special treatment' of non-white persons, and that 'political correctness' 
is an exercise in unjustified sanctimony. Current trends in international 
political discourse serve to provide further examples of this. In a recent BBC 
interview, Britain's State Secretary for Trade and Industry claimed that 
refugee camps host "swarms" of "discontented, resentful people" and, as 
such, are "hotbeds for terrorism".57 With this comment, the sources of 
resentment-poverty, displacement, dispossession, grief-are effectively 
obscured while fear of the resentful is encouraged and actions which may be 
regarded as motivated by resentment are lent advance delegitimation-in 
this case as part of an argument for state terrorism, for the Secretary was 
defending the United States congress decision to permit its president to 
engage an act of war in the absence of a United Nations mandate. 
56This formed an important theme in Australian Prime Minister John Howard's electoral 
campaign in 1998, from which this phrase 'politics of envy' is drawn. In one of the more 
memorable media moments of this campaign, Howard mistook the price tag on a Land 
Rover as the total cost of the vehicle rather than the minimum deposit required to buy 
it. The apparantly cheap price provided Howard with occasion to impugn the 'politics of 
envy' animating the claim that his government's neoliberal economic policy drive had 
precipitated a rise in the cost of living and increased economic inequality. With the 
cameras of every major Australian mass media outlet rolling, Howard argued that, as 
the price of the Land Rover evinced, the good life was available to all hard-working 
Australians. He stood by his point when later informed of the actual price of the vehicle. 
57BBC Interview, February 5, 2003. 
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It is clear that a very different set of political sensibilities to those of 
Scheler attend the accounts of feminist ressentiment examined in Part 2. I do 
not claim that those accounts rehearse the moves Scheler makes. Rather, in 
illuminating these moves, I offer the more narrow point that one risks trading 
on this second-order asceticism in setting ressentiment up as an essentially 
'undemocratic' mode of political expression, rendering it a kind of political 
damnation-a "dead end" as Cocks put it.58 According to the interpretation 
offered here, ressentiment is 'undemocratic,' but it is so only in the sense that 
it arises from and rails against democracy's failures. One of contemporary 
feminism's greatest strengths is its intelligence for auto-critique, and 
feminism does indeed require a political imagination reflexive enough to 
discern the ways in which emancipatory political projects entertain reactive, 
regressive and mimetic postures. But, as Nietzsche's account of asceticism 
indicates, self-blame can be just such a posture. For this reason I suggest 
that we assume critical distance from the notion that overcoming 
ressentiment involves 'taking responsibility,' and be equipped to discern the 
point at which resubordinative self-blame is 'rebaptised' in discourses of 
responsibility, including feminist ones. Perhaps what is required is a certain 
restlessness in blaming. Nietzsche identifies the concept of blame as one of 
the innovations of slave morality, and laments the grammar it imposes on 
human action. But for emancipatory purposes the key offering of the concept 
of blame is that it enables one to imagine self and world otherwise. We would 
do well to retain this imaginary while holding its resubordinative tendencies in 
check. 
58Cocks, 'Augustine, Nietzsche and Contemporary Body Politics,' 154. 
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6.3 Emasculation and the direction of ressentiment 
In this final section of the chapter, I wish to impose a qualification upon the 
positive reading of ressentiment offered in this part of the dissertation, and in 
so doing point out a further labour the concept of ressentiment might in future 
perform for feminist theory, a labour which pertains to theorising violence 
against women. So far I have not drawn attention to the role gendered 
metaphorics play in Nietzsche's account of ressentiment, but these 
metaphorics form the backdrop for the point I wish to make here. By 
'gendered metaphorics' I refer in this case to Nietzsche's conception of 
ressentiment as a form of emasculation, a conception made explicit when he 
describes ressentiment as a "shameful emasculation of feeling".59 Deleuze 
reasserts this characterisation when he ascribes to ressentiment a "dreadful 
feminine power".60 It appears that part of Nietzsche's objection to 
ressentiment is that it feminises 'man' and, as such, threatens to close the 
distance between the sexes-an objection which of course relies on a reified 
representation of women as the 'weaker sex'. It also appears that Nietzsche's 
account of the struggle between master and slave contains a particular and 
perhaps peculiarly modern narrative of masculinity, and may in part be read 
as a story about the dynamics of gender relations among men, no less than as 
a highly useful account of the dynamics of power which illuminates key 
aspects of the exercise of rule and the circumstance of being ruled. 61 
When introducing Nietzsche's Genealogy at the beginning of Chapter 5, I 
noted that part of the drama of this text is that it places moderns as the heirs 
of slave morality, cut off from the masterful ancients and left to consider 
59GOM: III, 14. 
60Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 119. 
61 I draw this notion of 'gender relations among men' from R. W. Connell's arguments 
regarding the operations of hegemonic masculinity in his book Masculinities (Sydney: 
Allen & Unwin, 1995), see especially Chapter 3, 67-86. 
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whether and how this chasm may be breached. Let us now briefly consider 
the extent to which this circumstance may be regarded as sexually specific. 
In the Genealogy's drama modernity is cast as a time in which the "good man" 
holds the "man in man" to ransom, making the generation of a "man who will 
justify man" ever less likely.62 Through the workings of ressentiment as an 
instrument of culture, the consummate masculinity of the original nobles has 
been eroded, its signature capacities for evaluative autarchy and spontaneity 
of action thwarted by slavish logics. This form of masculinity was never 
available to all men. On the contrary, through its exercise as a mode of form-
imposing rule, a majority of men are enslaved, made "impotent", separated 
from what they can do, made to occupy a starting position of emasculate 
weakness. According to the terms set out in the Genealogy, slave revolt 
serves to generalise this condition of emasculation, and as such has served to 
generate a democratic political culture which exhibits "unmanly 
tenderness". 63 
In other words, a strand of Nietzsche's telling sees the dynamics which 
unfold between master and slave encompass a process of emasculation and 
counter-emasculation, a process in which the ressentiment of the slaves 
appears as an expression and an effect of emasculation which threatens to 
emasculate in turn. These gendered metaphorics inform the Genealogy's task 
to observe and present a dilemma regarding how a "man who justifies man" 
will find conditions of possibility given the emasculated state of modern man, 
a state in which "maggot man" prevails.64 Let us register the discernible 
rapport between this dilemma and the circumstance into which Dostoevsky 
62It is worth noting that, in BGE, Nietzsche casts the fight for women's rights as an effect 
of this condition of masculine decadence: "That woman ventures forth when the aspect of 
man that inspires fear-let us say more precisely, when the man in man is no longer 
desired or cultivated-that is fair enough, also comprehensible enough." BGE: 339. 
63BGE: 202. 
64GOM: I, 11. 
RESSENTIMENT REDIRECTED 374 
casts the anti-hero of Crime and Punishment. Raskolnikov "wanted to be a 
Napolean", but came to realise that positing this very desire extended 
irrevocably the distance between he and that famed 'man of action'.65 
According to Dostoevsky's narrative formulation, the desire to be a man of 
action not only is insufficient for shoring up a Napoleonic aura. Harbouring 
this desire itself signifies that one will not be a man of action, for the latter 
does not deliberate but rather acts. Nietzsohe and Dostoevsky jointly pose 
this as a signature problem for the fortunes of masculinity in modernity.66 
This cursory sketch of the relationship between masculinity, 
emasculation and ressentiment provides a useful backdrop for considering 
feminist Nietzsche scholar Maudmarie Clark's first thoughts on why 
Nietzsche should be recognised as a "resource for feminist analysis": "his 
analysis of resentment should be useful to feminists for understanding much 
of what has been said and done against women."67 Clark is suggesting that 
Nietzsche's concept of ressentiment can be used to explain the dynamics of 
misogyny.68 When set against the backdrop of the gendered metaphorics of 
Nietzsche's account, Clark's point enables us to consider the idea that 
violence against women plays a key role in attempts to close the distance 
between men and ideal types of masculinity, and to preserve the distance 
65As Raskolnikov confesses to Sonya, "If I worried for so long about whether Napolean 
would have done it or not, it must be because I felt clearly that I was not a N apolean." 
Fyodor Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, trans. Jessie Coulson (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995 [originally published 1866]), 401. The deed Raskolnikov refers to 
is his murder of the money lender. Raskolnikov also murders her sister on account of the 
latter's accidental witnessing of the crime. 
66The dossier on Nietzsche's encounter with Dostoevsky's work, which he began to read 
while still working on the Genealogy, includes his Letter to Overbeck, The Portable 
Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (London: Penguin, 1982), 454-455 and his 
reference to Dostoevsky as "the only psychologist ... from whom I had anything to learn" 
in TI: 45. 
67Maudmarie Clark, 'Nietzsche's Misogyny,' International Studies in Philosophy Vol., 
XXVI, No. 3 (1994): 3. 
68Penelope Deutscher also suggests that misogyny be read as a form of ressentiment, "Is it 
not remarkable that Nietzsche ... should have hated Rousseau?", 178. In making this 
point Deutscher draws attention to Nietzsche's own impugnation of misogyny in D: IV, 
346. 
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between 'men' and 'women'. In other words, a further modality in the direction 
of ressentiment can be discerned here, a modality which sees the ressentiments 
which attend emasculation directed at women rather than toward 
constructive transformation of their source: relations of power among men. 
In questioning Nietzsche's condemnatory attitude toward ressentiment I 
have sought to press against the idea that ressentiment should be regarded as 
'bad.' I do accept, however, that ressentiment is 'bad' when it accepts an 
ersatz object upon which to spend its anger and redistribute its pain-that is, 
when it is diverted from the task of constructively transforming the 
conditions under which it has been produced. This qualification delivers in turn 
a suggestion regarding a further labour the concept of ressentiment might 
perform for feminist theory. The suggestion is that this notion of a 
ressentiment redirected toward an ersatz object has explanatory power for 
feminist theorisations of male violence.69 This is why an epigraph from 
Joyce's Dubliners appears at the beginning of this chapter. Mr Farrington, 
the character whose emotional barometer is "set for a spell of riot", 
experiences severe humiliation at the hands of his rank-pulling boss. Lacking 
alternatives, and lacking the imagination for alternatives, Farrington spends 
his rage in the private sphere, where his wife and sons act, to recall 
Nietzsche's phrase, as "drainage ditches" for his affects.70 Farrington, in 
short, suffered an intensely emasculating experience, and sought to restore 
his sense of masculinity by perpetrating violence upon those whom he was 
free to dominate, upon those marked as even more powerless than he. 
If this suggestion is right, then we can discern a second sense in which 
feminism works 'against' ressentiment. Firstly, as I have argued, in a general 
69Lynne Segal's discussion of male violence suggests that this kind of redistributive 
manoeuvre is a key dynamic, Slow Motion: changing masculinities, changing men 
(London: Virago Press, 1990), 207-271. 
70BGE: 260. 
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sense feminism works against ressentiment to the extent that ressentiment is 
a political force which always works against itself when it seeks at best to 
force change upon the configurations of power which condition its production. 
The 'aim' of ressentiment is to transform the conditions under which it is 
produced. Secondly, in view of the connection drawn here between 
masculinity, violence and the redirection of ressentiment, we can discern that 
a more particular line of feminist movement proceeds against ressentiment as 
it is produced within gender relations among men, and as it is vented 'outside' 
of these relations. 
Conclusion 
The critical re-reading of the concept of ressentiment I have offered has sought 
to demonstrate that this concept does indeed aid our understanding of 
feminist politics, but that this understanding need not proceed along the lines 
of negative intra-feminist diagnosis, nor shore up a jettisoning of ressentiment 
as its goal. In the Genealogy, Nietzsche spends his praise on the noble and, in 
a more conflicted manner, the ascetic priest, reserving his spleen for the 
slave. But once we look behind this ostensibly stable Pro and Con and take in 
the full view of Nietzsche's account of the dynamic struggle between master 
and slave, we can see that, if it manages to remain shameless, ressentiment is 
an affective venue which can enable the relatively powerless to craft the very 
kind of positive political capacity that Brown's account of feminist 
ressentiment beckons: the capacity to "conjure an imagined future of power to 
make itself."71 On my reading, this process does indeed centrally involve the 
category 'victim,' but does so in a manner which situates this category not as 
an end in itself, but as a vehicle through which socio-political being may be 
71Brown, States of Injury, 66. 
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opened to contingency. In this sense, the category 'victim' may be regarded 
not as inimical to agency, but as a source of agency. 
By Nietzsche's own account, ressentiment represents the slave's potential 
passage out of the social fate assigned to him, and in this sense may be 
interpreted as an effect of domination which can become an effective weapon 
against domination. In view of this, overcoming ressentiment most certainly 
should be feminism's goal, but such overcoming should not be construed as a 
matter of switching political strategies so as to locate a feminism that is 
'without ressentiment'. Overcoming ressentiment requires the perhaps less 
enticing and certainly more arduous task of redressing those configurations of 
power which incite noncreative ressentiment most powerfully. This in turn 
entails discerning how best to direct ressentiment, how best to keep it 
creative, enervated, courageous, imaginative and productively reflexive, how 
best to resist those who would contain it and, given that political struggle is 
not the chosen life work of all, how to judge when to broker compromises that 
will not eclipse the ability to envisage a time when neither feminism nor its 
particular repertoire of ressentiments will be needed. 
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